An obligation with internal and external effects

When it was formulated, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL was probably understood as an obligation with an internal dimension only. According to this interpretation, State parties to the Geneva Conventions are placed under the obligation to ensure that their armed forces indeed respect IHL. However, an external dimension to that obligation has emerged, most likely because of the absence of any centralized monitoring system contemplated in IHL. Pursuant to this external dimension, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL likewise applies to third States to armed conflicts, which must take all the necessary and reasonable measures to ensure that the warring parties comply with IHL.

The origins of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL date back to the 1929 Geneva Conventions, as article 87 already provided the obligation to “respect” the Convention

“in all circumstances”⁶⁶. The wording of the article highlights the willingness to create a permanent, non-derogable obligation. No condition may be interposed in order to justify any infringement upon the 1929 Geneva Conventions, even the traditional principle of reciprocity. Already at that moment, abandoning reciprocity was a clear manifestation of the substitution of the bilateral logic, typical of the traditional law of war, with the more imperative necessity to protect human beings⁶⁷. As the ICRC official Commentary to the Geneva Conventions of 1952 (hereafter, ‘1952 official Commentary’) put it:

66 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929: “The provisions of the present Convention shall be respected by the High Contracting Parties in all circumstances. In time of war if one of the belligerents is not a party to the Convention, its provisions shall, nevertheless, remain binding as between the belligerents who are parties thereto”.

67 DEVILLARD, Alexandre. “L’obligation de faire respecter le droit international humanitaire: l’article 1

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It is not an engagement concluded on a basis of reciprocity, binding each party to the contract only in so far as the other party observes its obligations.

It is rather a series of unilateral engagements solemnly contracted before the world as represented by the other Contracting Parties. Each State contracts obligations ' vis-à-vis ' itself and at the same time ' vis-à-vis ' the others. The motive of the Convention is such a lofty one, so universally recognized as an imperative call of civilization, that one feels the need for its assertion, as much because of the respect one has for it oneself as because of the respect for it which one expects from one's opponent, and perhaps even more for the former reason than for the latter⁶⁸.

In 1949, the obligation takes a new turn with the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions, as State parties also have the duty to “ensure respect” for IHL. Indeed, with the enshrinement of Common Article 1 into the Geneva Conventions, it is the first time that the obligation to ensure that third parties comply with IHL is stated. This principle was later reaffirmed in Additional Protocol I⁶⁹, thus reinforcing its authority.

Nevertheless, the scope of the obligation used to be more restricted than it is today. It is reasonable to believe that, when it was drafted, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL was not understood as an instrument binding upon third States to an armed conflict. It rather referred to the obligation to ensure that the nationals of the warring parties respect IHL. The records of the travaux préparatoires demonstrate that the adoption of this provision did not lead to much discussion:

M. MARESCA (Italie) pense qu’il conviendrait de préciser les termes

“s’engagent à faire respecter”, qui selon l’interprétation qu’on leur donne, sont un pléonasme ou introduisent une idée nouvelle en droit international.

M. CASTBERG (Norvège) estime qu’il s’agit de faire respecter les Conventions par l’ensemble de la population.

M. YINGLING (États-Unis d’Amérique) partage la manière de voir du délégué de la Norvège. Il estime que l’article I n’implique pas l’obligation d’édicter des sanctions pénales.

(…)

commun aux Conventions de Genève et à leur premier Protocole Additionnel, fondement d’un droit international humanitaire de coopération?”. Revue québécoise de droit international, Vol. 20.2, 2007. p.

78.

68 PICTET, Jean, (dir.). Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Volume I, Geneva:

International Committee of the Red Cross, 1952. pp. 27-29.

69 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (hereafter, ‘Additional Protocol I’), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.

3, article 1(4).

This general obligation was reproduced in Additional Protocol I but not in Additional Protocol II relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts. However, it is clear that this obligation is valid for non-international armed conflicts as well since it explicitly covers the conflicts defined by Common Article 3 (see infra).

M. LAMARLE (France) estime que les termes “faire respecter” tendent au même but que l’expression “au nom de leurs peuples”, qui a été supprimée à Stockholm.

L’article I est ainsi adopté sans changements⁷⁰.

On the basis of these comments, it has been argued that Common Article 1 should be restricted to its internal dimension, so that the State parties should not solely comply with IHL in times of war, but also take all the necessary measures in times of peace in order to ensure that the relevant rules can effectively be enforced in case of armed conflict⁷¹. It should be noted in this regard that, as the French delegate observed, the wording of Common Article 1 proposed at the 17^th International Conference of the Red Cross was slightly different from the final version of the Geneva Conventions as it included the expression "au nom de leurs peuples" (on behalf of their peoples). The ICRC considered at the time that the latter expression should be understood as associating the peoples themselves in the respect of the fundamental principles contained in the Geneva Conventions in order to facilitate its application at all times, including in case of civil war:

En invitant les Hautes Parties Contractantes à déclarer solennellement qu'elles s'engagent au nom de leur peuple, le Comité International de la Croix Rouge a eu l'intention d'associer les peuples eux-mêmes au respect des principes qui sont à la base de la présente Convention et à l'exécution des obligations qui en découlent. Le texte aura, en outre, l'avantage de faciliter l'application de la Convention, notamment en cas de guerre civile⁷².

It could therefore be understood that the intent of the parties when the Geneva Conventions were drafted was to stipulate an obligation with internal effects only⁷³.

70 Acte final de la Conférence diplomatique de Genève 1949, annexe 2, section B de la Convention de Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre, p. 51.

71 See: MOULIER, Isabelle. "L'obligation de "faire respecter" le droit international humanitaire". In:

MATHESON, Michael J., MOMTAZ, Djamchid (eds.). Les règles et institutions du droit international humanitaire à l'épreuve des conflits armés récents/Rules and institutions of International Humanitarian Law put to the test of recent armed conflicts. Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010. pp. 701-704.

72 CICR, Projets de Conventions révisées ou nouvelles protégeant les victimes de la guerre établis par le Comité international de la Croix Rouge avec le concours d'experts des gouvernements, des sociétés nationales de la Croix-Rouge et d'autres associations humanitaires, XVIIe Conférence internationale de la Croix-Rouge (Stockholm, août 1948), nº4, 2è ed., Genève, mai 1948, p. 4. Quoted in: MOULIER, Isabelle. "L'obligation de "faire respecter" le droit international humanitaire". op.cit., 2010. pp. 703-704.

73 KALSHOVEN, Frits. “The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstance: From Tiny seed to Ripening Fruit”. op. cit., 1999.

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Nevertheless, international law is to be interpreted in accordance with the current state of the international community. In particular, the travaux préparatoires can be seen as no more than supplementary means of interpretation, so that the intent of the parties expressed at the moment of the 17^th International Conference of the Red Cross is not decisive. It is indeed necessary to refer to subsequent State practice⁷⁴ on this matter to comprehend the whole meaning and implications of Common Article 1. In the words of Frits Kalshoven, the international community planted a “tiny seed”, but it has considerably evolved afterward. Indeed, different elements make think that the valid interpretation of Common Article 1 is an extensive one, as Common Article 1 actually establishes a two-fold duty, with both internal and external effects.

First, it could be objected that the intent of the parties was not to stipulate an obligation with internal effects only. As Isabelle Moulier demonstrates, a restrictive interpretation would mean that the expression “to ensure respect” is a repetition of the duty “to respect”; it would therefore be unnecessary, as this duty already exists as a consequence of the ratification of the Geneva Conventions:

Si l'obligation de faire respecter le droit international humanitaire ne s'étend pas à l'ordre international, elle ne constitue alors qu'un 'doublet' de l'obligation de respecter les Conventions qu'il était finalement inutile d'exprimer puisqu'elle découle ipso jure de la ratification des Conventions⁷⁵.

Consequently, if the State parties decided to add this clause to the four Geneva Conventions, it is more logical to look for a different meaning. In this line of reasoning, the ICRC delegate’s comment during the debate on Common Article 1 should not be forgotten:

M. PILLOUD (Comité international de la Croix-Rouge) rappelle qu’en présentant ses propositions à la Conférence de Stockholm le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge releva que les Parties contractantes doivent non seulement appliquer elles-mêmes les Conventions, mais encore faire tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour que les principes humanitaires qui sont à leur base soient universellement appliqués⁷⁶.

74 In accordance with article 31(3)(b) VCLT: “Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation” shall be taken into account, together with the context when interpreting treaties”.

75 MOULIER, Isabelle. "L'obligation de "faire respecter" le droit international humanitaire". op.cit., 2010.

p. 705.

76 Acte final de la Conférence diplomatique de Genève 1949, annexe 2, section B de la Convention de

It thus seems that the extensive interpretation of Common Article 1 could be inferred at the time when the Geneva Conventions were adopted. As Éric David observes, since the ICRC delegate’s declaration was not contradicted, it was understood that the obligation to ensure respect for IHL should go beyond the scope of State parties' populations;

otherwise, it would not make sense to refer to a universal application of IHL⁷⁷. As a consequence, it seems plausible to consider that the delegates chose a formulation that could accommodate a broad understanding of Common Article 1 “be it in terms of an entitlement or a duty”⁷⁸. The 1952 official Commentary endorsed such interpretation:

The Contracting Parties do not undertake merely to respect the Convention, but also to ensure respect for it (…) It follows therefore that in the event of a Power failing to fulfill its obligations, the other Contracting Parties (neutral, allied or enemy) may, and should, endeavour to bring it back to an attitude of respect for the Convention⁷⁹.

As Knut Dörmann and José Serralvo note⁸⁰, the original version in French of the 1952 official Commentary clearly distinguishes between the entitlement to act (pouvoir) and the obligation to do so (devoir):

Ainsi encore, si une Puissance manque à ses obligations, les autres Parties contractantes… peuvent-elles – et doivent-elles – chercher à la ramener au respect de la Convention⁸¹. (emphasis added)

Volume II of the Commentaries ratified this interpretation and provided the following details:

The proper working of the system of protection provided by the Convention demands in fact that the States which are parties to it should not be content

Genève relative au traitement des prisonniers de guerre, p. 51.

77 DAVID, Eric. Principes de droit des conflits armés. 3è ed., Brussels: Bruylant, 2002. pp. 562-563:

“Cette déclaration, qui n'a pas été contredite à l'époque, montre que, dans l'esprit de ses auteurs, l'obligation mise à la charge de l'Etat partie avait une portée qui dépassait largement le cadre de sa seule population puisqu'il s'agissait de veiller à ce que les Conventions de Genève fussent "universellement appliquée"; une application universelle ne se limite évidemment pas à une application nationale”. Quoted in: MOULIER, Isabelle. "L'obligation de "faire respecter" le droit international humanitaire". op.cit., 2010. p. 706.

78 DÖRMANN, Knut; SERRALVO, José. “Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the obligation to prevent international humanitarian law violations”. International Review of the Red Cross, 2015. p. 715.

79 PICTET, Jean, (dir.). Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Volume I, op. cit, 1952. pp. 25-26.

80 DÖRMANN, Knut; SERRALVO, José. “Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the obligation to prevent international humanitarian law violations”, op. cit., 2015. p. 715.

81 PICTET, Jean (dir.). Commentaires des Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949. Volume I. Geneva:

Comité international de la Croix rouge, 1952. p. 25.

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merely to apply its provisions themselves, but should do everything in their power to ensure that it is respected universally⁸².

The 1952 official Commentary thus signed the “birth certificate” of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL, as it is commonly interpreted today. Moreover, subsequent practice, coupled with international case law and scholarship, has endorsed to some extent the ‘broad’ interpretation of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL. It cannot be solely understood as ensuring that the nationals of a State party to an armed conflict respect IHL, but rather as an external obligation falling upon third States to ensure that the warring parties comply with IHL norms.

In this sense, the Diplomatic Conference that led to the adoption of the Additional Protocols in 1977 used the exact same wording as that of the Geneva Conventions, without further debate, thus seemingly acknowledging the interpretation put forward by the ICRC⁸³. Actually, the extensive interpretation of the obligation to ensure respect for IHL was referred to and taken for granted by national delegates, as the official records of the Diplomatic Conference so underline:

[l]ors de la première session, plusieurs experts ont souligné le caractère impératif du droit humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armés. On s’est notamment référé à l’article premier, commun aux Conventions qui fournit une base juridique aux actions collectives de la communauté internationale.

On peut considérer que l’ensemble des Hautes Parties Contractantes ont reçu un mandat supérieur, celui de concourir à l’application des Conventions – et certains ont parlé à ce sujet de responsabilité collective.

Dans une proposition, des experts ont prié le CICR d’étudier le rôle que doivent jouer les Parties aux Conventions pour donner effet à l’intérêt qu’a la communauté des Etats à voir ces Conventions dûment respectées⁸⁴.

In the same way, the adoption of the 1977 Additional Protocols was the occasion to complement Common Article 1. Indeed, article 7 of Additional Protocol I provides the possibility for Switzerland – the depositary of the Protocol – to convene meetings of the State parties to discuss general problems concerning the application of the Geneva

82 PICTET, Jean, (dir.). Commentaries to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Volume II. op. cit., 1958. pp. 25-26.

83 SANDOZ, Yves, SWINARSKI, Christophe, ZIMMERMANN, Bruno, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987. p. 36.

84 CICR, Conférence d’experts gouvernementaux sur la réaffirmation et le développement du droit international humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armés (Genève, 3 mai-3 juin 1972), Commentaire, vol. II, première partie, Genève, janvier 1972, p. 7. Quoted in: MOULIER, Isabelle. "L'obligation de

"faire respecter" le droit international humanitaire". op. cit., 2010. p. 708.

Conventions and of Additional Protocol I⁸⁵. An expert to the second session of the 1972

‘Experts Conference on the reaffirmation and development of IHL applicable in armed conflicts’ indeed underlined that this article elaborates in details the collective commitment undertaken by the State parties pursuant to Common Article 1⁸⁶. In the same way, article 89 of Additional Protocol I completes Common Article 1 and enshrines the State parties’ consensus on its broad interpretation:

In situations of serious violations of the Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, in co-operation with the United Nations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter.

Here, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL by others is explicitly recognized and the connection between third States and the wrongful behavior of the belligerent parties is clearly established.

Another important aspect of this article is the reference to the United Nations (hereafter,

‘UN’), as it enshrines the mutual recognition of jus ad bellum and jus in bello in an international treaty. In the same line, the International Court of Justice (hereafter, ‘ICJ’) confirmed the existence of a link between the obligation to ensure respect for IHL and the UN in the ‘Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’ (hereafter, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Wall’).

It expressly referred to the responsibility of the UNSC and the General Assembly in this regard:

The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated régime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion⁸⁷.

In this respect, different UN bodies have embraced this new concern. By way of example, the UNSC has scrutinized IHL violations on different occasions, including in Kuwait, Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Sudan⁸⁸. This

85 Additional Protocol I, article 7.

86 MOULIER, Isabelle. "L'obligation de "faire respecter" le droit international humanitaire". op. cit., 2010. p. 710.

87 ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (hereafter, ‘Advisory Opinion on the Wall’), I.C.J. Reports 2004, para. 163.

88 MATHESON, Michael J. “The New International Humanitarian Law and its Enforcement”. In:

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also holds true regarding the Secretary-General, the General Assembly and even the Human Rights Council⁸⁹.

The idea that the international community as a whole is involved in a universal mechanism of responsibility to ensure respect for IHL is therefore blatant. States can act individually, but also in cooperation with the UN, provided that their action complies with the UN Charter. Article 89 of Additional Protocol I has gained increasing relevance as most of the measures adopted by the State parties to ensure respect for IHL are now conducted under the UN umbrella.

This broad interpretation of Common Article 1 is further confirmed by practice. By way of example, the ICRC has based its action on this interpretation of Common Article 1 to obtain the respect of the parties to an armed conflict:

[i]t is on this interpretation that the ICRC has taken a number of steps, confidentially or publicly, individually or generally, to encourage States, even those not Party to a conflict, to use their influence or offer their cooperation to ensure respect for humanitarian law. (9) Leaving aside any bilateral or multilateral measures taken by States, which rarely become known, it should be pointed out that the organized international community has frequently and emphatically manifested its concern that humanitarian law should be respected⁹⁰.

In this regard, the fact that the European Union, an international organization representing 28 Member States, felt the need to adopt ‘Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL’⁹¹ is symptomatic. Indeed, these Guidelines, which express the consensus of EU Member States on this matter, specifically focus on the EU action “to

In this regard, the fact that the European Union, an international organization representing 28 Member States, felt the need to adopt ‘Guidelines on promoting compliance with IHL’⁹¹ is symptomatic. Indeed, these Guidelines, which express the consensus of EU Member States on this matter, specifically focus on the EU action “to