Apparent discrepancy between increasing resources allocation to food and agriculture in Africa and the declining performance of the sector

I, ,

U:\'ITED :'lATIONS

ECONO:\lIC AND SQUAL COUNCIL

Distr.

ClENl'llAL

E/roA/CM.lO/21 Date: February 1984 Original: ENGLISH

_ _ _ _^~..._a,_=' • """'"

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

Fifth meeting of the Technical Preparatory Committee of the Whole

Conakry, Guinea, 16-23 April 1984

Item 6 (b) (i) of the provisional agenda

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA Nineteenth session of the Commission

and tenth meeting

of the Conference of Ministers Conakry, Guinea, 26-30 April 1984

Item 8 (II) (a) of the provisional agenda

APPARENT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN INCREASING RESOURCE ALLOCATION TO FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN AFRICA AND THE DECLINING

prnFORMANCE OF THE SECTOR

- i -

~:/SCA/Cl".10/21 T,WL,: OB" CONTElI'fS

S~MMY 1

FOOD POPlJLi\'rIOlI BALAN\;S Oil AFTIICA' S LAND 3

HAS '['}!E!(;

m::,1l

INCRSASC:D RESOUHCS ALLCCA'fION? 4

Or-owt h of Public Expendit ur-e a 4

Share of Agriculture in Totul Outlays 6

Official Development Assistance 8

Allocations to Subse~torG 11

Ite aour-ce Flows in Kind 11

Oommi, tmerrt e - Disbursements Lags 11

HAS ~;Hrn:': JJl::BII A ;:IECLINl'; HI 'I'lm P''RFOl1HANCE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE? I3

;:Iietary .illergy Supply (DES) 13

Food Production Per Caput 13

Flood Import s 13

Agricultural Exports 16

Usc of Resources 16

SIGHS OF SUCCSSS 17

CAUS':S OF THE IJECLINc: OF TH:: S·SCTffi 18

Na't.ur'u.L and Physical Factors 18

Causes Due to Africa's Own T~aking 18

Research, Technology and Delivery Systems 19

Vianpm'ler Development and Training 21

InfrGstructure and Institutions 22

Sxt.erneI -~conomic and Polit.LccI Causes 22

Indebtedness of African Countries 23

PRIOilITY ,IREAS l'OR H1WERSING Tm: IJECLINE IN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE PERFffillA.VCE 25

COlICLIJ:3ION

27

.10/21

APPARENT DISCREPANCY BE~ INCREASING RESOURCE ALLOCATION TO FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN AFRICA AND ^THE DEl::LINING PERFORMANCE ^{OF THE}

SEl::TO~

SUMMARY

1. Whatever economic and development indicators are applied, the deterioration of the food and agriculture situation which characterized the 19706 has continued into the 19808 and the situation remains bleak in outlook. The deepening and prolonged world economic crisis now characterized by a sluggish recovery; presistent and recurrent drought and other calamities; the burden of debt service payments; chronic balance of payments problems and the increasingly unfavourable terms of trade - all compound the African food and

agriculture problems.

2. The net result is that over the past two decades, Africa has moved from an self-sufficiency in food and agricultural products to presently growing deficits.

decline in per capita food production has accelerated from

7

percent in the 1960s 15 percent in the 1970s.

earlier The to

3. With demography exploding at the rate of 3 percent per annum against declining agricultural productivity, the growth of agricultural production per capita in the period 1970-1980 was barely at the rate of 1.1 percent. This has created a big food gap which

has been widening at the rate of 1.3 percent annually during the same period. The problem is compounded ^by an alarmingly high dependency ratio and a very high rate of urbanization, against diminishing population supporting capa.city of land in many countries.

4.

Africa is faced with a growing import dependency at an unprecedented Beale whereby cereal imports have doubled to 24 million tons in the five-year period from 1975 to 1980.

The cereal import bills to Africa rose tenfold in the 1970s to nearly

usa

6 billion in 1981. In Sub-Saharan Africa alone the cereal import bills in 1979 and 1980 were equivalent to 30 percent of their total agricultural export earnings - while in Borne countries,

these bills accounted for nearly all of these earnings.

5. Deteriorating foreign exchange earnings and declining real incomes r~ve limited the capacity of African governments to import vital capital goods and food. The result is that Africa has to depend heavily on foreign aid, especially food aid, to the extent that the region - despite having only 15 percent of the population of the developing' world - now receives about 30 percent of official development assistance. Africa is also currently the largest recipient of food aid - receiving some

50

percent of all food aid flows to the developing world.

6. It was against this background that the El::A Secretariat was requested by the El::A Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in 1983, to undertake a study which wculd ascertain the causes of apparent discrepancy between increasing resource allocation to food and agriculture in Africa and the declining performance of the sector. The purpose is to galvanize and increase understanding of African governments and the international community towards realizing the food and agriculture objectives of ~he Lagps Plan of Action.

7. The -taak before African governments to accelerate food and agricultural production

to the level that will match population growth - is therefore immense. Any effort ⁱⁿ this regard must take into account the fact that nearly 900 million people - about twice tbe present population level - will need to be fed by the turn of the century. However, neither the Great Leap Forward nor the Green Revolution are in sight on the Continent to cope with this task.

l!

The valuable contribution made by FAD in the fonn of data and useful comments is hereby acknowledged with thanks.

S/:XA/CH .10/21 Page ?

8. The continuing economic crises on the continent is predominantly a production crisis. It is a chronic crisis which has its origin in the legacies of the colonial past culminating in inappropriate and, indeed, outmoded policies which do not reflect African needs, aspirations and the rising expectations. At the heart of resolving the crisis is therefore the need for policy adjustments and reforms which - though painful - must be faced and brought about by African governments as a matter of political imperative.

9. It is a paradox that hunger and. malnutrition with their human degradation and despair should be so widespread on a. continent with such immense potential. It is, furthermore, an irony that even though external resources have increased in both general terms and concessional terms, African ~vernmentshave not matched this by stepping up

budgetary allocations to food and agriculture and according this sector the highest priority which it deserves in national policies and development strategies. If African governments have to accelerate the development of this sector which serves as the major engine for overall economic development, then they must seriously implement and be seen to be implementing nationally and collectively the Lagos Plan of Action towards greater self- reliance.

-10. The constraints abounding in the sector are indeed formidable but not insurmountable.

Therefore, if supported by the international community in a more resolute manner, African governments can indeed make appropriate policy adjustments, reforms and efforts which could reverse the presently deteriorating performance of the food and agricultural sector.

Turning the tide of a growing hunger, malnutrition and destitution is a political imperative which must be accomplished urgently if the impending economic and possible political

collapse are to be averted in many African nations.

":/C:';A/CI1.10/21 Page 3

FOOD-POPULATION BALANCE ON AFRICA'S LAND

11. Considerable concern with the diminishing self-sufficiency in food and agricultural output, increasing population and growing import dependency make it essential to examine the African food-population balance against the continent^{1 5} agricultural land potential.

With the population growth rates appI~aching3 percent and 4 percent in some countries, Africa would have to feed twice as many people by the turn of the century as it does today.

12. A recent FAD study carried out in collaboration with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA)y shows that Africa as a whoJ.e has the potential to feed three times the population

it had in 1975 and more than one and a half times the projected Year 2000population even at low level of technology~. At the intermediate level of technology

J{

in which most of Africa would just be entering by Year 2000, the continent could feed up to five times

its population. This result is significant given the fact that the continent's population will double by that time.

13. However, a generation on regional basis tends to mask certain location-specific factors. For instance, because of uneven distribution of high potential land, not all countries will be able to feed their populations under the various technological options.

Moreover, the regional self-sufficiency presupposes massive movements of food (and probably populations) on a scale that would seem hardly feasible, given the very poor communications that exist on the continent. Moreover, there are problems of trade barriers and balance of payments problems that would certainly hamper food movements.

14. TableAl (Annex) shows that even though the continent as a whole would be self- sufficient under the various technological possibilities, there will still be a number of

"critical" countries whose potential population supporting capacities would be questionable.

Out of a total of 51 African countries, some 22 (i.e. nearly 50 percent of the countries representing 50 percent of the 1975 population) could not feed the year 1975 population at low level of technology. The number of co\mtries drops to 7 and 2 at the intermediate and high level of technology

11

^{in 1975.}

15. The situation would be more serious in the Year 2000 when most of the African countries _l~uld have adopted, at least, the intermediate technology. By that time (i.e.

Year 2000) and at that technology, some 13 countries would not feed their populations and even at high level technology, 4 countries will sill be considered to be critical countries.

16. The FAO/IIASA study also shows that by the turn of the century, some 21 African countries out of 51 could feed their population even at a low level of technology. However, of the 30 critical countries at low-level inputs by the end of the century, 17 of them can feed themselves only at intermediate and 9 only at high-level technology. However, even

1/

FAO/UNFPA/IIASA; "Land, Food and Population"; paper presented to the Twenty-Second Session of the FAO Conference, Rome, November 1983.

The low level technology uses traditional crop varieties, crop mixes and fallow

periods; no fertilizers or other agricultural chemicals; manual labour with hand tools and no explioit lon@-term soil conservation measures.

The intermediate technology level introduces limited use of improved varieties and agricultural chemicals, reduced fallow; animal traction as well as manual labour;

some conservation measures and optimum crop mixes on half of the land.

The high level technology assumes the use of high-yielding varieties, optimum use of chemicals, minimum fallow; full mechanization and conservation measures and optimum crop mixes on all rather than half of the land.

E/ECA/CM.IO/21 Page 4

at a high level of technology, some 4 countries in Africa will not be able to feed their Year 2000 population. This is, of course, better than Southwest Asia where three-quarters of the countries will not feed themselves 3.t all from their agricultural land resources.

Nevertheless, Southwest Asia, being an oil-rich region, can afford food imports while Africa cannot.

17. All these trends underscore the need to extend agricultural land frontiers through appropriate technologies, reclamation of hitherto unused land, exploitation of non-

agrioultural resources, environmental preservation, soil conservation, land-use m~nagement,

better population policies and, above all, subregional cooperation in trade and in sharing productive assets. Moreover, the use of inputs described herein would call for massive improvements in rural infrastructure, institutions and stepped-up agricultural and social services.

HAS TIlERI': DEEN INCREASED RESOURCE ALLOCATION?

18. Resources allocated to the agricultural sector in Africa include public and external resources. Unfortunately estimates of both of these resources are scanty. The picture presented below of public and external resources in African agriculture although quite revealing, cannot therefore be regarded as complete.

19. To answer the question 3R to whether there has been increased allocation of resources to agriculture in Africa an attempt is first made to analyse the patterns and growth of domestic and external flows of resources. ~~ sets of data will throw light on the nature of resource flows in a historical persPective. The first set include budgeted public expenditure on agriculture; the share of agricultural investment and expenditure in total expenditure. The latter will be compared with planned investment and expenditures in the national development plans in order to ascertain the extent to which governments have tried to realize their agricultural development goals - frequently declared as being the

attainment of greater self-sufficiency in food and agricultural products.

20. The second set of analysis attempts to show whether or not the action by the inter- national community to support African iood and agriculture efforts has been a sustained one _ when judged from the assistance provided. The bulk of analysis of external resource flow

i8 based on commitments rather than disbursements because data on disbursements are not easily available. However, an attempt has been made to examine the lag between commitments and disbursements of multilateral capital flows.

Clrowth of Public Expenditures

21. Public expenditure examined here includes ·ooth capital and current outlays of

central, regional and local governments as well as capital expenditure of public enterprises engaged ⁱⁿ agricultmal activities. It also includes external resources that are ohanne Lfed through national treasuries.

22. Over the last four yeaxs beginning 1978, average annual planned public expenditure on agriculture has declined in real terms in all the subregions ⁱⁿ Africa except ⁱⁿ West Africa (Niamey-based MULPOC) where there has been a slight increase of 2.1 percent. The decline has been sharpest in Central West Africa (Yaound~basedMULPOC) and Central Africa (Gisenyi-based MULPOC). Table 1, which is based on 24 countries bears testimony to this decline. These flows include both capital and current outlays of central, regional and local governments as well as capital expenditure of public enterprises engaged in agricultural activities.

Table 1: Average Annual Growth Rates of Total Public Expenditure for all Sectors and for the A icultural Sector

at Constant Prices

E/ECA/CM.lO/21 Page

5

All Sectors Agricul ture

1979 1980 1981 1982 Average

1979 1980 1981 1982 Average

1979-82 1979-82

North Africa 6.1 4.0 -6.0 3.6 1.8 -6.3 2.2 -0.3 -5.8 -2.6

West Africa 9.1 -15.7 -18.4 -1.7 -7.3 -10.4 18.9 -5.4 8.0 2.1

Central West 20,3 -3.0 3.1 -8.8 2.4 68.7 -7.5 -34.2 -34.5 -9.5 Africa

Central Africa

- - - - -

^-13.5

^-48.6

^{10.0 39.1 -9.2}

East and

14.5 -3.9 -11.0 -18.7

-5.5

^{27.0 4.9 -1.1 -30.7 -2.2}

Southern Africa

Source: FAO, 1983: Public Expenditure on Agriculture Computer Print-Outs 13/12/83, Rome.

11

The data in the table is based on 24 countries.

S/ECA/Cj,j .10/21 Page 6

23. It would seem therefore that African governments have not been backing up their avowed food self-sufficiency objectives by increased allocation of public resources.

Exception is shown only by West Africa - mostly Sahel ian countries - may be because they are compelled by the drought to give a higher priority to agriculture and especially to food security and famine relief. On the other hand, this subregion has experienced difficulty in maintaining a sustained growth in the overall public sector expenditure in real terms.

24. It is noteworthy that the average growth in real terms of total public expenditure has been positive in North Africa and Central Africa - -l;;hough year to year fluctuations are observed. However, for the East and Southern Africa subregion there seems to be a strong correlation between the decline in gro~nhof total public expenditure and the average gr-owth of public expenditur-e in agriculture. Available data indicates that on per capita basis public expenditure ⁱⁿ agriculture has .been declining in real terms ⁱⁿ all the sub- regions with the sharpest decline being in Central Africa which also has the lowest internal capital flow per capita of agricultural population. On the whole, however, the information available shows higher growth rates of these flows to the total economy rather than to the agricultural sector. This is a further evidence that African governments have yet to accord higher priority to agriculture in their development policies and efforts than presently.

Share of Agriculture in Total Outlays

25. An examination of the share of agriculture in total expenditure and in planned total and public investment would help to throw further light on government efforts and policies towards agriculture. Table 2 gives this information for selected African countries and it can be seen that in some countries agriculture has received little public investment.

It is surprising that this is particularly the case in oil exporting countries such as Nigeria and Gabon. While low absorptive capacity could limit the amount of investment in agriculture, in most of these countries, however, the marketable agricultural surpluses have been invested in non-agricultural activities in favour of the urban populations - with consequent low investment in agriculture and rural infrastructures. These shortfalls are increasingly being recognized and plans are underway to step up investment and incentive structure in favour of agriculture

1/.

26. Ideally, it would be interesting to ascertain exactly how much of the planned investment was actually spent ⁱⁿ the agricultural sector. However, lack of data for comparable periods preclude such an analysis. Earlier data shown, nevertheless,

corroborates the fact that expenditure and investment in agriculture has been very low in African countries.

27. Moreover, considering that the African national plans have been rather like shopping lists and given the low absorptive capacities and real delivery capabilities of African development institutions, it is not surprising that investment targets, which are already low, have not been achieved. FAD documented that in 1978, for instance, general public services ⁱⁿ Sub-Saharan Africa absorbed nearly a quarter of central government expenditures (nearly a third if defence is included) compared with 15 percent for education, 6 percent for health,

5

Jercent for roads, 12 percent for other economic services and

9

percent for

agriculture~. Such low allocations to agriculture and related social and physical

infr&structure are indeed unacceptable.

For the 1980-82 Plan Period, the Government of Gabop has raised the share of agriculture in public investment to 10.9 percent. Nigeria has also offered incentives to medium and large-scale farmers in the form of various fiscal and credit allowances aimed at

increasing agricultural investment and productivity.

FAa Committee on Food Security - Interim Report on Constraints on Food Production ⁱⁿ Low-Income Food-Deficit Countries of Africa - Rome, April 1983.

Table 2: Share of Agricultural Expenditure in Total Investment for Selected African Countries

(percentages)

'..:.../\',~A/;;i':.^lO/21 Pro-e 7

Share of

l

Duration Share of

public Share of Agriculture in total

Country and scope investment investment of plan

in GDP in total Total Public

investment investment investment

Bur-undo, 1978-1982 27.0

-

^22.2

^-

Gabon 197 6-1980 49. 0 68.0 3.5 0.5

Ga.mbia. 1975-1980

- -

^14.9

^-

Ivory Coast 1976-1980 5.6 32.0 51.9 13.6

Kenya 1979-1983 20.6

-

^{16.0 18.7}

Lesotho 1976-1980 13.5

- ^-

^:)2.6

Liberia 1976-1980 9.0

-

^{19.3 19.3}

Madagascar 1978-1980

-

^{40.2 27.7 22.6}

Malawi 1971-1980 23.8 36.7 8.2 19.3

Mauritius 1975-1980 28.0

- - ^-

Morocco 1978-1980 24.0 26.3 16.2 18.0

Nigeria 1975-1980 26.6 66.7 8.3 6.5

Togo 1975-1980 33.0 88.4 21.8

-

Ttmisia 1977-19 81 25. 0 43.0 15.8 26.2

United Republic

0'

Cameroon 1976-19 81 19.5 70.7 17.3 ^16.6

United Republic of

Tanzania 197 6-1980

-

^{56.8 15.2}

^-

United Republic of

I

Uganda 1976-1980

- -

^20.0

-

Zaire 1979-1983

- ^{- -}

^3.8

Sources: The State of Food and Agriculture, 1980 (Rome, FAO, 1981), and development plans of various countries

S/F:GA/G11.10/21 Page 8

Official Development Assistance

28. Available estimates indicate that net receipts by developing countries of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from all sources and to all sectors in developing countries amounted to 05$ 36.3 billion in 1982. This outlay represents an increase of 05$ 900 million over the previous year and Africa recieved around 05$ 13 billion (1981) of it. Net dis- bursements by Om::D countries through bilateral and multilateral channels increased by

9 percent in 1982. This increase which was largely due to contributions to the multilateral financing institutions only brought the total con~ribution6of these advanced countries to 0.39 percent of their GNP or only half of the target of 0.7 percent set by the International Development Strategy.

29. In discussing external assistance to agriculture it is important first to distinguish between agriculture by "broad" definition and by

"narrow'

definition. The "narrow"

definition of agriculture referred to as "directly to sector" includes appraisal of natural resources; development and management of natUl~al resources; research; supply of production inputs; fertilizers; agricultural services; training and extension; crop production,

livestock development, fisheries; etc. These are all activities which are directly in support of agriculture.

30. On the other hand the "broad" definition includes in addition to the items in the foregoing paragraph, activities defined as "indirectly to sector". These additional activities are forestry; manufacturing of inputs; a.gro-industries; rural infrastructure, rural development; regional development and river basin development.

31. Against this background it is now easy to describe external assistance to agriculture.

32. In 1981, official commitments of external assistance to agriculture to the 4 developing regions increased by

7.5

percent over the previous year and Africa received 32 _pe~cent (or USa 3 billion) of this outlay. This was the largest regional share after East Asia and Pacific which topped the list by having 42 percent of all the external flows to agriculture

in the developing world (see Table 3).

33. On a global scale, official commitments to agriculture by "narrow" definition fell in 1981 due mainly to diversion of funds to manufacture of farm input s and to rural

infrastructure. In spite of this the external resource flow to African agriculture, however defined, has increased tremendously. The total flows by "narrow" definition have trippled in real terms between 1974 and 1981 while flows by "broad" definition have more than doubled in real terms. The details can be seen in Table

4.

34. Subregional patterns show generally the same trends. This is in contrast to the global pattern which showed about 4 percent decline in multilateral assistance in 1982 - due mainly to difficulties in replenishing the funding of IFAD, Ul/DP and IDA 1/. The effect of short fall in multilateral finance has meant that poor countries have

to

resort to

commercial loans with high interest rates - thereby worsening their debt burdens.

35.

The share of concesaional commitments to agrioulture to total of external assistance both by IInarrow. and "br-oad" definition (see Annex) showed an upward and sustained trend between 1975 and 1981.

official commitments Tables A2a and A2b in The share of agrioulture

The World Bank - the largest single source of multilateral assistance to agriculture (accounting 59 percent of commitments to agriculture and 49 percent of the concessional flows to this sector, witnessed in 1982 a decline in concessional commitments for a second year running - reflecting the squeeze of resources available to IDA as part of its sixth replenishment.

Table 3: Regional Percentage

Distributio~

^{of Capital}

Y

Curmnitments to Agriculture "Broad Definition"

Total Concessional and Non-Concessional Concessional Region

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

East Asia and

Pacifio

42.2 50. 0 35.9 39.7 48.7 46.0 46.3 42.3 50.2 53.8 35.5 43.0 52.6 54.9 50.4 48.5

Africa

25.7 22.2 26.9 31.4 24.5 26.3 27.2 31.7 29.1 26.1 33.4 35.6 28.8 26.0 32.9 37.8

Latin Amerdca

21.2 22.0 28.3 24.0 20.9 21.6 23.7 23.0 15.7 14.2 22.9 14.0 14.4 13.2 13.5 n.8

West Asia

10.9 5.8 8.9 4.9 5.9 6.1 2.8 3.0 5.0 5.9 8.2 7.4 4.2 5.9 3.2 1.9

TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: FAO,

1984:

FAO Total and Concessional Capital Commitments Print-outs,

8/2/84,

Rome.

Y

Excluding technical assistance grants

Broad DIlfin1tiOD Itarrow Detin.1tic:a

1914 1915 1916 1911 1978 1919 1980 1981 1914 1975 1976 1971 1918 1919 1980 1981

Conoe . .1oa.a.l 0:::.1

Xultil&hr&! 213.7 198.6 468.4 330.5 421.8 402.3 89603 181.3 127.6 162.8 306.8 219.8 271.2 280.6 634.2 516·9

Bilateral 312.6 311.9 458·9 9'4.1 886.2 990.1 1311.4 '5'4.6 115·4 303.2 269·5 538.5 434.1 512.1 121.8 196.9

Sub-total (current pricea) 586.3 510.5 927·3 1245·2 1301·5 1393 2213.7 2295.9 243.1 465·9 516.3 158.3 7 11.3 85303 1356 1313.9

Sub-~otal (oonatant 1975 priO.~ ^{658.8 510.5 927·3 1142.4 1046 974.1 1410.1 1530.6 273.1} 465·9 51603 695.1 569 596.1 858·2 915.9 (41.5) (81.1) (62.1) (60.9) (54.4) (61.3) (60.9) (59·8) Non-oona •••ion&! OCA

JIultil&hral 186.1 275·1 ^106.2 436.9 378.1 414.1 314.1 601.1 119.3 2<1/.1 92.8 278.2 238.5 281.3 200.; 46;.4

Bilateral (20.1) 0.6) (91.;) (43.8) (48.9) (12;.6) (98.2) (14.0) 3.1}/ o.~ ^66.;}/ 12.~(28.3) ^{(14.1) (26.6) (41.9)}

Sub-total (ourrent prioe.) 206.8 279.3 197.1 480.1 427 599.1 41203 681.1 122.9 2<1/.8 15903 291.0 266.8 295.4 227 .1 498.3 Sub-total (oonatant 1975 prio.~ ^{232.4 27903 197.1 441.0 341.6 419.4 260.9 454.1 138.1 2<1/.8 15903 267.0 213.4 206.6 143.1 322.2}

(59.4) (74.4) (80.6) (60.;) (62.5) (4903) (55.1) (13.2) All OCi.

Jtultil&tnal 399·8 41403 514.6 161.4 199.4 8'/6.4 1210.4 1388.4 246.9 369.9 399.6 498 515.1 561·9 834.1 1033.3

Bilateral 39303 315.5 550.4 958.5 935·1 ^1116.3 1415.6 1588·6 119.1 304 336 5;103 462.4 586.8 148.4 838.8

Total (ourr.nt prloe) 193.1 849.8 1125.0 1125·9 1134.; 1992·7 2626 2971 366.0 613.8 135.6 1049.3 978.1 1148.1 1583.1 1812.1 Total (conatant 1975 price# 891.1 849.8 1125.0 1583.4 1381·6 1393.5 1662.0 '984.1 411.2 613.8 135.6 962.1 182.5 80303 1002.0 1248.1 (46.1) (19.3) (65.4) (60.8) (56.4) (51.6) (60.3) (62.9) Table 41 Offici&! C~t_nhor Er.hrnal ... i.t&nCl. to .1sr1oulture (0:::.4.) for Uric.}:!

(1n ai111011 lEt)

Source, FlO, 198)1 FAD External lid to J.gricul ture Coaputer Print Out., 12/13/83, Ro. .

Y

All co-tt. .ntll exolude teobn.1oa.l ...eiatance granh.

y

Figure. in parenth. . ie indica.t.e oo-.1\. .nh (aarrow detinihon) ... pel'OAntac'e otoo-it_nb (broad derinition).

}/ Under-repre••nted due to laclt: of all d&ta..

E/ECA/CH.lO/21 Page 11

in total (official) aDA commitments reached 16 percent and 25 percent in 1981 for "narrow"

and "broad" definitions respectively. Per capita flows of OCA also show a high and

impressive rate of change in 1974-76 to 1979-81. These trends are shown in the last column of Table AS (Annex) and the trends are true for Africa as a whole as for the subregions.

Allocations to Subsectors

36. Analysis of the external resource flows to the subsectors shown in Table A3 (Annex) reveals that the growth of external capital flows has shown a drastic decline in crop production, regional and river basin development and manufacturing of farm inputs. This is certainly a disturbing phenomenon given the fact that these are the subsectors which are critical and essential in providing food security and foreign exchange earnings. Apart from these, the other subsectors e.g. land and water development, rural development and infrastructure, inputs, fisheries and agricultural services, research and delivery systems, agro-industries, etc_, show impressive gro~h in the flows of external capital allocated to them.

Resource Flows in Kind

37. The most important external resource flows ⁱⁿ kind is food aid supplied to developing countries for relief, for programme support and for building economic assets in the form of food for work. World shipments of food aid in oereals are estimated at 9.25 million metric tons "in 1982/83. This is about 2 percent greater than the previous year and Africa, having replaced Asia as the world's principal food aid recipient, now receives 50 percent of all cereal food aid to developing countries - against 6 percent in

19705_

38. Due to the continuing food shortage on the continent against a background of natural calamities and worsening economic conditions, Africa's share of food aid flows has increased.

Commitments - Disbursements Lags

39. It should be remembered that the analysis of external resource flows, so far

presented, refers to commitments - i.e. budgeted allocations and not actual disbursements which are lower. Lack of data prevents a thorough analysis to determine whether resources actually spent on food and agriculture in Africa have increased in recent years. An exam- ination of annual cumulative disbursements is attempted in Table

5.

Because of data limitation the analysis is done only for multilateral capital commitments to African agriculture by "broad" definition.

40. Two trends emerge from the analysis. Firstly, over time, disbursements of the funds committed have shown a decline. Secondly, the table shows that even up to the fourth or fi£th year a~ter commitment, only around 50 percent o£ the funds were disbursed. This fact underscores the low absorptive capacity of recipient countries or difficulties encountered by poor nations as a result of strict procedural requirements of donors which result in such delayed disbursements and hence retarded progress in food and agriculture.

41. In summary, it must be concluded that while there has been a decline in public resource allocation there is evidence of increased external resource flows, in real terms and on per capita basis. However, the long lag between commitments and disbursements and problems of project assistance, lack of other complementary inputs and effective policies, and strict donor procedures have certainly hampered the effective use of these resources.

E/ECA/CM.10/21 Page 12

Table

5:

Peroentage Annual Cumulative Disbursements of Multilateral Capital Commitments to Agriculture "I1road Def5.nition^l1 in Africa Continent

Cumulative Disbursements

1/

Year of

Commitments 1st year

2nd year

3rd year

4th year

5th year

6th

year

7th year

8th year

1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• per cent ••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••

0.2 18.8 34.6 52.8 66.8 76.4 8403 90.2

0.3 8.5 2303 41.8 59.9 72.8 79.6

0.9 7.0 21.7 36.3 51.0 63.1

1.9 11.1 30.2 48.7 60.8

2.9 14.5 26.4 38.9

0.4 7.2 18.7

1.7 7.4

0.7

Souroe: FAO, 1984' FAO Cumulative Disbursements Print-outs, 8/2/84, Rome.

11 The

first year of disbursement corresponds to the year of commitment, the 2nd to the year after and so on.

E/ECA/cr,r.10/21 Page 13

;U,'i TH3RI: IlEC:II ,] DECLIIIE IN 'me; PER1'ORl>IAJiCE OF FOOD AN]) AGRICULTURE?

42. The performance of the food and agriculture sector will be looked at in relation to the following measures: dietary energy supply, food production per caput, volume of food imports, and volume of agricultural exports. An examination of these measures and changes in resource use in African food and agriculture over the last decade throws some light on the question as to whether there has been a decline in ~he performance of food and agri- culture. The most recent basic indicators also show the present status of agricultural performance.

43. In Table 6 the courrt r-Lea are ranked within each subregion according to their level of per caput dietary energy supplies (DES) as a percentage of estimated requirements achieved in the period 1979-81. This in effect is the first indicator of performance on COIIDtry basis and it can be seen that Libya comes first in North Africa, Cape Verde in West, Gabon in Central West, Burundi in Central, while Mauritius comes first in East and Southern Africa.

Dietary Energy Supply (DES)

44. Dietary Energy Supply - the best available indicator of nutritional status of a country - has increased moderately in Africa in the period 1969-71 to 1979-81 except in 15 out of 45 countries which show decline. While the regional weighted average shows a 4 per- cent increase, North Africa shows above average improvement in nutritional status at an annual growth rate of 21 percent. In fact, all countries in North Africa show positive improvement in nutritional status over the decade. The worst performance is indicated by Central Africa and East and Southern African subregions, both of which exhibit a decline over a period of a decade of I percent and 3 percent respectively. While Dietary Energy Supply is a measure of the degree to which a country is able to satisfy the nutritional requirements of its popu.lation, it must be remembered that it includes food imports (and food aid) which can be acquired at great sacrifice.

45. Analysis of food demand and food production indicates a widening gap between growth rates of food production and estimated demand over the decade, increasing by 1.3 percent per annum in the region and in the majority of the courrtr-i.ee , Despite improvement in

dietary energy supply in North Africa, the food gap is growing fastest (2.3 _perc~t) in this subregion compared to the rest o~ the Sub-Saharan Africa. The high growth rate of demand is most certainly due to a high growth of income as evidenced by a high increase of per capita GNP shown in Table 6.

Food Production Per Caput

46. Domestic productivity in food as measured by food production per caput of agricul- tural labour force is growing very slowly (in some cases negative) indicating that the domestic food production is lagging behind food demand and even population growth. On the other hand, while the share of agricultural exports in total imports in 1980 was quite small, it can be seen in Table 6 that the terms of trade facing most countries deteriorated considerably.

Food Imports

47. Food imports needed to supplement calorie supply, are taking an increasing share of total export earnings especially in the food deficit countries which are frequently

affected by drought and natural calamities. This is also the case in oil producing Sub-Saharan countries. However, by and large, the rate of change in the share of food

imports in total exports has tended to decline in 21 African countries. This may be due

~/ECA/CM.IO/21 Pa,<l,'e 14

r.ble 61 . . . .ur•• or ro04 &ad isrieultural P.rfor.anc. in th. 1970. (Annual oha.l\I•• b.tween 197~1980)

Value of Food production

DES agriow. tu.re Share of p.roaput Tenu ofY lllpOrt value COWltt'7 69-71/7 9-81 _exporte food iJIPOrts/ 8gTioul turd trade {index) growth

'I, ohange

growth rate total exports la.bour for 19'71-73 r&te. 1911-80 popula.tion

Lib;r.. 60 -22.8 _1.6 7·2 0.0 10.9

EQl>' 24 1.1 13.7 0.3 64.6 16.9

Tuni.b. 26 6.5 -5.2 2.2 57.6 9.5

Ale-ria 39 -2.1 -2.6 1 101.3 14·9

"'roo<>o 6 8.5 2.0 -1.0 72.4 7.1

S... 10 6.4 5.4 1·9 83.8 3.4

HORNDRfCI 21 2.5 5.8 0.6

74.5

^11.9

C..~Verd. 39 2.8 4.8 2·9 0.0 4.4

lYOJ"7 Cout 6 25.2 -4.3 4.2 102.5 6.0

Se.p}. 5 14.0 -2·4 0·4 76.0 -1.0

Hir-ria 6 9.0 3.7 2.1 _103.0 23.8

Nipr 12 5·1 -6.4 4.4 7).4 8.7

Liberia 5 16·5 5·5 1.0 93.5 6.)

Boni. 4 -0.1 1).8 1.8 71.8 3·5

a_bi. -3 9.7 12·5 -3.6 80.1 16.8

Guin... Bi.eau 3 24.1 -16.1 0.2 0.0 -1.7

TOIO -3 14.7 2.0 1.1 115.2 1)·3

KaurUa.nia 2 11.7 14.7 1.) 87.1 7.5

Upper Volt. 2 17.1 1.8 1.8 9'7.9 8.4

SierraLeon. -6 16.1 7.5 0.1 101.8 2.2

QuiD•• -7 5.2 -6.6 0.4 0.0 9.5

0. . . . -15 15.6 -4.6 -3.4 139.8 -0.7

lIa1i -8 18.4 -10.4 2.4 94.5 -6.0

WIST IFRlCA 2 U.S 1.2 l.b

9].]

14.6

a.boD 27 27.4 0.8 1.3 206.4 18.4

Co. . . 12 1).3 -3.2 2.1 111.0 n ,o

C.-roon 7 19.8 -3,) 0.6 108.3 5.1

C.ntral AtricaD R.public -3 12.4 -4.1 0.2 82.9 -0.8

Chad _12 _14.2 -19·5 1.9 84.8 -14·2

cLfm ^QiSTifRH':A 6 17.1 -].4 L6 107.6

0.3

...41 6 18.8 0·9 1.2 0.0 8.9

R...,... 11 24.1 4.5 2.1 85·2 11.1

Zaire -4 8.8 0.1 0.2 78.8 -).6

cbfi'RIL URICA -1 11.9 6.1 0.5 70.4 -0.3

Kaurit1ua 16 '5.) 0.1 -1·9 98.8 5·9

Swasil&lid 16 19.2 1.7 3.2 0.0 6.9

_or

^{1 1).) 3.0 0.0 84.8 6.9}

Le.otbo 19 7.5 -3.7 -0.5 0.0 1).0

Bo'hwana B 1 ).1 -1.9 -2.4 0.0 14·4

....". 14 -2.2 26.7 -0.6 n s.; 23.7

lo. .bi. 3 0.0 -0.0 -0.5 75·7 -1.9

Wal.-n -3 ^lad -5·9 0.3 69.6 -2.1

Ethiopi. 5 ^{12.4 14.8} 1.2 83.5 2).6

Z,iabelNe ^j ID·9 -5·0 -0.8 0.0 -li:!.a

3o-.1i. -11 15.3 8.6 -4.1 135·5 11.5

K_.

^{-12 18.4 -7.2 -0.8 62.6 -0.2}

Tans.ah. -I 8.4 2·7 2.2 86.4 2.3

1Io. . .biqu -11 -5·3 ^1)·9 -1.7 52.3 10.0

0... -22 6·9 -9.9 -0.0 110.2 -7·7

iIIlS1'& sot1I'HERif IFRI~ -1

9.$

^{4.6 0.1 17.8 7.6}

TOI'J.L.lPRICJ. 4 8.9 3.0 0.8 83·9 9·9

SOuro.1 '10, 196)1 FAOCOllPuter Prln~-Out.on Food and Agrioultur. _P.rfO~O.,28/12/83, iSPS, FAD, Rome.

!I T.~ or Tr&4. 1971-731 thi. i • • net bart.r terae of trade 1979-81/1971-73. Thi • •how• • deterioration tor me' oountri. . . . th.,. are le•• than 100.

EjECA./CM.lo/n Page 15

rab1e o{cont.)t M.eaaures of P'ood &ad Avicultural P.rfo~o.in tbs 1970. (~U&lobw. . bet. . .n 1270-.19801

f'opw.&tion

Country sro~b

1911-80

Libya 4.2

....' 2.5

Toni_i& 2.2

!lrerta 3.3

Morocoo 3.0

Sudan 2.1

NOm URIC", 2.1;1

Cape-Vude 1.9

Ivor,r co. .t 4.1

Senegal 2.8

Ni. .ria 3.2

Nirer 2.9

Liberia 3.5

Benin 2.9

G. .bi. 3.0

Gwn". Bi . .au 1.1

Togo 2.1

Mauritania 2.8

Upper Volta 2.5

SierraLeone 2.b

Guinea 2.5

Ghana 3.1

Wali 2.6

~TAFRICA 3.1

Gabon 0.9

Co~ 2.5

C....roon 2.2

Central ..Hrioan Rep. 2.1

Cbad 2.0

dj'TRiL Wi5TAFRICA. 2.1

Burundi 2.0

RW&Qu 3.0

Zaire 2./;1

CDH'lW. 1FRICA. 2. 7

1laur1hWl 1.5

Swul.land 2.1

Na.dagu<I&I' 2.b

Leeotho 2.4

Botswana 2.7

Angola l.4

2&l11bia j.1

Malawt ).2

~tbLopLa 2.1

Zi.~bwe 3.4

3ouli. 5.1

J<en"y.. j.9

TanZI.nLa ).0

MoSalD.bique 2.6

Ugan~ J.O

J:lt,.ST &: SOI.1l'HEKN AF'ltlUA :':.9

TarAL AFRICA 2.9

E1&1rUoit,.

!I

0.4 0.40.4 0.47 0.:)1 0.46

0.39

0034 0.00 0.45 0.18 O.}6 0.41 0.30o.)}

0.34 D.16 D.42 0.34 0.)) D.34 0.16 0.)8 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.21 0.12 0.60 0.31 0.17 0.41 0.24 0.25 0.44 0.42 0.'9 0·42 0·42 0·44 0·48 0·46 0.41 0.40 0.47 0.49 0.41 0.44 0.44

0'44

0.)4

OIIPjP.c.

p-owth 1910-80

-0.9 5.6 5.4

;.1 2.8 0.9

3.7

5.5 1.5 -0.4

;.0 -0.8 -0.1 1.2 ).1

2.9

Y

0.9 -1.0 I ••

-1.1 0.4 -2.b 2.) 1.(

).2 0.5

).) -0.2 -}.6

o.B

5.0;.b

-1.6 8 ••

9·0 -12.0if

-203

,."

0 ••

-1·5 1.1

'.4

1.1

-5.0if

-4·1 -0.8 1.1

Total food de-.nd.

1971-60

1.8 2·12.9

2.1 -0.' 1·9 ,.)

'.1

)·1

4.'

3·7

'.1

b.O -2·9

··5 '.0

4·5 4!.4

£.7

b •.<:!

5·1)·5

0 ••

1.O!

2••

).2

Food.

produotion

.... "'.

197 1-80

)ob b.l

'.5

5.1

;.0

).0

-2·7

1. )

1·5

1.b

'.b

1., 1.5 -1.9;.1 2.3

0.4

'.0

2.'

1.8

'.5

2.1

-0.2;.2

1.1 0·5 -).7 0.4

'.1

2.0

1.' 0.'

0.s 1·9

;·9 -1.1 :.!.u 1.J 1.9

Food GAP 1971-1::\0

;.1

-;.1

_2.2

-;·5

-2.6

-2.3

-0.' 1.9 -2.6 -1.2

'.5

-0.5-a.) -6.1

-1·4 -1.j

-0.8 -0.4 _1.0 -1.1 -4.6 -0.4 -1.1 -1.4 -0·1 -D.]

-0.3

'.)

0.1 -o,e D.;

-0·5 -0.4 -;·9 -1.0 -1.0 -10.2-5·5 ).;

0.1

-2·5 -0·7

-'·5

-5·4 -3.2 0·4 -2.3

0.8 _1.1 -1.3

sewce s FAO, 198.h FAD COllputer Print-Oub on Food and AgricultW'fl Perfora&Qce, 28/12/83. LSi'S, FAO ROille.

!/ ESCecurc e ,

Y

Growth as shown in 1980 ,"orlll &nk Atl . . for 1970-78.

JJ Eat.illlll;ted by diffnenc.e betw. .n GDP growth Tat.. 197~80 {We nev. Report 1982).

E/ECA/CM.10/21 Page 16

to an increase in exports in the 19708 due to attractive commodity prices but also to cut- backs in imports of food because of balance of payments problems. Table A4 (Annex) shows

that the share of food imports in total exports in 1980 was as high as 25 percent and increasing at abcut 3.0 percent (Table 6). Countries such as Egypt show 68 percent,

Sudan 56 percent, Cape Verde 584 percent, while Guinea Bissau 96 percent, Lesotho 134 per- cent to name but a few. This is evidence of a growing food import dependency and of the burden which food imports impose on governments^I ability to accwnulate foreign exchange urgently needed for development.

Agricultural Exports

48.

The value of African agricultural exports (at current dollar value) has also grown by 9 percent annually over the decade and all the subregions have performed reasonably well except North Africa in which the growth in agricultural exports is below average (2.5 per- cent). This is mainly due to poor performance by Libya and Algeria in the agricultural export market. In Sub-Saharan Afrioa poor performance in agricultural exports is noted in Angola and Mozambique, obviously because of difficulties involved in economic reconstruction following the end of hostilities and attainment of political independence.

Use of Resources

49. Table A5 shows that ar'iCUltural labour force is growing at 1.4 percent (although not as fast as population growth but growth rate of arable land per caput of this labour force is negative. In the absence of agricultural technology this implies an increasing unemploy- ment, underemployment and worsening agricultural productivity. The fact that land available is not being brought into cultivation as fast as the growth of the agricultural labour force may be due to the inability of governments to exploit irrigation potential and to extend the agricultural land frontiers rapidly to areas hitherto infested by tse-tse fly and other animal and human diseases. Indeed a lack of technology per se could not be a plausible

explanatio~, given the high rates of fertilizer consumption and tractorization indicated in the table in question.

50. Although there is evidence of increased official commitments of external assistance to African agriculture over the last ten years in real terms and in per caput of agricul- tural population, certain anomalies in the flows such as the long lag between resource corwnitments and disbursements may have hampered their effective use. Also, even though official resourCe commitments may have increased,the question is whether they have been adequate enough to meet the African agricultural investment needs of US$ 4.4 billion per year set by the Lagos Plan of Action. The FAD study AT2000 oven estimates a net investment requirement of US$ 56 to US$ 88 billion over 20 years. Given the present pattern and level of resource flows to African food and agriculture sector, these inves1ment targets are far from being realized.

51. Forest resources also show a disturbing trend. The data available (Table A5 Annex) shows a drastic decline in forest wood per caput of total population. Apart from Algeria which recorded a 3 percent growth rate, all other African countries showed negative per capita growth rates in forest and woodland between 1974 and 1981. In fact, other information available indicates that closed forest is in danger of extinction on the continent.

Moreover, the most recent FAO outlook study reveals that several West African countries (including Nigeria and Ivory Coast) "ill have totally consumed their closed productive forests by the early 1990s, and many others will follow them within 50 years. This is a disturbing phenomenon with far reaching implications for environmental protection and energy questions.

lc/~C '^{'.' ,. _,.'l}

/"'1 ]0/

^{J , • • 0 -1<-}

Page 17

52. In summary, the decline in forest and woodland, the present nutritional status, the widening gap between food production and demand, growing import dependency, low productivity of agricultural labour force, the sluggish growth Of agricultural exports - are all evidence of the decline of performance of the food and agricultural sector. However, the decline in performance cannot be explained by resource allocation alone. Equally important are other factors such as incentive structure, policies, mobilization of peasants, etc. Because of lags between investment and output which must occur due to investment gestation, it is hot possible to guage the precise effect

or

resource allocation except in general terms.

However, lack of domestic investment r-equja-ed to back up government agricultural policies clearly reinforces the belief that African governments have yet to place a high priority on food and agriculture.

SIGNS ^OF SUCCESS

53.

In spite of the decline in agricultural performance generally on the continent, there have been some signs of success in some individual countries or groups of countries and these examples are worth documenting - however limited they may be.

54.

Libya, for example, has done remarkably well in ensuring adequate nutrition for its people through increased agricultural labour productivity, bringing more land under

cultivation and through increased tractorization. This has been possible because a much higher investment ~riority has been accorded to agriculture. Algeria has also done exceedingly well in the development of forest and woodland and it is the only country on the African continent in which forest and woodl8.nd per head of population has increased over the last decade.

54.

Other countries such as Mali, Sierra Leone and the Gambia are successfully phasing out consumer subsidies which put a strain on pub I ic r-eaour-c es and beueftt mainly the politically more articulate urban folks.

55. From the information available, it would also seem that perceptible progress is being made by a number of African countries in policy areas. Several countries are

embarking on the necessary institutional ~nd policy reforms as a means of striVing towards food self-sufficiency. In this regard, a nili~ber of countries have prepared food plans which have been or will be incorporated into their national development plans. New measures include mobilization of farmers and resources, increased investment and. inputs,

institutional improvement and application of SOme forms of incentive structure.

56. Such activities include investment in food security infrastructure in the Sahel as well as in a number of African countries. In the field of food security infrastructure, Southern African countries through the Southern African Dev~lopmentCoordination Conference (SADCC) are also making a determined effort to establish a subregional food security

arrangement to tide them over during food emergencies. The same is true of the Great Lakes countries. Moreover, the 18 Eastern and Southern African countries have just considered a feasibility report aimed at establishing a subregional maize research centre as part of their effort to achieve greater food self-sufficiency. Investment activities have also been undertaken to improve rural infrastructure as in Benin, Burundi and in Cameroon. Develop- ment of irrigation in Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Mav.ritania, Nigeria and Madagascar are further examples. There is also evidence of rehabilitation of food industries and improved

research and delivery systems in some countries.

51. In general, where increases in productio~ have occurred, they have been closely associated with the r-ea.Li.za'tLon on the part of governments that the improvement of

agriculture is vital for the economic advancement of their countries and it is crucial in enabling them to feed their people and thereby contributing to social and economic stability.

A few countries like Malawi, Kenya and Egypt, managed to improve the food and agricultural