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Who’ll stop lying under oath? Empirical evidence from tax evasion games

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Academic year: 2021

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Figure

Figure 1: Tax evasion behavior in Experiment 1, by treatment
Figure 2: Optimal compliance in a cost of lying tax evasion model
Figure 3: EDF of the revealed morality parameter by treatment
Figure 4: Response times in Experiment 1 according to the intensity of compliance (a) Baseline 0%25%50%75% 100% 0 100 200 300 400 Time (seconds) (b) Oath0100200 300 400Time (seconds)low compliancemedium compliancehigh compliance
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