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The elasticity of voter turnout: Investing 85 cents per voter to increase voter turnout by 4 percent

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ONLINE APPENDIX

The elasticity of voter turnout: Investing 85 cents per voter

to increase voter turnout by 4 percent

Mark Schelker

University of Fribourg, SIAW-HSG, CREMA, CESifo

Marco Schneiter

University of Fribourg

July 2017

Abstract

In the aftermath of elections or ballots, the legitimacy of the result is regularly debated if voter

turnout was considered to be low. Hence, discussions about legal reforms to increase turnout

are common in most democracies. We analyze the impact of a very small change in voting

costs on voter turnout. Some municipalities in the Swiss Canton of Bern reduced voting costs

by prepaying the postage of the return envelope (CHF 0.85). Prepaid postage is associated

with a statistically significant 1.8 percentage points increase in voter turnout. Overall, this

amounts to 4 percent more voters participating in the ballots. Moreover, we estimate the

influence of this increase in turnout on party support in popular ballots. We find that social

democrats and environmentalists see their relative support decline.

JEL: D72

Keywords: voting cost, postal voting, voter turnout, party support.

Authors’ addresses: Mark Schelker (corresponding author) and Marco Schneiter, Department of Economics, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland. Email: mark.schelker@unifr.ch, mar.schneiter@gmail.com.

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Table A1: Municipalities introducing/abandoning paid postage

Municipality

Introduction

(d.m.y) Specific reason?

Repeal

(d.m.y) Specific reason?

Aarwangen 01.07.1991

Bern 01.07.1991 31.12.1992 Budget cuts

Brienz 01.07.1991

Heimenhausen 01.01.2009 Horrenbach-Buchen 01.01.2000 Interlaken 01.10.1995

Ittigen 01.01.1991 16.05.2004 Budget cuts

Kiesen 01.07.1991

Köniz 01.07.1991

Landiswil 01.07.1991 Increase turnout 31.12.1999 Budget cuts Langenthal 01.01.1998 Increase turnout 31.12.2003

Langnau 01.01.2011 Closing of polling stations 31.12.2012 No effect Lyssach 01.06.2005 Closing of polling stations

Mühleberg 01.01.1995

Muri bei Bern 01.06.2010 Increase turnout 31.12.2013 End of pilot Neuenegg 01.01.2007 Closing of polling stations

Steffisburg 17.10.1997 Increase turnout Zollikofen 01.01.2004

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Figure A1: Analysis of pre-treatment trends

Notes: Testing the common trends assumption: Estimated pre- and post-treatment effects. Estimated coefficients of 10 lags and 5 leads of treatment dummy (Postage).

Vertical bands represent 95% confidence intervals.Two-way fixed effects regression. Observations: 23’879. R2: 0.824. No municipalities: 325. Control variables included. Baseline specification according to Table 3, column 2. Standard errors are adjusted to clustering at the municipality level.

The dashed red line marks the introduction of prepaid postage. To the left, the figure shows the estimated differences between municipalities with and without prepaid postage in 5 treatment periods. The pre-treatment differences oscillate around zero, none of the estimated differences are statistically significant, and no pre-treatment trends are observable. To the right of the introduction of prepaid postage, the figure presents treatment differences of 10 post-treatment periods. Only half of the estimated differences are significant at least at the 10% level. The estimated coefficients oscillate around a turnout difference of about 2 percentage points. Note that the 10th post-treatment period contains all further periods. All estimated differences are relative to the baseline period of 6 or more pre-treatment periods.

Difference between treatment and control group: Effect of prepaid postage in percentage points turnout

Treatment Pre-treatment

period

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Figure A2: Average voter turnout per ballot day from 1989-2014 in municipalities of the

Canton of Berne

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