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Quo vadis, Moldova? The role of social and political elites in the norm internalization process

BALTAG, Dorina, BURMESTER, Isabell

Abstract

This article aims to assess the role of local agency and the local socio-cultural contextin the internalization of externally promoted political norms. When external norms arediffused to the domestic level, they are reinterpreted and adapted to the localnormative context.

Conceptualized as a dynamic process, norm internalizationimplies that norms undergo a modification in terms of law, discourse, and practice.To add to the scholarship that offers power-based explanations when discussinghow EU political norms are embraced locally, we discuss the internalization ofnorms at the national level, taking into consideration local reactions and the(re)interpretation of external norms. To do so, this article scrutinizes the localdynamic of the internalization process by showing how local agency and thecultural match between external and internal norms plays a role. Following theconstructivist study of norm diffusion, this research uncovers how Moldovan socialand political elites use societal pressure dynamic and elite learning dynamic in thecase of implementation of the anti-corruption norm. In addition, this article putsemphasis [...]

BALTAG, Dorina, BURMESTER, Isabell. Quo vadis, Moldova? The role of social and political elites in the norm internalization process. Democratization , 2021, p. 1-20

DOI : 10.1080/13510347.2021.1963237

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http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:154331

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Quo vadis, Moldova? The role of social and political elites in the norm internalization process

Dorina Baltag & Isabell Burmester

To cite this article: Dorina Baltag & Isabell Burmester (2021): Quo vadis, Moldova? The role of social and political elites in the norm internalization process, Democratization, DOI:

10.1080/13510347.2021.1963237

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1963237

© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

Published online: 10 Aug 2021.

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Quo vadis, Moldova? The role of social and political elites in the norm internalization process

Dorina Baltag aand Isabell Burmester b

aInstitute for Diplomacy and International Governance, Loughborough University London, London, UK;bDepartment of Political Science and International Relations, Global Studies Institute, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland

ABSTRACT

This article aims to assess the role of local agency and the local socio-cultural context in the internalization of externally promoted political norms. When external norms are diused to the domestic level, they are reinterpreted and adapted to the local normative context. Conceptualized as a dynamic process, norm internalization implies that norms undergo a modication in terms of law, discourse, and practice.

To add to the scholarship that oers power-based explanations when discussing how EU political norms are embraced locally, we discuss the internalization of norms at the national level, taking into consideration local reactions and the (re)interpretation of external norms. To do so, this article scrutinizes the local dynamic of the internalization process by showing how local agency and the cultural match between external and internal norms plays a role. Following the constructivist study of norm diusion, this research uncovers how Moldovan social and political elites use societal pressure dynamic and elite learning dynamic in the case of implementation of the anti-corruption norm. In addition, this article puts emphasis on the importance of cultural match for a norm to be internalized by discussing post-Sovietness in Moldova.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 4 January 2021; Accepted 1 July 2021

KEYWORDS Norm internalization; EU; Moldova; post-Sovietness; democracy promotion; corruption

Introduction

The EU’s immediate neighbourhood–Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine–is characterized by constant political crises with uneven patterns of democratic reforms. The EU has used very strong incentives vis-à-vis these countries by developing the Eastern Partnership (the EaP) that offers an Association Agreement (AA) – a broad framework that codifies an advanced series of democratic reforms. Yet, none of these countries are stable democracies. Research has investigated domestic factors such as a functioning rule of law, administrative capacity, economic liberalization1; or external factors such as the Russian Federation, which has leverage on domestic politics in the post-Soviet space2; or the legal adoption of these rules in the EU that influence its adoption

© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduc- tion in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

CONTACT Dorina Baltag d.baltag@lboro.ac.uk

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externally.3Such incentive-based models explain a country’s level of adaptation to EU rules in term of compliance,i.e.the extent to which the EU has the power to enforce legal approximation to EU legislation in these non-EU countries. Yet this approach does not account for the democratic backsliding that is observed in the neighbourhood.

We identify three potential blind spots. Firstly, the focus is rather on the EU than on the country receiving these external rules and norms and the EU’s success in inducing democratic reforms by means of rule transfer.4 Secondly, they offer limited expla- nations as to why EU norms are not internalized in countries like Moldova or Ukraine, which are in an advanced relationship with the EU and have the ability of adaptation to predetermined EU norms and rules (from a legal perspective).5 Thirdly, power-based explanations omit to explain how local actors engage with EU norms and how EU norms converge with the domestic sociocultural context.

To remedy the shortcomings of the existing scholarship and to understand better what shapes EU norm internalization in the neighbourhood, we use social constructi- vist postulates. Instead of focusing on how norms travel beyond borders and are being complied with (or not), a constructivist view defines diffusion as the transfer of ideas, processes, objects, and information from one actor to another. The focus is on the dis- cursive and behavioural constitution of norms: external norms need to be transmitted and empowered at the national level, which takes place in the form of norm accep- tance, rejection, or modification.6Checkel7specifically refers to norm empowerment to shift attention from legal implementation to the way in which the prescriptions of an external norm become the focus of internal dynamics, usually as a result of change in discourse or behaviour, or both. Norm diffusion research shows the impor- tance of examining how norms are interpreted locally. This research has highlighted the role of domestic constellations of elites and social groups and the sociocultural context.8To add to this strand of literature and to tap into the three identified blind spots, this article inquireshow local agency and the cultural match between external and internal norms shape the internalization of political norms.

Our point of departure is the norm cycle model developed by the pioneer construc- tivists Finnemore and Sikkink.9The last stage,“norm internalization,”is the focus of this research,i.e.when external norms are widely accepted and“achieve a‘taken-for- granted’ quality that makes conformance with the norm almost automatic.”10 To advance the conceptualization of this stage, we consider norm internalization as a dynamic rather than a static process - where the norm is contested and modified by the different political and societal actors in a complex domestic sociocultural context. To understand the local dynamic of norm internalization, we consider two independent variables–local agency and cultural match–and their power to shape the dependent variable–norm internalization.

Methodologically, this article embraces an in-depth single N case-study research design to qualitatively assesses the internalization of the EU-promoted anti-corruption norm in Moldova, which allows“to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenom- ena.”11A within-unit case-study research considers the specificities of the local actors and context, thereby detecting important nuances in the norm internalization process omitted by comparative and large-N studies. When it comes to the norm internalization process, Moldova had been seen as the best and most willing performer12and referred to as a frontrunner by the EU13till the bank fraud scandal in 2014 during which 1 billion USD disappeared from Moldovan banks. Whereas everything had pointed to norm acceptance at all levels, the large-scale corruption cases that came to light in 2014 cast

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doubt on this characterization of Moldova’s transformation. EU incentives were so strong that even corrupt governments sought legitimacy by mimicking pro-European agendas, Moldovan leaders used a pro-European discourse and the promise of inte- gration, while not delivering the reform agenda. It seems that in Moldova a more complex process of internalizing the anti-corruption norm was at work that incentive- based models fail to explain. Studies on anticorruption reforms14have shown that nor- mative change plays a major role in successful transformation. This makes the anti-cor- ruption norm in Moldova a most likely case for observing how norms are contested and modified by local agency in a local sociocultural context.

The analysis of our data involves pattern-matching“to test the causal implications of a theory thus providing corroborating evidence for a causal argument.”15Hence our study brings forward empirical knowledge about how the dependent variable (norm internalization) and the independent one (local agency and cultural match) interrelate, elucidating the existent causal mechanisms. We rely on evidence extracted from official Moldovan and EU documents, NGO reports, and national strategies on corruption.

Data from 15 semi-structured interviews with Moldovan civil servants and civil society representatives (conducted in 2013, 2016, and 2020) were corroborated against opinion polls and statements of political elites in media outlets to account for the discourse and practices that we observed when the EU anti-corruption norm interacted with the local realities. As a result, our findings reflect on how the norm internalization process is conditioned by local agency (social and political elites) and how post-Sovietness decreases the constitutive effects of EU political norms.

Analytical framework: norm internalization, local agency and cultural match

Norm internalization

Norm diffusion is afluid process during which“both international and domestic actors […] contest, interpret, and translate norms.”16 Norm internalization, on the conti- nuum of the norm life cycle17, is understood as a dynamic process: a “constant process of negotiating and re-negotiating”18 of norms. This is the stage where norms interact with a given domestic context and where“specific localizations come about in interactive [norm] translation processes.”19 Foreign norms become “loca- lized” through this reconstitution or congruence building between the external norm and the local beliefs by local actors.20Conceptualizing norm internalization as a dynamic process implies both norm contestation and norm modification. Norm con- testation is understood as a discursive, norm-generating practice21through which key players can challenge both the validity and the application of the norm.22Modification involves a process of reinterpretation and adaptation to the local normative context23, or as some24emphasized, shifts in the way the norm is being interpreted when applied.

From this standpoint, norm internalization involves norms that undergo a modifi- cation of meaning and scope; and a process of contestation at the national level taking into consideration local reactions and the (re)interpretation of external norms. This can happen at the level of discourse, law, and implementation.25 Internalization is inherently about:“norms [that] influence the behaviours of actors and actors’practices endow norms with meaning, validity, and legitimacy.”26A norm is empowered when it is internalized; and when there is change in local practice at the level of discourse and

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behaviour.27Norm internalization in this sense is not thefinal stage: a norm may also become obsolete or replaced after being internalized which is defined by some as norm regression28or even extinction29- a stage after internalization that may overlap with (a new) norm emergence30, hence making the norm life cycle dynamic and cyclical.

Aiming to explore the stage of norm internalization solely, this article examines local agency by studying the role that political elites and societal groups play in shaping external norms domestically as well as how distinct sociocultural contexts shape the prospect of external norm diffusion.

Local agency

We define local agency by the different existing constellations of domestic actors enga- ging with the external norm, namely–political elites and societal groups.

Political elites

Political elites, defined as a group of actors with decision-making power (i.e. political parties, ministers, president, and high-ranking civil servants), are key local agents that act as gatekeepers31byfiltering external norm diffusion or by“opening”gates and re- enforcing the implementation of norm requirements. Norms are empowered top down when these decision makers adopt, change, or modify the prescriptions embodied in the external norm through elite learning. Hence, the external norm comes to constitute a“set of shared understandings that make behavioural claims”32of the political elite that, in turn, will transfer them into law and implementation.

Rationalist accounts of norm diffusion conceptualize elite learning via the logic of consequences and emphasize how actors adopt an external norm to receive rewards or avoid punishment. But, for a norm to be internalized, according to social constructi- vists, one needs to pay attention to the“lock-in”effects of norm diffusion on domestic institutions via elite learning.33Following this, we distinguish between two types of elite learning - role playing and normative suasion– both of which rely on a logic of appropriateness and foresee the adoption of the behavioural prescriptions of a norm irrespective of material incentives. When actors acquire “the knowledge that enables them to act in accordance with expectations”34, they play a role that is“socially accepted in a given setting or community.”35Therefore, when political elites interna- lize the external norm through role playing, they act in a non-reflective automatic manner, accepting the norm in discourse and transferring it into law without adap- tation to the local context. This hampers norm implementation. When actors adopt the values or interests of a community as their own and thus adopt the behaviour pre- scribed by the norm in a reflective way because it is“the right thing to do”36; they learn by normative suasion. This leads actors to accept the norm in discourse, adapt the law to the local context, and actively promote implementation.

Societal groups

Scholars have argued that nongovernmental groups or advocacy networks can be power- ful“norm translators” when an external norm becomes internalized.37Societal groups supporting the external norm, which form a critical mass of society, represented by civil society organizations (CSOs), diaspora associations, mass media, and grassroot

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movements, can demand change from the national political elite.38If political elites allow these groups to play a significant role in national policy-making processes, they can provide specific policy recommendations and monitor implementation, thereby coercing decision makers to adopt the external norm into law and implementation.39This does not mean that NGOs are always reformist, but that they contribute to the social recognition of norms: through repeated social interactions an enactment and validation of a norm takes place in relation to a specific legal rule.40This type of societal pressure is observed through CSO participation in policy-making processes where they can modify the norm to the local context. Even if political elites do not allow these groups to play a role in the policy-making process, they can“bypass their state” and raise awareness domestically and internationally. This “naming and shaming” “bring[s] pressure on their states from the outside” 41that can lead to a change in local practices. In this way they can become norm promoters that empower the external norm. Theflip side of this argument is that societal groups may become powerful norm challengers as well by opposing reform implementation or defending state practices and thus weakening norm internalization.

Cultural match

The encounter between external and domestic norms happens in a sociocultural context and a“cultural match”between the promoted norm and the target country is key in determining patterns of norm diffusion. Cultural match refers to“a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with dom- estic norms.”42 This means that for norm internalization, the congruence between external norms and local beliefs and practices is important.43Convergence of external and domestic norms implies a process of cultural validation, through which the meaning of a norm is contextualized across different regions and cultures.44Hence, the cultural match of a norm with the local environment is“the sum of background experiences gathered through interactions over time and expressed though the cultural validation of norms in day-to-day life.”45It shapes norm internalization in the form of congruence between the external and the local norms.46It is important to emphasize that cultural match is not“a dichotomous variable (yes or no, one has it or not); rather, it scales along a spectrum.”47 This means that cultural match can increase and decrease, from a situation of no congruence – to no obvious barriers to external norms–to complete resonance with these norms. The significance of this independent variable stems from its potential to increase or decrease the probability that external norms may have fundamental effects. According to Checkel48, a cultural match is

“positive” when the external norm is congruent with the domestic environment, meaning that the effects of these norms on the local context increases. It is a“negative” match when the effects of the international norms are reduced by the local context.

Research shows how in different parts of the world a cultural misalignment has negatively affected norm validation, and subsequently slowed down, or weakened norm internalization.49 When it comes to the former Soviet republics, the Soviet legacy is discussed as a primary explanation for divergent democratization outcomes.50 It refers to the“legacies of the past,”a pre-Soviet Union occurrence that is an obstacle to democratization.51 Change in post-Soviet political regimes should consider the effects of these“legacies of the past,”which, as some argue, are perpetual impediments to good governance.52This legacy is especially potent because it can influence “not only structures and institutions, but the ideas and patterns of action observed in

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both elites and citizens.”53Historically, sudden changes implied that the situation must be accepted as a given at a societal level; this, in turn, means that“the issue is not so much the choice of what path the country should take but rather whether society can adapt itself to the choice that has been made.”54Hence, there is not necessarily an acceptance of new norms in the form of full congruence, but adaptation to them.55

To understand how cultural match shapes norm internalization, it is important to understand whether and how external (EU) norm converge with local ones (Soviet legacy). Empirically this can be seen when the Soviet legacy perpetuates totalitarian institutions, is not conducive to democratic rulemaking56; and holds explanatory power for the weak democratic practices in post-Soviet countries.57

Implementation of political norms in Moldova: status of the anti- corruption norm

The Moldovan commitment to implementing anti-corruption reforms came to the forefront in 2005, in response to the parliamentary election results and international pressure. To receive the necessary votes for the presidential office, the communist party’s (PCRM) leader Vladimir Voronin switched from a pro-Russian to a pro-Euro- pean orientation:“after the elections, we will further develop the country so as to build a European Moldova.”58In this time the anti-corruption norm was translated into law, aligning the legal framework with the standards of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption. Yet, the framework lacked clarity and had significant loopholes related to the criminalization of bribery in the public and private sectors.59Another major concern was the dependency of political parties’electoral campaigns almost entirely on private funding and donations. To address this, the Law on Political Parties was adopted in 2007 and the Electoral Code amended in 2010, laying down specific rules and obligations. These legislative changes along with the government’s awareness raising campaigns were commended by international actors. Nevertheless, the political leadership was challenging the application of the norm as international reports were signalling shortcomings in norm implementation.60As Voronin reverted to more authoritarian practices his party lost citizens’ support as the PCRM candidate in local 2007 elections received only 38.83% while the liberal candidate won with 61.17%.

The fall of the Voronin regime in 2009 and the coming into power of the governing coalition (AEI) of four pro-Western parties under the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) Vlad Filat coincided with the start of the AA negotiations in 2010 and a more consistent commitment to adopting EU rules. This government developed an ambitious new National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NAS) which led to legal norm adoption. The Visa Liberalisation Dialogue launched in 2010 gave an additional impetus to these reform efforts, resulting in a commitment to strengthen the anti-cor- ruption legislative framework. For these sustained efforts in translating EU norms into law, Moldova was praised as the“poster child”61of European integration: the govern- ment initiated the reform of the Centre for Fighting Economic Crimes and Corruption and established the National Integrity Commission tasked with the monitoring of assets declarations of public officials.62

Norm internalization was clearly contested as the implementation of the anti-cor- ruption norm was hampered by political crises, insufficient resources, and an incoher- ent legislative framework.63As was later leaked to the press, the governing coalition signed a secret annex through which they distributed control over state institutions

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and picked positions in key institutions tasked with fighting corruption.64The pro- European rhetoric was used as a cover for the removal of any mechanisms that con- strained corruption to allow for the Russian Laundromat scheme to take place through which large sums of money were moved from Russia through Moldovan banks.65In 2013 Vlad Filat was dismissed for abuse of power by the Parliament and a new pro-European coalition of three parties was established under the reign of the Democrat Party (PD) led by the Moldovan oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc. The signature of the AA was overshadowed by the 2014 bank fraud and Moldova transitioned into the EU’s“problem child.”Opinion polls indicate that Moldovan citizens were signal- ling that corruption was widespread and did not trust the self-proclaimed liberal pol- itical elites.66 Subsequently, most of the Moldovan population (52.2%) elected Igor Dodon, leader of the socialist party (PSRM), as Moldova’s president versus 46.7%

who voted for Maia Sandu who ran an anti-corruption campaign.67And while the Par- liament was voting for the new Filip government, more than 20,000 Moldovans pro- tested with anti-corruption slogans, due to Filip’s close connection to Plahotniuc.68

As a result, the implementation of the new NAS for 2017–2020 progressed slowly, reaffirming the previously raised issues vis-à-vis anti-corruption norm internalization.

The EU emphasized Moldova’s“backsliding in democratic standards and the rule of law.”69Independent media sources explained how low corruption perception scores were evidence of political elites mimicking anti-corruption reforms as adopted laws existed mainly on paper.70Political experts highlighted that in such a political constel- lation, civil society and societal pressure could be the only credible drivers of norm internalization domestically.71Whereas the norm was adopted rhetorically, to fully understand norm diffusion in Moldova, a further discussion about ideational factors is necessary, to which we turn now.

Political elites and societal groups shaping the anti-corruption norm internalization in Moldova

Norm internalization from top down? The role of political elites

Ourfindings show how most Moldovan political elites have been part of a dynamic process of applicatory contestation72: the legitimacy of the norm is accepted by politi- cal elites whereas its implementation is contested. The vast majority of Moldovan elites embraced the externally promoted anti-corruption norm rhetorically while not adopt- ing the behavioural prescriptions of the norm. At the start of the AA negotiations, the pro-European Filat government declared its commitment to ensuring the democratic functioning of state institutions through reforms in line with European standards. The efforts made by the Filat and later the Leancăgovernment to implement a“broad and very ambitious programme of reforms”73indicate their acceptance of the external anti- corruption norm at the level of discourse. Although this looked like role playing tofit in with the EU community, the decision makers’own corrupt practices are evidence of norm contestation at the level of behaviour. Moldovan politicians did not adapt their behaviour in accordance with the anti-corruption norm–as we would expect to see with normative suasion or role playing. In the aftermath of the 2014 bank fraud, Vlad Filat was sentenced to nine years in prison for taking bribes and the Vice Minister of Economy, the Minister of Agriculture and Food Industry, and the Deputy Chairman of the Liberal Party were also arrested on corruption charges.74

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Thereupon the process of norm internalization was limited to translation of EU templates into law without adaptation to the local context. As one of our interviewees explained, these anti-corruption measures“are not adapted to our reality, they are just copied from the Romanian legislation”75; this hampered norm internalization as prac- tical implementation is evaluated as ineffective.76Attempts of modification of insti- tutional practices were made by transferring the oversight of the National Anti- corruption Centre from the parliament to the government to better adjust to the Mol- dovan administrative context. Nonetheless, evidence showed that the National Integ- rity Centre’s work continued to be ineffective and just mimicking shifts in practices whereas political elites continued to dedicate insufficient resources to anti-corruption reforms thereby contesting the applicability of the norm.77 As another interviewee noted:“They put everything on paper, to show that these laws are adopted and they comply, but they are just on paper and that’s it.”78Data from interviews emphasized that this was characteristic to the self-proclaimed democratic Moldovan political elites – a purposeful non-implementation of the legally adopted external norm, which, in return, facilitated their corruption practices.79

From 2014 onwards a change in the domestic community’expectations led a new political elite to play the role of reformer. Anti-corruption protests (most of 2015 and 2016) were organized by grassroot movements putting anti-corruption high on the political agenda. Leading Moldovan think-tanks were lobbying the government to embrace concrete measures to combat corruption in election campaigns80 while Moldovan public trust in institutions was in decline: 68.7% had no trust in the judi- ciary, 64.1% - in political parties, 71.5% - in the Government, 73.9% - in the Parlia- ment, and 78.1% - in the President.81 Opposing the oligarchic structures of the Moldovan political system, ACUM Platform (a coalition between the two opposition parties DA and PAS both created amid the protests) centred their 2019 electoral cam- paign around the“fight for justice and for a better life, without corruption”82signalling acceptance at the discourse level. Contrary to the previous governments, ACUM poli- ticians also accepted the norm at the behavioural level: as one of our interviewees involved in monitoring the government observed, there is no evidence of corrupt prac- tices by the Sandu government.83They brought in Western-educated civil servants in key ministries who adopted the behaviour prescribed by the anti-corruption norm.

Using EU templates, translation of the norm into law seemed under way as the Sandu government prepared a law package for the creation of the Commission for Strategic Investments and created the Coordinating Council for Anti-Corruption Pol- icies and Justice Reform. ACUM’s role playing brought about a change in practices as investigations into numerous corruptionfiles were launched and several directors of national agencies were dismissed on integrity matters (among which the Centre for Centralized Public Procurement in Health and launched investigation into several cor- ruptionfiles). However, while the Sandu government tried to anchor anti-corruption practices in Moldovan politics by changing the nomination process of the prosecutor general, she was dismissed by a vote of no confidence after onlyfive months; again, the dominant political elite contested the applicability of the externally promoted norm resulting in little to no shift in practices.

Maia Sandu herself continued to actively promote the anti-corruption norm in her 2020 presidential election campaign. The Harvard-educated former World Bank advisor seems to have adopted the norm through normative suasion, becoming a“cor- ruption-crusader”: “The fight against corruption, especially among the highest

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dignitaries and civil servants, is a priority for me as President. I will militate for the construction of functional and independent institutions.”84 Indeed, Sandu is con- vinced that grand corruption is the main problem in Moldova and established an extra-governmental monitoring body because Moldovan state institutions are “too slow.”85Her behaviour shows modification of the external norm to adapt to the Mol- dovan context instead of blind acceptance and translation of EU templates into law. At the same time, large parts of the political elite continue to contest the application of the norm obstructing Sandu’s efforts and arresting twice Moldova’s anti-corruption pro- secutor in her absence.86

Norm internalization from bottom up? The role of societal groups

Moldovan societal groups made use of bottom-up societal pressure to empower the anti-corruption norm. The most active CSOs and media organizations supportive of the EU anti-corruption norm became norm promoters by raising awareness and par- ticipating in policy making processes. When elites acted as gatekeeper, they sought to bypass them by regularly monitoring and informing the public about government activities “showing first of all the corrupt schemes of the local politicians.”87 However, these efforts are hampered by the deteriorating state of media freedom in Moldova (the country dropped in the World Press Freedom Index from rank 55 in 2013 to 89 in 2021). Most media outlets are owned by oligarchs and used to advance their political and economic interests88; while the independent outlets face a rising number of court cases. Yet, there are examples of independent media outlets investigating corruption cases (such as the well-known newspaper Ziarul de Gardă) despite being curtailed by political pressure and self-censorship. As a result, a large part of Moldovan society is aware of the problem and rank it third in the list of most important problems their country is facing.89Nonetheless, citizens do not always exert pressure on the political elites to embrace anti-corruption reforms.

They even challenge norm internalization by supporting the part of the political elite that contests the norm: in 2019 only 26.84% voted for ACUM and in 2020 Igor Dodon got 42.2% of the votes.90

A prominent example of societal pressure were the demonstrations following the 2014 bank fraud where grassroot movements acted as norm promoters by sparking strong international91 and domestic pressure. As a result, the new government formed in January 2016 under the leadership of Pavel Filip (Democratic Party) embraced rhetorically the anti-corruption norm to respond to public discontent while at the same time relativizing the role of the government in implementing the norm. In a speech addressing Moldovan citizens, Filip stated that “this government is aware that the people are discontented because of corruption”but that“according to democratic and institutional rules, the government cannot intervene in the work of prosecutors and judges.”92It was this societal pressure that put the anti-corruption norm on the agenda of the ruling elite that was forced to position themselves in relation to the norm.

The effects of CSOs acting as norm promoters was limited due the political elites’ gatekeeping preventing their participation in the policy-making process. In response to EU pressure, the government created the National Council for Participation (NCP) - an advisory body consisting of 30 leading CSO representatives–for formal CSO participation in the decision-making process. Furthermore, it agreed to ensure

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the full functioning of the National Integrity Authority (NIA) with representation of civil society in the Integrity Council.93 The NCP was not operational during 2015– 2016 (its mandate was only renewed in May 2017) and CSO participation in the Integ- rity Council was delayed in the course of the NIA reform. Where CSOs were able to put forward proposals for anti-corruption measures in an effort of norm translation, these were not fully taken into consideration. Detailed recommendations of the Transpar- ency International Moldova assessment of the National Integrity System94were only broadly taken into consideration when developing the objectives of the new NAS (2017-2020).95

Cultural match or how post-Sovietness plays a role in shaping anti- corruption norm internalization in Moldova

Scholarly research has emphasized how Soviet legacy is not conducive to democratic rulemaking96 and holds explanatory power for the weak democratic practices in post-Soviet countries. Unlike insights from scholarly research, our findings show that when EU norms penetrate the Moldovan sociocultural context, specifically in the case of the anti-corruption norm, it meets the so-calledpost-Sovietness modus oper- andi. Post-Sovietness is not identical with what scholars defined as the Soviet legacy.

Unlike the Soviet legacy,post-Sovietnessrefers to a combination of democratic charac- teristics with non-democratic ones; it is represented by the cohabitation of EU external norms with the local (Soviet) ones:“a kind of socio-political mutation, when old Soviet values, practices and standards get modified, combined, mixed and interlinked with Western counterparts, generating a pretty new eclectic context”.97

This eclectic context characterizes Moldova’s present situation. Features of post- Sovietness can be observed in rather small details, especially by those working in the system or interacting with the system more often. Examples are civil servants needing approval from their heads of institution to deliver even the least sensitive information, warlike rhetoric and dividing society for political gains, and massive re-recruitments of civil servants based on nepotism or favouritism.98 Current and former civil servants in the Foreign Affairs Ministry emphasized that there was still no shift towards a European mentality. While post-Soviet practices prevail, Moldova’s democratization progress will be “slow” and “dreadful.”99 The way civil servants describe Moldova’s deadlock with EU norm internalization, specifically at the level of implementation, relates to“the form of managed democracy, where the President (in reference to former president Dodon) dictates the rules of the political game and the separation of powers is washed out.”100

Post-Sovietness, thus undermines norm internalization and Moldova remains“[… (one of the)] regimes that have met certain democratic minimums in terms of pro- cedures but lack democratic substance.”101Common to post-Sovietness is mimicking democratic processes while gaining control and simulating processes of gaining the public’s trust. Such practices are supported on a societal level by the cohabitation of people socialized in communism in early formative years and the generations living in a post-communist country. It is the experience of the former that has a demobilizing effect on civic participation, attitudes towards democracy, and market economy.102 Such mutation, of European and Soviet practices and behaviour, refers to the auto- cratic governance that produces political behaviours as well as to the deeply engrained social preferences that confer durability to authoritarian systems.103As recent polls

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show104, in the following 2021 parliamentary elections, 30% of respondents are still likely to choose political parties whose leadership is involved in corruption schemes and have been contesting the applicability of the anti-corruption norm thus far while 34% are choosing Maia Sandu’s party - PAS.

The cohabitation of norms in Moldova also takes the form of external and internal norms clashing. The dismissal of the 2019 Sandu government, representing a team of Western-educated skilled cadre, promoters of the anti-corruption norm, reflected the clash with the old Soviet practices of preserving power in the hands one leader – former President Dodon. The prominent clash was the no confidence vote to Sandu government in 2019: it threatened the interest of a large part of the Moldovan political elite. There were also clashes in the main institution responsible for the implemen- tation of the AA. The Foreign Minister and his team (2019 Sandu government) were recruited from the Moldovan diaspora community with a high reputation for having a Western mentality and way of conducting foreign affairs:“It was our way of independent thinking and working based on efficiency and transparency that was not coinciding with their way, characterized by following orders.”105For domestic pol- itical elites, the EU became a source of rent-seeking106; and instead of norm implemen- tation, business and political interests collided to the degree that the power was consolidated in the hands of one oligarch (Vlad Plahotniuc, 2015-2019). Instead of adaptation, change, and accommodating the anti-corruption norm in the political context, there was a consolidation of tenuous elite networks, polarization of politics and maintaining as much as possible of a weak state.107So, the outcome is that a con- tinuing balance“between socialist nostalgia and the promise of Western integration may in the long run undermine the consolidation of genuine democracy in Moldova.”108

To a certain degree, post-Sovietness can be seen as opposing change. Yet, political elites’resistance should not be equated to norm rejection but rather as the way they decide to legitimize their power by means of external EU norms.109Levada emphasized that post-Soviet closed societies have raised generations that do not question the prac- tices of the ruling elite.110Systematically, an underlying arrangement within the Soviet system, led to bribery, string pulling, moral corruption and doublethink; so, the col- lapse of the Soviet Union only removed the fear of punishment. The leader of a pro- minent Moldovan think-tank explains that in Moldova this is linked with the lack of critical thinking on behalf of the population, the low level of quality of life that decreases the value system and that“till the (current President) Sandu, Moldova did not experience a political elite but rather thieves, presidents of‘kolhoz’and reformed Soviet ruling parties interested in brain drain, to be able to control‘theflock’.”111

As one interviewee pointed out,“the Moldovan politician wants to survive, and this is not necessarily linked with delivering on the agreements made with the EU […]; it is corruption that is the norm for them. The political elites need to become responsible in front of their citizen, but they struggle to align their interests.”112 A well-known example among interviewees is the situation of locally elected officials, especially those who are choosing to embrace new (European) instruments and practices in their electoral campaigns: “there is constant pressure on them to become party members, usually of those parties for whom corruption is the norm, such as the Social- ist or previously the Democrat Party. There were situations when these candidates, at the beginning of their mandate would wake up with lawsuits under false pretences and to be left alone to do their jobs properly they choose to become party members.”113

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And usually, the better these independent candidates are, pressured into political affiliation they did not choose, the higher the merits of the political party.

As elaborated in the previous section, in Moldova, a consolidated group of society has a deep commitment to internalizing the external norm. In this sense, when the external EU norm is applied locally, a process of societal adaptation begins. Societal adaptation implies a disseminated value that defines societies’ capacity to cope with complex opportunities and threats, including managing change, and relates to its ability of self-organization.114In this sense, it is important to observe CSOs and policy networks that adopt the external norm and facilitate the penetration of the new EU norm in the local, Soviet context: the work of the NCP in Moldova (presented previously) is a relevant example. One of the tasks of the members of the Council is to ensure Moldova’s commitment to the EU and to put forward best practices inspired by the EU model.115 Therefore, the initiative to seek change comes from local actors, which is fruitful in terms of norm internalization116 because credible actors, such as Moldovan CSOs, are insider proponents of external norms; and norm adoption happens with their active involvement.117

Post-Sovietness in Moldovan politics is identified by the necessity to have control over politics, therefore norm internalization is preferred to be mimicked, as was the case of the pro-socialist government (under president Dodon) and the self-proclaimed pro-democratic government under the rule of the oligarch Plahotniuc. Therefore, it came as no surprise that it was specifically Sandu’s anti-corruption agenda that led to her receiving the no confidence vote. Instead of increasing the constitutive effects of norm internalization by implementing the norm, Moldovan ruling elites became

“masters in simulating democratic processes, practices and sometimes, even results.”118Typical examples provided by Moldovan CSOs referred to the strategy of the two politicians (and well-known oligarchs), Filat and Plahotniuc, skilled in attract- ing EU money and investing it in the modernization of infrastructure in the justice sector, instead of transposing legislation and adopting the norm. So, in Moldova, for a norm to be internalized it needs to be embedded at the societal level to then be trans- posed into policies, because many genuine reformers are societal actors.119The most prominent example is that of the current president, Maia Sandu (2020): many view her election as a turning point in the country’s fight against corruption because she embraces the new norm and act in accordance with it.120

The scholarship has already indicated that the translation of“legacies of the past”in the post-Soviet Eurasia in present realities is agency-driven, meaning that the ruling political elites are interested in power maximization and maintenance of authoritarian- ism.121Moldova falls under this category: it is being characterized as a captured state122 or a hybrid regime.123For the ruling oligarchic structures in Moldova, an incentive- based relationship with the EU is received better than a socialization one124, especially because this helps cover for authoritarian domination.125One may conclude that there is a negative cultural match. Yet, the interpretation should be more complex; as some emphasized, transitioning from communism to democratic practices would not be easy.126 Local context matters: in Moldova post-Sovietness is detrimental to norm internalization. Unlike Levada’s “homo post-Sovieticus” who is endowed with old habits that prevent the emergence of new practices or behaviour; this research shows that some Moldovan actors (societal groups) are not stuck in the past waiting for problems to be resolved by the system but become norm promoters and challenge

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the old Soviet practices. This implies that robustness of the old (Soviet) norm may decrease when norm promoters acquire political power (the case of Maia Sandu).127

Conclusion

In Moldova we observed a dynamic process of internalization of the EU-promoted anti-corruption norm. Ourfindings help us move away from rationalist explanations of norm diffusion and revisit the social constructivist128argument that for a norm to be empowered one must observe the ways in which the prescriptions of an external norm become the focus of internal dynamics through changes in discourse or behaviour. Pol- itical elites can also emulate discourses and simulate behaviour whereas the norm is not internalized. Additionally, our research emphasizes the complexity of the domestic sociocultural context which cannot be reduced to simply“Soviet legacy.”Instead, we show how in a country like Moldova, the cultural context is represented by post- Sovietness–a mutation between Soviet and Western norms which are cohabitating.

Normative suasion and role-playing as learning mechanisms are facilitators of norm internalization for political elites. Findings disclosed how from 2010 onwards the majority of Moldovan political elites have not contested the validity of the norm, but its applicability, mainly as a path to their legitimation. Role-playing resulted in acceptance of the norm in discourse and law, but contestation at the level of implementation. We observe that it is namely Maia Sandu that internalized the norm through normative suasion and modified the norm adapting it to the local context. However, efforts tofight corruption are hampered by the dominant political elites’contestation of the norm. For the norm to become internalized the whole of the political elite–not just a minority - needs to adopt its behavioural prescriptions.

Societal actors used their activities of watchdogging, advocacy, and monitoring to exercise pressure on political elites to prioritize the anti-corruption norm, enforce it, and embrace anti-corruption practices. Even though they were prevented from exert- ing pressure through participation in policy-making processes and couldn’t always act as norm translators due to the political elites’ gatekeeping, we observed that they became powerful norm promoters. Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that societal groups always empower norm internalization: a big part of society still chose political elites who prioritize personal gain over norm empowerment.

Furthermore, Moldova’s post-Sovietness limited domestic resonance and thereby the constitutive effects of norm internalization, specifically because the cohabitation of Soviet and Western norms concomitantly often clashed. Yet, when a certain type of societal actors has access to power the cultural match can shift towards the positive side of the spectrum. This was the case with a new generation of Western-educated and reform-minded elite. However, the 2019 Sandu government and current presidency’s practices seem to be the exception rather than the norm. As in Georgia, their ability to bring about change in a hybrid regime was limited.129To decrease the robustness of the Soviet legacy, and increase the cultural match, societal actors should further challenge the status-quo of the authoritarian regime.

The Moldovan government is far from being the only one instrumentalizing the EU and selectively implementing anti-corruption policies. A rent-seeking political elite contributes to corruption and bad governance in most post-Soviet countries.130 Elites act as gatekeepers,filtering external norm diffusion in line with their own pre- ferences in the southern neighbourhood too.131 What has received less scholarly

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attention so far is how societal groups can contribute to norm internalization by creat- ing public pressure. In Central and Eastern Europe this led to translation of the anti- corruption norm into discourse during electoral campaigns.132Finally, we see research avenues for cross-fertilization of studies on democratization and the Soviet legacies of the past. The latter have confirmed that overlapping legacies from the previous era have a powerful influence on the democratization efforts in post-communist countries.133A further development for scholarly research would be to consider our concept of post-Sovietness that confers a non-prescriptive view of the Soviet legacy134; as well as embrace its complexity as a concept that represents the cohabita- tion of the Soviet with external norms.

Notes

1. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig,EU Rules Beyond.

2. Dimitrova and Dragneva,Constraining External Governance. 3. Freyburg et al.EU Promotion.

4. Freyburg et al.,EU Promotion; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig,EU Rules Beyond; Dimitrova and Dragneva,Constraining External Governance.

5. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig,EU Rules Beyond.

6. Dandashly and Noutcheva,Whose norms?; ZimmermannSame Same or Dierent? 7. Checkel,International Norms.

8. Acharya,How Ideas Spread; Checkel,Norms, Institutions; ZimmermannSame Same or Dierent?

9. Finnemore and Sikkink,International Norm. 10. Ibid, 904.

11. Gerring,What is a Case Study,341.

12. EaP Index 2013; Freyburg et al.,EU Promotion; and Baltag and Romanyshyn,EU External Governance.

13. Delcour, Laure,You Can Lead.

14. Persson, Rothstein, and Teorell,Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail. 15. Gerring,What Is a Case Study,349.

16. Zimmermann,Same Same or Dierent?111.

17. Finnemore and Sikkink,International Norm. 18. Zwingel,How Do Norms Travel?12.

19. Zimmermann,Same Same or Dierent,106.

20. Acharya,How Ideas Spread. 21. Wiener,A Theory of Contestation.

22. Sandholtz,Norm Contestation.

23. Dandashly and Noutcheva,Whose Norms?

24. Sandholtz,Norm Contestation; Zimmermann,Same Same or Dierent? 25. See note 23.

26. Iommi,Norm Internalisation Revisited,77.

27. Checkel,Norms, Institutions.

28. Iommi,Norm Internalisation Revisited. 29. See note 27.

30. Ibid.

31. Tolstrup,When Can External Actors?; Çelenk,Promoting Democracy. 32. Checkel,Norms, Institutions,88.

33. Checkel,International Institutions. 34. Ibid, 804.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Zwingel,How Do Norms Travel?; Checkel,International Norms.

38. Keck and Sikkink,Activists beyond Borders; and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink,The Power of Human Rights.

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39. See note 25.

40. See note 28.

41. Risse and Sikkink,The Socialization of International,18.

42. Checkel,Norms, Institutions,87.

43. See note 20.

44. See note 28.

45. Wiener,A Theory of Contestation,45.

46. See note 19.

47. Checkel,Norms, Institutions,87.

48. Ibid.

49. Iommi, Norm Internalisation Revisited; Checkel,Norms, Institutions; Acharya,How Ideas Spread.

50. LaPorte and Lussier,What Is the Leninist; Gelman,Bringing Actors Back; and Hedlund,

Russian Path Dependence.

51. Gelman,Bringing Actors Back In,288.

52. Hedlund,Russian Path Dependence.

53. LaPorte and Lussier,What Is the Leninist,640.

54. Levada,Homo Post-Sovieticus,34.

55. Ibid.

56. Way and Casey,The Structural Sources. 57. Howard,The Weakness of Civil.

58. Full quote available here: https://www.ipn.md/en/vladimir-voronin-voted-for-moldovan- peoples-wellbeing-7965_974914.html.

59. GRECO,Third Evaluation Round.

60. Ibid.

61. Rinnert,The Republic of Moldova.

62. Commission(c),Implementation; and Commission(d)Implementation.

63. Commission(b),Implementation.

64. Jamestown Foundation.Sources of Moldovas Political Chaos.

65. Full report:https://www.occrp.org/en/laundromat/the-russian-laundromat-exposed/.

66. Transparency International.Corruption Index.

67. Data from the Central Electoral Commission, available here:https://a.cec.md/en/elections- and-referendums-2830.html.

68. See here:https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35403563.

69. Commission(a),Association Implementation Report,21.

70. Vlas. Corruption Perceptions Index 2016.

71. Gherasimov.Moldova.

72. See note 22.

73. The full statement is available here: https://newsroom.consilium.europa.eu/collections/eu- moldova/cooperation-council-2013-press-conference-part-3-1.

74. U4 AntiCorruption Resource Centre.Moldova.

75. Interview with Moldovan NGO representative 3, February 2020.

76. Commission(a),Association Implementation Report.

77. Ibid.

78. Interview Moldovan NGO representative 1, February 2020.

79. Interview Moldovan NGO representative 15, June 2016, Interview Moldovan NGO represen- tative 2 and 3, February 2020.

80. EaP CSF(b),Monitoring Public Policies. 81. IPP,Barometrul de Opinie Publică.

82. State News Agency Moldpres:https://www.moldpres.md/news/2019/01/25/19000654.

83. See note 78.

84. Statement on Facebook, available here: https://www.zdg.md/importante/presedinta-r- moldova-maia-sandu-a-avut-o-intrevedere-cu-directorul-cna-solicitarile-facute-catre- conducerea-centrului/.

85. Full quote available here:https://www.euronews.com/2021/06/08/president-of-moldova-maia- sandu-launches-committee-to-investigate-grand-corruption.

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86. Viorel Morari was arrested supra-legally in Sandus absence from Moldova:https://emerging- europe.com/voices/plight-of-anti-corruption-chief-is-maia-sandus-rst-test-as-moldovas- president/.

87. Interview Moldovan NGO representative 2, February 2020.

88. See note 78.

89. IRI,Public Opinion Survey. 90. See note 75.

91. The EU suspended budget assistance; the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank frozenancial assistance.

92. Filip speech: https://gov.md/en/content/prime-ministers-speech-unveiling-activity-report- rst-100-days-oce.

93. EU-Republic of Moldova Association Council.Recommendation No. 1/2017.

94. Transparency International Moldova,National Integrity System Assessment.

95. See note 78.

96. See note 56.

97. IWP,How to Get Rid,45.

98. Ibid.; Interview Moldovan think-tank representative 1, January 2020; Interview Moldovan civil servants 1 and 2, MFA January 2020.

99. Interview Moldovan civil servants 1 and 2, MFA, January 2020.

100. Interview Moldovan civil servant 2, MFA January 2020.

101. McDonagh,Is Democracy Promotion Eective,147.

102. Pop-Eleches,“Historical Legacies.”

103. Greene,Homo Post-Sovieticus.

104. Data available here: https://www.zdg.md/importante/sondaj-iri-numarul-partidelor-care-ar- accede-in-parlament-la-eventuale-alegeri-parlamentare-anticipate-cum-arata-topul-

increderii-in-politicieni/.

105. Interview Moldovan civil servant 2, MFA January 2020.

106. Delcour.You Can Lead; and Nizhnikau,Promoting Reforms. 107. Tudoroiu,Structural Factors.

108. Dragoman,“Political Transformation in Moldova,”83.

109. See note 19.

110. Levada,Homo Post-Sovieticus.

111. Interview Moldovan think-tank representative 1, January 2020.

112. Interview international consultant, European Commission, January 2020.

113. Interview Moldovan think-tank representative 2, January 2020.

114. Clemens,“Ethnic Peace, Ethnic Conflict.”

115. Interview Moldovan public policy consultant 1, September 2013.

116. See note 19.

117. Interview Moldovan public policy consultant 2, September 2013; Moldovan think tank repre- sentative 1, January 2020; Interview international consultant European Commission, January 2020.

118. Interview Moldovan think-tank representative 1, January 2020.

119. Gherasimov,Moldovas Power Transition; and Nizhnikau,Promoting Reforms. 120. Interview Moldovan civil servant 1 and 2, January 2020; Moldovan think tank representative 1

and 2, January 2020; international consultant European Commission, January 2020.

121. Gelman,Bringing Actors Back In; Greene,Homo Post-Sovieticus.

122. Tudoroiu,Democracy and State Capture; and Nizhnikau,Promoting Reforms. 123. Nilsson and Silander,Democracy and Security.

124. McDonagh,Is Democracy Promotion Eective. 125. Ekman,Political Participation.

126. Greene,Homo post-Sovieticus.

127. Deitelhoand Zimmermann,Norms Under Challenge. 128. See note 7.

129. Bolkvadze,Hitting the Saturation Point. 130. Gelman,Political Foundations. 131. Çelenk,Promoting Democracy. 132. Engler,“‘Fighting Corruption?

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