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You want a multicultural immigration country, but we don't want it: ideologies, interests and discursive strategies in German parliamentary debate on the 2004 Immigration Law

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Thesis

Reference

You want a multicultural immigration country, but we don't want it:

ideologies, interests and discursive strategies in German parliamentary debate on the 2004 Immigration Law

MATTILA, Heikki Seppo

Abstract

La confusion qui souvent caractérise le débat public sur l'immigration et sur les politiques migratoires est à l'origine de cette étude. Le débat est souvent insensible à la diversité de l'immigration, et l'argumentation politique, même la représentation des faits, est quelquefois manipulée pour servir des intérêts politiques, souvent populistes et xénophobes. Cette étude analyse le débat parlementaire mené en Allemagne entre 2001 et 2004 sur un projet de texte proposé pour une nouvelle loi à propos de l'immigration. La méthodologie utilisée est issue de l'analyse du discours critique, en particulier l'approche discours-historique de Ruth Wodak et ses disciples, et de la théorie du discours développée par Ernesto Laclau et Chantal Mouffe aux années 1980. A travers une déconstruction méticuleuse, l'analyse démontre les stratégies discursives du gouvernement et de l'opposition, et met en évidence la rhétorique populiste utilisée par la dernière pour empêcher la réalisation de la réforme proposée.

MATTILA, Heikki Seppo. You want a multicultural immigration country, but we don't want it: ideologies, interests and discursive strategies in German parliamentary debate on the 2004 Immigration Law. Thèse de doctorat : Univ. Genève, 2014, no. SES 844

URN : urn:nbn:ch:unige-399252

DOI : 10.13097/archive-ouverte/unige:39925

Available at:

http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:39925

Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.

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“You want a multicultural immigration country, but we don’t want it!”

Ideologies, interests and discursive strategies in German parliamentary debate

on the 2004 Immigration Law

(Idéologies, intérêts et stratégies discursives dans le débat parlementaire sur la loi d'immigration de 2004 en Allemagne)

Thèse

présentée à la Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales de l’Université de Genève

Par

Heikki S. MATTILA

pour l’obtention du grade de

Docteur ès sciences économiques et sociales mention : sociologie

Membres du jury de thèse :

Prof. Sandro CATTACIN, directeur de thèse, Université de Genève Prof. Matteo GIANNI, président du jury, Université de Genève Dr Khalid KOSER, Geneva Center of Strategy Policy, Genève Prof. Michal KRZYZANOWSKI, Université de Örebro, Suède

Thèse N° 844

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La Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales, sur préavis du jury, a autorisé l’impression de la présente thèse, sans entendre, par là, n’émettre aucune opinion sur les propositions qui s’y trouvent énoncées et qui n’engagent que la responsabilité de leur auteur.

Genève, le 14 juin 2014

Le doyen

Bernard MORARD

Impression d’après le manuscrit de l’auteur

How to cite: Mattila, Heikki S. (2014). “You want a multicultural immigration country, but we don’t want it!”. Ideologies, interests and discursive strategies in German parliamentary debate on the 2004 Immigration Law. Geneva: University of Geneva, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Department of sociology.

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Table  of  Contents

 

Preface  and  acknowledgements   5  

List  of  abbreviations   7  

Executive  summary   9  

Introduction   11  

Chapter  1:  Theory  and  method   28  

The  discursive  turn   28  

Some  characteristics  of  discourse  analysis  and  discourse  theory   32  

More  features  of  the  CDA   35  

Constructions  of  reality:  from  Wissenssoziologie  to    

discourse  theory   40  

Discourse  theory   43  

Philosophic  background  and  ontological  characteristics  

of  Discourse  Theory   47  

Back  to  the  (production  of)  reality   56  

Logics  of  difference  and  equivalence   58  

Discourse  –  variable  uses  of  the  concept   62   Chapter  2:  CDA  in  eclectic  application:  discourse  historic    

approach,  deconstruction  and  reconstruction   70  

Contextualization   72  

Deconstruction  and  coding   74  

Identification  of  specific  discourses:  the  parallel  concepts   76  

Initial  reconstruction   81  

Discourse  strategic  analysis   82  

Intermediary  reflections  on  the  method   88  

Chapter  3:    Germany  –  a  brief  historical  overview    

of  migration  policies  and  debates   91  

Some  figures  on  ethnic  Germans’  movement  to  Germany   92  

Labour  immigration   94  

Periodizations  or  ‘lead  discourses’   95  

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To  be  or  not  to  be  an  immigration  country   102  

New  red-­‐green  coalition   103  

The  two  Commissions   105  

The  new  immigration  law   106  

German  immigration  history:  large  numbers,  strong  discourses   109   Chapter  4:  Analysis  of  the  German  parliamentary  debate    

on  the  2004  Immigration  Law:  The  Corpus  and  an  overview   112  

The  Corpus   112  

Statistics  on  the  Corpus   114  

Overview  of  the  discursive  contents  of  the  Corpus   115   Chapter  5:  German  parliamentary  debate  on  the  2004    

Immigration  Law:  Examples  of  detailed  discourse  analysis   123  

Realist  Sub-­‐discourse   125  

Opinion  Leader  sub-­‐discourse   128  

Antagonist  sub-­‐discourse   131  

Conservative  sub-­‐discourse   137  

General  anti-­‐immigration  sub-­‐discourse   140  

Exclusivity   142  

Constructive  antagonist  subdiscourse   143  

Sub-­‐discourse  of  Whipping   148  

Pharisean  subdiscourse   150  

Third  Coalition:  Moral  Antagonist:  Profiling  through  promotion  of  

integrity  and  human  rights   153  

Intermediary  discussion   159  

Chapter  6:  Conclusion   161  

 

References   165  

Annex  1  –  Main  steps  in  the  process  leading  to  the    

German  Immigration  Law  of  30.07.2004   172  

Annex  2  –  Germany  corpus  list   174  

Annex  3  –  List  of  Speakers  by  session   175  

 

 

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Preface  and  acknowledgements  

So  many  years  have  passed  since  the  beginning  of  my  project  that  there   are  quite  a  few  people  who  have  helped  me  to  work  through  it.  Let  us  start   with  my  thanks  to  Josette  Bapst  and  Sandra  Lancoud  in  the  secretariat  of   the  Department  of  Sociology  at  the  University  of  Geneva,  for  always  warm   and  helpful  accueil,  starting  with  the  vital  technical  help  to  register  in  the   University  in  the  first  place.    

In  early  2011  I  went  to  Berlin  to  consult  the  Bundestagsarchiv,  where   really   sweet   and   helpful   people   made   my   work   easy,   so   warm   thanks   to   Gustav   Schlüter,   Petra   Jungklaus   and   Evelyn   Paschke.   In   the   same   connection,   many   thanks   to   Cornelia   Staudacher   and   Adrian   Staudacher,   and  Steffen  Angenendt  for  support  and  sharing  expertise.  

Thank   you   to   Anu   Pulkkinen   and   Leo   Riski,   earlier   in   the   Finnish   Embassy  in  Berlin,  for  sharing  their  knowledge.    

I  want  to  thank  the  Fondation  Schmidheiny  for  financial  support.    

Thanks  go  to  Annik  Dubied  and  Gaetan  Clavien  who  advised  me  in  the   beginning,  Gaetan  also  very  generously  shared  his  considerable  library  on   discourse  analysis,  as  did  Barbara  Lucas,  thank  you.    

Many   thanks   for   Annika   Egan   Sjölander   and   Jenny   Gunnarsson   Payne   for  very  kindly  sending  their  book.    

I   want   to   thank   Kerstin   Lau   from   IOM   Library   in   Geneva   for   always   helpful   and   kind   support.     I   also   want   to   thank   IOM   Offices   in   Abuja,   N’Djamena,  Ankara  and  IOM  Iraq  in  Amman  for  offering  me  work  during   these  years,  and  in  some  intensive  work  period  making  me  come  out  from   the  comfort  zone,  necessary  to  get  this  project  done.    

Many   thanks   for   Ruth   Wodak   for   her   advice   and   for   the   short   but   inspiring  conversation  in  Bern  in  October  2013.    

Many  thanks  to  all  members  of  the  Jury,  especially  to  Sandro  for  advise   and  such  kind  support  all  along,  and  to  Michał,  for  support  and  help  with   expertise.      

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I  want  to  thank  my  friends  Alessandro,  Alexandre,  Aline,  Esa,  Gyula  and   Heidi  for  their  warmth  and  sharing  energy.    

I  want  to  thank  my  parents.  

And  finally  all  my  thanks  and  feelings  to  Aline,  for  creating  the  comfort   zone,  almost  always,  and  to  the  progeniture  for  the  love  and  light.  

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List  of  abbreviations  

BAMF   Bündnis   90/Die   Grünen  

Bundesanastalt  für  Migration  und  Flüchtlinge  

Green  Party  of  Germany  (created  1993  from  the  two  parties)  

CDA   Critical  Discourse  Analysis   CDO   Christian  Democratic  Opposition  

CDU/CSU   Common  parliamentary  group  of  Christlich  Demokratische   Union  and  Christlich-­‐Soziale  Union  

CEE   Central  and  Eastern  Europe   DHA   Discourse  Historical  Approach   DA   Discourse  Analysis  

DT   Discourse  Theory  

EU   European  Union  

FDP   Free  Democrats  (Freie  Demokratische  Partei)   FRG   Federal  Republic  of  Germany  

GOC   Governing  Coalition  (the  red-­‐green  Governement)   GDR   German  Democratic  Republic  

OECD   Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and  Development   PDS   Partei  des  Demokratischen  Sozialismus.  Merged  in  2007  into  

the  new  Linke  

SPD   Sozialdemokratische  Partei  Deutschlands  

 

 

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In  1958  I  wrote  the  following:  

'There  are  no  hard  distinctions  between  what  is  real  and  what  is  unreal,  nor   between  what  is  true  and  what  is  false.  A  thing  is  not  necessarily  either  true  or   false;  it  can  be  both  true  and  false.'  

I   believe   that   these   assertions   still   make   sense   and   do   still   apply   to   the   exploration   of   reality   through   art.   So   as   a   writer   I   stand   by   them   but   as   a   citizen  I  cannot.  As  a  citizen  I  must  ask:  What  is  true?  What  is  false?  

Harold  Pinter,  in  1995    

 

I've   always   felt   that   a   person's   intelligence   is   directly   reflected   by   the   number   of   conflicting   points   of   view   he   can   entertain   simultaneously   on   the   same  topic.  

Abigail  Adams,  wife  of  the  second  U.S.  president  John  Adams,  in  a  letter  to   her  husband.  

 

 

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Executive  summary  

The  study  proposes  a  hermeneutic  framework,  with  discourse  analytic   methodology,  to  better  understand  the  complexities  of  current  migration   debate.   Migration   takes   many   forms,   and   migration   policy   planners   face   the   challenge   to   reconcile   global   and   national   economic,   security,   and   human  rights  -­‐based  rationales.  This  is  made  further  more  difficult  by  the   rhetoric   of   anti-­‐immigration   parties,   projecting   immigration   as   a   threat,   and  fallaciously  an  exclusive  alternative  to  the  domestic  labour  force  and   beneficiaries   of   social   security.   Such   populist   rhetoric,   which   has   proved   successful   in   many   countries,   also   hampers   such   unavoidedly   necessary   multi-­‐faceted   migration   policy   to   fulfill   countries’   commitments   for   international   protection,   to   address   labour   shortages   (while   trying   to   mobilize   the   domestic   labour   reserves)   combat   irregular   immigration,   integrate  the  legally  arrived,  let  alone  to  plan  relief  through  migration  to   stagnating   populations   in   the   industrial   countries,   and   the   ensuing   problems  to  continue  financing  the  welfare  state  with  increasingly  narrow   participation  of  the  native  population  in  the  labour  force.  

The  study  highlighted  the  extreme  politicization  of  migration  decision   making   at   a   historical   period   in   the   beginning   of   this   millennium   when   Germany   tried   to   turn   a   new   page   in   its   paradigm   on   immigration;   to   recognize  that  it  is  an  immigration  country;  an  expert  consensus  had  been   reached  on  that  but  many  ambitions  to  reform  the  immigration  legislation   were  sacrificed  in  the  political  duel  between  the  Governing  Coalition  and   the   Christian   Democratic   Opposition;   my   discourse   analysis   of   the   parliamentary  debate  puts  that  in  detailed  evidence.  

From   the   viewpoint   of   theory   and   method,   my   study   showed   the   usefulness  of  the  quite  rarely  applied  combination  of  the  discourse  theory   and  critical   discourse   analysis   in   analyzing   political   communication.   The   discourse   theoretical   concepts   and   dynamics,   such   as   the   binary,   antagonistic   organization   of   the   political   debates;   negative,   antagonist   positioning   used   in   the   self-­‐profiling   of   political   groups   in   order   to   articulate   the   sharpest   possible   public   profile   (in   the   common   populist  

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mise-­‐en-­‐scene   with   the   need   to   identify   an   enemy);   and   hegemonic   attempts  to  dislocate  the  opponent’s  discourse  with  the  help  of  empty  and   floating  signifiers,  were  particularly  fitting  to  my  material  and  the  political   debating  arena  of  the  German  Parliament.  

The  study  also  showed  the  usability  of  the  Discourse-­‐Historic  Approach   as   the   specific   type   of   the   Critical   Discourse   Analysis,   in   effectively   combining   a)   the   political   macro   approach,   where   the   contextualization   with  historical  and  political  background  is  key  to  the  substantial,  political   decoding   of   the   debate,   and   b)   the   text-­‐centred   rhetorical   and   argumentative   analysis   to   map   out   the   hegemonic   attempts   of   the   opposing  political  camps.  

Furthermore   at   the   method   level,   the   study   showed   my   own   contribution,   the   rather   micro   level   coding   of   the   corpus   into   very   small   units  (deconstruction  stage),  that  I  called  specific  discourses,  which  helped   to  present  an  analytic,  interpretative  mapping  of  the  corpus,  and  with  this   detailed  knowledge,  in  further  reading  to  distinguish  the  larger  discourses   of   the   politically   opposed   camps   as   totalities   or   discourse   coalitions   (reconstruction  stage).  

   

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Introduction  

International   migration   appears   nowadays   as   one   of   the   most   challenging  and  complex  issues  for  governments  to  handle.  Requirements   are  presented  for  coherence  in  migration  policy,  which  is  no  easy  goal,  as   in   the   governance   of   such   a   multi-­‐faceted   phenomenon,   widely   varying   goals   and   values   need   to   be   reconciled,   including   economic,   security   or   humanitarian.  

Such   different   goals   and   interests   may   first   contradict   when,   for   example,   governmental   authorities   try   to   prevent   illegal   forms   of   immigration   with   tighter   control,   which   may,   in   turn,   make   it   more   difficult   for   asylum   seekers   to   access   a   safe   country   and   lodge   their   applications   for   a   refugee   status.   A   similar   contradiction   may   surface   in   the  action  against  the  use  of  undocumented  immigrant  labour  force,  illegal   but   maybe   favouring   the   competitiveness   and   even   survival   of   some   economic  sectors  as  suggested  by  Reynieri  (2001).  

And   at   the   same   time   when   governments   try   to   sort   out   how   best   to   pursue   their   interests   in   regulating   migration   flows   there   are   lots   of   migration-­‐generating   phenomena   that   the   receiving   –   or   any   –   governments   have   hard   to   influence   upon,   in   particular   population   growth,  conflicts,  environmental  degradation,  problems  of  governance  and   poverty  in  the  developing  world.  

Such  difficulties  to  deal  with  all  the  variety  of  migration  flows  give  the   unavoidable  impression  that  migration  policies  in  practice  almost  always   fail  to  obtain  their  goals.  Such  imperfections  offer  permanent  opportunity   for  the  political  opponents  of  governments  to  attack  the  policies  in  place.  

In  the  debate  on  migration  policies,  due  to  the  complexity  of  the  issues,   contradictory,   even   opposite   interpretations   of   reality   can   be   considered   true.   For   example,   in   the   labour   market   the   simultaneous   occurrence   of   shortages   of   certain   professional   groups,   and   massive   unemployment   (that  theoretically,  mathematically  could  offset  labour  shortages,  but  does   not  because  of  the  often  occurring  mismatch  between  labour  supply  and  

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offer),   may   seemingly   justify   contradictory,   and   confusing   statements   of   the  state  of  affairs,  as  to  the  existence,  or  not,  of  lack  of  domestic  labour   force,  and  thereby  a  verified  need  for  immigrant  labour.  Here  I  can  already   refer  to  my  text  Corpus  and  the  German  parliamentary  debate  where  such   contradicting  views  were  advocated.  

The   political   sensitivity   of   migration   issues   is   further   increased   by   extremist   parties   who   use   immigration   as   one   main   issue   in   their   own   political  “marketing”.  Such  parties  highlight,  seemingly  in  a  very  calculated   manner,   the   imagined   threats,   playing   with   the   ignorance,   fears   and   frustrations   of   the   electorate,   and   promote   “order”   that   they   claim   to   be   able   to   deliver,   contrary   to   the   alleged   failures   of   the   more   moderate   mainstream  forces  in  power.  

For   populist   parties   the   goals   of   migration   policy   talk   look   often   different:   they   have   not   necessarily   even   the   ambition   to   tackle   with   the   complicated   issue,   but   use   simplifications   of   it   as   useful   election   propaganda,  playing  with  the  fears,  frustrations  of  the  electorate,  pointing   out   boucs   emissaires   for   social   problems.   My   study   of   the   German   experience   suggests   that   such   ‘populist   pattern’   of   constructing   political   discourse   is   spread   wider   than   among   the   traditional   populist   parties   only…    

Despite  the  success  of  the  anti-­‐immigration  movements,  in  Europe  and   elsewhere  in  the  industrial  world  the  stagnation  and  decline  of  population,   and  the  concrete  shortages  of  both  skilled  and  non-­‐skilled  persons  in  the   IT,   care   sector,   construction,   tourism   and   manufacturing,   have   put   pressure  on  governments  to  facilitate  some  forms  of  immigration  (see  for   example   OECD’s   yearly   migration   reports),   while   at   the   same   time   the   same   countries   are   struggling   to   find   solutions   to   deal   with   irregular   migration.  

Immanuel   Wallerstein,   in   his   critical   work   on   European   Union   (Wallerstein  2006)  presents  what  in  his  view  are  the  three  main  lines  of   the   ideological   and   value   content   to   the   current   actions   of   the   European   Communities:   the   defence   of   human   rights,   the   notion   of   the   shock   of   civilizations,   and   thirdly,   the   absence   of   alternative   to   neo-­‐liberalism.  

Wallerstein’s   characterization   of   EU’s   horizon   of   values   looks   very  

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relevant   to   migration   context   as   well,   including   my   corpus;   indeed   these   aspects  seem  to  cover  large  parts  of  the  debate  that  I  analyse  below  and   already  these  three  interests  seem  very  hard  to  co-­‐ordinate.  

I  will  however  not  problematize  the  background  values  as  such,  I  will   rather   attempt   to   identify   values,   or   interests   and   discursive   rhetorical   strategies,   and   thus   elaborate   a   general  interpretative   mapping   of   the   analyzed   migration   debate   and   at   a   specific   context,   the   national   parliament  of  Germany,  and  likewise,  to  provide  a  reading  of  the  motives   and  interests  articulated  in  the  course  of  the  analyzed  debate.  

Following   the   multiple   elements   and   interests   involved   in   the   migration  policy  making  in  wealthy  and  industrial  countries  –  economical,   security,   humanitarian,   demographic   and   pension   funding,   and   the   difficulty  to  control  irregular  migration,  Stephen  Castles  notes  that  despite   the   raised   controls,   and   increased   attention   to   migration   mangement,   there   is   the   strong   public   perception   that   migration   is  out   of   control   (Castles  2004b:  857).  

It   is   of   course   a   question   by   itself,   how   controllable   can   international   migration   or   any   other   social   phenomenon   be.   Both   governments   and   international  organizations  offering  policy  solutions  to  governments  may   have   the   interest   to   keep  keep   up   an   illusion   of   the   controllability   of   migration.   Exposed   to   ferocious   criticisms   towards   practically   any   immigration  policies,  governments  may  feel  forced  to  project  themselves   on  top  of  the  issue  in  trying  to  fend  off  criticisms  and  to  claim  that  their   policies  of  selected  immigration  do  make  a  difference.  

In   any   case,   migration   is   a   phenomenon   touching   all   countries,   and   practically  all  political  groups  advocate  some  kind  of  policy  interventions   to   manage   the   flows,   some   degree   and   way   of   regulation   as   opposed   to   laisser   aller.   With   the   inherent   contradictions   and   political   passions   the   complex  policy  area  is  easily  over-­‐sensitized  and  much  politicized  (Castles   2008a).  

While   strong   and   firm   opinions   on   migration   are   easily   voiced,   the   many  forms  of  international  migratory  flows,  and  the  political,  social  and  

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economic   dynamics   generating   them   make   comprehensive   analysis   and   understanding   already   difficult,   and   the   political   debates   look   fluid   and   confusing.  

Looking  at  the  complexities  of  migration  policy  Castles  argues  that  the   circumstances   of   global   migration   dynamics   and   domestic   policy-­‐making   are  so  complex  that  “states  tend  towards  compromises  and  contradictory   policies”,   “partly   because   of   conflicts   between   competing   social   interests   and  partly  because  of  the  way  the  policy  process  works”.  Furthermore,  he   points  out  that  an  important  underlying  reason  for  the  policy  shortcomings   and   contradictions   was   the   “contradiction   between   the   national   logic   of   migration  control  and  the  transnational  logic  of  international  migration  in   an   epoch   of   globalization”   (Castles   2004b:   854).   Indeed,   in   mixing   the   international   and   nationally   frameworks   and   logics,   seems   to   lie   one   important  source  of  the  confused  policy  debate.  

James   Hollifield   (2004)   illustrates   this   contradiction   by   saying   that   states   are   trapped   by   the  liberal   paradox:   in   the   globalized   world   of   increasingly  liberalized  international  exchanges  of  goods,  services,  capital,   and   also   people,   the   state   as   an   actor   from   the   viewpoint   of   migration   management  becomes  a  trading  state  (Rosecrance  1986)  whose  physical   borders  are  less  relevant,  whereas  in  international  law  the  state  remains   the  principal  responsible  unit  in  granting  rights  and  keeping  relations  with   other  states,  and  holding  the  responsibility  of  security  within  its  borders.  

In   line   with   Castles’   argument   of   national   logic   of   migration   control   Hollifield  argues  that  whereas  the  domestic  political  forces  push  the  state   towards  closure,  the  liberal  forces  of  globalization  lead  the  state  towards   opening.  

But   Hollifield   argues   further   that   while   states   have   to   negotiate   between  the  economic  interests  of  the  trading  state  and  control  interests,   sometimes  using  symbolic  politics  and  policies  to  “maintain  the  illusion  of   border   control,   and   thus   to   fend   off   the   forces   of   closure   and   defend   the   economic  interests”.  Besides  these  two  main  roles  of  the  states,  Hollifield   argues  that  states  have  also  assumed,  and  should  have  done  so,  a  third  role   a   “migration   state”   where   one   key   element   is  rights   of   migrants,   which   have   come   on   the   way   of   forces   of   closure,   and   gives   migrants   a   more  

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multidimensional   profile   than   pure   homo   economicus.   According   to   Hollifield,   EU’s   regional   migration   regime   helps   states   also   “to   finesse,   if   not  escape”  the  liberal  paradox.  

In  my  study,  and  in  the  course  of  the  analysed  parliamentary  debate,  an   interesting   tripartite   division   took   place   as   well,   as   a   formation   that   highlighted   migrants’   rights   profiled   itself   against   the   other   two   formations  (I  called  them  Discourse  Coalitions  in  the  German  Parliament),   who  were  close  to  a  similar  mutual  constellation  of  closure  vs.  openness  to   migration,  in  a  setting  as  described  by  Hollifield.  As  these  two  Coalitions   were   negotiating   with   each   other,   and   in   the   eys   of   the   third   Coalition,   compromising  the  human  rights  aspect.  

Since  the  1990s  a  sense  of  urgency  and  crisis  seems  to  have  emerged  to   the   migration   policymaking;   indeed   the   rising   numbers   of   international   migrants,   conflicts   generating   displacement   and   the   ongoing   pressure   towards   industrial   countries   from   the   South   has   given   experts   reason   to   speak  about  a  global  migration  crisis  Weiner  (1995)  and  Zolberg  (2001).  

It  is  not  difficult  to  see  a  range  of  factors  and  development  that  could   give  justifification  to  such  crisis  talk.  Pressures  of  migration  from  the  third   world  to  the  industrial  world,  challenges  to  control  the  ensuing  irregular   migration   which   coincide   with   demographic   stagnation   in   industrial   countries,  contributing  to  structural  labour  shortages  both  at  the  high  and   low  end  of  the  labour  market,  and  further  keep  up  demand  for  immigrant   labour,   both   officially   and   in   informal   economies.   Responding   simultaneously  to  the  irregular  migration  and  trying  to  satisfy  the  needs   for   imported   labour   force   continues   to   be   a   different   balancing   act   for   governments,   with   the   economic   recessions   and   inter-­‐cultural   and   -­‐

religious  challenges  capitalzed  by  anti-­‐immigrant  movements.  

The   national   governments   usually   get   the   blame   of   failed   policies,   although   the   mentioned   transnational   logic   and   dynamic   generating   migration  may  be  to  a  large  part  beyond  the  ‘circle  of  influence’  of  national   policies.  

The   ongoing   migratory   pressures   towards   the   preferred   immigration   countries,   relatively   strong   anti-­‐immigration   sentiments   nourished   by  

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populist  parties,  close  monitoring  of  the  media  and  NGOs  have  contributed   to   the   situation   where   the   “migration   crisis”   has   become   permanent,   as   Cattacin  (2013:  7)  remarks.  

Thus  the  migration  policy  debate  and  themes  of  research  have  evolved   to  somehow  recognize  the  multiplicity  of  frameworks  and  dynamics  that   generate   migration   and   influence   the   life   of   both   migrants   and   their   communities  of  origin  and  destination.  

The   term   transnationalism   covers   quite   a   few   of   the   topics   that   both   policy-­‐making   and   research   have   moved   onto   in   the   have   in   last   10   -­‐15   years   (Vertovec   2009)   and   which   Cattacin   (2013:   9-­‐12)   analyses   in   observing   that   there   has   been   a   change   of   approach   from   migration   towards   mobility,   which   for   some   professional   and   age   groups   (financial   professionals,  students)  may  be  rather  the  state  of  normality,  and  with  the   diluting  borders  (at  least  to  some)  the  issue  of  geographical  belonging  has   transformed   from   old   national   framework   –   with   facilitated   travel   and   internet   -­‐   to   more   complex   system   of   global,   cosmopolitan,   urban   networks,  and  transnational  presence  and  family  life  (Cattacin  2013:7).  

Transnationalism  and  mobility  have  become  integrated  into  the  toolkit   of   migration   management   through   the   concept   of   circular   migration   and   eventual  managed  temporary  migration  schemes  (European  Commission   2007);   and   through   the   grown   international   interest   in   migrants’   money   remittances,  and  new  solutions  to  diversify  and  facilitate  their  use  by  the   family  left  in  the  country  of  origin,  with  the  modern  communication  and   information   technology   facilitating   the   family   life   with   distance,   and   integrating  the  family  finances  across  continents.  

Likewise,  authorities  at  central  and  local  levels  in  many  countries  have   had  to  take  position  in  regard  to  the  complex  reality  of  the  the  presence  of   undocumented   migrants   and   their   families,   (not   least   the   Roma)   and   decide   whether   or   not   to   facilitate   access   to   health   care   and   schools,   recommended   both   on   grounds   of   public   health,   economic   and   human   rights  arguments,  opposed  by  more  anti-­‐immigrant  and  populist  political   forces.  

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Since  the  1990s,  along  with  the  raticication  of  the  UN  Convention  of  the   rights   of   Migrant   Workers   in   1990,   and   its   entry   into   force   in   2003,   the   voices   reminding   of   the  rights-­‐based   approach   in   migration   management   have   grown   stronger;   now   the   EU,   ILO,   IOM,   UNHCR   and   other   international   organizations   contribute   to   the   promotion   of   migrants’  

rights,  advising  states  in  their  policy  development.  

The   recognition   of   the   increased   complexities   of   migration   and   mobility,  and  the  new  demands  for  policy  are  however  not  shared  by  all,  in   fact  they  may  increase  the  already  complex  world  of  migration  which  only   experienced   experts   may   understand,   and   are,   sometimes,   listened   by   politicians,   who   are   either   prudent   or   bold   sensing   the   political   wind   in   such  touchy  area.  

Thus   the   complexity   of   the   expert   approaches   which   are   not   easy   to   understand  to  most,  the  national  ‘optique’  has  defended  its  positions  quite   well.   Populist   movements   and   their   simplified   discourse,   usually   against   any   projects   of   elites,   and   posing   as   defendors   of   people   (Laclau   2004:  

250)  is  continuing  to  appeal  and  has  shown  that  appeal  in  such  events  as   the  success  of  the  initiative  against  “mass  immigration”  in  Switzerland  on   9   February   2014,   where   interpretations   and   causalities   were   effectively   mixed  by  the  initiators,  who  anayway  score  a  narrow  victory,  which  dealt   a  serious  blow  to  the  Swiss  bilateral  EU-­‐relations,  and  which  has  caused   lots   of   work   to   the   political   Swiss   elite   for   managing   the   unexpectedly   large  fallout.  

I   will   get   back   to   the   discussion   on   current   populist   forces   and   their   approach   on   migration,   in   the   conclusions.   In   the   German   case   that   I   studied   for   this   thesis,   there   was   no   official   and   usual   populist   anti-­‐

migration  party  as  a  participant  in  the  debate,  but  the  political  opposition   in   the   Parliament   used   very   comparable   discursive   strategy.   And   maybe   not  only  comparable:  accoding  to  one  of  the  lead  influences  on  this  study  ,   Ernesto  Laclau  (2005:  xi)  populism  is  not  about  the  content,  it  is  “a  way  of   constructing   the   political”.   If   we   share   this   view,   the   German   experience  

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with  the  Immigration  Law  of  2005  turned  into  a  victory  of  populist  forces   incanated  by  the  Christian  Democrats.  

It   is   thus   in   my   view   fair   to   say   that   a  policy   confusion   seems   to   characterize   migration   debates   in   many   Western   industrial   countries,   where  different  forms  of  migration  are  discussed  in  a  commensurate  way   and  the  interests  of  the  participants  vary  greatly.  This  kind  of  lump  fallacy,   taking  migration  as  one  unilateral  phenomenon,  may  be  one  key  bias  and   source  of  that  confusion,  and  further  of  the  sense  of  crisis  and  inability.  

Recognizing   the   growing   complexities   of   migration   dynamics   and   policymaking,  it  might  still  help  to  structure  the  approach,  if  it  were  more   highlighted,   that   there   are  many   types   of   migration   flows   and   there   are   separate   national   and   international  legal   and   policy   regimes   to   deal   with   the  different  types  of  flow.  Secondly,  and  linked  to  this,  the  dynamics  that   generate  different  types  of  migration  flows  vary  a  great  deal,  and  part  of  the   economic  and  social  mechanisms  of  globalization,  or  poverty  are  certainly   beyond   the   influence   of   national   immigration   policy.   As   to   the   national   policies   with   regard   to   various   immigrant   groups,   there   are  different   economic  and  social  interests,  both  national  and  international,  vested  into   the  arguments  of  different  stakeholders  (industries,  trade  unions,  human   rights  organizatons  etc.).  

These   interests   and   interest   groups   give   most   variable,   even   contradictory,   interpretations   of   social   and   economic   trends   and   thus   most  differing  conclusions  and  recommendations  for  immigration  policies.  

These  latter  are  also  very  much  affected  by  the  often  extreme  politization   of   migration   policy   making   and   the   debates   between   government   and   opposition,  and  also  as  pursued  by  the  populist  anti-­‐immigration  parties   and   sensationalist   media,   are   contributing   to   the   difficulty   of   policy   making   and   confusion   on   the   interests   of   various   participating   groups   related   to   the   substance   and   to   the   practices   and   rhetoric   used   in   the   struggle  between  political  parties/the  government  and  opposition.  

The   notion   of   “clientelist   politics”   (Freeman   1995)   refers   to   the   government-­‐led  policymaking  as  an  arena  of  negotiating  strong  organized   interests,  and  Hollifield  argues,  as  discussed  that  governments  should  rise   above  the  clientelist  servicing  of  interest  groups  and  defend  the  humans  in  

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the   centre,   the   migrants   themselves.   Castles   points   out   that   in   trying   to   understand   to   the   complexities   and   contradictions   of   migration   it   is   essential   to   understand   and   investigate   both   the   political   economy   of   interests  and  study  the  political  sociology  of  the  state  and  the  interaction   of   these   two,   because   both   “influence   policy   outputs   and   outcomes”  

(Castles  2004b).  

The   government’s   policy,   whether   actively   articulated   or   implicitely   deducted   from   the   visible   actions   and   outcomes   of   migration   flows   and   their   consequences   and   effects,   is   usually   countered   by   the   political   opposition,   who   normally   tries   to   argue   that   the   governmental   policies   have   failed.   Furthermore,   populist   anti-­‐immigration   voices   add   to   the   polyphonic   chorus,   sometimes   in   the   ranks   of   the   government,   in   the   opposition,  or  beside  these  two  main  groupings.  

Hollifield  argues  that  state  is  more  than  just  a  forum  where  economic   interests   are   reconciled.   In   his   model   (Hollifield   2004,   2007/8)   state   assumes   roles   traditionally   in   economic   and   security   dimensions,   but   recently  the  migration  state  has  in  his  view  emerged,  not  least  through  the   obligation  and  commitments  assumed  by  the  states  in  the  area  of  human   rights,  and  following  intervention  of  judicial  authorities  who  have  pointed   out  to  governments  the  rights  that  immigrants  accrue  the  longer  their  stay   in  their  host  country  becomes.  Thus  these  rights  give  gravity  to  the  third   pole  of  state  role  beside  the  control  and  economic  interests.  

Giuseppe  Sciortino  (2000)  speaks  of  low  rationality  of  migration  policy   in  relation  to  its  declared  goals.  S.  studies  the  social  structure  of  migration   policymaking,   rather   than   the   interests.   Using   Luhman’s   model   of   the   sociology   of   the   political   system,   Sciortino   argues   that   migration   policy   actually   is   closer   to   the   Unstable/unable   pole”   instead   of   “stable/able   pole”  where  it  is  generally  thought  to  gravitate,  like  economic  and  labour   market  policies.  That  converges  with  my  argument  of  confusion.  

Also,  even  if  the  society  were  formally  egalitarian  and  democratic,  and   its   institutions   produce   decisions   formally   according   to   the   rules,   the   political   deliberations   and   the   struggle   between   competing   policy   views  

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mean   struggle   for   power   and   influence,   which   cannot   fall   in   similar   portions  to  everybody.  One  can  ask  like  the  Finnish  poet  and  playwright   Paavo  Haavikko:  “If  the  people  has  the  power,  who  has  it?”  In  the  debate   that  I  analysed  some  speakers  appeal  to  people’s  alleged  majority  opinion   as   the   authoritative   one,   but   use   it   against   an   artificial   and   biased   projection  of  the  camp’s  policy.  

Castles   asks,   after   discussing   some   migration   policy   failures,   whether   democratic  state  posses:  1)  the  capacity  to  analyze  and  forecast  the  long   term  consequences  of  migration  policy  decisions;  2)  the  political  ability  to   reach  consensus,  on  long-­‐term  goals  in  this  field;  and  3)  the  policy  tools  to   achieve  these  goals  in  a  manner  consistent  with  democracy  and  the  rule  of   law.   He   answers   dryly:   “I   have   my   doubts   on   all   these   counts”   (Castles   2004b;   856).   I   am   afraid   that   my   study,   documenting   and   detailing   the   very   politicized   debate   in   the   parliament,   cannot   provide   much   encouragement  to  him.  

How   to   navigate   in   this   complex   space   with   arguments   of   so   varied   motivations,  can  some  kind  of  hypotheses  be  formulated  as  to  the  linkages   between  the  interests,  ideologies  and  political  strategies?  That  is  a  difficult   questions,   but   my   earlier   exercises   (Mattila   2001)   studying   German   migration   debate   shows   that   an  analysis   of   the   discourses   can   offer   a   reading   help   to   structure   the   elements   in   a   debate.   I   found   a   number   of   discourses  from  the  German  debate,  part  of  those  discourses  being  more   anchored  to  the  substance  of  migration  (such  that  I  named  e.g.  ‘expert’  and  

‘realist’  discourses)  and  part  of  them  indicated,  in  my  interpretation,  more   indiresults   of   the   politicization   of   migration   debate   and   brought   about   primarily   to   mount   opposition   towards   the   government   or   satisfy   the   expectations  of  own  political  constituency  and  electorate.  

For  this  doctoral  thesis,  I  wanted  to  familiarize  myself  more  thoroughly   with  discourse  analysis,  and  then  find  and  study  a  comprehensive  ‘national   debate’  which  would  have  contained,  if  only  possible,  an  exhaustive  range   of   ideologies,   interests   and   political   opinions   that   a   debate   within   one   country  could  possibly  have.  Originally  I  even  aimed  to  study  and  compare   three   national   debates,   but   found   it   hard   to   find   comparable   national  

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material  packages  and  also,  the  exercise  risked  to  become  too  large  with   the  limitations  of  time  available  and  volume  reasonable  for  the  thesis.  

And  with  material  from  one  country  alone,  it  was  not  evident  that  ‘one   debate’  however  delimited,  would  be  achievable  and  contain  the  totality  of   national  voices  and  interests.  Nevertheless  the  exercises  that  was  passed   in  Germany  to  prepare  for  the  2004  migration  law  looked  as  close  to  such   a   comprehensive   national   exercise   as   possible,   with   the   independent   Süssmuth   Commission   and   the   CDU/CSU   Commission   (Müller   Commission)  at  work  simultaneously  in  2000-­‐01,  and  extensive  research   done   for   the   independent   Commission   especially,   thus   educating   the   political   class   on   migration   and   preparing   for   the   legislative   process   to   reform  immigration  law.  

However,  the  text  material  covering  all  the  years  and  different  studies,   policy   papers   and   proposals   and   policy   documents   from   individual   parties;   position   papers   of   various   national   organizations   (of   industries,   unions,  charities,  religious  organizations  and  academia,  and  parliamentary   protocols   from   the   specialized   Committees   (Ausschüsse)   and   plenaries   from   both   bot   upper   and   lower   chambers   (Bundesrat   and   Bundestag   respectively)   amounted   to   thousands   of   pages,   and   was   also   quite   heterogeneous  for  a  commensurate  study.  

Therefore  I  ended  up  to  the  set  of  nine  protocols  of  the  parliamentary   plenaries   that   were   had   in   2001-­‐2004   in   the   legislative   process   in   the   upper   and   lower   chambers   of   the   German   parliament,   and   ended   with   passing  of  the  Immigration  Law  that  entered  into  force  in  2005.  

But   why   then   choose   Germany   as   the   target   country,   and   not   some   other   one?   Comparison   of   course   would   have   been   ideal   and   it   may   be   relevant  to  do  later  in  a  possible  continuation  of  the  exercise,  but  after  the   decision  to  pick  one  country,  Germany  seemed  particularly  interesting,  for   a  number  of  reasons:  it  had  no  colonial  past  but  had  rather  soon  after  the   war   started   recruiting   foreign   labour   force,   but   continued   to   tell   others   and  itself  that  it  was  no  immigration  country.  Such  discourse  had  an  effect  

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on   the   policies   especially   on   integration   of   its   anyhow   multi-­‐million   immigrant  population.  

In   the   beginning   of   this   millennium   Germany   however   started   to   change   it   paradigm   recognizing   that   it   was   an   immigration   country.  

Despite   a   seeming   consensus   especially   among   experts   about   such   a   migration   profile,   turning   the   new   page   and   reforming   policies   proved   however  more  difficult  at  the  level  political  decision  making.  The  focus  of   my   empirical   analysis   is   in   that   difficulty,   the   friction   between   expert   analysis   and   political   combat   between   the   Government   and   the   Opposition,   that   at   the   end   seemed   to   hijack   the   ambitions   of   the   policy   reform.   Through   the   analysis   of   the   parliamentary   debate,   I   wanted   to   analyze  that  process  in  detail.  

Germany’s   migration   history   is   a   particular   one   among   European   countries.  Whereas  the  colonial  backgrounds  of  such  other  large  Western   European   countries   as   France,   the   UK   and   Spain   have   made   these   countries  exposed  to  immigration  from  their  former  colonies,  in  Germany   the   comparable   area   was   for   a   long   time   Eastern   Europe   and   Russia,   where   ethnic   Germans   had   settled   since   the   13th   century.   After   the   Nazi   era  and  the  second  world  war  such  Aussiedler  and  Übersiedler  from  the   Eastern   part   of   Germany   returned   to   the   Western   Germany   in   millions.  

Despite   the   fact   that   need   immigrant   labour   force   from   outside   the   German   settlements   emerged   with   the   Wirtschaftswunder   since   the   1950s,  the  division  of  the  country  between  1945  and  1989  and  the  “return  

“   of   Aus-­‐   and   Übersiedler   continued   to   be   prioritary   issues   and   the   non-­‐

German  Gastarbeiter  were  allowed  in  temporarily  only.  

That  prioritization  continued  however  also  after  the  active  recruitment   of   foreign   labour   force   was   finished   in   1973   with   the   Anwerbestoppverordnung   (decree   for   recruitment   stop)   but   the   temporariness  of  the  then  residing  immigrant  workers  was  not  enforced,   their  family  members  joined  them  and  with  the  continuing  asylum  seekers   and   other   migrant   family   members   ,   and   the   children   born   to   the   immigrant  families  the  population  of  foreign  citizens  was  in  1980  already   one  million  larger  than  in  1973.  

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Despite  the  multi-­‐million  population  of  foreign  citizens,  the  division  of   the   country   and   the   priority   in   receiving,   integrating   and   naturalizing   ethnic  Germans  from  the  east,  contributed  to  the  upholding  the  doctrine  –   hegemonic   discourse   -­‐   that   “Germany   is   not   an   immigration   country”,   of   which   followed   that   the   millions   of   immigrants   could   not   benefit   from   active   integration   measures,   which   also   made   the   integration   of   the   second   and   third   generation   immigrant   youth   more   complicated   than   it   would   have   been   with   more   active   reception   support   and   special   education   that   were   only   introduced   as   part   of   the   federally   adopted   policy  after  the  new  immigration  law  in  2005.  

After   the   reunification,   there   came,   besides   the   ethnic   Germans,   also   massive   waves   of   refugees   from   the   Balkan   wars,   there   were   waves   of   attacks   towards   foreigners   in   the   1990s,   large   shortages   of   labour   force   emerged   simultaneously   with   mass   unemployment,   and   the   widening   recognition   of   the   need   to   a   more   comprehensive   policy   and   legislation   towards  the  end  of  1990s.  The  new  Red-­‐Green  Coalition  entered  in  power   in  1998  and  from  200  onwards  launched  measures  to  reform  Germany’s   immigration  policy  recognizing  that  the  country  had  for  a  long  time  been   an  immigration  country,  contrary  to  the  official  doctrine.  

Such   a   through   learning   process   across   the   political   spectrum   could   supposedly   have   produced   many   new   migration   experts   and   raised   the   general   level   of   knowledge   on   the   issue   among   politicians.   With   this   assumed   enrichment   of   the   political   immigration   debate   I   wanted   to   examine   the   ensuing   law   debate   in   the   parliament,   and   if   the   argumentation  would  be  enlightened  on  both  sides.  

Theoretically,   possibilities   for   such   rich   and   quality   argumentation   (this  happened  but  on  one  side  only)  could  have  been  increased  by  the  fact   that   the   parliamentary   power   relations   were   very   tight   in   the   German   parliament   in   the   14th   legislature:   in   the   lower   house   the   Bundestag,   the   Red-­‐Green  governing  Coalition  retained  a  clear  always  available  majority,   but   in   the   Upper   house,   the   Bundesrat,   the   Coalition   actually   was   in   minority   against   Christian   Democrat   (CDU/CSU)   led   Bundesländer   and  

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one   where   the   Free   Democrats   (that   maintained   a   non-­‐politicized,   substance-­‐based  approach  to  the  law)  could  have  cast  a  decisive  vote.  

Indeed,   at   the   Parliament,   in   the   plenary   sessions   of   both   upper   and   lower   chambers,   the   main   opposition   party   Christian   Democrats   (CDU/CSU)  started  immediately  to  profile  itself  as  completely  opposed  to   the   law   proposal.   Indeed,   in   starting   to   build   its   discourse,   starting   from   the   lead   intervention   of   their   Chancellor   Candidate   Helmut   Stoiber,   the   opposition  seemed  to  consistently  project  a  picture  of  the  law  that  would   open   to   more   migration,   against   which   the   opposition   stood   firmly   presenting   a   series   of   arguments   in   the   name   of   national   interest,   and   appealing   to   the   through   the   surveys   established   opposition   of   the   majority   of   Germans   to   more   immigration.   I   will   argue   later   that   this   building  of  the  opposition  discourse  decidedly  against  the  law  project  was   (maybe  because  of  the  coming  elections)  with  the  discursive  strategies,  a   populist,   antagonist   discursive   strategy   that   seemed   rather   aim   to   distinguish  and  profile  the  opposition  from  the  ruling  Coalition,  rather  that   focus  on  how  to  deal  with  the  many-­‐side  migration  management  through   the  law.  

Every   country   may   have   their   own   particular   tendencies   to   build   expressions  to  somehow  manage  certain  phenomena,  or  hide  unpleasant   or   controversial   and   sensitive   issues   in   administrative   euphemisms   and   political   correctness.   Germany   has   certainly   given   its   own   strong   contribution  to  that  in  certain  times:  we  have  entartete  Kunst,  Endlösung,   Duldung   (patience/tolerance)   and   Kettenduldung   documents   for   the   foreigners   etc.   This   kind   of   cultural   capital   gives   its   own   semiotic   particularities  to  the  national  exchanges.  Part  of  it  certainly  stays  hidden   to   a   foreign   researcher,   but   some   of   such   national   heritage   I   could   also   find.  

At  the  start  of  the  study  the  research  problem  was,  as  may  often  be  the   case,   quite   broadly   and   loosely   defined,   as   well   as   the   methodology.  

Generally,  I  wanted  to  map  out  a  national  debate,  a  package  of  texts,  into   an   illustrative   chart   of   discourses,   and   thus   reveal   the   “ideologies,   interests,   and   discursive   strategies”,   and   thus   better   understand   and   extract   the   ‘real’   and   substantial   migration   element   in   the   debate,  

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imagining,  as  a  migration  expert,  that  the  faster  the  political  element  can   be  identified,  separated  and  put  aside,  the  better  chances  to  try  and  solve   the  actual  ‘purified’  issue.  

As  mentioned,  I  was  fascinated  by  the  German  process  and  a  seeming   change  of  the  époque  and  paradigm,  supported  by  the  profound  educative   and   widely   participated   process   that   the   Süssmuth   Commission   carried   out,  in  preparation  of  the  legal  changes.  For  Mattila  (2001)  I  went  through   a  pile  of  German  newspaper  material  from  2000-­‐2001,  when  the  Süssmuth   and   Müller   Commissions   worked   (Unabhängige   Kommission   Zuwanderung   2001,   Bundesausschuss   der   CDU   Deutschlands   2001)   and   appreciated   the   sachlich  expert   discourse   of   Mr   Müller   gratifyingly   converging   with   Ms   Süssmuth.   Both   agreed   that   Germany   had   been   for   long   been   an   immigration  country.  

But   when   Mr   Müller   handed   the   report   of   his   Commission   to   his   party   leadership   in   spring   2001,   these   latter   already   took   distance   the   realist   and   expert   findings   of   their   Commission,   in   what   I   already   then   named   antagonist   discourse.  

That  little  study  and  limited  knowledge  of  discourse  analysis  (DA)  led  later,   with  this  study  as  the  goal,  for  further  study  of  Fairclough  (1992,  1995)  and  van   Dijk   (1997a   and   1997b)   Wodak   (2000,   2009)   and   other   developers   of   critical   discourse   analysis,   whose   methodological   developments   and   theoretical   reflections   on   the  concept   of   discourse   itself,   on   such   important   concepts   as   intertextuality   and   politically   and   historically   conscious  contextualization,  and   the   extensive   linguistic-­‐argumentative   toolkit   that   especially   Wodak   presented   in   her   works   (Reisigl   and   Wodak   2000,   2009)   helped   to   detail   my   own   methodological  development  for  this  study,  in  parallel  with  the  first  reading  of   the  Corpus.  

Eventually,   I   found   also   Discourse   Theory   (DT)   and   despite   of   its   philosophical   depths,   relative   “inaccessibility”   as   Phillips   and   Jørgensen   (2002)   put   it,   I   found   that   Laclau’s   and   Mouffe’s   (1985)   views   on   the   binary  dynamic,  according  to  which  hegemonic  articulations  of  discourses   would   arrange   in   the   all-­‐encompassing   social   universe,   quite   plausibly  

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corresponded  to  how  I  provisorily  understood  the  discursive  structuring   in  the  German  Parliament.  

As   for   the   research   questions,   the   original   ambition   of   a   detailed   mapping  and  structuring  of  a  “politicized  and  confused  migration  debate”  

remained,  and  I  carried  it  out.  But  also,  further  questioning  and  reflection   emerged  about  the  relation  between  the  rational  deliberation  on  one  hand   and  politically   hegemonic   combat   on   the   other;   that   was   actually   part   of   my  original  aim  to  separate  these  if  I  could.  

However,   the   results   of   the   analysis,   and   the   actual   victory   that   the   politicized   Discourse   Coalition   had   scored   in   Germany   against   the   substance-­‐oriented   reformateurs,   and   similar   victories   of   non-­‐rational,   purposively   constructed   discourses   (such   as   the   Swiss   vote   on   “mass   migration”  on  9  February  2014)  led  to  further  questioning  about  why  and   how   come   such   hegemonic   discourse   have   that   success,   even   in   the   parliament  and  executed  by  non-­‐populist  mainstream  parties  such  as  the   CDU/CSU.  One  response  presented  was  obviously  electioneering,  but  is  it   all?  I  will  reflect  these  questions  in  the  Conclusion.  

In   any   case,   the   results   produced   with   discourse   analysis   are   always   highly  subjective  proposals  of  the  researcher,  so  it  is  in  this  case  as  well.  

Anyhow,   methodologically,   this   study   showed   how   well   the   two   political   forms   of   discourse   analysis,   the   discourse   theory   and   critical   discourse   analysis   could   be   combined;   the   first   one,   DT,   to   give   a   good   number   of   concepts   and   theses   to   discern   the   political   positioning   and   dynamics   of   the  debating  camps,  and  the  second  CDA,  sharing  much  of  the  theoretical   view   of   of   the   DT,   combining   both   the   political-­‐historical   savvy   and   an   extensive  methodological  toolkit  for  the  analysis  of  the  text,  that  helped  to   manage   the   text   corpus   and   know   and   characterize   its   contents   thoroughly.  

In   the   next,   first   Chapter,   I   present   the   theoretical,   conceptual   and   methodological   elaboration   on   critical   discourse   analysis   and   discourse   theory,   and   continue   in   Chapter   2   presenting   my   own   particular   application  of  the  critical  discourse  analysis,  for  this  study.  In  Chapter  3  I   start   the   political   and   historical   contextualization,   apresent   a   brief   historical   background   of   migration,   and   migration   policy   in   Germany  

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ending  up  with  the  legislative  process,  from  which  my  text  Corpus  is  taken   from.   Chapter   4   I   introduce   the   corpus   and   present   a   dramaturgic   overview   interpretation   of   the   analysed   parliamentary   debate,   using   the   characterizations  that  resulted  from  my  discourse  analysis.  In  Chapter  5  I   expose  that  analysis  and  the  final  Chapter  6  is  dedicated  for  discussion  and   conclusions.  

   

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