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Retirement age and the age of onset of Alzheimer’s disease: Results from the ICTUS study

Retirement age and the age of onset of Alzheimer’s disease: Results from the ICTUS study

employment delayed the age at onset of diagnosis and the age at first symptoms by 0.15 years. Therefore, taking into account the selection bias reinforces the hypothesis of an association be- tween deferred retirement and further age at onset of AD, as observed in Lupton et al. ’s study [ 13 ]. However, even though this association persists and remains significant, it is still plausible that patients left the workforce due to prior cognitive impairment, with several studies showing that the prodromal phase of AD lasts more than a decade[ 14 , 17 , 18 ]. Hence, the same analysis was conducted after exclusion of individuals who were diagnosed within 10 years after retire- ment. This latter analysis shows that the association between retirement age and age at onset of AD is reduced by half and is no longer significant. Although a lack of power could be argued due to the considerable reduction of our sample size, it still comprises 447 subjects. This find- ing highlights that the conclusion of Lupton and colleagues[ 13 ] is probably overstated. Indeed, the selection of AD patients who developed the disease before retirement (in order to ensure that people did not leave the workforce due to prior cognitive impairment) only leads to an au- tomatic association between a later age at retirement and delayed onset of AD. As a result, it was critical to use similar design in order to show that this selection strategy induces a selection bias, which leads to an overestimation of the effect of retirement. Thus, our study clearly points out that caution is needed when studying the effect of retirement on AD patients ’ health out- comes. Based on these observational data, it is still unclear whether it is retirement that has an impact on the onset of AD or whether it is cognitive impairment that inclines individuals to retire.
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Distance to Retirement and The Job Search of Older Workers: The Case For Delaying Retirement Age

Distance to Retirement and The Job Search of Older Workers: The Case For Delaying Retirement Age

working life. In particular, it is clearly beyond the scope of the paper to explain the overall retirement age distribution. Especially, unlike Benitez Silva (2003), we leave aside the interaction between job search, health and wealth. 4 Moreover, 4 See Bettendorf & Broer (2003) for another search model with savings. However, with perfect

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Ageing and retirement age. What can we learn from the Overlapping Generations Model ?

Ageing and retirement age. What can we learn from the Overlapping Generations Model ?

Table 4 and Figure 2 describe optimal paths for a constant retirement age for various social rates of discount. Augmenting the discount factor β means putting more weight on future generations. At the same time, that means decreasing the pensions of the current generation of old agents and accumulating more capital. Examining integenerational transfers helps to understand the trade-off faced by Society. In our case of undercapitalization, the interest rate is higher than the growth rate. The return on capitaliza- tion is larger than the return on pay-as-you-go social security. The social security system, therefore, rests on a negative intergenerational transfer at the expense of all generations, apart from the current old generation that will receive a positive transfer. The discounted value of all transfers sums up to zero. The basic issue is thus how much to take out of future genera- tions’ earnings in favor of the current old generation. The answer obviously depends on the social rate of discount.
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Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation

Social security, retirement age and optimal income taxation

of a non-linear tax-transfer function depending upon two variables 2 : the weekly income and the retirement age. We show that, in a setting of asymmetric information, a distortion towards early retirement is desirable for some individuals. More precisely, the optimal policy in the two-type case induces highly productive and healthy workers to retire efficiently (namely when their labor disutility is marginally equal to their productivity) while less productive and less healthy workers are induced to retire earlier. We also show that the tradeoff between weekly labor supply and retirement age (for a given lifetime income) may or may not be distorted. When a distortion is called for, its sign depends on whether the ‘‘dominant’’ source of heterogeneity is health or productivity. When individuals differ mainly (or exclusively) in productivity, the distortion goes against weekly labor supply. When health differentials are dominant, the distortion goes against retirement age.
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Low back pain around retirement age and physical occupational exposure during working life.

Low back pain around retirement age and physical occupational exposure during working life.

Sandrine Plouvier * , Julie Gourmelen, Jean-François Chastang, Jean-Louis Lanoë and Annette Leclerc Abstract Background: Physical occupational exposure is a risk factor for low back pain in workers but the long term effects of exposure remain unclear. As several countries consider increasing the retirement age, further information on this topic is relevant. This study aimed to describe the prevalence of low back pain among middle aged and aging individuals in the general French population according to physical occupational exposure and retirement status. Methods: The study population originated from the French national survey ‘Enquête décennale santé 2002’. Low back pain for more than 30 days within the previous twelve months (LBP) was assessed using a French version of the Nordic questionnaire. Occupational exposure was self assessed. Subjects were classified as “exposed” if they were currently or had previously been exposed to handling of heavy loads and/or to tiring postures. The weighted prevalence of LBP was computed separately for men and women, for active (aged 45-59) and retiree (aged 55-74), according to 5-year age group and past/present occupational exposure.
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Framing social security reform: Behavioral responses to changes in the full retirement age

Framing social security reform: Behavioral responses to changes in the full retirement age

retirement age (FRA) from 65 to 66 in two month increments per year of birth for cohorts born from 1938 to 1943. We find strong evidence that the spike in the benefit claiming hazard at 65 moved in lockstep along with the FRA. Results on self-reported retirement and exit from employment are less clear-cut, but go in the same direction. The responsiveness to the new FRA is stronger for people with higher cognitive skills. We interpret the findings as evidence of reference dependence with loss aversion. We develop a simple labor supply model with reference dependence that can explain the results. The model has potentially important implications for framing of future Social Security reforms. JEL: J26
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Voting on pensions with endogenous retirement age

Voting on pensions with endogenous retirement age

the substitution effect dominates the income effect, it induces people to retire earlier. 3 To our knowledge, only two papers deal with the retirement decision in a political econ- omy environment. Lacomba and Lagos (1999) study the problem of a direct vote on the (mandatory) retirement age. More closely related to our study, Conde Ruiz and Galasso (2003, 2004) develop a model in which the vote takes place simultaneously on the payroll tax rate and on the decision on whether to introduce an early retirement provision. They show that the early retirement provision may be sustained at equilibrium by a coalition of the poor workers, who want to retire early, and old people with incomplete earnings history, who would receive no pension without this provision. This analysis and ours can be considered as complementary. Indeed, we do not investigate the issue of introducing an early retirement age.
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Effects of delaying the normal retirement age on retirement behaviour of Belgian women

Effects of delaying the normal retirement age on retirement behaviour of Belgian women

(0.011) (0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) Observations 33005 Notes: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the individual level. Specifications include indicators for the treatment group, the period after the treatment and additional controls for blue- collar status, activity sector, region, family status, partner’s employment status, partner’s pension status, second-order polynomials in experience, assimilated days, lifetime average earnings, annual earnings, partner’s annual earnings and partner’s age as well as quarter dummies. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Retirement age and senior workers’ employment: modelling the ‘distance-to-retirement’ effect

Retirement age and senior workers’ employment: modelling the ‘distance-to-retirement’ effect

The distance to retirement effect modelling implies to modify the end of the professional career. The easiest way to model it is to postpone the age of leaving the labour market by the same proportion of the increase of the minimum legal age of retirement. For example, when the minimum legal age of retirement increases by one year, we postpone by one year all individual employment situations: all individuals in employment at 60 year old will be in employment at 61 year old, etc. We can also make the assumption that the proportion is lesser than 1 to take into account a partial feedback effect or for the transitional period before the total implementation of the reform. The proportionality coefficient is then ad-hoc. This type of assumption is made in Destinie for the 2010-2060 population projection exercise 8 .
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Mortality transition and differential incentives for early retirement

Mortality transition and differential incentives for early retirement

The second contribution of this article is methodological. Existing stud- ies analyzing the relation between mortality change and retirement age often use indexes or parameters to represent mortality changes, and consider the derivative(s) of the optimal retirement age with respect to the mortality para- meter(s). However, such a change in the mortality parameter usually affects the instantaneous mortality rates (and thus the survival probabilities) at dif- ferent ages. We show that the more fundamental question about the effect on retirement age of a mortality decline at an arbitrary age can be achieved by using the Volterra derivative. As mortality changes at different ages may also have systematically different effects on other important variables such as growth rate of output per capita (e.g., Boucekkine et al., 2002; Zhang et al., 2003), the analysis in this article leads us to believe that the use of the Volterra derivative will be helpful in other economic-demographic studies in the future.
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The Recent Evolution of Retirement Patterns in Canada

The Recent Evolution of Retirement Patterns in Canada

The determinants of the decision to retire are numerous (Lumbsdaine and Mitchell, 1999). They are best understood within the context of a life-cycle model where individuals compare the expected utility of retirement and that of continuing to work. Within that framework, financial incentives embedded in retirement programs influence retirement decisions. Not only the level of retirement benefits but also how these accrue with age and contributions to a pension plan affect these forward looking decisions. Most retirement programs “tax” work at older ages by providing actuarially unfair adjustments to benefits when retirement is postponed and by taxing work while claiming pensions (Gruber and Wise, 2004; Baker, Gruber and Milligan, 2003 for Canada). According to Milligan and Schirle (2006), the actuarial adjustment in the Canada/Québec pension plan does not sufficiently compensate for foregone year of earnings. Hence, it provides some disincentive to work longer. Defined benefit private pensions provide similar incentives, with large disincentives at particular ages surrounding the “normal retirement age” and early retirement windows which allow workers to leave the workforce with little or no penalty for early withdrawal (Stock and Wise, 1990). The level of earnings and
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Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: the French experience

Taxation of early retirement windows and delaying retirement: the French experience

reduces job destruction holding all other things fixed. On the other hand in the case of a high tax rate τ , an increase in the mandatory retirement age may encourage employers to dismiss their older workers, offsetting therefore the dissuasive effect of the tax. The idea is the following: in the case of a high taxation of early retirement windows, an employer has interest to retain his older worker, even though the present value of his job to the employer is negative after a productivity shock. Indeed, as long as the loss in profits does not exceed the separation costs due to the tax, the employer prefers waiting for his worker to reach the mandatory retirement age. In this setting, when the government raises the mandatory retirement age, the horizon along which the firm will incur loss in profits is longer and the employer may have interest to dismiss his older worker earlier, offering him early retirement windows. This impatience effect of firms will therefore raise job separations among older workers, offsetting the initial labor-hoarding effect of the tax.
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Senior activity rate, retirement incentives and labor relations

Senior activity rate, retirement incentives and labor relations

Interaction between implicit tax and generalized trust In table 5, we replace working conditions by trust of males aged between 55 and 64. Trust is measured at the country level using the European Values Survey and the World Values Survey. Trust is the share of people who answer most people can be trusted to the following question : Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people ? This widely used measure of trust in others is recognized as a proxy for many aspects of cooperation and condence incentives. Table 5 shows that trust in others play the same role as the quality of labor relations in the response of seniors participation rate to retirement incentives. The in- teraction term between trust and implicit tax is always negative and strongly signicant. As previously, we nd that the elasticity of senior activity rate to pension generosity is stronger in countries with higher trust. This result holds for all specications (controlling for standard retirement age and including time xed eects) and when using dierent measures of implicit tax on continued work. We do not measure the role of the dispersion of trust since it will not provide additional information in the case of a Bernoulli variable. All the infor- mation about the distribution function is summarized in the average answer.
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Retirement and the Marginal Utility of Income

Retirement and the Marginal Utility of Income

Our regression sample from the HRS is defined as follows. For the purpose of our analysis, we require that the individual be in work at wave t and also be observed at wave t + 1. We concentrate on individuals who are at “prime retirement age” in the US, 55-70, at both waves t and t + 1. We also drop those who are retired in the first period in which we observe them (as we then have no pre-retirement observation when they were employed). We keep the observations only on individuals who are in employment; any subsequent observations once they are retired are dropped. The approach is then to relate the individual’s current characteristics when employed to their probability of being retired two years later. Last, some individuals are observed to retire but subsequently re-enter the labour market. We drop all observations on these individuals, and as such consider retirement as an absorbing state. Our final estimation consists of 22,075 observations on individuals in employment, representing 7,975 individuals, amongst whom 41% will retire over the seven waves of data. categories.
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Does Retirement Affect Cognitive Functioning?

Does Retirement Affect Cognitive Functioning?

[Table 2 about here] 4.1.4. Alternative instruments: expected age of retirement This section presents results of the IV model using an alternative instrument for retirement: expected age of retirement. This measure has been found to be a good predictor of actual date of retirement (Bernheim, 1989; Disney and Tanner, 1999). The HRS includes questions on whether and when the respondent plans to retire, and if there is currently no planned retirement date, when he thinks he will stop work or retire. 14 For this purpose, we select all individuals who are working at the first interview year and who have reported the year they expect to retire. The instrument is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 when the respondent has reached her/his expected retirement age. Table 3 displays the results of the model estimated by two-stage least-squares within estimator. 15 The first stage equation shows that this instrument has a large and significant impact on the retirement decision. The probability of retirement increases by about 19 percentage points when individuals reach their expected retirement age. The F-test on the instrument shows that it has strong predictive power on actual retirement (F(1, 16190) = 690.85). The estimated effect of retirement on memory score is again negative and significant and close to the previous within-IV estimator. The magnitude of the effect is estimated to be -0.24 of a standard deviation of the memory score (95% confidence interval -0.43 to -0.06).
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Fair Retirement Under Risky Lifetime

Fair Retirement Under Risky Lifetime

Proof. See above. The introduction of asymmetric information a¤ects the form of the ex ante egalitarian optimum at three levels. First, the optimum now involves inequal- ities in terms of the expected lifetime welfare between types H and L, since equalizing expected lifetime welfare is incompatible with incentive constraints. A higher expected lifetime welfare for type H is necessary to prevent type-H agents from pretending to be of type L. Second, the optimal consumption pro- …le is no longer ‡at for type-L agents, but is now decreasing, unlike at the …rst-best. Moreover, type-L agent’s optimal retirement age is here distorted downwards. Making type-L agents consume less and retire earlier at the second- period makes mimicking unappealing for type-H agents. Regarding the ex post egalitarian optimum, the same incompatibility with incentive constraints holds, and therefore inequalities in realized welfare remain at the optimum, between type-H and type-L agents. Those inequalities are not related to the young age, since …rst-period consumptions are equalized across all agents. On the con- trary, second-period consumptions are not equal, since type H enjoy a higher consumption than type L. Here again, the age at retirement is distorted down- wards for the type-L agent, in such a way as to make mimicking by type-H unappealing.
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Retirement and Unexpected Health Shocks

Retirement and Unexpected Health Shocks

5 (2014) come to similar conclusions using Australian data. Other authors provide similar evidence based on the HRS (Insler, 2014), SHARE (Coe and Zamarro, 2011), SILC (Hessel, 2016), and German panel data (Eibich, 2015). In the latter paper, the channel is the relief from work-related stress and strain and the increase in sleep duration and in physical activity. Hallberg et al. (2015) reach the same conclusion using a reform in the retirement age of military officers in Sweden. Finally, some papers release more ambiguous results. In particular, Johnston and Lee (2009) find a positive impact of retirement on mental health and a less clear effect on physical health. Moreover, De Grip et al. (2015) show that retirees face lower declines in cognitive flexibility, but lower-educated retirees face greater declines with respect to information processing speed, compared to those who remain employed, in the Netherlands.
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The double dividend of postponing retirement

The double dividend of postponing retirement

Quite often, when people are asked to choose between the status quo in terms of ben- efits and retirement age and a new regime with postponed retirement and about similar benefits (yearly pension) they will most likely choose the status quo. This is individually rational. However this decision is based on an unrealistic alternative. With the dependency rate reaching its peak in a couple of decades benefits will have to be cut, if both contribu- tions and retirement do not change. This is the iron law of pay-as-you-go systems. There was a time when one could escape this iron law by shifting the financial burden to future generations. But today this is less and less possible.
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Raising the age of retirement: an example of political ratchet effect

Raising the age of retirement: an example of political ratchet effect

An obvious response to increased life-expectancy would be to raise the retirement age, both the statutory and the effective ones. Yet, Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) stressed that the generosity of policymakers in the pension area is reflected by the fact that since 1970, the effective retirement age has declined in several industrial countries while life expectancy has increased significantly. Why are policymakers so generous and why have they been unable to maintain a reasonable balance between life expectancy and retirement age? First, increasing eligibility and real benefits in pay-as-you-go pension systems is not very costly in the short-term, since budgetary imbalances, as measured by general government deficit, will only unfold in the longer term. Second, there has been a strong support in the public at large for social protection, which certainly contributed to increasing government size. Increased
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The Recent Evolution of Retirement Patterns in Canada

The Recent Evolution of Retirement Patterns in Canada

The determinants of the decision to retire are numerous (Lumbsdaine and Mitchell, 1999). They are best understood within the context of a life-cycle model where individuals compare the expected utility of retirement and that of continuing to work. Within that framework, financial incentives embedded in retirement programs influence retirement decisions. Not only the level of retirement benefits but also how these accrue with age and contributions to a pension plan affect these forward looking decisions. Most retirement programs “tax” work at older ages by providing actuarially unfair adjustments to benefits when retirement is postponed and by taxing work while claiming pensions (Gruber and Wise, 2004; Baker, Gruber and Milligan, 2003 for Canada). According to Milligan and Schirle (2006), the actuarial adjustment in the Canada/Québec pension plan does not sufficiently compensate for foregone year of earnings. Hence, it provides some disincentive to work longer. Defined benefit private pensions provide similar incentives, with large disincentives at particular ages surrounding the “normal retirement age” and early retirement windows which allow workers to leave the workforce with little or no penalty for early withdrawal (Stock and Wise, 1990). The level of earnings and
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