• Aucun résultat trouvé

Formal Security Proof of CMAC and Its Variants

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Partager "Formal Security Proof of CMAC and Its Variants"

Copied!
15
0
0

Texte intégral

Loading

Figure

Fig. 1. Proof sketch
Fig. 2. Computing CBC-MAC with block cipher E and key k on an m block message.
Fig. 3. Illustration of ECBC E k 1 ,E k 2 ,E k 3 (m 1 ||m 2 ||m 3 ) m 1 m 2 m 3 E k 1 E k 1 E k 2 tag m 1 m 2 m 3padm01m02 m 0 3Ek1Ek1Ek 3tag Fig
Fig. 6. Illustration of CMAC E k (m 1 ||m 2 ||m 3 )
+3

Références

Documents relatifs

The FG-repeats of Nup98 and the homeodomain of HoxA9 are essential for the effect on NHEJ

Cette utilisation d’une fonction de hachage avec une clef secrète intervient dans le calcul d’un MAC, et une attaque d’extension comme celle-ci permet de signer un message

In this note, we prove that the density of the free additive convolution of two Borel probability measures supported on R whose Cauchy transforms behave well at innity can be

We observed from tongue contour tracings that the Mid Bunched configuration generally has a lower tongue tip than the Front Bunched one in speakers who present both bunched

We have presented in this paper the concept of the mini-square propagation over a block cipher: for a well chosen quartet of plaintexts, the corresponding ciphertexts, after

Rogaway, XOR MACs: New methods for message authentication using nite pseudorandom functions, Advances in Cryptology { CRYPTO '95, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.

[3]; it shows that if the block ci- pher is secure in the sense that it is hard to dis- tinguish it from a random permutation, the CBC mode offers secure encryption in the sense

1 When our work was done in 2011, the best previously published cryptanalytic re- sults on Camellia with FL/FL − 1 functions were square attack on 9-round Camellia- 128 [11],