Table of Content
Preface 1
CHAPTER 1 How big is the Financial Penalty for Dictators? The Case of Cuban Bonds at the time of Independence
Preamble 28
Introduction 28
I. The odious debt doctrine 31
II. The dream case: Cuban bonds 35
III. Historical Context 38
IV. Data Series and methodology 45
V. Results 51
Conclusion 63
References 65
Archives 69
Annex 70
CHAPTER 2 Lending Money to the “Executioners”: The Case of the 1906 Russian Loan
Introduction 76
I. Bond Prices and Repudiation 78
II. The 1906 loan... 80
III. Repudiation threats 85
IV. Data and methodology 88
V. Results 93
Conclusion 105
References 107
Archives 112
Annex 112
CHAPTER 3 A unified Italy? Sovereign debt and investor scepticism
Introduction 114
I. On the road to Italy 116
II. Sovereign debt integration 119
III. Data series and methodology 123
IV. Results: state unification and investor scepticism 128
V. Parallels with the current European sovereign debt crisis 133
Conclusion 135
References 138
Archives 144
Annex 145
CHAPTER 4 With or without the Rothschilds: Sovereign bonds during the Netherlands-Belgium break-up
Introduction 147
I. Sovereign debt during a country break-up 148
II. The Netherlands-Belgium country break-up 150
III. Data and methodology 155
IV. Result : country break-up risk premium 159
V. Result : new country risk premium 160
Conclusion 164
References 166
Archives 169
Annexes 170
Conclusion of the dissertation 172
