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Innovation systems and the competition between regional vineyards

Innovation systems and the competition between regional vineyards

vi) Economic evaluation (cost – benefit) of institutions involved in wine SIs appears difficult. Several attempts have been done (Montaigne et al. 2003), but without any econometric tests. Direct costs could be calculated, compared to the value produced by the sector and compared between vineyards ; institutional forms can also be associated to regional economic growth or evolution of wine average price, but they generally cannot be isolated as a separated factor. As a first evaluation we note a paradox : the most important regional wine SI (at least in term of employement) corresponds to the Languedoc vineyard which is facing most difficulties, lowest price, decrease in volume and value of production. On the other side the most profitable vineyard, Champagne, is associated with one of the less dense regional SI, benefiting from less public investment (no Inra center). Does-it mean that the links between SI and economic growth, seen in the new world, are not avalaible for the French wine Industry ? Several assumptions may be proposed to overpass this apparent paradox : - inherited reputation and quality of the wine have prooved to be the major factor of the price level, whatever the scope of current investment in research and innovation…
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Innovation systems and the competition between regional vineyards

Innovation systems and the competition between regional vineyards

i) French institutions dedicated to research, education and innovation have been marked by the historical confrontation between the centralized State and the regional dimension of the wine industry. The evolution of political negociations between the Ministry of Agriculture and coalitions of regional unions of wine producers has remained crucial in order to understand the French SI construction and transformation (Touzard, 1998). The feature of a national wine SI has been established after the second world war, following linear and top down conception of innovation, and expressing the domination of a national and public project. National Institute for Agronomic Research (INRA), created in 1946, has developed a specific wine department carrying out research in genetic, oenology, agronomy, machinary... and progressively localized in Montpellier, Bordeaux, Angers, Colmar (Alsace) and Dijon. Specific national public institutions have also been created for “development and innovation transfer” : ITV (agronomic and oenology technology), ANTAV (varietal management and control), agricultural public schools (with specialisation in vine and wine)... During the same period producer’s associations created their own organizations for development and extension, at departmental level (then merging at regional level since the 1980s): chambers of agriculture (not specialized in wine), ICV (oenological advice for wine cooperatives), local associations for experimentation. During the 1960s, these professional organizations took control of the official role of extension, when national institutions were developping “upstream” activities for innovations.
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Competition, R&D and the cost of innovation

Competition, R&D and the cost of innovation

The two main variables of interest in the regressions, namely the R&D effort and the competition index, come from the Fiben and Centrale des Bilans databases (Banque de France Balance Sheet dataset). They are collected on a voluntary basis. Clerks in the different local establishments of the Bank of France contact firm to complete a survey. The Fiben database is based on firms tax forms and includes all businesses with more than 500 employees and a fraction of smaller firms. It covers about 57% of employment for manufacturing but less for service sectors. The advantage of this base is to include firm that have episodic R&D activities or novel firms. We focus on firms that have conducted observable R&D activities at least one year. Our unbalanced sample includes about 16,000 firms from 1990 to 2004. The sectoral distribution of observations is given in appendix.
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Impact of the Backbone Network Market Structure on the ISP Competition

Impact of the Backbone Network Market Structure on the ISP Competition

Thus, a scenario where a monopolistic IBPs is operating is also a feasible one. The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model: it explains the separation of providers into IBPs and (local) ISPs, their economic relations and profit functions, as well as the users’ preference model determining the ISP they will subscribe to. The decisions being played at different time scales, the multiple stages will be described. We will also explain why the IBP competition for content providers and ISPs’ association leads to a Bertrand competition, so that IBPs can be treated as a single backbone network. Section III describes and analyzes the game at the shortest time scale: the competition between ISPs for end users, making use of the users’ preference model. It separates two cases: when there is no transit price from the IBP (resuming to an analysis carried out in [4]), and when there is a transit price t per unit of volume. Section IV then looks at the transit price determination which, even if made before the ISP competition, is performed anticipating the subsequent equilibrium. Three scenarios are considered: several IBPs in competition (hence as a consequence of Bertrand competition, a transit price t = 0), a monopolist IBP seeking to maximize his profit, and a transit price chosen by a regulator to minimize social
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Mancoosi Deliverable D5.4: Report on the international competition

Mancoosi Deliverable D5.4: Report on the international competition

Before MISC 2010 Organizing a solver competition is a complex task. Besides organizational issues, the technical setup of the competition proved to be challenging for the Mancoosi team. For this reason we decided to prepare the official international MISC competition by some trial runs (MISC-live 1 and MISC-live 2) with the goal of detecting early the problems in the setup, and thus avoiding them in the first official competition. The first trial run, called at that time Mancoosi internal Solver Competition (MiSC), was run in January 2010 followed by a second trial run before the official MISC competition in June 2010. Because of the positive feedback we got from the community after the first trial run, and because of the benefit to allow solver developers to continually test their solvers in a formal setting, we decided after MiSC to repeat such trial runs at irregular intervals in the future, and we baptized these trial runs MISC-live.
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Competition and regulation of the advertising financed media platforms

Competition and regulation of the advertising financed media platforms

of TV viewers to advertising and the interactions between viewers and advertisers in the supply decisions of TV broadcasters. The structural econometric models adopted here allow to take into account the competitive landscape of a market through the horizontal differentiation among TV channels. Most importantly, I identify the precise shadow prices related to regulation constraints, which consist in important indicators for policy makers. Finally, using rich data on the broadcasting side, I am able to conclude on the impact of regulation on viewers’ welfare. The paper exploits a novel set of hourly data on 12 broadcast TV channels in France during one year (2014). Details include the number of TV viewers watching each of the 12 TV channels, total number of TV viewers watching (both free and pay) TV during each hour, the genre of broadcasting contents (classified into 20 categories) on each TV channel, the lengths of advertising breaks (in minutes). Reduced form analyses confirm that the two-sidendness and the competition degree of the market matter for the TV stations’ supply of advertising spaces. As a first step, I estimate the demand of TV viewers and of advertisers. Demand of TV viewers is modeled by a random coefficient logit model, such that a viewer’s utility from watch- ing TV depends on the broadcast TV programs, and on the length of advertising breaks. The reliability of the estimation hinges on the precise identification of the demand shapes and of substitution patterns across differentiated TV channels. The use of aggregate data on audience makes the ability to accommodate the viewers’ heterogeneity of demand especially crucial, as the individual preferences for advertising and for broadcasting content are confounded in the aggregate data. The literature of empirical industrial organization has addressed this need us- ing random coefficient logit models (Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, henceforth, BLP, 1995; Nevo, 2000 and 2001), which prove
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The Application of EU Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector

The Application of EU Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector

The Court’s approach of focusing on factors of supply and demand, rather than the question of whether an activity is ‘legal’ under the applicable EU or national reg- ulations, is pragmatic as it will often be uncertain whether the use of a product off-label is ‘legal’ – i.e. that it com- plies with all applicable regulatory requirements. Further, a competition authority is not well placed to resolve this question. Indeed, the Court noted that whether the use of a product off-label is legal is not a matter to be deter- mined by the competition authority, but rather by the competent regulatory authority. 35 In short, the judgment allows competition authorities to focus on standard mar- ket de finition factors of supply and demand, while also obliging them to take into account any relevant decisions or judgments of regulatory authorities concerning the use of the products, to the extent such decisions or judgments have an impact on the structure of supply and demand. 36 In the specific case at hand, the Court found that nei- ther the off-label prescription of Avastin nor the repack- aging of Avastin so that it could be used for intravitreal injection were necessarily illegal, but that the off-label use and repackaging had to comply with certain regulatory rules. 37 The Court determined that there was no evidence in the file to suggest that the conditions under which repackaged and prescribed were unlawful, though this would be a matter that the referring court could verify.
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Men Too Sometimes Shy Away from Competition : The Case of Team Competition

Men Too Sometimes Shy Away from Competition : The Case of Team Competition

often choose to engage in competition with a teammate rather than alone. One can think, for instance, of academic publication where papers are often co-authored or of invitations to tender which frequently oppose several teams, each representing a firm. Numerous experimental results suggest that the decision-making process may be more efficient among teams than for individuals: teams are faster learners than individuals (Cooper and Kagel, 2005, Kocher and Sutter, 2005), they take more risks when it enables them to get higher expected earnings (Rockenbach et al., 2007) and they play closer to the predictions of game theory (Luhan et al., 2009, Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998). However, as other experimental results point toward less efficiency of groups in comparison with individuals (Cason and Mui, 1997, Cox and Hayne, 2006), it is not straightforward to predict how the team membership will affect subjects’ willingness to compete. One of the main questions is whether a team tournament will do a better job of attracting the best candidates into the competition than an individual tournament. In the present experiment, participants actually make the decision whether to enter the team competition on their own. While one can think that the competitive decision may be very different when team members decide together whether to enter the competition, it allows us to avoid the confound that men and women may be different in their propensity to being talked into entering a competition.
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Impact of Competition Between ISPs on the Net Neutrality Debate

Impact of Competition Between ISPs on the Net Neutrality Debate

meaning that players anticipate the solutions of the later games when choosing their strategies. Our results have highlighted the fact that side payments, unless decided by ISPs , have little chance to address the concern from ISPs regarding the fairness of the revenue sharing associated with users accessing content through their infrastructures. This is due, to a great extent, to the competition played among ISPs on the access prices that drives their revenues to low values. On the other hand, the CP being in a monopolist situation, always obtains significant revenues. An interesting paradox we have highlighted is that side pay- ments may be beneficial to the CP. Nevertheless, when side payments are decided by the ISPs (non-cooperatively), it can be beneficial to them, but at the expense of both the CP and the users. Remarkably, the side payments maximizing social and user welfare are the same than those maximizing the CP revenue. But looking at the whole supply chain, in order to avoid too big disparities between revenues of providers, the neutral case is the most suitable. If the side payments are decided non-cooperatively by ISPs, in our experiment, one (only) is a big winner, while the other ISP gains a bit more than in the neutral case. This asymmetry may be a problem and can create complicated tensions and negotiations.
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Application of EU Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector

Application of EU Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical Sector

French competition authority finding that Sanofi- Aventis had abused its dominant market position and imposing a fine of €40.6 million. In its 2013 decision, the competition authority found that Sanofi-Aventis had engaged in a marketing cam- paign that systematically discouraged the use of generic versions of Sanofi-Aventis’ blockbuster Plavix by high- lighting that the generics used different salts from the original version and that they were not indicated for use in combination with aspirin for acute coronary syndrome (ACS). The authority considered this marketing cam- paign to be misleading. While Sano fi-Aventis did not claim that the use of different salts could affect the ef fi- cacy or safety of a generic, or that the use of generics with aspirin to treat ACS was dangerous, it implied as much, which created doubts in the minds of doctors and pharmacists concerning generics. As doctors are reluctant to change their prescribing habits and are risk averse, any dissemination of negative information or insinuation that a generic product may present risk will be suf ficient to convince doctors not to prescribe it and pharmacists not to provide it to the patient when given a choice.
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The Measure and Regulation of Competition in Telecommunications Markets

The Measure and Regulation of Competition in Telecommunications Markets

Applying this test in predatory pricing cases must be done efficiently, that is, by minimizing the implementation costs. At the present time, the MIA test is applied repeatedly in predatory pricing and antitrust cases with plaintiffs and defendants producing evidence before the Competition Bureau, Competition Tribunal, or Antitrust Authorities and pleading their respective statements of case. Lawyers, accountants, engineers, and economists are called as expert witnesses to help the authorities decide on the different cases. The same could be done with the SS test. This test requires a bit more data, which will be provided by the firms themselves as it is the case in most applications of the MIA. But even if it were somewhat more costly than the MIA test, the SS test has many advantages: it is more coherent and transparent, more easily understood, and has characteristics that are crucial in designing a level playing field in telecommunications, namely additivity, order-independence, stability, non-manipulability, and horizon-independence. Firms, regulators and expert witnesses should be able to move rapidly down the learning curve. The SS cost allocation rule appears therefore as a powerful engine of competition and a properly intense incentive mechanism to foster innovation, both technological and organization, and creative destruction the benefit of all Canadians.
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Large Spatial Competition

Large Spatial Competition

Hotelling-type model with an arbitrary number of players, different possible structures of the space where retailers can locate, and different distributions of the customers. Lederer and Hurter ( 1986 ) consider a model with two re- tailers where consumers are non-uniformly distributed on the plane. Aoyagi and Okabe ( 1993 ) look at a bidimensional market and, through simulation, relate the existence of equilibria and their properties to the shape of the market. Tabuchi ( 1994 ) considers a two-stage Hotelling duopoly model in a bidimensional market. H¨ orner and Jamison ( 2012 ) look at a Hotelling model with a finite number of customers. Note that, with just two retailers, the literature has underlined the existence of a “curse of multidimensionality” (see Bernheim and Slavov ( 2009 ) and Xefteris ( 2015 ) for a discussion). This curse implies that there exists no equilibrium in pure strategies for almost all distributions of consumers whenever the competition takes place in a setting with more than one dimension (as first identified by Plott ( 1967 )) 3 . When the
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Competition law - Reader

Competition law - Reader

This distinction is especially difficult to make when the state has contracted its public tasks out to private undertakings. The Court’s approach to certain questions concerning these entities is not always that transparent or predictable. It is clear from the case-law that the decisive factor is whether there is an offering of goods and services on a market which could be carried out by a private undertaking to make a profit. 60 The test which is applied by the Court focuses on the nature of the activity carried out by the entity. However these activities are assessed separately in order to verify whether they are economic or non-economic. Thus in that sense the concept of undertaking is a relative one, since one and the same entity can be classified as an undertaking for one part of its activities whereas it falls outside the scope of competition law for the other part. 61 However the Court will not apply the competition rules to an entity which, although it performs economic activities, is not considered being an undertaking since its economic activities are inseparably connected to its exercise of public powers. This was also the Courts assessment in SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v Commission. 62 Eurocontrol (European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation) was engaged in the creation and collection of route charges on behalf of the Contracting States from the users of the air navigation services, assisting the national administrations and technical standardization. Some of these activities clearly are an exercise of public authority others are more economical activities. However the ECJ held, in contrast to the General Court of appeal, 63 that all the activities were inseparable from the activity of assisting the national administrations which was connected with the exercise of public powers. Consequently Eurocontrol was not acting as an undertaking. 64 Whereas in the MOTOE-case, 65 ELPA, a
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Competition for attention in the information (overload) age

Competition for attention in the information (overload) age

The Information Age comes from several sources, primarily lower costs of sending information as more (and cheaper) channels now reach potential consumers. Traditional billboards and newspaper ads have been supplemented by Internet pop-ups, telemarketing, and product placements within TV programs (and on football players’ jerseys). Information costs have not been lowered uniformly across the board, though, and some sectors’ messages are more appropriately delivered by the new media. However, cheaper access to attention also means that rivals can access attention more cheaply too, intensifying in-sector competition. This effect renders competition more acute, lowering prices and beneÞting consumers. Scarcity of attention brings spillovers into other sectors, raising their prices and making it more likely interesting offers are missed. New product categories cause pricing churn for other advertised goods. A new product class depresses existing classes’ ads relatively (as a fraction of the total volume of messages), and it drives down weaker ones absolutely. Surprisingly, it may cause stronger sectors to increase in size because price competition is relaxed (prices are stochastically higher). Thus there are information complementarities across product classes.
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Multiplicity of eco-labels, competition, and the environment

Multiplicity of eco-labels, competition, and the environment

This result is very important in our paper. First, this proposition establishes that even if the products have eco-labels, their environmental qualities can be very low and do not match with the environmental quality expected or announced by the eco-label. One must notice in this case that it is the multiplicity of eco-labels that permits …rms to practice the "green washing" phenomenon. Second, this proposition entails that the global level of environmental quality has decreased since the q HC q ^ H and q LC q ^ L :So the eco-labels don’t re‡ect the real level of the environmental qualities when several eco-labels are present in the market. Therefore, the consumer will buy a labelled product with a higher price but a lower environmental quality. Despite the fact that an eco-label is a means to reduce the informational gap between producers and consumers, consumers will not use the eco-label information to buy the product.
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The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law

The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law

In BPB Industries, 79 the Commission considered that it was necessary to consider “not only the position of BPB in the market but also its technological and financial resources […]” Any considerations that do not pertain directly to the relevant market under review should not be factored in to any analysis of market power. Despite some Commission and EC Courts’ practice suggesting the contrary, it is argued that the same reasoning should apply to “deep pockets” claims or to claims about the alleged favoured access of the supposedly dominant entity to capital markets. Large multinational groups are in many instances publicly-traded companies, and are directly responsible vis à vis their shareholders – as well as vis à vis their creditors – for any conduct aimed at preserving an inefficient business unit to the detriment of the most profitable segments of the company’s range of activities. While capital markets do not always exercise as tight a control as one would hope on large multinationals, the fact remains that -- again -- it would be necessary to demonstrate that subsidization across activities is possible and likely. Moreover, evidence would then need to be adduced to show that specific capital markets deficiencies would deny competitors access to comparable funds. (viii) Behavioural factors
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Competition and intellectual property in the European Union

Competition and intellectual property in the European Union

See Crampes, Hollander and Macdissi (2004). 1515 For example, the international distribution of films on DVD has been technologically and legally segmented into geographical markets. The regional coding system requires that all DVD players be manufactured for distribution and use in one of six geographic regions around the world. It is a global initiative by agents of the film and DVD industries aimed at preventing the free movement of licensed copies of copyright DVDs around the world. Dunt, Gans, and King (2001) have studied whether the restrictions on DVD usage across regions can be justified as a means of generating potentially socially desirable price discrimination for content providers or are simply a means of restricting competition. They conclude that "the conditions that may theoretically allow such restrictions to be efficient are unlikely to hold in the case of DVDs and that social welfare is likely to be significantly enhanced by eliminating such technical restrictions." (not italic, add page ref.) Their argument is that among the four potential consequences of such restrictions on regional flows (price discrimination, collusion, free-riding, and the prevention of consumer confusion), the latter two -potentially socially desirable- consequences are unlikely to be important.
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Maple and the Putnam Competition

Maple and the Putnam Competition

L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignemen[r]

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The EU and China in 2020: More Competition Ahead

The EU and China in 2020: More Competition Ahead

Changing European Views of the Belt and Road Initiative Two weeks after the 17+1 forum, Beijing itself played host to the second Belt and Road Forum, with several European leaders in attendance. Europe’s own view of the BRI has been mixed from the beginning. During the first Belt and Road Forum in 2017, EU leaders surprised their Chinese hosts by refusing to explicitly endorse the initiative. Since then, the EU has remained fairly cautious and apprehensive about Beijing’s intentions and about how some BRI projects are being implemented, especially in vulnerable Balkan countries. Around half of the EU’s member states— including Greece, Hungary, Italy, and Portugal—have broken ranks and endorsed the BRI. Reflecting growing European hesitations about the Chinese initiative and the need to provide an alternative, the EU released its own strategy for connecting Europe and Asia in September 2018. And in a landmark development, at the first-ever EU connectivity forum in Brussels in early September 2019, the EU and Japan signed an agreement to coordinate more on transport, energy, and digital infrastructure projects linking Europe and Asia based on sustainability, quality infrastructure, and a level playing field.
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Assessing competition in the market for corporate acquisitions

Assessing competition in the market for corporate acquisitions

potential gains at the successful offer price for unsuccessful bidders pro-. vides a test of this rivalry hypotht^sis[r]

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