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Captive model tests for assessing the coursekeeping of the DND Joint Support Ship contract design

Captive model tests for assessing the coursekeeping of the DND Joint Support Ship contract design

Direct Regression Anal ysis for JSS Contract Design: Pure Harmonic S way Data and Regression Fit Using Coefficients From Drift Tests... Fourier series representation.[r]

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Resistance, self-propulsion and wake survey tests of the Contract Design (Model OCRE911) of DND Joint Support Ship

Resistance, self-propulsion and wake survey tests of the Contract Design (Model OCRE911) of DND Joint Support Ship

Additional information on the Towing Tank is provided in Appendix A. 4.0 DESCRIPTION OF PHYSICAL MODEL OCRE911 Model IOT911 is a 1:29.77 scale, nominally 6 m long, representation of the contract design of the Joint Support Ship fabricated using a polystyrene foam core with ¾” plywood and Renshape TM for areas requiring reinforcement as described in NRCSJS’s model fabrication standard provided in Reference 1. Foam was milled to conform to the desired hull geometry using NRCSJS’s Liné milling machine. For this series of experiments, the model was complete up to the deck at 15.25 m full scale. This height corresponds to the Replenishment at Sea (RAS) deck. The model was then painted with three coats of polyurethane yellow.
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Contract Design to Sequester Carbon in Agricultural Soils

Contract Design to Sequester Carbon in Agricultural Soils

transfers in our contract design T (S); q(S) . Comparing these necessary conditions with the ones obtained with complete information allow us to draw the following conclusions. Firstly, the …rm with the highest potential for additional carbon sequestration produces the optimal agricultural commodity and sequesters carbon with respect to the optimal path (a no-distortion at the top result). All other …rms would get an information rent which allows them to get a higher subsidy compared to the complete information case and to sequester a lower amount of carbon. The social planner minimizes the cost of this regulation policy by allowing the lowest possible information rents: the pro…t of the less e¢ cient …rm is nil and the others get a subsidy. This leads to distortions to the less e¢ cient …rms (Baron and Myerson, 1982) 3 . It is actually a kind of reward because in this model, the lower e¢ ciency
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Quality of Outsourced Services, Opportunism and Contract Design

Quality of Outsourced Services, Opportunism and Contract Design

5 Conclusions The results we obtain in this study show that reducing contractual incomple- teness enables to significantly reduce moral hazard issues through direct and indirect effects. Indeed, while more complete contracts are associated with lower moral hazard, they also enable to increase the incentive power of controls and penalty processes. In addition, we find that this improvement does not necessarily result in a significant increase in prices. It validates the idea that asymmetries of information result in opportunistic behaviors that can be diminished by providing good incentives. The solution we provide is appropriate for standard transactions. However, for single-use contracts, bearing the costs of reducing contractual incompleteness might be irrelevant. Consequently, this paper also has an important message concerning the way that outsourcing of public services is organized in the European Union. As illustrated by the previously mentioned decision of the administrative court of Paris, European rules on public procurement do not allow for taking past experiences and reputation into account. Whereas this obligation increases transparency and thus, limits abuses in discretion with public funds, it still appears to be insufficient to systematically obtain the best value for money. The drawbacks come from the fact that those rules put the emphasis only on the awarding process, which ensures, under rarely obtained conditions, an efficient contract execution. In the end, when awarding custom- made contracts, public managers still have to find a way to address the issue of contractual incompleteness and contract enforcement.
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Captive model tests for assessing the coursekeeping of the DND Joint Support Ship contract design

Captive model tests for assessing the coursekeeping of the DND Joint Support Ship contract design

National Research Council Canada Ocean, Coastal and River Engineering... Serial #: Programmable Gain: Plug-In Gain:.[r]

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Contract design and coordination in supply chain for a perishable product

Contract design and coordination in supply chain for a perishable product

Zimmer (2002) se situe d’amblés dans les contextes exposés plus haut étudie la coordination au sein d’une supply chain avec des commandes en juste à temps entre un produc[r]

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ContrACT : une méthodologie de conception et de développement d'architectures de contrôle de robots

ContrACT : une méthodologie de conception et de développement d'architectures de contrôle de robots

2) Élaboration de la méthodologie de conception / développement de l'architecture de contrôle La première étape consiste à définir un ensemble cohérent d' « artefacts » qui permettent de définir la méthode et les outils utilisés pour concevoir et développer une architecture de contrôle. Nous avons adopté une approche générique pour définir cette méthodologie, c'est-à-dire que cette dernière est indépendante des projets PROSIT et ASSIST, même si bien sur elle prend en comte les besoins inhérents à ceux-ci. Ceci se justifie par deux raisons : la possibilité de réutiliser la méthodologie pour des projets futurs tant au sein du LIRMM qu'au sein des autres équipes partenaires ; la volonté de ne pas limiter nos options afin de pouvoir s'adapter aux modifications susceptibles d'apparaitre dans le projet (notamment l'ajout de nouvelles stratégies de commandes ou des modification majeures dans l'approche adoptée pour la supervision du système, etc.). La proposition résultante, qui regroupe ces « artefacts » sous le terme de méthodologie ContrACT (Control Architecture Creation Technology), est décomposé en trois artefacts présentés par la suite:
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A Contract-extended Push-Pull-Clone Model

A Contract-extended Push-Pull-Clone Model

IX. C ONCLUSION We presented a contract extended push-pull-clone model (C- PPC) where users share their private data by specifying some contracts that receivers should follow. Trust values are adapted according to users’ past behavior regarding conformance to received contracts. Modifications done by users on the shared data and the contracts given when data is shared are logged in a distributed manner. A mechanism of distributed log-auditing is applied during collaboration and users that did not conform to the required contracts are detected and therefore their trust lev- els are updated. We implemented the proposed collaboration model with a number of simulations using PeerSim simulator. Experiment results show the feasibility of our model. In future work, we plan to analyse solutions for truncation of logs, and to explore a wider range of contracts that can be specified in our proposed model.
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Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany

Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany

to long-term contracts. If the employer's outside option in a contrac- tual relationship becomes binding, it is however optimal to renegotiate. MacLeod & Malcomson (1989) (see also MacLeod & Malcomson 1993) have pointed out that if one increases the contract space by allowing for discretionary bonuses, then any allocation of the surplus from a re- lation may be consistent with an equilibrium. The ecient contract will x a wage at the beginning of a relationship according to a split of the surplus. Since this split is the result of some bargaining process between the two parties and thus Pareto-ecient, no party will want to renegotiate afterwards, except if one party's outside option is larger than the utility obtained from continuing the present contract. If this constraint becomes binding, both parties will renegotiate, and the new contract will re ect the split of the surplus at the time of renegotiation. If the worker's outside options are a decreasing function of unemploy- ment, then the wage in the current contract will re ect the best labor market conditions since the start of the contract as in the implicit con- tract model, but conditional on the employer's outside option not having been binding in the meantime, and conditional on the value of the best labor market conditions, occurring say at time t > t (0), having been
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A Tag Contract Framework for Heterogeneous Systems

A Tag Contract Framework for Heterogeneous Systems

1 DISI, University of Trento, Italy 2 INRIA/IRISA, Rennes, France Abstract. In the distributed development of modern IT systems, contracts play a vital role in ensuring interoperability of components and adherence to specifica- tions. The design of embedded systems, however, is made more complex by the heterogeneous nature of components, which are often described using different models and interaction mechanisms. Composing such components is generally not well-defined, making design and verification difficult. Several frameworks, both operational and denotational, have been proposed to handle heterogeneity using a variety of approaches. However, the application of heterogeneous opera- tional models to contract-based design has not yet been investigated. In this work, we adopt the operational mechanism of tag machines to represent heterogeneous systems and construct a full contract model. We introduce heterogeneous com- position, refinement, dominance, and compatibility between contracts, altogether enabling a formalized and rigorous design process for heterogeneous systems.
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Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design

Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design

With one-sided private information, only these two types of organization exist, that is, those with full communication (centralized) and those with no communication (decen- tralized); however, with bilateral private information, there exist hybrid types with partial communication. One player may communicate its information to the other player who then makes the production decision based on this report and its own private information. I call these hybrid organizations hierarchical organizations. They are governed by a contract which speci es a menu of di erent mappings of production levels into wages where the spe- ci c choice of a mapping is contingent on one player's report of its private information. For example, suppose the principal must report her private information to the agent who then makes the production decision. The principal's report determines the choice of the production{wage mapping that, in turn, conditions the agent's choice of production. Partial communication occurs, namely, one player communicates its information. This leaves some scope for renegotiation, but not as much as in a centralized organization since, following one-way communication, the set of implementable alternatives is still fairly large (a whole production{wage mapping). It may then be hard for the players to agree on what constitutes a Pareto improving allocation. A hierarchical organization allows some coordination through partial communication, but it also opens the door to some renegotiation which a ects its ex ante eciency.
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Job Characteristics, Wages and the Employment Contract

Job Characteristics, Wages and the Employment Contract

6. Promotion: Movement to a higher rank, usually, though not al- ways, associated with greater pay. 2 This list does not exhaust the types of pay that we observe in practice, though it does move beyond the types of pay that would be considered in most macro-economic models. In the next section the standard agency model is brie y reviewed. This model, the starting point for the economic theory of contract, helps us understand the conditions under which a rm should link measures of performance to pay. However, as Table 1 illustrates, explicit pay for performance contracts are by no means ubiquitous. In section 3 we explore the limitations of the agency model in the context of Williamson (1975)'s concept of opportunism.
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SoS contract verification using statistical model checking

SoS contract verification using statistical model checking

Exhaustive formal verification for systems of systems (SoS) is impractical and cannot be applied on a large scale. In this paper we propose to use statistical model checking for efficient verification of SoS. We address three relevant aspects for systems of systems: 1) the model of the SoS, which includes stochastic aspects; 2) the formalization of the SoS requirements in the form of contracts; 3) the tool-chain to support statistical model checking for SoS. We adapt the SMC technique for application to heterogeneous SoS. We extend the UPDM/SysML specification language to express the SoS requirements that the implemented strategies over the SoS must satisfy. The requirements are specified with a new contract language specifically designed for SoS, targeting a high-level English- pattern language, but relying on an accurate semantics given by the standard temporal logics. The contracts are verified against the UPDM/SysML specification using the Statistical Model Checker (SMC) PLASMA combined with the simulation engine DESYRE, which integrates heterogeneous behavioral models through the functional mock-up interface (FMI) standard. The tool-chain allows computing an estimation of the satisfiability of the contracts by the SoS. The results help the system architect to trade-off different solutions to guide the evolution of the SoS.
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Partnership contracts, project finance and information asymmetries: from competition for the contract to competition within the contract?

Partnership contracts, project finance and information asymmetries: from competition for the contract to competition within the contract?

(Hart, 2003). Nevertheless, it appears that if the synergies between conception, construction and operating stages are significant, the interest of a simultaneous arranging of the financing is less obvious (at the very least for “conventional” PFI projects). Dewatripont and Legros (2005) distinguish two types of external financiers, respectively outside shareholders and debt creditors. Their insight is to consider that the financial structure of the contract is not without consequence on the private partner incentives. A conventional result of corporate finance literature is to stress that outside debt or equity may lower incentives to exert effort for the contractor (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Indeed, if the bundling of construction and operating stages in a PPP contract creates proper incentives for the private partner (Hart, 2003), it appears that external finance induces the loss of a part of its rent. External finance introduces a new agency relationship into the contract. On one hand, it is positive of the public contractor because the interests of external financiers are convergent with its objective. By the way, he can externalise a part of the monitoring costs. But on the other hand, this new agency relationship could be seen as harmful for productive efficiency because the private partner must share its rent. We observe the conventional trade-off established by Laffont and Tirole (1993) between incentives for productive efficiency and informational rents. In a PPP, the benefits in terms of incentives to productive efficiency, induced by the bundling, could be undone because external shareholders end up getting too much of the effort returns. The higher is the share of external equity, the lesser are the incentives to improve the productive efficiency.
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Legally Fair Contract Signing Without Keystones

Legally Fair Contract Signing Without Keystones

Let us give a more formal account of legal fairness as described in [ 8 , 22 ] in terms of concurrent signatures. Unlike classical contract-signing protocol, whereby contractors would exchange full-fledged signatures (e.g. [ 15 ]), in a concurrent signature protocol there are “ambiguous” signatures that do not, as such, bind their author. This ambiguity can later be lifted by revealing some additional information: the “keystone”. When the keystone is made public, both signatures become simultaneously binding.

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Contract-based safety verification for autonomous driving

Contract-based safety verification for autonomous driving

ion to verify local road models where during each iteration we first find a proposal contract using reachability analysis and then try to falsify the proposed contract by searching for a counterexample. In this sense, we provide safety guarantees for controllers and planners of au- tonomous systems that can operate under consideration of the safety contract, which can be readily implemented via state-space constraints. The focus hereby lies on obtaining safety guarantees for road networks that are known a priori, such that we can obtain the necessary safety guarantees in an offline procedure before deployment. Moreover, as we consider a priori known road networks, the probabilistic traffic model can be validated and augmented using real-world traffic data from the considered road network to ensure its accuracy. While we do not actively consider perception as part of the verification procedure, we note that the modular, decomposable approach of our method can be leveraged to also introduce assume-guarantee contracts between the control system and the perception system, such that (potentially probabilistic) safety guarantees for the perception system can be derived independently.
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Risk Sharing in Mushārakah Contract: Theory and Practice

Risk Sharing in Mushārakah Contract: Theory and Practice

The study revealed that the distinctive features of risk sharing in mushārakah contract lie in the bases for entitlement to profits and sharing of losses as both are the essence of the contract. Accordingly, the study found that there should not be any element of guarantee of capital nor profit in mushārakah as it violates the essence of the contract. If, however, capital is guaranteed in mushārakah contract and all profit is stipulated to one partner only, the contract is no longer considered as mushārakah, rather; it is ruled as a loan (qarḍ) contract. Hence any increase over and above the capital will be tantamount to ribā.
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A Tag Contract Framework for Modeling Heterogeneous Systems

A Tag Contract Framework for Modeling Heterogeneous Systems

Due to the significant inherent complexity of heterogeneity, there have been only very few attempts at addressing heterogeneity in the context of contract- based models. For instance, the HRC model from the SPEEDS project 1 was designed to deal with different viewpoints (functional, time, safety, etc.) of a single component [6, 7]. However, the notion of heterogeneity in general is much broader than that between multiple viewpoints, and must take into account di- verse interaction paradigms. In our previous work, we have laid the foundation for a modeling methodology which is contract-based and heterogeneous [8]. Our methodology enables different distributed components to be specified as different contracts and the whole system model to be built by composing its component contract models. In addition, the underlying modeling mechanism of heteroge- neous tag machines [9], which supports our methodology, allows the component models to be specified in different timed models and interaction styles. In this paper, we further develop our framework to cover also aspects related to de- sign and development, and explore the issue of how to correctly decompose the specification hierarchically into a refined implementation.
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Dynamic Service Contract Enforcement in Service-Oriented Networks

Dynamic Service Contract Enforcement in Service-Oriented Networks

second, using ten SON Appliances and a maximum al- lowed rate (X) of 128 requests per second represented by a horizontal dotted line. Even though both approaches process a number of requests near C = X × T = 128, they never reach the maximum value. Therefore, at each enforcement period, there are a number of requests that are left unprocessed and accumulate significantly over time (see Fig. 8). As a consequence, the system is unable to exploit its maximum capacity. Given the costs of implementing SON and issues inherent to the provision of Web Services, it is imperative to design efficient algorithms that optimize the overall utilization of the system. Achieving optimal performance is fundamental in the long term.
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Private environmental incentive contract and a weather signal

Private environmental incentive contract and a weather signal

Yet, an incentive contract is not necessarily in dis- credit of the contracting farmer who can benefit not only a minimum utility but also a minimum pay- ment. Our theoretical aim is to use the weather sig- nal and a constraint of a minimum payment for every point of farmer’s environmental output to improve and so to make more attractive an envi- ronmental incentive contract binding a farmer: we consider ex ante contracts.

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