is the definition of the UK Sustainable Procurement Task Force in 2006, which states “sustainable procurement is the process whereby organizations meet their needs for goods, services, works and utilities in a way that achieves value for money on a whole life basis. It results in benefits not only to the organization, but also to society and the economy, whilst minimizing damage to the environment” (DEFRA, 2006; Perera et al., 2007; Preuss, 2009). Sustainable PublicProcurement (SPP) does not have a consensus definition among researchers. The EU defines SPP as “a process by which public authorities seek to achieve the appropriate balance between the three pillars of sustainable development - economic, social and environmental - when procuring goods, services or works at all stages of the project” (European Commission, 2017a). Other names like green publicprocurement (GPP), Environmental preferable Procurement (EPP), Social Responsible Procurement (SRP), Sustainable Acquisition (SA), Responsible Procurement (RP), CSR Procurement and Ethical Procurement are also being used but mean the same as SPP. GPP and EPP try to emphasize the environmental aspect over social and economic ones but don’t exclude them (UNEP, 2013). Defined by the EU “Green PublicProcurement (GPP) means that public authorities seek to purchase goods, services and works with a reduced environmental impact throughout their life-cycle compared to goods, services and works with the same primary function which would otherwise be procured” (European Commission, 2017a). Seeing all the definitions pointing on one or more aspect of sustainability in publicprocurement it makes sense to use the all-inclusive expression of SPP following the lead of the WTO and the UNEP (UNEP, 2013; Yaker, 2017).
In a nutshell, while auctions are supposed to ensure transparency, selection of the lowest cost bidders by benefiting from competition and prevent biased awarding of contracts, it may have some undesirable self-selection consequences and fail to respond optimally to ex post adaptation. On the contrary, negotiations may easily be suspected of corruption and favouritism but in the same time these “relational” contracting modes allow public buyers and suppliers to spend more time discussing ex ante the characteristics of the project to be delivered, and the appropriate design of the contract thereby reducing the risk of ex post opportunistic haggling. Hence, according to this literature, the trade-off between auctions and negotiations in publicprocurement is assumed to depend on (1) the buyers’ level of expertise and competencies regarding the organization of competitive tendering, (2) the potential for competition, and (3) the level of complexity of the project to be procured. In what follows, we present the theoretical arguments regarding these three aspects. In the next session, we investigate whether we can find empirical regularities suggesting that these aspects influence French public buyers’ decision regarding the choice of an award procedure for works contracts.
This paper proposes an approach to identify reticent respondents and correct biases in firm-level surveys using a more objective measure of cor- ruption based on respondents’ actual experience of corruption. The iden- tification strategy uses observed breach and circumvention of rules in the allocation of publicprocurement contracts. This red flag indicator of cor- ruption risk is computed at firm-level using publicprocurement data in Madagascar matched with a survey among firms awarded public contracts, and is used to identify how experience of corruption influences firms’ deci- sions to participate in a corruption survey and to answer a sensitive survey question about their perceived magnitude of bribery in publicprocurement. We find that while firms more at risk of corruption have the same be- havior, on average, than other firms with regard to survey participation and response rates to sensitive questions, these firms deny significantly more frequently than the others the existence of corruption in public contract- ing. More specifically, firms which have won more public contracts through breach or circumvention of procurement rules are more likely to deny that firms similar to their own have to offer gifts or make illegal payments to pub- lic officials to secure public contracts. In terms of magnitude of the effect, one additional public contract suspected of corruption awarded to a firm increases its probability of estimating a zero magnitude of bribery in publicprocurement by 0.84 percentage point, with a proportion of zero estimates in the survey sample of 15.7 percent. These results suggest that bribery in- dicators using business survey data are largely underestimating corruption due to such strategic behavior by corrupt firms. The more corrupt firms in the survey sample, the larger the downward bias. This result is particularly problematic for the reliability of cross-country indicators of bribery which compare countries with different proportions of bribe-paying firms.
In order to implement and actually use a SIs selector in publicprocurement professionals require a pool of SIs or criteria and their methods, similar to the one used for this study. Experience and evolution of the used indicators then lead to a more focused set of reusable SIs for publicprocurement. The rise of SIs and the increased production of new SIs and frameworks like the GPP criteria of the EU provide more than enough SIs in order to use a SIs selector. The derived typology contributes to the debate between quants and poets a new approach of combining qualitative and quantitative methods as called for by scholars (Macnamara, 2015; Morse, 2004). In the debate between quants an poets the paper with its typology and the selector anticipates critiques from poets like Jesinghaus and Crane et al. (Crane et al., 2018; Jesinghaus, 2018) about the aggregation of numbers and dominating quantitative measures. Thus, it aims to balance the usage of methods in SIs development bringing the two camps closer together. Firstly, by providing an overview of current usage in a typology, secondly, by conceptualizing a tool which enables the harmonious usage of quantitative and qualitative methods simultaneously in a hybrid way for the best usage of SIs towards sustainable development. Furthermore, it contributes to the debate between incrementalists and contextualists a way to refocus on contextuality by combining numerical IVs with qualitative methods until the development of thresholds and limits flourish. Although, instead of waiting for new SIs and thresholds as proposed by Baue (2019) we use his argument to learn by doing and use today what is there in order to provide needed contextuality in the usage of SIs with the conceptualization of the selector and mixed methods (Baue, 2019).
These analytical precautions lead me to ask two questions: (1) What new development and (2) what paradigm are associated with sustainable procurement? In this article I shall answer these two questions by putting forward two theses. Firstly, I shall show that, despite the legitimate doubts that have just been expressed, there is indeed something new in the idea of sustainable procurement. I shall explain that this has to do first of all with the fact that sustainable procurement today is identified as a stake in its own right that is both a specific strand within sustainable development policies and pulls together causes that until now had followed parallel tracks. In addition, we shall see that when the players describe good sustainable procurement practices, they support the finding that these good practices are completely out of line with the ways in which publicprocurement usually works. Secondly, I shall show that the sustainable procurement paradigm connects up various notions of what is desirable. In so doing, this article reproduces the classic finding of the variety of orientations that are prescribed in the name of sustainable development. Yet I believe that this finding is usefully illustrated by the case of procurement. By adopting a highly inductive research approach, I shall single out three justifications that are generally put forward and that I shall call “doubly winning purchasing”, “globally winning purchasing” and “morally responsible purchasing”, associated with three good practice models incarnated in the figures of the buyer, the expert, and the citizen. Based on this work I shall then show what in my view appears to be a lack in the institutional and normative literature on sustainable procurement and shall plead in favor of testing deliberative decision- making schemes.
B- Government of Quebec PublicProcurement Process
Publicprocurement is an extremely complicated function of a government (Thai, 2001). There are multiple laws, regulations, decrees, policies and guidelines regulating public contracting. For example, in Quebec, the main law for Government contracting is the An Act respecting contracting by public bodies: “The purpose of this Act is to determine the conditions applicable regarding public contracts between a public body and a contractor who is a legal person established for a private interest, a general, limited or undeclared partnership or a natural person who operates a sole proprietorship.” An Act respecting contracting by public bodies (2006). This law gives the power to the Treasury Board to define a normative framework that the government and other public entities must follow. To this end, the Treasury Board has defined multiple contract types, methods of solicitation as well as methods of adjudication for IT services contract after a publicprocurement process.
, en même temps que de rénover les règles de fond du droit des marchés publics. En 1992, une autre directive sur les recours fut adoptée pour les industries de réseaux 14 . Ce rapport, disponible sur Internet, fournit quelques indications intéressantes sur comment le système fonctionne en pratique, plus particulièrement comment il est perçu par les acteurs économiques 15 . Le rapport montre que, parmi les 543 opérateurs économiques qui ont répondu, 212 (39 %) ont déjà participé à des procédures d’attribution de marchés publics dans leur propre Etat-membre et 39 (7 %) dans un autre Etat-membre (ce qui démontre que la majorité des entreprises ayant participé à cette étude d’impact n’avait jamais participé à une procédure d’attribution d’un marché public). Parmi ces 212 entreprises, une majorité était satisfaite ou assez satisfaite du résultat (58,2 %, soit 122 pour 87 qui n’étaient pas satisfaites). La principale raison de mécontentement provenait d’opérateurs économiques qui considéraient que les marchés publics n’étaient pas attribués sur les seules critères de concurrence (32,9 %), les autres estimant qu’ils n’avaient pas reçu une explication suffisante au rejet de leur offre (22,2 %), ou qu’ils avaient eu des difficultés à comprendre ou à se conformer aux règles de procédures (15,8 %) ou qu’ils avaient eu du mal à connaître l’existence d’un avis d’appel public à concurrence (13,3 %). Parmi ceux qui ont manifesté leur mécontentement, seuls 21,2 % ont déposé un recours devant l’autorité publique contractante, devant un organe spécial ou devant une juridiction. Les raisons de cette réticence à déposer un recours étaient diverses : la crainte qu’ils pourraient être désavantagés dans de futurs marchés publics (25,5 %) ; l’absence de confiance dans le système de recours (17,5 %) ; l’inopportunité d’un recours alors que le contrat est déjà signé (11,3 %) ; la lenteur des procédures juridictionnelles (9,9 %) ; les frais de justice associés à un recours (8,5 %) ; ou le fait que le recours potentiel serait insuffisant pour compenser la perte réelle (8 %). Près de 75 % des opérateurs économiques ayant répondu à cette question se déclaraient favorables à une période moratoire entre la décision d’attribution du marché public et la signature du contrat.
decision to privatize through economic efficiency factors are usually related to cost reductions. In theory, when choosing between contracting in-house or privately, the municipality should account for the two main dimensions of the TCE, namely, asset specificity and contractual complexity (Williamson , Levin and Tadelis ). On the one hand, asset specificity describes the condition where the assets cannot be redeployed to alternative users or uses without loss of productive value (Williamson , Klein et al. ). Situations where asset specificity is strong may lead one of the parties being locked in this contractual scheme. On the other hand, contractual complexity refers to the contract completeness. Complexity is made of two main dimensions: the measurability of ex-post performances and the need for flexibility leading to high contractual costs if privatization is chosen. Therefore, public ownership is more likely as asset specificity and contractual complexity get stronger (Brown and Potoski , Levin and Tadelis ). Other dimensions, such as sensitivity to quality, should be accounted for. As Hart et al.  show, in the case of private provision, the contractor typically has too strong incentives to reduce costs which consequently has an adverse effect over the quality. Also, the government needs to engage in negotiations with the private operator if he wants to improve the quality level. They advocate to use in-house provision when non-contractible cost reductions deteriorate quality, and when quality innovations are not an important dimension of the service. In this respect, the water sector does not appear to be relatively subject to transaction-cost issues. As explained
Keywords: Government Procurement, Trade Agreements, Gravity Equation. JEL codes: F13, F14, F15, H57.
∗ We are grateful to Mario Larch and Federico Trionfetti for insightful exchanges and suggestions. We also thank Serena Cocciolo, Julien Gourdon, Asif Islam, Bill Maloney, Gustavo Piga, and participants to the World Bank Virtual Seminar Series on Deep Trade Agreements for useful comments. This paper is part of World Bank’s ongoing work on Deep Trade Agreements and a background paper for the flagship report on Global PublicProcurement and Development Impact. This paper has benefited from support from the World Bank’s Umbrella Facility for Trade trust fund financed by the governments of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Lorenzo Rotunno acknowledges funding received from the French National Research Agency Grants ANR-17-EURE-0020. Errors are our responsibility only. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
In this context, the objective to “identify the determinants of the sustainability, and variations in the impacts, of different FQS at the food chain and rural area” (Task 5.1) is reached by developing a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators able to capturing the environmental, social and economic impact. Much of the same methodology will be employed to evaluate the impacts of new forms of publicprocurement and meal provision in selected elementary schools in the countries of interest (Task 6.3) and, with some further adaptations, to evaluate the impacts of SFSC on rural territories while identifying the factors that support or deter their development (Tasks 7.1-7.2). This evaluation will consider the structure of the LAFSs and the related value chains, differentiating whether it is comprised (i.e., the supply chain) within the given territory and, thus, in the market. Quantitative data will guarantee the possibility to observe the magnitude of the variables in different contexts and over time, but, most importantly, will allow for comparing the indicators according to their specific framework (i.e., quality scheme/territory/food chain). Quantitative indicators are defined by using both primary and secondary data, with the latter being collected using existing database(s) that refer(s) to the territorial dimension and, when possible, to the food chain. Primary data will be collected by direct interviews with agents in the chain, when necessary. Both data collection procedures will follow the “index card” approach developed for each indicator and collected in the Methodological Handbook (Deliverable 3.2).
SidiBou Said, Carthage, Tunisia
Abstract—In this paper, a four-phase approach for Integrated Procurement-Production (IPP) tactical planning in a multi- echelon, multi-product and multi-period Supply Chain (SC) network is proposed. To account for ambiguity and vagueness in some real-world data and preferences, in the ﬁrst phase of the approach, the Fuzzy Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (fuzzy TOPSIS) method is used to obtain the overall performance and risk ratings of the suppliers with regard to a set of qualitative and quantitative criteria. In the second phase, we introduce a novel multi-objective possibilistic mixed integer linear programming model (MOPMILP) for solving an IPP planning considering conﬂicting goals simultaneously: maximization of the overall performance and minimization of the overall risk. Then, after converting this MOPMILP model into an equivalent crisp multi-objective mixed integer linear programming (MOMILP) model, we use the Goal Programming (GP) approach to solve this MOMILP model in order to find an efficient compromise solution (i.e. an efficient procurement production plan) for the whole SC. The proposed approach and solution methodology are validated through a numerical example. Keywords—Integrated Procurement-Production; Fuzzy TOPSIS; performance; risk; Possibilistic mixed integer linear programming; goal programming
de la demande et de l’offre, et plaçant l’auditeur dans une sorte d’auto-soumission pleinement acceptée, plus que cela, recherchée avec passion. 2
Ce geste aura une longue descendance, puisque, à travers Wagner, Debussy, Schönberg, Boulez – et plus encore, chaque fois, à travers les wagnériens, les debussystes, les défenseurs de la musique atonale ou de la série généralisée –, selon des modalités différentes il va peu à peu s’installer, sans partage, comme le rapport exclusif à l’art contemporain. Mais on voit combien cette posture n’a rien d’un déni du public. En imposant une esthétique, en trouvant ses défenseurs, puis en devenant la norme du goût moderne, l’« art-pour-l’art » n’est pas une rupture avec le public : il est une entreprise inédite de production de son propre public par l’art, l’une des plus puissantes qui aient existé dans l’histoire. Beethoven, précurseur de l’art- pour-l’art, ne s’arrache à la tyrannie de l’art-pour-un-public qu’en s’imposant de fabriquer de toute pièce un public-pour-l’art – et il va réussir !
Analysis of Procurement Strategies
The markets for the technologies relevant to avian influenza vary significantly in terms of their competitiveness, cost to entry, regulatory environment, and excess capacity in the industry, among other factors. However, several themes can be highlighted to understand market efficiencies and the barriers to pandemic preparedness. The pre-pandemic procurement of each of these technologies faces unique challenges but policy solutions can be used to bring about change and we have used our technologies unique characteristics to highlight this. Upon the emergence of a pandemic virus, immediate demand surges can be expected. Anticipating shortages, governments have already begun to stockpile key technologies such as anitivirals and facemasks. However, even with adequate funds for purchasing supplies, market conditions will render some technologies unavailable without other government interventions. Government procurement can improve the supply of technologies needed for pandemic response. The ability of the government to procure pre-pandemic supplies of technologies, and the urgency for doing so, depends heavily on the market conditions for each technology. It is worth repeating that the scope of this report is restricted to procurement of technologies limiting the effects of a human pandemic specifically. Therefore, our analysis of procurement is limited to the critical technologies targeted for humans.
Démarré à la lisière d’une frontière longtemps barbelée, mon parcours vise à présent la compréhension de la notion d’espace vital au sein d’une agglomération urbaine, lieu de tous les possibles et emblème d’un univers où la concentration des multitudes pose le problème de l’espace existentiel. Celui-ci se trouve de plus en plus réduit et soumis aux contraintes, aux règlementations, tout en favorisant une superposition aléatoire et ambi- guë entre public et privé. La frontière entre intérieur et extérieur est fragilisée. L’espace qui devrait nous définir se dilate et se contracte au gré des mouvements du monde. Dans La poétique de l’espace Gaston Bachelard écrit : Alors, à la surface de l’être, dans cette région où l’être veut se manifester et veut se cacher, les mouvements de fermeture et d’ouverture sont si nombreux, si souvent inversés, si chargés aussi d’hésitation que nous pourrions conclure par cette formule : l’homme est l’être entr’ouvert 5 .
This paper presents a novel optimization model for green supply chain management with green procurement that minimizes traditional supply chain location and transportation cost, in addition to the carbon emissions cost through carbon trading. The mixed-integer programming (MIP) model captures the impact of different emission caps on the supply chain cost, and helps reveal an optimal strategy for companies to meet their carbon cap, while minimizing the opportunity cost. The model assumes that the company’s emissions are directly affected by the carbon embedded in the raw materials procured from the suppliers. The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the literature conducted on green supply chains; Section III presents the mathematical formulation of the model; Section IV presents the numerical analysis of the model; and Section V concludes with future research directions.