A critical review of public administration reform

Source: Schacter. M., (2000, p. 6), Public Sector Reforms in Developing Countries: Issues, Lessons and Future Directions, Paper prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada

3.3 A critical review of public administration reform

This section presents the main critical approaches to public administration (including good governance) reforms found in the literature.

3.3.1 Expected outputs vs. results: the missing link

The discrepancy between the expected outcomes of reforms and the actual result is one of the most discussed topics in PA literature (see, for instance, Boyne, 2003b; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; Monteiro, 2002; Schacter, 2000). The results of PAR range from very pessimistic to a position of moderate caution.

For instance, Pollitt & Bouckaert (2004), after reviewing the results of over twenty years of PAR in twelve western countries, observe that while “there is utopian quality to some of the political rhetoric around reforms” (p. 103), “it would take a giant dose of cynicism to arrive at the conclusion that nothing has changed and that the productivity of specific organizations has remained static”

(p. 139).

Less encouraging are the conclusions of Boyne (2003b). The researcher has reviewed 65 empirical studies in relation to PAR, which deal with issues such as agencies reorganization, economic and administrative decentralization, changes in the regulation environment, and management improvement. The conclusions are:

There is no significant support for the proposition that “more resources lead to better services” (p. 374);

“The evidence on regulatory arrangements [concerning the quality of public services] is clearly sparse, weak and incomplete” (p. 379);

“The evidence of the impact of competition on service performance is very mixed”. Furthermore, “the effects of market structure do not vary systematically with whether competition is between public agencies or between public and private providers” (ibid);

“Although the body of evidence is small and incomplete, it suggests that managerial variables make a difference to service performance” (p.

385). This has been observed in over half the projects assessed.

There “is consistent support for a positive relationship between centralization and service performance” (p. 388);

When we turn our attention toward developing countries, the record seems to be even more deceptive. Monteiro (2002), for instance, observes that reformers are obliged to face the reality of clearly disappointing reforms efforts. He refers to a WB survey conducted in 1999 of 124 reforms projects instituted since 1980 in 32 countries: two out of three projects were assessed as “unsatisfactory and even where positive results were identified, there were no guarantees of sustainability beyond the project” (Monteiro, 2002, p. 4).

The same point has been expressed by Schacter (2000): “public sector reform has produced little to cheer about” (p. 7).

3.3.2 Good governance and “embedded autonomy”

One of the most virulent criticisms against the good governance model comes from the concept of “embedded autonomy”. This concept comes from Evans (1995). The author explains the success of the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies as being the result of the combination of several characteristics, among them the fact that the bureaucracies of these countries have had the opportunity to operate unconstrained by special interest (autonomy) and that, at the same time, those same bureaucrats were part of a dense set of informal social networks (embedded) that bound them to the private sector (Evans, 1995).

As pointed out by the author, under such arrangements, bureaucrats are not

“insulated from society as Weber would suggest they should. To the contrary, they are embedded to a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies” (Evans, 1995, p. 12).

It is clear that the embedded autonomy represents a different path to development and is, to some extent, an alternative to the positions of those who advocate that development and economic growth be achieved by restraining the room to maneuver of the state and its bureaucracy through greater civil society involvement in policy making and tighter mechanisms of control and accountability of state officials and agencies (Fritz & Menocal, 2006, p. 8).

3.3.3 The “good enough governance” model

A second popular criticism against the good governance model has been advanced by Grindle with the idea of “good enough governance”. Grindle (2002) puts forward the theory that the good governance “agenda is far too long for the governments of poor countries to approach with clarity, commitment, or reasonable expectations” (p. 11).

While not contesting the intrinsic value of managing a country’s resources according to good governance principles, Grindle (2002) asserts that recipient countries in most cases do not have the financial-, institutional-, political-, or technical capabilities to implement such ambitious measures. It is in such sprit that the author wonders whether there is “anything that can be done to make it less overwhelming, less additive, more strategic, and more feasible” (p. 13).

Grindle (2002) proposes a new agenda, the Good Enough Governance, which, contrary to the good governance agenda, would have a more pragmatic

approach. This would include setting priorities according to contextual realities, domestic capacities and institutional feasibility, a greater concern for incremental and progressive change, explicitly accepting trade-offs (e.g., some state capture may be tolerated to achieve development goals) and finally, “no normative commitment to any particular political regime” (Fritz & Menocal, 2006, p. 6).

3.3.4 Formal vs. informal institutions & public vs. private

Mainstream approaches to reforms embody a strong practical and ideological preference for formal institutions and procedures (see, for instance, the WB and other international organizations). However, informal practices and relations play a major role at all levels of the public realm in any country.

As observed by Monteiro (2002), public sector reform concerns formal institutions (i.e., bureaucracies, the Legislative, the Executive, state owned enterprises, etc.), whereas “traditional forms of societal organization are based on informal rules and relations” (p. 7). By dealing with formal institutions alone, PAR, asserts the author, neglects critical practices and institutions that have a profound influence on domestic governance issues.

Moreover, in the good governance perspective, the state is one among three systems (together with civil society and the market) that are expected to strategically cooperate in order to overcome the weakness of each individual system (Rhodes, 1997, as cited in Ferlie et al., 2005, p. 433) and thus deliver higher social uplift and policy outcomes.

Along the same line, Hirschmann (1999) suggests that the novelty of good governance is that governance outcomes are not expected to be achieved by supply, i.e., it is not expected of “the state and the bureaucracy to become accountable of their own accord, but by demand”, which rests upon the idea that

“civil society builds the capacities and skills to press government to be accountable for its actions” (p. 301).

In these two examples, civil society and the state appear as being both partners and competitor agents of change, assuming a clear distinction between them.

Migdal (2001) and Migdal et al., (1997) alert us to the fact that this assumption brings back a Weberian ideal type of state. Painter (2005, p. 267), referring to Migdal (2001), notes that a more realistic interpretation should view the “state as a set of institutions embedded in and inter-penetrating wider social and political groups”.

In the same spirit, Fforde and Porter (1995) note that the dominant view erroneously holds “that civil society is a sphere of life that arises in reaction to, and needs fostering in opposition to, the predatory and monolithic state” (p. 3).

The authors go on to suggest that we should take seriously the scholars on civil society who warn us against idealizing the “concept and loading it with the virtues of freedom, equality, and liberty from the state” (p. 6): civil society should be considered as “a realm of association interpenetrated by the state” (Kumar, 1993, as cited in Fforde & Porter, 1995, p. 6).

3.3.5 Universality vs. governance values

The cultural dimension of development and of state reforms has been largely

debated in the literature (see, for instance, UN, 2001). An example of the questioning related to the universality of values associated with the good governance agenda is illustrated by the debate opposing western to Asian values.

While good governance is considered to be embedded in western values as it promotes transparency, accountability, participation, and an emphasis on private sector, Boll (2001)²⁶, mentioning the work of Han (1999), notes that “Asian values have been defined as putting emphasis on a consensual approach, communitarianism rather than individualism, social order and harmony, respect for elders, discipline, a paternalistic State and the primary role of government in economic development”.

Cheung and Scott (2003) alert us to the fact that governance systems (i.e., the state, the market, and civil society) are culturally and sociologically constructed arenas in which players and institutions interact, and that they are not detached from politics and the dominant values of society. In such light, suggest the two scholars, arrangements (e.g., accountability and participatory mechanisms) between the three governance systems – the state, the market and civil society – need to be envisioned, developed, and understood in the light of context-based conditions and factors.