HAL Id: hal-02083356
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02083356v3
Preprint submitted on 18 Aug 2019
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Entanglement virtualization after the first quantum key teleportation
Mario Mastriani
To cite this version:
Mario Mastriani. Entanglement virtualization after the first quantum key teleportation. 2019. �hal-
02083356v3�
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Entanglement virtualization after the first quantum key teleportation
Mario Mastriani
ORCID Id: 0000-0002-5627-3935
Abstract—
In this draft, we present a new technique of quantum key distribution, where the first time the initial key is teleported, and after that, the entanglement is held in a fictitious way. In the transmitter, the new key is built with the previous key and the plaintext and with the new key and the plaintext we obtain the ciphertext. On the receiver side, with the previous key and the ciphertext we obtain the new key and with it and the ciphertext we obtain the plaintext. In other words, it is as if we emulate successive teleportations of the new keys that do not exist.
Keywords—Quantum Entanglement; Quantum Key Distribution; Quantum Teleportation.
1 Introduction
In the literature, there is a great amount of papers about Quantum Key Distribution (QKD); those which do not use quantum entanglement [1-10] and others which use it [11-18]. In our humble opinion, they all make an excessive exposure of the keys by using a pair of channels (classic and quantum) complementary to the channel that transports the ciphertext. See Fig.1. The idea behind this paper is the presentation of an enhanced QKD technique that minimizes such exposure.
Fig. 1 Typical QKD architecture.
2 Enhanced QKD 2.1 How does it work?
1. An interlaced pair of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type is generated 2. Both EPRs are distributed between Alice and Bob
3. Teleportation [19-21] of the initial key is done k
04. From Alice’s side and thanks the Boolean functions F
Aand G
Awe obtain the first ciphertext
PT ,k1 1 F PT ,kA
1 0 and CT ,k1 1 GA PT ,k1 1 (1) where PT is the plaintext and CT the ciphertext. In a generic way,
1 0 and CT ,k1 1 GA PT ,k1 1 (1) where PT is the plaintext and CT the ciphertext. In a generic way,
PT ,k1 1 (1) where PT is the plaintext and CT the ciphertext. In a generic way,
PT ,ki i F PT ,kA
i i1 and CT ,ki i GA PT ,ki i (2)
i i1 and CT ,ki i GA PT ,ki i (2)
PT ,ki i (2)
2
5. From Bob’s side and thanks to a couple of complementary Boolean functions F
Band
GB, we obtain the first plaintext,
CT ,k1 1 F CT ,kB
1 0 and PT ,k1 1 G CT ,kB
1 1 (3) In a generic way,
1 0 and PT ,k1 1 G CT ,kB
1 1 (3) In a generic way,
1 1 (3) In a generic way,
CT ,ki i F CT ,kB
i i1 and PT ,ki i G CT ,kB
i i (4)
i i1 and PT ,ki i G CT ,kB
i i (4)
i i (4)
Fig. 2 Enhanced QKD.
6. The PT
ican be portions of a message in frames, in such a way that the key changes with each frame, consequently, this automatic change of key could be given several times during the transmission of the same message.
2.2 Advantage
1. No human has ever knowledge of any key, not even their own and yet the keys change with each plot or portion of them.
2. There is never migration or distribution of any key by any channel, with the exception of initial teleportation.
3. As each message usually occupies several frames, with each frame the keys change. It can also be configured so that the process is applied several times during a frame. This causes that any hacker does not have the necessary latency to break a message, in fact, even a single frame.
He cannot even perform an expert off-line intervention (batch or quasi-batch).
4. The corresponding functions can act from the messages themselves or according to a certain characteristic of them.
5. Since the functions used are Boolean, then:
- there are no coding and decoding delays,
- it is actually the encryption algorithm that is parameterized with the keys and therefore said algorithm changes with each frame or portion of the frame,
- It is very easy to program, implement and maintain, and
- It does not require additional occupation of the network service, i.e., accessory to the
encrypted message itself.
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6. nobody should remember a single key, or think about future keys, 7. It is ideal to be applied in:
- blockchain - home banking - interbanking - government - defense - among others
In fact, even a purely classical version can be applied to:
- mobile phone communications.
3 Conclusions and Future Works
The current quantum communications systems distribute public keys using a pair of additional channels (classical and quantum) to the channel used by the ciphertext, and they do this as a standard procedure. This causes the exposure of these keys to an apocryphal presence, as well as implies a culture of remembering keys and renewing them periodically. In this work, we have presented a new QKD protocol which minimizes said exposure.
Competing Interests
The author declares that there are no competing interests.
Funding Statement
The author acknowledges funding by LosWW under contract NMQCLC-06#5/1/2015.
Acknowledgments
M. Mastriani thanks boarding of LosWW for his tremendous help and support.
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