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234. These assessments of the overall physical and financial implementation are summarised as

medi^ef'afand good "^ ****^^ ^ them 3'three 'eVe'S °f Performance

Table 4.31

235. There was some confusion on resource mobilization which led undoubtedly to the fact that real resources were not indicated although the term "mobilization" referred only to the external resources obtained. It is very unlikely that for projects above m$100 no local funding was forthcoming. In this evaluation exercise, physical implementation seems to best reflect the efforts made by the various stakeholders as well as the subregiona! and regional distribution.

236. Finally, 466 projects were partly or fully implemented at a total cost of about m$14, 164.15 which is about 20 per cent more than the initial cost of all the projects. The funds mobilized for this purpose amounted m$9,005.51 that is 71 per cent of the envisaged funding (m$12 745) at the beginning of the Decade (see Table 4.1). Funds obtained in 1991 amounted to m$2,096.45, funds mobilized during the Decade was m$6,909.06 which was about 65 per cent of the remainder to be secured (see Table 4.1). This is considered a good performance. It is therefore no exaggeration to state that the implementation of the Decade programme was a success as about 70 per cent of the projects were implemented together with the mobilization of about 71 per cent of the envisaged resources.

237. A comparison with the figures in Table 4.2 shows that the number of projects fully or partly implemented rose from 295 to 466, an increase of about 58 per cent and the funds mobilized rose from m$5,598.5 to m$9,005.51, an increase of 61 percent. This brings the increase to 97 per cent if account is taken of funds mobilized during the Decade excluding the funds available at the time the Decade was launched. These results pertaining to the physical and financial implementation confirm that project implementation was accelerated from 1997.

238. Graph 4.14 below provides a summary of the physical and financial implementation of Decade projects.

Graphiaue/Diaaram 4.14

Execution physique et financiere des proiets du programme de la "Decennie"

Financial and physical implementation of " Decade programme projects"

A) Execution physique de tous les 708 Projets/

Physical implementation of all 708 projects

29%

16%

49%

BEfC 354

BPE/PI 112

□ NEflMI 202

□ A/A 40

B) Projets totalement ou partiellement executes / Totally or partially implemented projects

B. 1. Execution physique des 466 Projets/

Physical implementation of 466 projects

29%

71%

H Transports 331

a Communications 135

i

mm

iifflii

fSSm

40.00%

0.00%

9

y

/ I

HfU 401 mom

SritSm 33

>

1

I

12%

-19%

25%

HCE HES

aNR OSA

58 87

37 116

■WE 115 EIRE 53

B.2 Execution physique des 466 Projets par modes/

Physical implementation of 466 projects by modes

*- ' ','-'&.&%*

?Q.OWo

10.00%

L

y

s

y

m

_. _ I

RRT 150 32.n%

RWT 55 11.60%

AIT 54 11.59%

MST 25

MPT 21

4.51%:

0.

£*

^—

iWT iJRT

$

& '. TEC

I 1

P

l".'1.111.111.^1 ■.'■.■'■1.1.1. ^.■■".'""."""■i-yv^sfinKswiwsft

#« l iSllii

Transport Transport

19%

"*-*■■» -.

^ /■' .

81%

B.3. Execution financlere (9005.51M$)/

Financial Implementation (9005.51M$)

E3 Transports 7290.59MJ

a Communications 714.92MJ

25% 20%

EICE 288.13MJ BES 1809.10MJ DNR 1868.34M$

DSA 2701.38M?

■ WE 2213.27MJ mRE 125.29WS

21%

V. Problems and Difficulties Encountered During the Implementation of the

Decade Programme

239. A review of the various reports indicates that the problems and difficulties encountered in the implementation of the Decade programme had a significant impact on its implementation.

These difficulties could be grouped into 5 categories namely : the lack of financial resources, the regulatory and institutional management environment, natural disasters, political and social environment and the programme monitoring in environment.

Programme Financing

240. Stakeholders considered the lack of resources as an essential factor affecting in the programme implementation. Many projects which failed to attract donor interest were not implemented. On review, this assertion should be qualified. In the first place, the primary responsibility lay with national governments which also contribut to the programmes of those organizations to which they belong. It seems that all the projects that were accorded priority received funding. It is very difficult to understand how priority projects costing less than $500,000 can fail to secure local or external funding only a period of ten years.

241. Project quality in terms of cost/advantages or cost/efficiency as well as design and priority seems to have beem affected primarily from inadequate funding from the documentation made available. A number of projects were modified both in their objective and scope and this serves to confirm the tow level of preparatory work for the projects or indeed, the divergence in their

objectives with that of the principal objectives of the Decade programme.

242. The Institutional, Regulatory and Management Environment. Administrative practices also had an impact on programme implementation. The time it took to decide - on say telecommunications projects made them obsolete due to the speed of technological changes.

Consequently, they lost importance and were replaced by other projects which could not have been included in the programme since the appropriate organs of the Decade were no longer operating from 1995.

243. Rigid regulations and resistance to change also account for the delay in the entry into force of international conventions to improve multimoda! transport. The lack of qualified personnel either through lack of training or the lack or delay in technology transfer were also drawbacks in project management as well as in the creation of appropriate conditions for adequate project preparation and marketing in African countries and in the developed countries.

244. The impact of structural adjustment programmes concluded with their financial partners was also noted. This impact is reflected (1) by the setting aside of projects considered inappropriate for Governments' intervention or projects which were not considered priority in the programme concluded by joint agreement (ii) by the restructuring of public enterprises in which the new partners froze some projects because they were not in consonance with modern techniques in public enterprise management.

245. Natural disasters floods and hurricanes, in some countries like Mozambique and Madagascar, floods and hurricanes occurred and the scope of those disasters had a severe impact on the implementation of the Decade programme either because work stoppage was prolonged and some projects nearly completion were resumed or the investment priorities were changed to

cope with material damages or meet other emergencies arising from these disasters.

246. Political and Social Environment. During the Decade, social and political upheavals took place in many countries notably Angola, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda and Somalia. These events led to political instability and their scope often placed development programmes on hold for all other activities that were not essential for the reestablishment of stability and security in the countries concerned.

247. Finally, the monitoring mechanisms for programme implementation were not operational due to lack of funds. Each stakeholder pursued their own project implementation priorities. Not only did this detract from the priority programmes of the Decade as priority programmes of the Decade should have had but it also sapped the cohesion of the various integration activities which should have pursued in a manner best suited attaining their objectives.

This demonstrates, undoubtedly, why the implementation of subregional and regional projects compared so poorly with country projects implementation.

Vi. Final Observations

248. Following the review of programme implementation and the difficulties and problems encountered, it would appear that some of the problems were already obvious at the launching of the Decade programme.

249. First of all, the misconception of the Decade as a source of financing was not dispelled even by the observations made after the two earlier mid-term evaluations. So pervasive is this idea that during the current evaluation, some countries and organization failed to report on their project implementation for the mere reason that the projects were not financed within the framework of the Decade.

250. These was also weaknesses in the projects selected for inclusion in the programme. It should be recalled that out of 708 projects, 669 projects, more than 90 per cent were approved before the launching of the Decade programme. These projects did not follow the required procedures which had yet to be formally adopted. It was clear that many of these projects introduced were obviously not priority projects (see paragraph 211 of the report on the first mid term review) for one thing and did not further the Decade objectives for another. Nor were they adequately designed to attract donor interest by way of compliance with their funding rules and regulations. This situation is confirmed by the modifications that took place in the aim, scope, the establishment as well as the cost estimates of projects.

251. The Decade was also too long a time for a project approved at its beginning to remain current throughout the period considering the rapid change in technology and the impact of globalization which appeared at the beginning of the Decade, particularly in communications and

some transport subsectors.

252. The Decade programme should have been prepared to incorporate the following concerns:

■ Policy reforms should have constituted the backbone of the programme ; the launching of the programme should merely have provided guidelines on procedures for project preparation and eventual selection.

■ Project approval should have been conditioned to the pursuit of policy reforms which could have facilitated their funding by reform advocates. Such approval could have been sequenced

to more in tandem with the reforms.

253 Projects should have focussed more on areas promoting subregional and regional integration in order to improve programme efficiency with the long-term objective of establishing an

integrated transport and communications system.

254 The commitment of the partners (States, organizations) should have been concretely reflected in their provision of regular reports, at least annual reports for effective monitoring by the responsible structures. The financing of these monitoring mechanisms should have started at the

time the programme was launched.

CHAPTER V

PROGRESS REPORT ON PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

?^ I" °I?err,t0 stren9then institutional capacity, a number of thematic programmes were

included in the Decade programme whose implementation aimed at increasing project impact for greater efficiency in the attainment of Decade objectives. These were the programmes:

(a) Human Resources and Institutional Development (HRID)

(b) Databank (c) Road Safety;

(d) The Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Programme (SSATP) (e) The Trans-African Highway programme;

(f) International Traffic Facilitation;

(g) The Yamoussoukro Declaration.

(a) Human Resources and Institutional Development (HRID) and Transport Data Bank 256. The implementation of these two programmes encountered various difficulties that more or

less affected their efficiency. The HRID programme came to an end after the implementation of the first phase with a funding of about m$1.95 and the preparation of a second phase The programme earned out 28 case studies for 7 subsectors (roads and road transport, ports, civil aviation, rail, maritime transport, inland water transport and telecommunications) and six (6) seminars. The second phase of the HRID programme was not financed due to coordination problems among a large number of participants at the initial financing as well as the way it was handled outside sectoral components. It did not, therefore, attain the expected results.

(b) Transport Databank.

257. Programme falls within objective 5 of the Decade programme aimed at establishing a transport and communications information system to serve as an analytical tool for the improvement of information, planning and management of information". The implementation was effective after a first phase involving a funding of m$0.8. The second phase did not take off due to the lack of funding. As a result, the recommendations of the seminar held in 1995 on the outcome of the first phase were not implemented. However, it should be pointed out that the follow-up missions despatched by ECA during 1997 in some pilot project countries (Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal) indicated that the changes in project personnel had a severe impact on the progress of

the projects.

(c) Road safety

258. The overall findings of the Third African Road Safety Congress organized by ECA, OECD and other collaborating agencies and held in South Africa in April 1997 showed that the road safety situation in Africa still posed a cause for concern. Despite the fact that the road sector has been and continues to dominate Africa's freight and passenger movements, it still remained by far the most hazardous and accident prone mode of land transport in Africa where efforts to combat the adverse effects are still minimum. The incidence and severity of road accidents is worse than in all other regions in the world. Comparative statistics showed the following:

(a) Global level

259. 500,000 persons die and 10 to 15 million persons are injured every year in road accidents throughout the world and approximately 70 per cent of these fatalities and injuries are experienced in developing countries. Analysis of accident occurrence between 1968 and 1990 showed an increase of 350 per cent in Africa, compared to a reversing trend in industrialized countries where car ownership per 1000 inhabitants has been estimated to be ten times higher on the average, than in our continent. Further analysis of global accident statistics indicates that the fatality rate per vehicle registered in African countries ranges from 8 to 50 times higher than in the industrialized world.

260. A recent analysis of the Global Burden of Disease, in assessing changes in the ranking order of disease burden for 15 leading causes in the world, shows that road traffic accidents ranked number 9 in 1990 will be number 3 in the year 2020. According to a Global Road Safety Partnership(GRSP) report, during the next 10 years alone, a total of around 6 million persons will die and over 60 millions will be crippled or injured as a result of road accidents in developing countries unless urgent action is taken to address this problem. The Global Health leaders (WHO and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) have specifically identified road accidents as a major public health problem and have urged that appropriate action

be taken.

(b) Regional level

261. Studies by several research institutions showed that road accidents were commonly the second highest cause of death for the 5 to 44 years age group in Africa. This should be seen in the light of the fact that approximately 50 per cent of the African population is below the age of sixteen.

Pedestrians and young road users have been identified as highly vulnerable groups. The economic cost to African countries accruing from road accidents has been estimated to approach two per cent of GNP, ($10 Billion) with a high foreign currency component for importing medicines, hospital equipment, vehicle spare parts, etc.

262. Growth in urbanization in Africa has reached 11 per cent and has resulted in serious implications for road safety. The proportion of accidents occurring in urban areas is very high with figures ranging from 80 to 90 per cent of the national totals. Accidents involving children under 15 years vary from 32 per cent in Addis Ababa to 40 per cent in Abidjan

263. A comparison of fatalities per million people to GNP/per capita and fatalities per 10 OOOvehicles to GNP per capita again demonstrates the severity of accidents in African countries.

While Malawi, Denmark, Germany and Canada in the early 1990s all had around 100 fatalities per million people, the fatality rate per 10 000 vehicles for Malawi was 100 times higher.

264. Analysis of fatality rates for the driver, passenger and pedestrian shows that the passengers and pedestrians are most vulnerable. This could be largely due to, in countries like Kenya and South Africa, the non-recognition and respect of regulations governing the Matatu, the Minibus and Taxi transport industries. In general, this appalling situation could, for passengers and pedestrians, be attributed to the level of car ownership, inadequate law enforcement and adjudication, human failure drivers and vehicle fitness and underdevelopment of the road environment;South African statistics related to traffic discipline showed that approximately 69 per cent of drivers exceed the speed limit in 60 km/hr speed zones, with approximately 28 per cent in 120 km/hr zones; an average of 37 per cent of front seat occupants of vehicles fall to wear seat

belts; approximately 7 per cent of all drivers are intoxicated during nighttime (compared to a normal figure of less than 0.5 per cent in some Australian States);

265. On the brighter side some countries have already taken steps to developing road safety action programmes. Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'lvoire, Egypt, Gabon, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia, South Africa and Zimbabwe are engaged in significant safety activities such as improved road designs, traffic engineering schemes in urban areas, highway legislation, traffic law enforcement, vehicle inspection maintenance, occupants' restraint measures, road safety training and education and post-accident assessment and assistance through donor assistance.

(d) Sub-Saharan Africa Transport Policy Programme (SSATP)

266. This programme was launched in 1987 as a joint initiative between the World Bank and EGA to improve transport sector performance through policy reforms and institutional changes.

The SSATP is based on the following premises:

(a) Policy reform is crucial for improvement of transport services;

(b) The countries as well as their development partners need to work closely within the framework of a common policy for the sector.

267. At the launching of the Conference held in Oslo in 1988, 11 component issues were selected which as implementation proceeded were reduced to 5 (five) major issues such as:

• Road Maintenance Initiative (RMI) for sustainable road network services which is a breakthrough in the organization and financing of road maintenance;

• Rural Travel and Transport Programme to provide low-cost, sustainable transport facilities and

services in the rural areas.

• Urban mobility for the improvement of urban transport services focussing on other issues such as traffic security, clean air initiative and non-motorized transport;

• Trade and Transport for the improvement of the competitiveness of African products on the regional and world markets with special emphasis on multimodal transport and trade

facilitation; and

• Railway restructuring for a sustainable, efficient and affordable rail transport system.

268. The activities of SSATP consisted of studies carried out by the staff of the World Bank and consultants and workshops, seminars and conferences organized in the region as well as financial support or technical assistance in the preparation of policy reforms and implementation. Three external audits were effected namely in 1995,1999 and 2001 on the programme.

269. Financing for the SSATP programme came from multilateral subsidies of the European Union, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank and bilateral agencies (Germany, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, USA, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland. From 1987 to 1999 about m$30.7 was mobilized. The 17 countries and the two subregionai organization which

undertook activities to attain the objectives of SSATP received an overall funding of m$15,8 that is more than 50 per cent of the resources provided by the donors.

270. On results, it has been acknowledged that SSATP is an international association facilitating transport reform policies and strengthening institutions in the transport sector. It is an innovative platform for African development partners to meet and exchange views and to sensitize the countries which are members through an exchange of experience as well as the dissemination of studies and technical documents. In addition to bringing about awareness and the strengthening of cooperation among the various partners, the implementation of SSATP with particular reference to:

RMI : has led to the establishment of a second-generation Road Fund Agency second generation and the marketing of road maintenance;

URBAN MOBILITY : policy commitment to reforms in nine countries (namely Senegal, Cote d'lvoire, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Cape Verde and Zimbabwe) and the establishment of a module for the training of municipal staff;

TRADE AND TRANSPORT: led to the reform of shippers' councils, the facilitation of transport and international trade through the implementation of the appropriate international

TRADE AND TRANSPORT: led to the reform of shippers' councils, the facilitation of transport and international trade through the implementation of the appropriate international