Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
mean sd min max
A: Men
Female Partner 0.52 0.51 0 1
Number of Boxes Collected in Risk Taking 38.74 12.46 10 66
Self-Reported Risk Taking 5.59 2.66 0 9
Self-Reported Competitiveness 6.80 2.36 1 10
N 44
B: Women
Female Partner 0.55 0.50 0 1
Number of Boxes Collected in Risk Taking 40.64 11.64 11 61
Self-Reported Risk Taking 4.45** 2.35 1 9
Self-Reported Competitiveness 5.36*** 2.68 0 10
N 47
T test for the Panel A and B mean comparison: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table A2: Performance, self-rank, and competition choices
Men Women
Task-1 performance 8.32 (0.58) 8.15 (0.45) Task-2 performance 10.43 0.60) 9.74 (0.47) Task-3 performance 10.91 (0.66) 10.51 (0.53) Task-4 performance 11.27 (0.61) 10.47 (0.47) Mean performance 10.23 (0.58) 9.72 (0.43) Self-rank in Task-2 1.34 (0.07) 1.47 (0.04) Competition chosen in Task-3 70% (0.07) 30% (0.07)***
Competition preferred in Task-4 70% (0.07) 28% (0.07)***
WTC in Task-4 2.11 (0.58) -1.39 (0.50)***
N 44 47
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. T test for the mean comparison for men versus women: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table A3: Performance, self-rank, and competition choices: gender composition
Male Partner Female Partner
Men Women Men Women
Task-1 performance 8.10 (0.95) 8.52 (0.56) 8.52 (0.71) 7.85 (0.69) Task-2 performance 10.62 (1.07) 9.57 (0.64) 10.26 (0.62) 9.88 (0.69) Task-3 performance 11.10 (1.13) 10.24 (0.59) 10.74 (0.75) 10.73 (0.85) Task-4 performance 11.24 (1.07) 10.52 (0.67) 11.30 (0.66) 0.42 (0.66) Mean performance 10.26 (1.02) 9.71 (0.53) 10.21 (0.62) 9.72 (0.65) Self-rank in Task-2 1.52 (0.11) 1.43 (0.11) 1.17 (0.08) 1.50 (0.10)***
Competition chosen in Task-3 67% (0.10) 29% (0.10)*** 74% (0.09) 31% (0.09)***
Competition preferred in Task-4 67% (0.11) 29% (0.10)*** 74% (0.09) 27% (0.09)***
WTC in Task-4 1.48 (0.81) -1.74 (0.67)*** 2.70 (0.82) -1.12 (0.73)***
N 21 21 23 26
Men Women
Male Partner Female Partner Male Partner Female Partner Task-1 performance 8.10 (0.95) 8.52 (0.71) 8.52 (0.56) 7.85 (0.69) Task-2 performance 10.62 (1.07) 10.26 (0.62) 9.57 (0.64) 9.88 (0.69) Task-3 performance 11.10 (1.13) 10.74 (0.75) 10.24 (0.59) 10.73 (0.85) Task-4 performance 11.24 (1.07) 11.30 (0.66) 10.52 (0.67) 0.42 (0.66) Mean performance 10.26 (1.02) 10.21 (0.62) 9.71 (0.53) 9.72 (0.65) Self-rank in Task-2 1.52 (0.11) 1.17 (0.08)*** 1.43 (0.11) 1.50 (0.10) Competition chosen in Task-3 67% (0.10) 74% (0.09) 29% (0.10) 31% (0.09) Competition preferred in Task-4 67% (0.11) 74% (0.09) 29% (0.10) 27% (0.09) WTC in Task-4 1.48 (0.81) 2.70 (0.82) -1.74 (0.67) -1.12 (0.73)
N 21 23 21 26
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. T test for the mean comparison for men versus women and those with a male partner versus a female partner: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table A4: Choosing to compete in task-3: probit
(1) (2) (3)
Female subject -1.023*** -0.816 -0.781
(0.34) (0.51) (0.50)
Female partner 0.376 0.449
(0.53) (0.49) Female subject × female partner -0.387 -0.472 (0.74) (0.70)
Task-2 performance 0.139* 0.145* 0.156**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Improved Performance 0.052 0.054 0.052
(between task-1 and task-2) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Task-2 self-rank 0.259 0.146
(first=1, second=0) (0.38) (0.41)
Risk preference 0.360*** 0.372*** 0.379***
(self reported) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Constant -2.923*** -3.174*** -3.259***
(0.84) (0.92) (0.89)
N 91 91 91
chi2 54.133 54.644 54.519
Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significant levels are: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p
<0.01
Table A5: Willingness to compete in task-4: OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Female subject -2.427*** -1.937** -1.891**
(0.64) (0.96) (0.94)
Female partner 1.535 1.617*
(0.94) (0.89) Female subject × female partner -0.958 -1.059 (1.31) (1.25) Task-2 performance 0.218** 0.239** 0.251***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Improved Performance -0.050 -0.041 -0.041
(between task-1 and task-2) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Task-2 self-rank 0.561 0.210
(first=1, second=0) (0.72) (0.76)
Risk preference 0.773*** 0.802*** 0.812***
(self reported) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Constant -4.751*** -5.712*** -5.799***
(1.23) (1.36) (1.32)
N 91 91 91
r2 0.490 0.509 0.509
Standard errors reported in parentheses. Significant levels are: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p
<0.01
B Instructions
Screen 1
Good morning.
Thank you for participating to this experiment.
You are now taking part in an experiment in which you can earn betweene5 ande30. It is therefore important that you read the instructions carefully as they explain how your decisions will affect your earnings.
The main part of the experiment will consist of four tasks. For each task you will receive specific instructions.
These instructions will explain how you make decisions and how your decisions and the decisions of other participants influence your earnings. Therefore, it is important that you read the instructions carefully.
At the end of the experiment you will receive e5 for having completed the four tasks. In addition, we will randomly select one of the tasks and pay you based on your performance in that task. At the end of the experiment we determine which task counts for payment by drawing a number between 1 and 4.
You will also participate to a complementary task that will be paid too.
Your earnings will be expressed ine. They will be paid to you in private at the end of the experiment.
Interactions are strictly anonymous. No one other than the experimenter will be informed about your decisions in the experiment.
From now on you are not allowed to communicate in any other way than specified in the instructions. Stay focused: do not use cellular phones or personal computers; otherwise, you may be excluded from the experiment.
Please carefully read these instructions.
Should you have any questions, please raise your hand and call the administrator.
Screen 2
Your personal characteristics You are: a man / a women Your age: xx
Your education level : Bac+1, +2, +3, +4, +5, +6 or more
Screen 3
Task 1 – Piece Rate
For Task 1 you will be asked to calculate the sum of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers. Example:
28+17+81+78+74=?.
You will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of these problems.
You cannot use a calculator to determine this sum, however you are welcome to write the numbers down and make use of the provided scratch paper.
You submit an answer by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter an answer the computer will immediately tell you whether your answer is correct or not. Your answers to the problems are anonymous.
If Task 1 is the one randomly selected for payment, then you get 50 cents per problem you solve correctly in the 5 minutes. Your payment does not decrease if you provide an incorrect answer to a problem. We refer to this payment as the piece rate payment.
Please do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
Screen 4
Task 2 - Tournament
As in Task 1 you will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of five 2-digit numbers. You cannot use a calculator to determine this sum, however you are welcome to write the numbers down and make use of the provided scratch paper.
You submit an answer by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter an answer the computer will immediately tell you whether your answer is correct or not. Your answers to the problems are anonymous.
However for this task your payment depends on your performance relative to that of another participant, selected at random among the participants present in this room. You will be informed about his/her personal characteristics (gender, age, education level), and he/she will be informed about your personal characteristics, before the beginning of the task.
If Task 2 is the one randomly selected for payment, then your earnings depend on the number of problems you solve compared to your partner. The individual who correctly solves the largest number of problems will receive e1.00 per correct problem, while the other participant receives no payment. We refer to this as the tournament payment.
You will not be informed of how you did in the tournament until the end of the session.
If there are ties, the winner will be randomly determined. Please do not talk with one another. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
Screen 5
Personal characteristics of your partner
From now on, you will be paired with this person. His/her personal characteristics are:
A man / a women Age: xx
Education level : xx Screen 6
Task 3 – Choice of payment system
As in the previous two tasks, you will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of five 2-digit numbers. You cannot use a calculator to determine this sum, however you are welcome to write the numbers down and make use of the provided scratch paper.
You submit an answer by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter an answer the computer will immediately tell you whether your answer is correct or not. Your answers to the problems are anonymous.
This time you can chose the compensation you want to have applied to this task: either “piece rate” or “tour-nament”.
In the piece rate, you will receivee0.50 per problem solved correctly.
In the tournament, your performance will be evaluated relative to the performance of your partner in the Task 2 -tournament. The Task 2-tournament is the one you just completed. If you correctly solve more problems than your partner did in Task 2, then you receive two times the payment from the piece rate, which is e1.00 per correct problem. You will receive no earnings for this task under the tournament scheme if do not solve more problems correctly now, than your partner did in the Task-2 tournament.
You will not be informed of how you did in the tournament until the end of the session.
If there are ties, the winner will be randomly determined.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
Screen 7
Task 4 - Choice of payment system (II)
As in the previous three tasks, you will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of five 2-digit numbers. You cannot use a calculator to determine this sum, however you are welcome to write the numbers down and make use of the provided scratch paper.
You submit an answer by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter an answer the computer will immediately tell you whether your answer is correct or not. Your answers to the problems are anonymous.
As in the task 3, the compensation scheme can be piece rate or tournament. In the piece rate, you will receive e0.50 per problem solved correctly.
In the tournament, your performance will be evaluated relative to the performance of your partner in the Task 2 -tournament. The Task 2-tournament is the one you just completed. If you correctly solve more problems than your partner did in Task 2, then you receive two times the payment from the piece rate, which is e1.00 per correct
problem. You will receive no earnings for this task under the tournament scheme if do not solve more problems correctly now, than your partner did in the Task-2 tournament.
We now invite you to think which of the two compensation systems is your preferred one. Suppose you can execute the task 4 and be compensated according to your preferred system. Is there a sum of money against you accept to renounce to this payment scheme and be compensated according to the other one ?
You will be allowed to indicate us your choices by means of a dynamic table with two columns and multiple rows. On a row you can chose between Option A – your payoff is the piece rate compensation plus a fixed amount of money a, and Option B - your payoff is the tournament compensation plus a fixed amount of money b. If this option is selected, this fixed amount (aorb) will be paid to you regardless of your performance in the execution of the task. On each row, the text in green indicates that the option is preferred to the option with the text in black.
The amounts (a, b) vary betweene0.00 ande6.00 by increments ofe0.50.
By placing the slider around the middle row in the table (the original position of the slider), you are indicating that you don’t have a very strong preference between the Piece-rate or the Tournament compensation in executing the Task. By moving the slider up, you are indicating a stronger preference for the Tournament (you require a higher compensation if you had to play the Piece rate) and by moving the slider down, you are indicating a stronger preference for the Piece rate compensation (you require a higher compensation if you had to play the tournament).
Once that you expressed your preferences by positioning the slider, the computer will draw at random one of the rows in the table. You will be assigned to your preferred option (text in green) on that row in executing Task 4.
If at the end of the experiment Task 4 will be selected for payment, you will be compensated according to your performance in the task plus the fixed amount specified in that row.
As said, you will be asked to answer to such questions regarding your own choice, by using a dynamic table with two columns and multiple rows.
Screens 8-9
Two examples of how the slider works, about a hypothetical individual. In case of wrong answer subjects can retry once, then the Administrator will come and explain.
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
Screen 10
The subject indicates his preference on a Table (see main text for the table) by moving the slider up/down, than validates his/her choice.
The computer draws a row, and the subject is informed about the system of remuneration that will be applied to him/her in task 4.
Screen 11
The first part of the experiment is over now. Before moving to part two, please make a guess about you rank in the task-2 tournament. You will be paide1.00 for a correct answer.
Your rank in Task 2 was: first / second
Screen 12
The box collecting task
On the PC screen you will see a field composed of 100 numbered boxes.
You earn 20 cents for every box that is collected. Every second, a box is collected, starting from the top left corner. Once collected, the box disappears from the screen, and your earnings are updated accordingly. At any moment you can see the amount earned up to that point.
Such earnings are only potential, however, because behind one of these boxes a time bomb is hidden that destroys everything that has been collected. You do not know where the time bomb is. You only know that it can be in any place with equal probability. Moreover, even if you collect the bomb, you will not know it until the end of the experiment. Your task is to choose when to stop the collecting process. You do so by hitting ’Stop’ at any time.
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly determine the number of the box containing the time bomb by means of a bag containing 100 numbered tokens.
If you happen to have collected the box in which the time bomb is located, you will earn zero. If the time bomb is located in a box that you did not collect, you will earn the amount of money accumulated when hitting ’Stop’.
We will start with a practice round. After that, the paying experiment starts.
Screen 13.
Survey
1. How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?
0 [unwilling to take risks] ——— 10 [fully prepared to take risks]
2. How do you see yourself? Do you like to compete, or your rather prefer to avoid competition?
0 [I do not like to compete at all] ——— 10 [I really enjoy to compete]
Screen 14.
Do you remember the gender of your partner? yes/no if yes: ->His/her gender was: male/female
Screen 14.
Results and payoff The experiment is over now.
Your performance in Task 1:
Your performance in Task 2: number of correct answers [] and rank []
Your performance in Task 3: number of correct answers [] and compensation scheme []
Your performance in Task 4: number of correct answers [] and compensation scheme []. The fixed amount [].
The task selected for payment was [].
Your earnings are for this task are: []
The guess of your rank in task 2 brings you []
The box collecting task brings you []
Total earnings for the session: []
Thank you for your participation!
Centre de Recherche +33 (0)1 34 43 30 91 research.center@essec.fr