... noncooperative wagebargaining refer to Rubinstein’s alternating offer ...non-stationary bargaining models for real life ...to bargaining models with preferences described by sequences of ...
... union-firm wagebargaining model in which the union must choose between strike and holdout if a proposed wage contract is ...on wagebargaining concerns the parties’ preferences which ...
... the wagebargaining with sequences of discount rates varying in time it would be interesting to analyze the existence of inefficient SPE with a strike for some periods followed by an ...
... union-firm wagebargaining originally introduced in Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Haller and Holden (1990) and further analyzed, ...new wage contract and in case of disagreement the union must choose ...
... 3 Wagebargaining with discount factors varying in time The bargaining procedure between the union and the firm, as presented in Fernandez and Glazer (1991), and Haller and Holden (1990) is the ...
... 4 Conclusion There are several issues that could be examined in the follow-up research on the gener- alized wagebargaining. First of all, we could examine a game in which both strikes and lockouts are ...
... Rubinstein’s bargaining procedure (Rubinstein (1982a)), but similarly as in Rusinowska (2001) we generalize the model by assuming that preferences of each party are expressed by discount factors varying in ...a ...
... the wage setting process for one third of French firms 5 whereas André (2012a) finds a significantly positive short-term elasticity of actual wages to wage floors (higher than the one associated with the ...
... between wagebargaining practices according to professional categories (executives and non-executives), case studies reveal the extent to which the compensation of non-executive employees lies outside ...
... form wage equation from an alternating-offer wagebargaining game à la Hall and Milgrom (2008) by imposing a plausible parameter ...in bargaining is equal to the separation ...in ...
... L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignemen[r] ...
... and, consequently, the final decision. Moreover, note that in our bargaining model the current policy becomes the default option in case of no agreement in the next legislative session. This creates a dynamic ...
... The proof of this Proposition is simple: the unique equilibrium without talk is pooling; the unique neologism-proof equilibrium for c e (c*,l/2) is separating; and the post-talk. bargain[r] ...
... linear bargaining frontiers to focus on the role of the disagree- ment points, any solution located on the Pareto frontiers of both sets, X and Y , maximizes the sum of players’utilities across issues and is thus ...
... Hard Bargaining There are many sources of power in negotiation, although in a hard bargaining situation only a few are relevant (Fisher, ...its bargaining power by bringing members into a supportive ...
... j ( ˜ G), while disagreement leads to the default regime for ˜ G where his continuation payoff is δ α v i ∗δα ( ˜ G). The condition v ∗ i ( ˜ G) + v j ∗ ( ˜ G) > 1 implies that 1 − δ α v j ∗δα ( ˜ G) < δ α v ∗δα i ...
... if an agent plays the mechanism repeatedly with changing sets of par- ticipants, the safe strategy is always available when she happens to be clueless about the other agents’behaviour, Many di¤erent mechanisms can ...
... Huntington in his book on the Defense Department, The Common Defense (New York, Columbia University Press, 1961), contrasts the making of alliance policies and the conting[r] ...