OBJECTIVE
The judicial authorities should send to prison only those men and women who have committed such serious offences that imprisonment is the only reasonable punishment or those from whom the public must be protected. The objective of this chapter is to show that, within that context, prison staff have a clear responsibility to protect the pub-lic by ensuring that prisoners do not escape from lawful custody.
ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES
Use of force, including use of firearms, to prevent escape should be employed only when less extreme means are insufficient to prevent the escape.
Restraints may be used as a precaution against escape during transfer for no longer than strictly necessary, provided that they are removed when the prisoner appears before a judge or administrative authority, or on medical grounds.
Instruments of restraint shall never be applied as a punishment.
Chains and irons shall not be used as restraints.
These principles should be presented visually and remain on display throughout the session.
BASIS IN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS Exercise:
Using the Compilation of Instruments, the trainees should work in pairs in order to dis-cover the basis for each of these principles.
They should be asked to report back.
IMPLICATIONS
The important elements are the different levels of security and the concept of “dynamic security”.
When presenting this section, it is necessary to encourage comment and questions from the trainees in order to assure yourself that the ideas have been thoroughly aired, un-derstood and accepted.
It may be that this is a very different way of doing things for some prison staff and they may be resistant to, or even threatened by, the ideas.
PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
These practical suggestions simplify the task that must be done to ensure recognition and implementation of the instruments. Encourage comment and understanding.
TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION
A list of topics is provided in the Manual.
Methodology:
The trainees should be divided into small groups for discussion. Each group should be given two topics.
A reporting back session should be scheduled at the end of the allotted time. It would be helpful if facilitators could move around the groups, ensuring the quality and rele-vance of the discussions.
Points to be highlighted/suggested areas for discussion:
39. – Not all prisoners present the same level of risk of escape or of danger to the public should they escape;
39. – Security is not just high walls and bars;
39. – Security is everyone’s job;
39. – Daily engagement with prisoners is the best method of security;
39. – Prison staff must be trained and supported to work with prisoners in this way;
39. – It is easy to fall into bad habits when working with prisoners because they can be extremely difficult to deal with;
39. – Constant referral to the instruments is recommended to ensure correct handling of prisoners, especially the more difficult;
39. – How important is it to have external, independent scrutiny of prisons?;
39. – Prisons are rarely newsworthy unless something extreme happens. Prison staff should take every opportunity to present the work of the prison service in a professional light, i.e. as an organization run according to rules and regulations and by trained staff;
39. – The public are more likely to accept the explanations and advice of such an organization when it talks about security needs;
39. – Senior prison staff must take responsibility for ensuring the correct implementation of the international instruments, e.g. as regards the use of restraints.
CASE STUDIES Methodology:
Round-table discussions using expert practitioners from the training team together with volunteer trainees are recommended.
After each case study has been successfully dealt with, in the judgement of the trainer, different trainees should be invited to take part.
The trainer must control the amount of time spent on this exercise to ensure that all the cases are discussed.
Points to be highlighted/suggested areas for discussion:
CASE STUDY 1
39. – The international instruments ask us to consider three criteria when assessing levels of security for individual prisoners:
39. – The threat to the public should they escape;
39. – The likelihood of escape;
39. – The resources available to assist in an escape;
39. – The first prisoner’s problem is probably alcohol abuse. Without a previous record and with no known contact with the criminal underworld, he is unlikely to prove a serious security risk;
39. – The second prisoner is a long-term drug addict; he is likely to be prepared to do anything to obtain the drugs he wants. He is likely to be a nuisance, possibly a danger to the public, but unlikely to have access to resources. Drug dependence treatment would be an example of dynamic security;
39. – The third prisoner is unlikely to be a danger to the public but he is likely to want to escape and to have the contacts that could assist in this.
CASE STUDY 2
39. – The authorities must listen to the information from the junior member of staff;
39. – They must consider the risk according to the instruments and take the security measures required;
39. – They have to consider dealing with an attempted exchange of prisoners on the approaching day of release, escape equipment coming in during the visit, plans being discussed during the visit, and the possibility that this is a smokescreen for an attempted escape elsewhere;
39. – They must take account of intelligence coming in from other members of staff working daily with prisoners.
CASE STUDY 3
39. – Dynamic security is the best preventive measure to avoid dangerous prisoners escaping;
39. – Junior staff should be trained to mix with prisoners, getting to know them and assessing any possible risk of escape;
39. – Keep prisoners busy in useful activities;
39. – Staff in daily contact with prisoners may be rotated and appropriately coached by senior staff.