Firstly, we demonstrate that firms’ adoption and use of ICT is a positive function of their size. As expected, there is a positive correlation between a firm’s size and its ICT capital stock (adoption), showing the existence of scale economies for digital investment. Similar to industrial technologies, large firms have more incentives to adopt ICT, as they have the chance to spread adjustment costs over a more substantial output volume. Larger firms are more likely to adopt digital technologies because they show lower levels of financial constraints. This effect is relatively stable regardless of the type of the technology considered. At the same time, the firm’s size has a positive and significant effect on the intensity of use of ICT (intra-firm diffusion). Our results confirm the expected effects stated in hypothesis 2. The raking effect ofdiffusion seems validated here since we have shown that a firms’ size matters in intra-firm diffusion. This is mainly because larger companies need relatively more internal or external (wave 2 and 3) coordination tools. Concerning the firm's seniority effect, we show that ICT adoption and uses differ according to the models. Globally, the age of the company does not have a significant effect on the adoption of the second and third waves ICTs. And only more than ten-year-old firms have a significant effect. The effect of this variable in the intensity of use is more important for aged firms than for others. Within our sample and especially for companies that are older than ten years we find a significant effect. These findings show that the disequilibrium theory is validated. In fact, the correlation between the intensity of use (intra-firm innovationdiffusion) and the rank variables (seniority and size) indicate that a firm’s behavior can’t be independent of its size and seniority even if expected returns of the marginal use of the technology considerations are forgotten. Our results show also that the dynamics followed by the adoption of the technology differ from the ones followed by the depth of adoption. These findings are shared by most of the new literature in the matter of ICT usage. The challenge to verify the epidemic variables seems to be more attractive in this context.
Costs associated with transferring innovation- related information on OPAC modifications are relatively minor---at most involving providing a copy of user-developed software code plus some informal consulting by library staff. As a result, we hypothesize that small transfer costs, such as when an innovating user already has established links in place to other users and manufacturers (for example, via member- ship in manufacturer-sponsored user groups), will increase the likelihood that a user making a modi- fication will share it with others. Rogers (1983) has identified the importance of preexisting communica- tion networks in the diffusionofinnovation, while Midgley et al. (1992) demonstrated the effect of dif- ferent network structures in determining the shape of the diffusion curve of an innovation. In addition, we would expect users to be more likely to undertake the effort to inform other users and/or manufacturers of an innovation they had developed if they thought that those others would find it of value. We use member- ship of a manufacturer-sponsored OPAC user group as a surrogate for network connectedness of the user. We have direct measures of the manufacturer’s valua-
Our simple formulation of an urban genome and associ- ated evolutionary processes, implemented by the diffusionofinnovation, already capture complex urban dynamics, as shown for example by the emergence of an intermediate op- timal regime corresponding to local innovation niches which diffuse far. Although much more empirical work would be needed to compare these stylized facts to real world settings, our model suggests in this particular setting that too much integration is not always optimal, what corresponds to the theoretical fact that complex systems are generally modular at different scales (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004). More gen- erally, regarding the implications of our results for possible formalizations and theories of urban evolution which would closely build on biological and cultural evolution by extend- ing them, we have demonstrated how a particular instance of an urban genome can be used to simulate urban dynamics, including fundamental processes needed to effectively have evolution. To what extent this approach relates to existing approaches of urban evolution which use other definitions remains to be investigated.
North-Eastern and Central regions is very instructive. Actually, within this subgroup the first rank goes to the Abruzzi region, immediately followed by Emilia-Romagna and Marches, while the Umbria region instead features a low coefficient. At a comparative level it is worth noting that the speed at which innovation capabilities spread within the Abruzzi region is 76.6% greater than that of Piedmont and 40% than that of Lombardy. For what concerns the Emilia-Romagna region the magnitude of the difference is of +55.1% and +23% as compared to Lombardy and Piedmont respectively. The Marches region has a β value 25.2% higher than that of Piedmont, but almost equal to that of Lombardy. It must be also noted that the rate of appearance in Liguria is in between that of Piedmont and that Lombardy The results of the econometric estimations therefore provide strong support not only to the idea that the emergence ofinnovation capabilities followed a logistic path, but also to the hypothesis concerning cross-regional differences. Some regions in the North-East-Centre, specifically Emilia-Romagna, Marches and Abruzzi are characterized by diffusion rates systematically higher than those of Piedmont, and equal or higher to those of Lombardy. The Emilia-Romagna region, in particular, can be considered as the first region in the North-East-Centre side of Italy in which the diffusionofinnovation capabilities took place, while Abruzzi and Marches seem to follow it with a slight delay 14 .
an ideological or commonplace linguistic context. It serves the practical – as opposed to the purely mental or intellectual.
From the very first theoretical thoughts on ‘social innovation’ in the twentieth century (e.g.: Drucker, 1957) to the most recent ones, social innovation, defined as “new ideas that work in meeting social needs” (Mulgan, 2007), has been presented as a new idea, or at least the interest in the idea is presented as new or relatively new. Some writers date the origins of the term to 1970 (Cloutier, 2003). Some suggest that Benjamin Franklin, Karl Mrrx, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and Joseph Schumpeter had the “notion” already (Mumford, 2002; Hillier et al., 2004; Nussbaumer and Moulaert, 2002; Ionescu, 2015). However, most often the ‘newness’ is taken for granted and is not documented. In fact, social innovation is regularly contrasted to technological innovation, and presented as a remedy for or adjustment to the undesired – or limited – effects of technological innovation (e.g.: Mesthene, 1969; Dedijer, 1984; Mulgan, 2007; Klein and Harrisson, 2007; Callon, 2007; Murray et al., 2009). In this sense, the term social innovation would have appeared after that of technological innovation. In fact, one of, if not the oldest X- innovation form is social innovation. It amounts to an enlargement of the concept ofinnovation, from the religious to the political to the social and to the economy (Godin, 2015). The term dates back to the beginning of the nineteenth century – a time when ‘technological innovation’ did not exist in discourse.
country level, it is hard not to make the link between the sub-par Canadian performance in business R&D and weak productivity performance at the international level. R&D is only one, though often the most important, of several activities leading to successful innovation. According to Statistics Canada (Schelling and Gault, 2006) a large percentage of firms reporting R&D activity and claiming R&D tax credits spend less than $100 000 per year, an amount barely covering the wage cost of one full time equivalent senior researcher. This suggests a suboptimal level of R&D activity below the critical mass of human and complementary resources needed for successful innovation and its commercialization. In conclusion, results from this study show interesting trends confirming the importance ofinnovation to productivity at the firm level. However some results require further investigation. First, the weaker relationship between collaboration, government financial support and innovation expenditure intensity for Canada compared with most other OECD countries merits further research. Results show that Canadian firms do not increase their innovation expenditure intensity as much as in other countries when collaborating or when receiving public funding. This could be symptomatic of weak coordination/design of existing government programs involving collaboration or support to business innovation and cooperation.
2.2. Arguments d’assimilation du référentiel SCF 2010 en tant qu’innovation managériale
Afin d’apporter des arguments suffisants aidant à qualifier le référentiel SCF 2010 d’innovation managériale, nous revenons encore une fois sur le concept d’innovation managériale. La plupart des définitions de l’innovation managériale (Kimberly, 1981 ; Van de Ven, 1986 et Kremen-Bolton, 1993) insistent, d’une part, sur la nature des innovations managériales (idées, programmes, structures, procédures) et, d’autre part, sur le fait que pour qu’il y ait innovation, il suffit que l’innovation présente un caractère nouveau pour l’organisation qui l’adopte (Zaltma, Duncan, Holbeck 1973).
One final lesson I would like to draw from the VCR case has to do with the prominent role played by retailers in the transformation of the VCR market. If NCI is generally underplayed in the literature, innovation by retailers is nowhere to be seen. This blind spot needs correcting, and the VCR case is a good one to argue this point. Just like complementors, retailers are free agents interested in riding on a winning platform. If a few large players happen to dominate a retail market, the challenge of enticing some of them to favour a particular technological platform will not be very different from that of enlisting the support of some key complementors. But when retail networks are very fragmented, as they often are in worldwide mass markets, these two challenges become very different, as can be seen in the VCR case. As Sony learned, too late for its own good, the chances of survival of a losing platform in a mass market will depend crucially on whether or not exclusive retail deals can be secured before the battle for market domination goes into overdrive. Alas, as the VCR battle of formats began to unfold, the market for movie-video rentals — the ancillary market that no platform leader had foreseen — started calling the shots, and its fragmented structure left no opening for the losing platform to negotiate a survival niche. Betamax was dead.
Knowledge : Central object around which actors interact within innovation networks in order to generate innovative technologies
Innovation network : Temporary set of partners composed of private or public laboratories, companies, customers, suppliers, financial institutions who actively participate in the development of new products
In the world ofinnovation, many radical or disruptive ideas exist toward the end of the long tail as outliers, ideas initially discarded or considered too strange to be valuable. Given that
Collective Innovation is designed to gather thoughts from a scale and scope of sources
previously thought unattainable, the potential is quite high that many such thoughts might arrive in an organization's database. Through the use of the aforementioned Web 2.0 tools during Stage Two, an organization can increase the chance that a potentially disruptive idea will catch the eye of someone who can I appreciate it. Furthermore, if there is a mechanism that
• Miller, D. and Friesen, P.H. "Innovation in Conservative and Entrepreneurial Firms: Two Models of
strategic Momenetum." Strategic Management Journal, 3(1), 1982: 1-25.
• Pistorius, C. & Utterback, J.M. “A Lotka-Volterra Model for Multi-mode Technological Interaction:
Modeling Competition, Symbiosis and Predator-Prey Models.” Proceedings of the 5 th International
- Technology Assessment
Another pillar is represented by the works on Technology Assessment (TA) and its variants. Grunwald underlined back in 1999 that the assessment of the effects and consequences of technology had been a concern since the 1960s, due to dire problems or incidents linked to technologies. Technology assessment has led to two distinct approaches that developed independently of each other: the ethics of technology and the assessment of technology (Grunwald, 1999). The latter emerged in the 1970s in the United States, due to these negative effects but also because of the warnings given by the Club of Rome (Grunwald, 2014). At the time, the issue concerned, especially for the newly established American Office of Technology Assessment, identifying potential risks in order to be prepared rather than orienting research and technology in a more favorable and less dangerous direction. Technology was thought to have its own dynamic (Grunwald, 2011). However, this approach evolved in the 1980s, when it was acknowledged that science and technology were socially constructed. Gradually, especially after Habermas’s works, which denounced the power of experts on technological progress and the lack of technological democracy, the absence of legitimacy in some decisions about technologies, such as nuclear power, and the conflicts that this entailed, the idea of technologies developed more in keeping with societal values became more widespread. A book written by Ulrich Beck, a German sociologist, and called The
Producing User-Developed Products
Firms can make a profitable business from identifying and mass producing user-developed innovations or developing and building new products based on ideas drawn from such innovations. They can gain advantages over com- petitors by learning to do this better than other manufacturers. They may, for example, learn to identify commercially promising user innovations more effectively that other firms. Firms using lead user search techniques such as those we will describe in chapter 10 are beginning to do this sys- tematically rather than accidentally—surely an improvement. Effectively transferring user-developed innovations to mass manufacture is seldom as simple as producing a product based on a design by a single lead user. Often, a manufacturer combines features developed by several independent lead users to create an attractive commercial offering. This is a skill that a com- pany can learn better than others in order to gain a competitive advantage. The decision as to whether or when to take the plunge and commercial- ize a lead user innovation(s) is also not typically straightforward, and com- panies can improve their skills at inviting in the relevant information and making such assessments. As was discussed previously, manufacturers often do not understand emerging user needs and markets nearly as well as lead users do. Lead users therefore may engage in entrepreneurial activities, such as “selling” the potential of an idea to potential manufacturers and even lining up financing for a manufacturer when they think it very important to rapidly get widespread diffusionof a user-developed product. Lettl, Herstatt, and Gemünden (2004), who studied the commercialization of major advances in surgical equipment, found innovating users commonly engaging in these activities. It is also possible, of course, for innovating lead users to become manufacturers and produce the products they developed for general commercial sale. This has been shown to occur fairly frequently in the field of sporting goods (Shah 2000; Shah and Tripsas 2004; Hienerth 2004).
In this quest for technological innovation, statistics has been the best way to establish evidence. In the academic literature, technological innovation began to be measured via patents in the 1910s, culminating in the works of economist J. Schmookler in the 1950s (Schmookler, 1966). Then, it appeared to many that patent counts measure invention, not (commercialized) innovation. Then expenditures devoted to R&D came to be used as a proxy, thanks to the systematic data collected in the then recently-launched survey series from the US National Science Foundation. This practice then spread to other countries via the so-called OECD Frascati manual (Godin, 2005). R&D is not a bad proxy of technological innovation in reality, since two-thirds of R&D expenditures are devoted to the D (development of new technologies) (Godin, 2006b). Yet an official study concluded otherwise. In 1967, the US Department of Commerce published a study, known as the Charpie Report, which was the first governmental survey of technological innovation per se (US Department of Commerce, 1967). It showed that R&D does not constitute the main source of technological innovation. In light of the literature on technological innovation from the 1980s onward (Freeman, 1994), it appears that the study was correct. But at the time, it was criticized by economists and statisticians (Mansfield, 1971; Stead, 1976), among other things because of the definitions and categories used (Kamin et al, 1982) and because the numbers on which the study relied were “rule of thumb figures”, so qualified by the authors of the study themselves. Nevertheless, the 48 On an early publication on innovation from these two think tanks, see US National Bureau of Economic Research (1962).
lated market value ? We explore two potential reasons why this may be the case. Consider
first the case where the project is complementary with the buyers activity if bought by the buyer. The buyers willingness to pay for the project will then be what the project is worth individually and the complementary revenue that it brings in. This would shift the incen- tives of the entrepreneur towards projects that are complementary with existing technology. Now consider the case where the entrepreneur’s technology is substitutable with the buyers technology. Here the buyers willingness to pay is more complex. If the buyer has the option of shutting the project down by buying it then the buyers excess willingness to pay does not depend on the projects value but depends on the buyers revenue loss if the project is not bought 3 . Either of these two cases have the same result, industry convergence. Even if a project would potentially be very profitable, if the damage it cause to an existing firm is significant enough, then there will be an incentive to buy it out and shut it down. The basic equivalence between complementarity and substitution will be shown in the discussion section below. The static effect can be extended to the dynamic case of the model with projects having different time structures. If the different projects of the entrepreneur will both end up with the same technology but with different patterns of arrival this can equally cause firms to pursue projects of different horizons due to the possibility of being bought out. Specifically we show that projects which pass through intermediate stages of efficiency are more threatening to incumbents than projects which can more directly reach their goal. Even a technology with a lower expected value can be preferred due to the chipping away of incumbent profits. The models presented can be interpreted in one of a few different ways. The most straightforward way is simply to say that a firm wishes to buyout another firm 1 The dynamic effect is usually interpreted as a change in industry structure in such a way that less
The question has been asked, when the concept ofinnovation has been applied to the service industry, whether service innovation is identical to, similar to, or different from manufacturing innovation (which, until the 1990s, was what studies ofinnovation in SMEs looked at –Drejer, 2004; Gallouj & Savona, 2010). To the extent that innovation in municipalities has been studied (Nahlinder, 2013), similar questions have also arisen without any definitive response. In this paper we show that municipal innovation can be approached using concepts similar to those for understanding private-sector innovation. The key difference is not the type ofinnovation (which can be in technological, organizational, and policy fields), nor the overall process ofinnovation (it relies on internal capacity – both in terms of size and type -, is associated with location, and – as others have shown – is connected with external information sources and networking, McCann & Ward, 2011): the difference is in the way innovation is evaluated and in who evaluates it. In our exploratory empirical analysis, we identify some pointers as to which types of municipality engage in innovative behavior: these pointers are consistent with a Schumpeterian understanding of open innovation processes. However, we are unable to usefully distinguish innovators who receive awards from those that do not. Indeed, the fact that a jury is required to evaluate municipal innovations speaks to the difference between private-sector and municipal innovation. Municipal innovation is not usually an outward looking quest by local administrations for markets, for world firsts, or to be attractive to outsiders (this type ofinnovation can be assessed with market-like indicators, Tiebout, 1956), but is often an inward looking quest for problem solving and service provision that will be judged by local businesses, residents and civil society. Walker (2006), in his analysis ofinnovationdiffusion across English local governments comes to a similar conclusion (though he places more emphasis on competition, probably because he is analyzing large upper-tier authorities):
given the time needed for young start-ups to reach profitability or, if applicable, an appropriate selling value. This also entails an “illiquidity premium” that adds to the first one.
The economic consequence of this observed equity gap is the undervaluing of research outputs, especially public research outputs, and consequently a negative influence on economic growth. This analysis justifies the common emphasis put on the role of the States to bridge this gap, especially because New Technology-Based Fimrs (NTBF) are pivotal actors in the modern technological transitions. Regarding public policy, private equity investment has also become a means to leverage the development of innovative sectors with strong social or environmental impact. Through the participation to specialized funds, States may for example contribute to the development of sectors such as “Clean Technologies”.
des « mico-entreprises » qui sont créées pour mettre en œuvre des applications industrielles des innovations scientifiques.
Sur la base de ce constat, une stratégie est proposée : à l’échelle européenne, Grenoble reste une ville d’importance moyenne, tant est si bien qu’elle ne peut pas, à la différence des métropoles régionales comme Lyon, jouer la carte d’une économie diversifiée. Son positionnement international passe par une spécialisation : l’affirmation des compétences reconnues en informatique et en électronique doit aller de pair avec une diffusion croissante des nouvelles technologies dans l’industrie (tant en ce qui concerne les nouveaux produits que les nouveaux processus de fabrication) de manière à constituer un véritable « pôle de conception industrielle ». Autour de ce pôle qui constitue en quelque sorte le cœur de chauffe de l’économie, gravitent des activités de sous-traitance, ainsi que le commerce et les services à la personne dont la croissance est liée à l’élévation du niveau général des revenus.
donc peut-être à induire une petite différence, alors même qu’il ne s’agit pas d’un disease modifier : elle ne modifie pas fondamentalement l’histoire de la maladie. Entrer dans un essai clinique, ou dans un traitement innovant, change tout de même l’impli- cation de la famille et le suivi, ce qui impacte la prise en charge symptomatique. C’est un cercle ver- tueux. Comme le précise la Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS), pour l’instant, le Tanslarna® s’insère sans le modifier dans le schéma thérapeutique actuel de la dystrophie musculaire de Duchenne  . La deuxième histoire est celle d’un bébé de 2 mois atteint d’une amyotrophie spinale infantile (SMA) de type 1, porteur de deux copies du gène SMN2. Ses parents viennent en consultation dans un Centre de Référence parce qu’ils veulent absolument que leur enfant bénéfice du nusinersen (Spinraza®). Ce traitement est débuté à l’âge de l’âge de 3 mois, à l’issue d’une décision collégiale. L’enfant n’a alors pas d’atteinte respiratoire. Des troubles de la déglu- tition apparaissent à l’âge de 3,5 mois, puis une insuffisance respiratoire à 4 mois. L’enfant est mis sous ventilation non invasive (VNI) et hospitalisé en réanimation. Dans ce cas, le traitement innovant a eu un impact sur la prise en charge. L’enfant a bénéficié d’une VNI qu’il n’aurait peut-être pas eu s’il n’avait pas été traité par nusinersen. Il a été pris en charge en réanimation au lieu d’être hos- pitalisé en service conventionnel. L’évolution vers une insuffisance respiratoire terminale a conduit à la décision d’un arrêt du Spinraza®. L’enfant est décédé à 5 mois, dans un consensus préservé entre Éthique et innovation