• Aucun résultat trouvé

State-Policy Dynamics in Evolutionary Games

N/A
N/A
Protected

Academic year: 2021

Partager "State-Policy Dynamics in Evolutionary Games"

Copied!
29
0
0

Texte intégral

Loading

Figure

Fig. 1 Trajectories of the system (S  ) from different starting points and the slow manifold M 0 with  = 0.01.
Fig. 2 Convergence of the replicator dynamics equation (24) to the ESS δ x ∗ = 0.71875 starting from q x (0) = 0.2 and q x (0) = 0.9.

Références

Documents relatifs

First introduced by Faddeev and Kashaev [7, 9], the quantum dilogarithm G b (x) and its variants S b (x) and g b (x) play a crucial role in the study of positive representations

It is plain that we are not only acquaintcd with the complex " Self-acquainted-with-A," but we also know the proposition "I am acquainted with A." Now here the

In this case, the laser pump excites the titanium film and, through a thermoelastic process, leads to the generation of picosecond acoustic pulses that propagate within the copper

We shall see that this phenomenon coincides with an omnipresence of time in society where individuals, confronted with more time, in an ever more disturbing world, find refuge

represents an irrational number.. Hence, large partial quotients yield good rational approximations by truncating the continued fraction expansion just before the given

The objective of this paper is consequently to assess empirically how monetary policy, scal policy and exchange rate frameworks aect the cost of systemic banking crises..

In the case of the I-frame, the utility function is derived with respect to the individual contribution d i , and in the We-frame, all individual contributions d j are equal

This motivates our empirical strategy: we rst estimate sector- level trade elasticities, then compute price and income changes resulting from trade cost changes