The development and utilization of human resources : the case of the African least developed countries

E/ECA/LDCs/BXP.7/4

THE DEVELOPMENT AND UTILIZATION OF HUMAN RESOURCES:

The case of the African Least Developed Countries

UNITED NATIONS

ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA

April 1988

Page

I. Introduction 1

II. Population and Poverty 5

III. Trends in Educational Development 9

IV. Cost Issues in Education 14

V. Investment Priorities in Education 19

VI. Labour Absorption 27

A. The rural sector 27

(i) Farm activities 27

(ii) Non-farm activities 32

B. The urban sector 35

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations 40

REFERENCES

ANNEXES

THE DEVELOPiiEHT AND UTILIZATIBN OF HUMAN RESOURCES:

THE CASE OF TEE AFRICAN

I. Introduction

1. The objectives of development are peoplee In the past, the main preoccupation of economists was with investment in physical capital relative to human capital. The turning point came in the early 1960s, when a wide variety of human skills was seen to be an essential pre requisite in fuelling the dynamics of development* J/ In the 1970s, an entirely new school promoting the economics of education came to the fore.

Not only was the focus on education and training, but emphasis shifted to entrepreneurial and managerial abilities, research and technology, general skill formation for the mass of the population and participation in the decision-making process. In addition, the need to build up a structure of incentives was stressed for it was thought that people should be provided, not only with monetary incomes, but also with non-monetary incentives (fringe benefits). Kore funds should be earmarked for the development of primary and secondary education. 2/ Above all, it was argued that the people*s control over their political lives and their liberty mattered the most. Education, skills, technology, capital, level of remuneration, etc*9 are extremely vital, but they are not sufficient in themselveso "There must, in addition, be an enabling environment in terms of political freedom, - freedom of speech, of thought, and of association; freedom frora economic and personal insecurity ami freedom from arbitrary arrest iiiust be supreme in such a society. Individuals must be able to express new ideas, to articulate new thinking without being molested. It is in such a political environment that a high level of productivity can be generated. It is in such a society that the values of self-reliance can be developed. It is in such a society that a consensus of values based on the common characteristics - toughness, determination, resilient inner strength, steadfastness in duty, respect for the law, etc- will evolve and grow", 3/

2. Given the above broad definition of human resources development, what type of yardsticks should be applied to measure country performance in improving human welfare? While the political dimensions of human resources development are subject only to qualitative judgecient, those indicators which n*easure the physical health and well-being of people (for example,

life expectancy, infant mortality) can be quantified. This argument is being advanced because GliP bears little relationship to human well- being, kj

3. Table I ranks 20 African LDCs by life expectancy and by rates of infant mortality and shows how these rankings differ from those based on per capita income. For example, Mauritania's per capita income, at $470, is 1.3 times that of Togo at $£30j although Togo has one of the lowest mortality rates in the African LDCs, Sierra Leone's per capita income, at $320, is 2,1 times that of Burkina Faso, at $150, but the former has the highest infant mortality rate among the least de\elcped African countries. Per capita

income in Guinea is 2 A times that of Mali9 but Kali has the better average life expectancy. The United Rapublic of Tanzania, with income per capita

of only $290, has one of the lowest mortality rates among the countries surveyed. These big differences suggest that the inclusion or the human dimension into objectives and strategies *ay make a significant difference to the results, in drawing conclusions as opposed with an approach focussing

exclusively oo growth in incomes.

4 Durin" the last three decades, many physical, human and financial resources have been directed to the development of education, **ee&, as the World Bank has commented, the growth in primary school enrolments in Sub-Saharan Africa durirg the 1960s and the 1970s is probably un

paralleled at any other time or place in history. Despite these impressive gains, however, the development of education in African LOCs is now

seriously threatened by the explosive population growth and Africa s significant cut-backs in public spending. The African LuCs are now in a state of distress and have been subjected to a number of severe and debilitating exogenous shocks. Depressed commodity prices, high levels of external indebtedness, sluggish aid flows, the collapse of Private lending and high interest rates on external debts are severely H^ing their capacity to sustain their momentum. As a group, therefore, they have been hit hardest by the world economic malaise. As if these difficulties were not sufficiently daunting, the bulk of them have suffered from drought and famine during the period 1966-1969, 1972-1974 and 1982-1906. These disasters, not only adversely affected agriculture and destroyed a

significant proportion of their livestock populations, but also contributed to the acceleration of desertification and the rate of disappearance of forests. These factors all combined to increase unemployment and poverty.

5 To counteract these problems, African countries had a desperate need for external resources. By 1956, the external debt of African LDCs was estimated at US$33.1 billion, which is equivalent to 73.6 per cent ot

their GDP at 1980 constant prices, and 355.0 per cent of their total exports.

Debt servicing absorbed 37.0 per cent of their total export earnings in 1986.

6. Whilst still suffering the financial and debt crisis, the African LDCs are being told to adjust with no explicit concern for income distribution and poverty. Kot only should they amortize their loans, but they should also bear the rising costs of interest on loans. Poverty can wait, the banks cannot. Admittedly, adjustment is a prerequisite for self-sustained development, while the more growth oriented and human-focussed approaches need greater time in order to be fully effective. As has been argued

elsewhere, "To miss out the human dimension of adjustment is not only a human tragedy; it is an economic error of the most fundamental sort.

:«uch evidence already exists of the economic returns of investment in

huaar. resources. To fail to protect young children at the critical stages

of their prowth and development is to wreak lasting damge on a whole

generation, the results of" which nay veil have effects on economic develop

ment and welfare for decades ahead, iioreover, in the short run, it is

Plainly absurd to imagine that economic dynamism can be ful^y restored when

an important fraction of a country's workers retaain malnounshea - or even

lack, as among small-holder peasants in many African countries today,

enough basic foods to buy to provide incentives for extra efforts. 5/ _

It may be asked whether the donor community and the international financial

institutions can afford to remain indifferent to this menacing situation.

- 3 -

Table I.

Country

Guinea

Sierra Leone Niger

Ethiopia Chad

Burkina Faso Malawi

Somalia Mali Uganda Mauritania Burundi Rwanda CAR Sudan Benin Togo Tanzania Lesotho Botswana

Source:

Country ranking:

mortality,

Life Expectancy Rank

1 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 9 10 11 12

Year 39 39 42 43 43 44 44 44 45 45 45 46 46 47 47 48 49 50 53 54

Life expectancy, income per capita

(19fc

Infant Mortality Rank

5 1 8 3 9 7 4 6 2 17 11 13 12 10 15 14 19 16 18 20

World Development Report, '

Per 1,000

153 175 140 168 138 144 156 152 174 108 132 118 127 137 112 115 97 110 106 71

1987.

infant

Income

Rank

11 11 6 1 N.A.

2 4 8 2 N.A.

12 5 8 7 10 7 5 9 13 14

per capita

$

320 320 250 110 N.A.

150 170 280 150 N.A.

420 230 280 260 300 260 230 290 470 840

because of inadequate opportunities for production and gainful employment.

The myth that the benefits of rapid industrialization in the modern sector

would trickle down to the urban and rural poor has proven to be empirically

unfounded. As Vanekand Emmerij observed, "The few who came from the country

side and got well paying union jobs were turned into inanimate consumers of their industrial products. The majority coming from the countryside, not finding well-paying jobs, formed the infinite slums surrounding all cities.

With rapid population growth everywhere and no adequate employment growth in the modern sector, destitution and poverty in the slums and in the countryside for the ioost part were accentuated". 6/

8. Increasingly, many questions are being posed, in the face of the emerging problems of education and employment: which types of education have a more direct effect on generating employment; how high a proportion of the national income can be directed towards primary, secondary and

tertiary education; are the priorities within education consistent with national interest; Which kinds of educational programmes should be insti tuted to motivate the peasants, numbed for decades by despair and stagna

tion; what of the large numbers of youths who will have no access even to

primary education; are they to be written off from participating in the modernization process; how and where can surplus secondary school leavers and university graduates be absorbed; what are the projected requirements of middle and high level manpower? These are some of the nightmares that plague the human resources planners. In as much as formal education commands

routes to wealth, prestige and power, it is bound to favour the few at

the expenses of the many in poor societies. ]_/

9. In the view of the World Bank, human resources development encompasses

education, better health and nutrition, together with fertility reduction. £/

Unfortunately, neither time, nor resources permit a thorough investigation of these multi-facted issues. Perforce, this paper deals only with the creation of human resources (education and training) and their development

and utilization in African LDCs.

10. Part II is a dicsussion on population and poverty and Part III deals

with an evaluation of the trends in educational development. Part IV

raises issues on unit costs and the measures necessary to mitigate them.

Part V gives an exhaustive account of the investment patterns in educa tional development in the African LDCs. Part VI discusses the absorptive capacity of the urban and rural sectors, while Fart VII makes policy

recommendations as to how best the African LDCs can cope with the problems

of the development and utilization of their human resources.

- 5 -

II. Population and Poverty

11, The 27 African LDCs had a combined population of 178,6 million, or 34.2 per cent of the total population of 522.5 million for developing Africa as a whole, in 1935, Individually, however, these countries differ

markedly in terms of total population size and density, Ethiopia is the largest with A3.6 million and Sao Tome and Principe, the smallest with

97,000, Population density per square kilometer varies from 1 in Mauritania to over 230 in Rwanda, Their combined population is projected to increase

from 172.6 million in 1985 to approximately 281.0 million by the year 2000 (See Annex 1).

12-. Average life expectancy at birth is about 46 years compared with 49 years for developing Africa as a whole and 59 years for all low-income countries. There is one physician for every 26,000 people in African LDCs compared to 21,000 for developing Africa, and in the majority of cases about 60-70 per cent of physicians in Africa work in urban areas where only about 20 per cent of the population live. The child mortality rate is double the average of developing countries. Other characteristic traits of these

populations are the dominant proportion of children under 15 and the

declining labour force as a share of the total population. The cohort of

0-14 was around 45.6 per cent of the total ppopulation in 19G5, while the active population aged 15-64 accounted for 51.5 per cent during the same period. The number of people over 65 years was 2.7 per cent of the total population (See Annex 2). These population data have two ominous implica

tions. First, there is already an acute demand for education, and secondly, the dependency burden on household incomes is rising.

13. Of those in the primary education age cohort, only 20 perccent were actually enrolled in most of the African LDCs, Furthermore, in 1985, every

100 adults in African LDCs had 109 minors dependent on them*. Taking into^

account those over 65 and between 0-14, this would imply a dependency ratio of 94. This ratio goes up to 122 if the lowest class is 0-17 (See Table II).

If the present trends continue, the population of dependents in African LDCs will be multiplied by 1.6 by the year 2C00 and the number of minor dependents

per 100 adults will rise to 111 and the dependency ratio to 125 (See Annex 3),

14. These different pressures on public as well as household incomes, and the low level of resources available to satisfy basic human needs in educa

tion and health do not augur well for the eradication of mass poverty in

African LDCs. The picture becomes even more alarming when the food needs of Africa's inexorably growing population are considered. Between 1974 and

19G5, per capita food production declined significantly, with the result that cereal imports to the African LDCs soared from 1.7 million tons in

1974 to 4.2 million tons in 1985,

* The definition of a minor varies from country to country; in some countries the upper limit is age 14, in others, young people are only

included in the active labour force at a&e 17. In this analysis, therefore, both age limits may apply; a uinor is certainly under 14, but could be between 14 and 17, with adults being defined as those between these ages and 64.

Table II, Some

Country

1. Benin 2. Botswana 3. Burkina Faso 4. Burundi 5. Cape Verde 6. Central African

Republic 7. Chad 8. Comoros 9. Djibouti

10. Equatorial Guinea 11. Ethiopia

12. Gambia 13. Guinea

14. Guinea Bissau 15. Lesotho

16. Malawi 17. Mali

18. Mauritania 19. Niger 20. Rwanda

21. Sao Tome and Principe 22. Sierra Leone 23. Somalia 24. Sudan 25. Togo 26. Uganda

27. United Rep. of Tanzania African LDCs

Sources: - ECA

Demographic Characteristics

Ratio 17+/17- 1985

47:53 44:56 50:50 49:51 51:49 51:49 51:49 47:53

-

53:47 49:51 51:49 51:49 53:47 51:49 47:53 47:53 47:53 47:53 45:55

53:47 49:51 49:51 49:51 45:55 45:55 48:52

2000

48:54 45:55 49:51 49:51 56:44 50:50 50:50 49:51

-

51:49 48:52 50:50 50:50 53:47 51:49 47:53 47:53 46:54 46:54 45:55

52:48 49:51 50:50 48:52 45:55 44:56 47:53

Number of per 100

1985

113 127 102 103 96 94 94 111

-

90 105 94 98 87 94 111 111 111 113 121

90 104 106 t04 120 124 109

or Atrican \LD(JS

Minors Dependency Ratio

Adults F 3

2000

119 124 105 106 77 99 98 105

-

94 109 99 101 88 95 113 114 115 118 123

94 106 100 108 124 127 111 \]

Secretariat Calculations based on United 1985

98.5 104-5 88-0 92-7 86-0 86.5 84.8 95.8

—

83.8 90.4 83,6 85.2 81,8 84.9 94.4 96.0 96,8 99.9 102.3

79.7 91.8 92.0 92.2 102.3 104.6 94.2 121.7 91.9

2000

10U6 102*6 92.2 92.5 73-2 88.?

87-9 90-2

—

85«8 93.5 87,3 88*8 82»0 85,4 97-7 97,9 98.6 100,8 104.2

82.9 92.1 87.0 9A.8 104.8 107.2

1/ 96,1 1/

1/124.7 2/

3/ 92.8 3/

Nations Population Studies, No. 98, ST/ESA/SER,A/98 UN. New York, 1986.

- World Population Prospects in 1984.

J_/ The ratio is calculated for the age groups 0-14 inclusive and over 65 years.

2/ The ratio is calculated for the age groups 0-17 inclusive and over 65 years.

3/ The arithmetic mean of the 25 ratios

i t

- 7 -

15. The most obvious and disquieting trend, however, has been the incidence

of rural poverty. In most countries, the distribution of income and wealth is becoming more unequal. In Botswana, for example, in 1974, the top 5 per cent of households received 26 per cent of the rural income, while the bottom 69 per cent received just 24 per cent. Mean earnings in the highest

decile were 26 times as great as those in the lowest one. According to the 1974/1975 Rural Income Distribution Survey in that country, about 5 per cent of rural households owned 50 per cent of the national herd, while some 45

per cent had no cattle at all. 9j

16. In Lesotho, in 1970, 20 per cent of the rural households controlled

45 per cent of the allocated land; in 1960, they controlled 53 per cent.

At the bottom end of the scale, 40 per cent controlled 16 per cent of

allocated land, while in 1980, the holdings of this group had declined to 6 per cent. From 1970 to 1980, the proportion of rural households without livestock increased from 38 per cent to 47 per cent. \Gj In the Sudan,

tenants on the mechanized irrigated schemes earn annual incomes ranging

from LS 700-1,200, while seasonal labourers, who come from the traditional sub-sector, earn a meagre LS 140-170 per person, which gives an income ratio of approximately 7:1. In the mechanized rainfed crop production sub-

sector, communal farmers earn between LS 3,000-6,000 per annum, while

seasonal labourers earn between LS 50-100 per season. Wj In Sierra Leone, the per capita income in rural areas is estimated at Le 115 per annum for 1975/1976 compared with Le 376 in the urban areas, implying an urban to rural ratio of 3.3:1. The top 6 per cent of the population received some 34 per cent of the national income. Y2J In Malawi, households with a per capita income of less than K149 account for nearly 95 per cent of the popu lation, receiving 58.7 per cent of the total income, while 5 per cent of the population receive 43.3 per cent of the total. J3/

17, If present trends in income distribution continue, there is no doubt t^af by the y^a* 2000, millions of people in African LDCs will continue to live in atrocious material conditions. According to the World Bank, most of the additional people will begin life in rural areas. Even if the cities

were to grow at unprecedented rates, they could only absorb part of the

increase in the rural population. If only 60 per cent of the increase -

lTS\nZ* S^1' declininS to -5CS by the year 2000, the rurr.l copulation would

still bd 50 per cent neater m two decades. These trends indicate that there will le uassive pressure on rur^l resources and services. 14/ Already, the nunber sufferingsevere hunger and inadequate nourishrent IE Sub-Sahara^ Africa

^e? ? d f close t0 eo ™""" « 1972-1974 to 100

18. Table III shows two sets of estimates of urban and rural poverty in 15

African LDCs. World Bank and ILO data reveal that there was considerably

more poverty in rural than the urban areas. Since in most African countries,

the rural population constitutes over four-fifths of the total, the estimates

imply that there were five times as many poor people in the rural areas as

in urban areas. J_5/ This assertion should however be interpreted with

caution. Recent evidence for the period 1980-1985 reveals that real wages

in the non-agricultural sectors dropped considerably, which suggests that

poverty in African countries is increasing in urban areas and that the gap

between rural and urban income is narrowing. 17/ (See Table iv). ,

Table III. Incidence of Poverty in African countries 1970s and 1980s (Percentage of urban and rural population)

World Bank a/

^{ILO b/}

African LDCs

Benin Botswana Burundi Chad Ethiopia Lesotho Malawi Mali

Niger Rwanda

Sierra Leone Somalia Sudan Togo

United Republic of Tanzania Other Sub-Saharan Africa Cameroon

CSte d'lvoire Gabon

Ghana Kenya Liberia Madagascar Nigeria Zair-e Zambia

Urban

a *

40 55 30 60 50 25 27 '

a *

30

40

* *

42 15*

15 30*

a a

59*

10 23 50

• *

25

Rural

65 55 85 56 65 55 85 44 35 90 65 70 85

..

25*

40 26*

a a

37*

55 50

• a

80 d/

Urban

• • a a a a

a a

33 e_/

a • a a a a

30 d/

50 f/

6 1/

a a

a •

15 g/

■ •

• ■

* *

* •

8 c /

.a

a.

33 ej

25 £/

Rural

.,

• • a a a a a ■

35 e/

a a a a

• a

60 d/

45 f/

33 f/

a a

t a

27 £/

• a

25 d/

38 c/

• • a •

40 e/

80 g_/

a/ Per cent of population below absolute poverty level 1977-1984, Adopted from the State of the World's Children 1987, UNICEF, Oxford

University Press.

b/ Vali Jamal: (1984) Rural-Urban Gap and Income Distribution Synthesis Report of 17 African Countries (Addis Ababa, JASPA) p. 49.

c/ Refers to 19765 d/ Refers to 1975;

ef Refers to 1978;

£/ Refers to 1977?

£/ Refers to 1980.

* UNICEF Field Office Source.

+ Absolute poverty levelt that income level below which a minimum, nutritionally adequate diet, together-vlth essential- non-food requirpynts

Ls not affordable.

Table

- 9 -

Development of non-agricultural real wages between I960 and the most recent"year"availapTe"

IOC)

Country Latest available

year

1905

19C4 :

1983

1985 19.C5 1SS3

Tnrta XuQC

113 76 60

7b 90 95

African LDCs

Burundi l^alawi

United Republic of Tanzania

Other Sub-gaharan Africa Kenya

Mauritius Swaziland Zambia Zimbabwe

1904

1984 39

Source: ILO

Geneva, 23-25 November 19C7, p.* 2C.

and Structural

Trends in educational development

19.,- In the past three decades, a great deal of effort has gone into the development of formal and non-formal education. The later, which includes mainly national youth service training programmes for agricultural extension workers, instruction in child care and literacy programmes of various kinds, is: difficult to assess and describe comprehensively. It is, howeverj : towards the development of the formal education system at primary, secondary and juniversity levels (including vocational and technical training institutes) that a great deal of physical, human and financial resources were directed.

Unfortunately, the ensuing benefits have not been commensurate with the enormous costs incurred. In the first place, each educational level is structured as preparatory to the next level, and is not an adequate level in its own right. ttithin each level, students are not given any specia lized skills that could make them readily employable. More specifically, the content of education is not structured to the real needs of the

African economic environment and the socio-cultural and economic gulf created deprives the rural areas of the most important productive asset required for their transformation.

20. Governments appreciate that this is a problem requiring immediate

attention, and sorae have tried to restructure the systems. ^Indeed, some

have even tried to find ways out. Their efforts have been thwarted,

however, because of the lock-in effect of the educational structure. As

will be shown in detail later, the larpe proportion of their national

resources which governments allocate, increases inversely to student

population at higher levels. Without overhauling their educational

philosophy and system, beginning at the primary level, all their efforts

to contain the tide will be a waste of resources.

21. Table V provides data on net and gross enrolment ratios for 2A African LDCs. The gross enrolment ratio* at the primary level, which considerably overstates the true proportion of children who are at school, was only 38 per cent in 1965 but rose to 63 per cent by 1983, partly because of an increase in repetition rates» The corresponding net enrolment rates**

are much less encouraging. Of the 13 African LDCs whose net enrolment ratio is shown in Table V, only five had a net enrolment ratio of over 50 per cent-; Cape Verde, the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho and Rwanda*

22. In 1984, the gross enrolment ratio at the secondary level ranged from 28 per cent in Botswana to 2 per cent in Rwanda. Approaching the apex, the pyramid becomes very narrow* In 1984, tertiary education showed a highest enrolment rate of 2.1 per cent in Guinea and a lowest of 0.3

per cent in Rwanda*

23. Between 1965 and 1983, the percentage of females enrolled at the primary level rose appreciably in eight countriest Comoros, from 26 to 41 per cent;

Somalia, from 21 to 36 per cent; Djibouti, from 27 to 42 per cent; the United Republic of Tanzania, from 37 to 49 per cent; Gambia^- "<"* 29 t0 37 per cent; Burundi, from 29 to 40 per cent; Cape Verde, from 39 to 49 per cent and Ethiopia, from 28 to 3« per cent (See Annex IV).

24. The vast majority of students in African LDCs are overwhelmingly in the humanities, arts, religion and behavioural sciences, where the demand, as well as the need for, such skills has already been saturated. In

contrast, in areas where the need for high trained manpower is the greatest, the enrolment ratio has been abysmally low. These trends are particularly typical in such vital subjects as medicine, engineering and agricultural sciences. Out of 16 countries for which data is available, only Guinea

(52.5 per cent); Malawi (21.8 per cent) and Ethiopia (17.6 per cent) had sizeable proportions of students enrolled in agricultural sciences (see Table VI). These achievements are noteworthy in view of the urgent need to concentrate far more research and action on food production and animal husbandry. The dismal «taxolment record in the medical sciences attests

to the low priority the governments accord to this vital factor in the welfare of the people. Nor is the record any better in the engineering

field. Whatever services are available in this and other critical fieldscCome through expatriate expertise, creating not only a drain on resources, but _ - also limiting the advancement of indigenous skills.

* The gross enrolment ratio is the total number of children enrolled whether or not they belong in the relevant age group for that level -

expressed as the percentage of the total number of children in the

relevant age group of that level.

** The net enrolment ratio is the total number of children enrolled,

of the relevant age group, expressed as a percentage of the total number

of children in that age group.

TableV,Evolutionofeducation Country- Benin Botswana BurkinaFaso Burundi CapeVerde; CentralAfricanRepublic Chad Comoros EquatorialGuinea Ethiopia Gambia Guinea Guinea-Bissau Lesotho Malawi Mali Mauritania Niger Rwanda SierraLeone Somalia Sudan Uganda UnitedRepublic ofTanzania

1965 35 69 12 26 ■71 59 30 27 85 12 26 31 25 106 38 16 12 12 67 29 9 29 44 35 Sources;UNESCOStatistical

Primary Latest year 1984 1985 1984 1984 1983 1983 1984 1980 1983 1983 1984 1984 1983 1983 1984 1982 1982 1980 1983 1982 1983 1983 1982 1983

enrolmentratiosandilliteracyin (Percentage)

Gross enrolment ratios

Ratio 64 99 29 49 110. 77 38 93 108 39 73 32 62 111 62 24 37 27 62 58 25 49 58 87 Yearbooks,1970

Secondary 1965 3 3 1 1 7 2 1 3 8 2 6 5 1 4 1 1 *• 0.6 2 4 2 4 9 2 and1986.

1984 19 28 4 •• 11 ■• 6 24 *• 11 21 13 11 21 4 7 12 5 2 17 17 19 8 3

AfricanLDCs Tertiary Latest year 1982 1983 1984 •• .* 1983 1984 •* •* 1983 a• 1984 •■ 1984 1984 1982 •* 1984 1983 •• •• 1983 1982 1984 ■

Ratio 0.7 1.6 0.7 •• •* 1.2 0.4 •* •• 0.4 •• 2.1 •• 1.8 * u.7 0.9 •* 0.6 0.3 •• •• 2.0 0.6■ 0,4

Net primary enroimenu ratios (1984) 46 25 39 89 •. •■ .■ 63 26 53 71 44 16 *a 21 59 *• •a •• 40 .a

Illiteracy Latest year 1979 1971 1975 1982 1970 1975 .• 1980 1980 1983 •a aa 1979 aa aa 1976 1976 •a 1978 a. .a 1973 .a 1978

sJ

% 83.5 59.0 91.2 66.2 63.1 73.0 aa 52.1 63.0 37.6 ■* .a 80.0 a• 90.6 82.6 aa 61.8 aa a* 68.6 a• 53.7

a/ Population aged 15 +» except for Burundi, Ethiopia and the Sudan (10 +), for Cape Verde (14 +)

~"andforMauritania(6+).

Country Students enrolled

Education and teachers training

q

Medical health related

humanity, Agricul- reiigion,

Engi- ture, fine arts, neering forestry, fceha-

fishing vioural

818 a/.

435 406 411

1 16

12 2 1 5 2 1 33 4 7

643 b/

030 304 303 849*a/

792 bJ 450

705

527 c/

234 312 a/

12.9 27.9 30.2 9,3

23.5 10.5 13.6 2.2 60.7 17.4 32.5 12.3 8.6 2.6 34.9 22.4

Benin 6

Botswana 1 Burkina Faso 3

Burundi . 2

Central Africa^

Republic Chad

Ethiopia Guinea Lesotho Halawi Mali

Niger Rwanda

Sudan Togo Uganda

United Repu blic of Tanzania

Source: ECA SecretariaTc^culations based on UNESCO Statistical.

Yearbook f 1986.

a/ Refers to 1982;

bf Refers to 1984;

c/ Refers to 1981;

dV Refers to 1980.

3 662d/ 3t.8

7.2 0.0 5.5 0.0

5.1 0.0 7.5 4.8 1*0 9.8 5.9 9.3 11.4 6.3 9.0 6.8

13.7

3.6 0.0 0.0 5.2:

2.1

0.0 8.2 7.5 0.0 11.4 12.3 0.0 3.8 7.2 3.4 10.7

15.8

5.0 0.0 11.7 2.7 3.1 0.0 17.6 52.5 2.7 21.8

10.5 5.0 7.2 8.8 3.6 6.4

8.3

43.8 65.6 67.3 45.1 56.0 77.6 25.6

n.a.

14.8

n.a.

20.7 54.4 54.5 44.9 33.6 23.8

21.1

* Data refer to the University only,

.1 n.,|i.in i.i u j,... .

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25. The record of technical (vocational) training institutes has been equally dismal. Not only avp^tstise-itwtii^itions costly to administer, but they suffer from the unavailability of trained teachers and other support ing services (chemicals, timber, metals, water, electricity, etc.). 18/

Data are difficult to obtain, but the administrative costs been l&xad"

to be 20 per cent higher, than those of a typical secondary school in the United Republic of Tanzania. W In fact, in cost/benefit terms, studies have shown that the rate of return from core subjects (general science, mathe matics, and languages) is often higher than from traditional agricultural, industrial or commercial subjects. 2$/ Furthermore, the demand for the graduates of this system has been low because of limited employment opportunities, access to land, capital and markets. Nevertheless, an increased vocational orientation for secondary education is being urged without the systematic analysis of the absorptive capacity of the African

economies. In most of the African LDCs, there are large numbers of

registered unemployed masons, carpenters, tailors, metal workers, welders, mechanics and typists. In the African socio-economic environment,

therefore, the development of vocational training should depend upon the structure of incentives within the economic system and in the degree to which the institutional milieu is supportive of entrepreneurial activity.

Without such a milieu, no amount of vocational instruction can be effective, since the skills acquired will not be utilized". 21/

26. In spite of the commitments undertaken at the 1961 Addis Ababa

Conference and at successive Conferences of African Ministers of Education, to endeavour to reach certain targets for qualitative and quantitative improvements in respect of the continent's human resources situation, the percentage of literates in the total population is far less than that envisaged in the Addis Ababa Plan. Table V shows that the percentage of illiterates aged 15 and above was 91.2 per cent in Burkina Faso; 90-0 percent in Mali; 83.5 per cent in Benin; 82.6 per cent in Mauritania and 80.0 per cent in Guinea Bissau. Only four countries (Ethiopia, 37,6 per cent; Comoros; 52.1 per cent; Tanzania, 53.7 per cent and Botswana, 59,0 per cent) have-an illiterate population of below 60 per cent.

27. Largely, owing to rapid population growth and the competition for funds from other social and economic sectors, universal primary education in the majority of the African LDCs will be far from being attained by the turn of this century*. The data on Table VIAis even more revealing. If past enrolment trends continue, then 83 per cant of the primary-school age population of the African LdCs will live in countries with en- '-ent ratios below 90 per cent at the dawn of the next century 22/ -

This assertion is made using the net enrolment ratio. According to UNESCO, a country is generally said to have achieved UPE, when its gross enrolment ratio at primary level attains 100 per cent, i.e. when the number of primary-school pupils equals the number of children of primary school age. Since, however, enrolment ratios are inflated by the

inclusion of repeaters and late entrants and depressed by dropouts, this is not a precise yardstick, High repetition may, for example, cause enrolment ratios exceeding 100 per cent, even in cases where not all children enter school; conversely, a high level of wastage may depress enrolment ratios below 100 per cent, even in cases where everybody enters

school.

Table VIA.

ipr.ted distribution of thet African Leastjeveloped Countries* by gross ratio oj

priaary"^chooTs"Th tf" "

Percentage enrolment

Less than 50 50-59 60^ 69 70 79 80 89 90 99 100 and above

Countries

percentage of the LDCs primary-school

age population

Burkina Faso

Chad, Guinea, Mali, Niger

Burundi, Gambia

Ethiopia, Uganda Malawi* Rwanda, Sudan

Benin, Central African Republic, Somalia

Botswana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho,

United Republic of Tanzania

2.9 15.9 1.8 20.2 39,3 6.9 13.0

Source: UNESCO (1985) Reflection of the future development of education,

Paris, p. 284.

*Excluding Cape Verde, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti, Mauritania, Sierra Leone, Sao Tome & Principe and Togo.

IV. Cost Hsues in Education

28. Available data reveal that the share of public education in GUP between 1970 and 1984 increased in twelve African LDCs but declined in six,

(19.4 to 11.3 per cent); Malawi (13.2 to 3.5 per cent); Rwanda (26.6 to 24 per cent); Somalia (7.6 to 6.3 per cent) and Tanzania.(16 to '5.3 oer cent), See Annex VI). These trends indicate the ..ny other urgent needs competing with education: health, social security, the financing

of infrastructures, industrial investment and defence expenditures. In

some countries, however, the trend has been one of marked £«•«««

educational expenditure. In Botswana, for example, while the share of GNP spent on public education increased from 4.4 per cent in 1970 to 6.1 per cent in 1983, the share of public educational expenditure in the budget rose from12 3 to 18.5 per cent over the ,«. period, An examinationof the pattern of fiscal expenditure in Botswana, further reveals that the Ministry of Education's annual budget is increasing faster than the aggregate government budget, largely on account of very high growth rate of mineral revenue in the past decade.

29. In Africa, teacher's salaries constitute a major component of the

recurrent cost of public education. In 1984, teacher's salaries at the

primary level represented more than 90 per cent of the total in Burkina

Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Mali, Mauritania and Rwanda. On the

- 15 -

other hand, expenditures on teaching materials have declined considerably.

In Comoros and Burkina Faso, expenditure on teaching materials has fallen

as low as 0.3 and 0.8 per cent respectively, of total recurrent primary educational expenditure in 1983, (See Table VII).

Table VII.

-

Country

Botswana Burkina Faso Burundi Comoros a/

Ethiopia b/

Gambia Mali

Mauritania c/

Rwanda c/

Percentage materials

in

Source: ECA Secretariat Yearbook.

£/ Refers b/ Refers c/ Refers

to 1982;

to 1981s to 1983.

of teachers1

in recurrent salaries and instruction

public cost of education

selected African LDCs, 1984

Teachersf Salaries All levels

52 68 78 71 83 73 61 52 80 calculations

Primary 83 99 98 54 - 95 95 91 98 91

Instruction materials

(primary) 8.6 0.8 1.4 0.3 2.5 3.9 4.6 1.9 4.0 based on UNESCO, Statistical

30. The equally firm commitment to free tertiary education, including the cost of residence and out-of-pocket expenses is a burden on the Education

Budget. In 1983, student allowances in Uganda accounted for 12 per cent

of the public sector allocations at the Uganda Technical College, 15 per

cent at the National Teachers* College^ and 15 per cent (probably under-

reported) at Makerere University. Until 1981, 43 per cent of the Malian education budget went in student allowances. In Burkina Faso, the

allowances given to the University students amount to 770 per cent of the

country's per capita income, 23_f

31. In 1974, in developing Africa as a whole, average cost per pupil stood at $2,941 for higher education, compared with $50=4 for primary education.

In other words, the resources spent on providing one year's higher education for a student, whose parents in many cases probably had the funds to pay.

for at least in patt of it, might have served to send nearly 60 more children to primary school. 24/

32. The ratios of enrolment between primary, secondary and tertiary education

in Africa were 90:9M in 1960, but 78:20:2 in 1982. 25/ When these data are

plotted against unit costs as a percentage of GDP per capita, then in East

Africa, the percentages are 16:85:1040 at successive levels and in francophone Africa 20:143:804. 26/

33. Indeed, very few governments of African LDCs are firmly opposed to enrolment ceilings at the secondary and tertiary levels, in spite of the fact that post primary schooling in many of the countries costs many times as much as a student in primary education. The fact that a disproportionate share of public expenditure is still spent on higher education is clearly brought out in Table VIII. Out of 12 countries for which data is provided,

the proportion of the educational budget earmarked for the primary level is less than 50 per cent in ten of them. For example, in Niger, in 1981,

83.3 per cent of the total enrolment was in the primary category, which recei ved only 36.8 per cent of the budget allocation. In contrast, the share

of enrolment in higher education accounted for Qay per cent of the total but it received 17 per cent of the total budget outlay.

34. In summary, the sacrifice made by African LDCs to provide university education for a tiny minority is quite exhorbitant* In Malawi, for

example, over two hundred children could be supported in primary education, for every one university student level. In countries suchas Italy, Japan, Sweden and the United States of America, the aanual expenditure on one university student is less than three times that on the primary school

child. 27/

35. Unfortunately, the surge in unit costs does not seem to be accompanied by a marked improvement in the quality of education. In the bulk of the African LDCs, teaching supplies are seriously underfunded for a variety of reasons. There is only one book for several students, and there are not enough benches and tables to seat the pupils. In Lesotho, for example, out of a total of 3,151 classrooms in 1980, approximately 1,000 were church halls, many of which were in very poor condition, and 65 per cent of the pupils sit on the floor. 28/ In Malawi, in 1979, only one pupil m eight had a chair, and only oneTn 88 had a desk. 29/ Libraries are rare and

even where they exist, they have not enough books. Classrooms are over-

crowded and buildings are rarely maintained. The percentage of 'untrained primary school teachers, particularly in rural areas, is substantial. In Botswana, for example, there were 1,791 'untrained1 primary school teachers in 1985 and 1,025. of these had completed only standard seven. ^0/ In Sierra Leone, 60 per cent of the 12,069 teachers in primary schools in 1984/1985 were 'untrained' and unqualified. 31/ Even where the teachers are qualified

to teach, they are often assigned subjects completely unrelated to their training. For example, teachers trained to teach languages are assigned

to teach science and mathematics.

36. The pupil-teacher ratio may be used as a yardstick for measuring quality. Table IX shows that between 1975 and 1984 the ratio worsened in nine of the 23 countries for which data are available.

37. The existing evidence for the pupil-teacher ratio improving the internal efficiency at the various levels of the educational pyramid is rather mixed.

In the first grades of primary education, keeping the pupil-teacher ratio within reasonable limits, has been found to be an important means of enhancing

internal efficiency. At the secondary and tertiary levels, however, the

evidence of the effects of increasing the pupil-teacher ratio as a cost-

reducing device has been inconclusive. In order to reduce the cost of

teachers, distance teaching (radio, television, etc.) is being advocated.

- 17 -

Table VIII.

Country

Botswana Burundi Burkina Faso Central African

Republic Guinea Lesotho Malawi Mali Niger Rwanda Sudan Uganda

, Distribution of public current expenditure

and enrolments in selected African LDCs

Year

1983 1981 1983

1982 1984 1983 1983 1982 1981 1983 1980 1932

(percentages)

Primary

% of budget

43.0 38.8 31.4

58.8

30.8 39.7 40.9 43.5 36.8 78.2 48.0 16.3

% of en rolment

88.1 90.2 87.6 82.5 72.0 89,2

97.0 79,9

83.3 97.9 78.0 91.4

Secondary Z of

budget

29.1 35.3 16,6 11.6

36.9 35.1 14.8 22.3 46.2

-

31.0 55.7

Source: ECA Secretariat calculations based <

Yearbook", 1986.

% of en rolment

11.1 8.9 11.3 16,8

25.3 10.1 2,6 18.5 16.0 1.9 20.5 8.2

on education

Higher

% of budget

23.7 23.8 25.9 19.3

23.5 19.5 27.3 18.7 17.0 12.7 20.7 17.5

% of en rolment

0.8 0.9 1.1 0.7

2.7 0.7 0,4 1.6 0.7 0.2 1.5 0.4

>n UNESCO Statistical

Table IX. Evolution of the pupil-teacher ratio in first-level

' education in selected African LDCs: 1975-1984

Countries in which the ratio has improved

Countries in which the ratio has remained

more or less constant

Countries in which the ratio has worsened

Benin (53-33) Cape Verde (4C-33) Chad (77-64)

Guinea (34-23)

Guinea-Bissau (34-23) Kali (41-37)

Sao Tome and Principe (34-31)

Somalia (57-23)

Sudan (37-33)

Tanzania (54-42)

Botswana (33«32) Gambia (26-25) Malawi (61-60) Niger (39-30)

Burkina Faso (47-56)

Burundi (31-51)

Central African Republic (67-69)

Djibouti (36-44) Ethiopia (44-54) tlauritania (35-45) Rwanda (50-54)

Sierra Leone (32-34) Uganda (34-36)

Source; U1JESC0, Statistical Yearbook, 1936.

; The hieh rate of -repetition and dropout that are typical of many

dropout (See Annex VII).

^ and 39 Two major policy conclusions emerge. First, since the qW^

y envisaged. The following evidence is overwhelmng. 33/

as

- The use of new educational media (radio, television,

S' nd d.

well motivated group is it cost eftective.

m make effective use of the new techniques. ,

illutory to believe that the total cost of primary educatxon could

be lowered by distance techniques alone.

already 40

40. At the secondary level and above, however, where student^^ave alr ac^ired the basic sLdy skills and maturity to make use^f a v.r«^7 o educational media on their own with a minimum ol ^^^"^ '

training. ^4

- 19 -

41. The important issues which merit consideration in setting investment priorities in education, in the context of African LDCs will now be

considered.

V* Investment Priorities in Education

42. Those who contend that primary education should be accorded priority in the development of education, question the efficacy of expanding secondary and tertiary education when large numbers of those completing this system fail to find gainful employment. Nor is it only a question of quantitative expansion. Educational outputs do not meet the skill needs and demands of society; the wrong kind of skills are being developed. Even more dis turbing are the numerous inequalities manifest within higher education - spatially, sexually, intergenerationally and in terms of class. The bulk of the institutions of higher learning in the African LIjCs are located in urban conglomerations, so creating a spatial inequality between urban and rural areas. 35/ In Somalia, for example, educational opportunity remains heavily biased towards the urban areas. In 1980-tti, 54 per cent of primary pupils were enrolled from the urban areas, although only

approxiii^tely 25 per cent of the total population was classified as urban.

Banaadir (incorporating liogadishu) and Sh/Hoose regions together accounted for 45 per cent of the enrolment and the latter had almost six times its

'share1 of enrolment relative to population J36/. In Ethiopia, of a total of 68,164 children who sat the Sixth Grade National Examination in 1963, only 35,645, or 52 per cent, passed. The highest number of passes were from a few educationally privileged provinces such as Shoa (16,7 per cent), Addis Ababa (21.1 per cent) and Eritrea (15.1 per cent). By contrast, the

unprivileged regions of Bale and Gemu Gofa had pass rates of only 1.1 per cent and 1.6 per cent respectively. 37/ Before the 1974 Revolution,

there were less than a dozen Sadama who had ever seen the inside of a University. 38/

43. In the vast majority of the African LDCs, the enrolment of wotaen is abysmally low. In the Central African Republic, in 19G3, of a student enrolment of 2,143 in higher education, women accounted for only 9.9 per cent* The respective figures for Chad, Ethiopia, i^ali and Rwanda were: 8.6 per cent; 10.9 per cent; 12.2 per cent and 13.4 per cent.

44. The intergenerational inequality in higher education and educational policies in the African IDCs is seen in the absolute priority given to the education of the youth and the modest provisions made for the education of adults, in terms of educational expenditure. The intergenerational aspect is perhaps the most serious and pervasive expression of inequality in higher education. Recent work has shown that the poor tax payers help to finance the education of the well-to-do. There are also a number of cases in which costly advanced training (secondary and higher) is offered free to the children of wealthy families, without there being any pressing demand on the labour market; at the samettime a huge number of poor families are excluded from primary education. 39/ The Cumberland Conference is even more to the point: "It is seriously open to doubt whether universities in Africa provide the kind of value for money that the tax payer is entitled to expect. Certainly, they provide engineers, doctors, scientists and civil servants, but: when the employability of their arts graduates drop sharply - or, worse still, the grouth in the number of local unemployed

arts graduates puts pressure on government to expand public sector employment - and when research programmes fail to tackle important local or national issues,

one has to question the university's role and its right to go on mopping up large sums of the tax payers money... Are the universities rigidly bound to their own narrow dogma about what constitutes success, without being sufficiently aware that there are other measures of success both for

themselves and for their alumni?" 40/

45. On the grounds of equity and of optimizing the use of resources, therefore, the policy of allowing higher education to expand indefinitely

can no longer be justified.

46. In spite of the massive investment in secondary and tertiary education, it is hiPhly doubtful whether the content of the curriculums taught at

secondary and tertiary institutions can hrin3 about the self-sustained ana rapid economic transformation of the African LDCs. Although the same question can be raised about primary education, it can be excluded as a major issue in terms of cost, because of the literacy and other benefits

gained by the majority of school pupils,

47 Under the French colonial administration the dominant policy in education was one of assimilation- Rather than developing an,educational

system which upheld African values, and cultures and ideals, determined efforts were made to make colonial education a close replica of the

educational system in France. Even today, students in Francophone Africa study Voltaire, Mbliere and Victor Hugo, while those m English speaking countries study Shakespeare, Dickens and Wordsworth, simply to pass the School Leaving Certificate. 'The history section concentrated Papally on Europe and Russia and when it did refer to Africa, it was only with an

implied image of inferiority', 41/ President Julius Hyerere is even more

explicit:

"We defined education for self-reliance. We have not quite succeeded there. The reason was the model we inherited: the British grammar school. There is a tremendous outcry for secondary education. If we had the meana, we would expand secondary education, but this outcry for

secondary education tends to ignore the need to improve the seven years of education that every adult receives. Of those who finish primary education, 98 per cent do not get secondary education. So our national education is really primary education. Education for self-reliance has to fit this najority of our population to be self- reliant. And it is here that I say we have not quite succeeded.

There is this tremendous outcry for secondary education. But very few have access to secondary education. A vast majority of those who are left out feel frustration. What starts as education, ends

in alienation."

48- Those who advocate the expansion of primary school give empirical evidence to demonstrate that the returns to investment in primary schooling

in African LDCs exceed those from secondary and tertiary education. As can be discerned from Table X, both private and social returns to educa tional investments are considerable, confirming that tte/ie" t0 be.

derived from education is well worth both the private and public funds

d i i invested in it.

- 21 -

Table X.

Returns to investment in education in selected Le Developed African CountrieT (per cent)

Country

Botswana Burkina Faso Ethiopia Lesotho Malawi

Sierra Leone

Somalia Sudan Uganda

United Republic

of Tanzania

Year Social Private

1983 1982 1972 1980 1982 1971 1983 1974 1965

Primary 42.0 20.1 20,3 10.7 14.7 20.0 20.6

-

66.0

Secondary 41.0 14.9

18.6 15.2 22.0 10.4 8.0 28.6

r_ Hig 15 21 9 10 11,

9, 19.

4.

12.

her .0 .3 .7 .2 .5 .5 .9 ,0 ,0

Primary 99.0

—

35.0 15,5 15.7

_.

59.9

-

Secondary 76.0

22.8 26.7 16.8

_

13.0 13.0

r.Hig 38

27 36 46

33.

15.

her .0

.4 .5 .6

.2 .0

PE?ar°POUlOS' in the Journal of Human ReSo»^g. vol.

the conclusion that prijry

suggest that

51. Elsewhere, it has been shown that a shift of resources from secondary

and tertiary education, in favour of primary education would be beneficial, both on the grounds of equity and of efficiency. The study maintains that the.present structure of subsidization in Africa is both inefficient and inequitable. As regards efficiency, a reduction in subsidies would compel

students to choose their education options in a responsible manner, for

"the implied increase in the private cost of education would cause them to

behave more like * investors1 than 'consumers1 and to pay greater attention to labour market signals in making their educational choices". A reduction in student subsidies would also lead to an improvement in internal effi

ciency since higher private costs would possibly dissuade students of low ability from enrolling^ thus dropout and repetition rates would fall. The subject of equitability raises two issues which merit consideration.

Equality of opportunity implies that access to education depends

essentially on personal ability (aptitude ai.d effort) rather than on the parent's ability to pay, or the geographic or ethnic background.

Inequality is also reinforced, when more is given to those who are already in a privileged position. The study.which was carried out in 10 Sub-

Saharan countries (Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d'lvoire, ilali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Burkina Faso, halawi and the United Republic of

Tanzania) shows that a 10 per cent reduction in higher education subsidies,

whether in students grants or operating costs, would fund an average 2 per cent increase in primary school enrolment, at the existing level of

quality; a similar reduction in secondary education student subsidies

would allow a 1.6 per cent increase. 44/

52. While education has a positive impact on productivity, it must be

clearly understood that although it is necessary, it is not sufficient in itself. One study examined the effect of education on farm productivity, using thirty seven sets of data; in six of them, education had a negative effect, while in the remaining thirty one, the effect of education on farm productivity was both positive and significant. On average productivity

increases, by 7.4 per cent if a fanner has completed four years of

elementary education rather than none. 45/

53. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to repeat the experiment cited

above in the African context because of the problem of quantification. To begin with, the data base is insufficient to estimate the production function

in order to derive elasticities for determining the impact of education on

labour productivity and on output levels. Secondly, one of the measurements used to determine income differentials was the wage rate but in the context

of African LDCs, markets for agricultural labour do not exist, mainly

because the majority of the peasants operate on an individual basis and employment opportunities are entirely open whatever the level of education

attained.

54. Furthermore, agricultural production depends partly on climatic conditions and partly on the availability of arable land, both of which are outside

the control of producers, whatever the level of education. The nature of

the economies of these countries is basically subsistence. Farmers are

not independent of exogeneous forces or united enough to have the capacity

to fix prices or output levels ex ante, with the result that an increase

in output would not ensure maximization of income.

- 23 -

55, Admittedly, the more educated the farmers, the more they are included to modernize their farming ysystems. The modernization process in the context of African LDCs, however, is not automatic, because of the rigidity

of production structures, which cannot be easily changed and the time

needed to attain some level of education. In addition, for the modernization

of agriculture, other supporting institutional infrastructures, such as

agricultural research, are vital. In the majority of the African LDCs, however, the research institutes are not yet sufficiently developed. Even

if farmers accept the benefits of modernization, they are precluded from making the necessary investment, because of the low level of monetary

income.

56. Colclough and Hallak point out that even in cases where positive

association between education and agricultural productivity is revealed, great care should be taken before implying notion of causality. For instance, farmers born into a rich family are more likely to be sent to

school and to be given a sufficient resource base to begin farming than those with poor parents. Schooling, then, may be a result of earlier high levels of productivity, more than a cause of present levels. Moreover, it is less important to know the effects of primary schooling on productivity than to know how the effects compare with those of alternative types of '

organized learning systems, including literacy programmes, extension, non-

formal and basic education approaches. There is, therefore a need to shift the focus of research to a more comparative approach, 46/

57. Elsewhere, it has been argued that there are sharp limits to what

education can do in isolation. Learning about fertilizers is of little value for someone who cannot buy them. Knowledge of improved techniques of

cultivation, which depend upon land reforms, is of little value if the

power structure makes any land reform improbable. The effects of educating

adults need to be assessed within the political framework of the country

concerned. Education is seldom a motive force; where it is working against

the interests of the host society, it cannot be expected tr »olv« the major problems of peasants who have never been to school, 47/ Griffiths has pointed out that adding to the quantity of factual knowledge is not the problem, but changing the quality of thinking very much is. Moreover, these attitudes and understandings are not taught by adding isolated

subjects, such as elementary science and agriculture to the curriculum, but by permeating all teaching with these ideas, so that they become part of the pupil's thinking and personality, applicable in all relevant

situations. 48/

58, The available evidence of the impact of education on agricultural production in the African LDCs is mixed. A study on peasant farming

conducted between 1964 and 1967 in Sukumaland (Northern Tanzania) reveals

that even those having completed eight years of education, were only a little better on average than the illiterate fanners. /

59. In Uganda, however, there appeared to be a positive correlation between

years of schooling, income and propensity to use progressive farming methods methods. 50/ In Botswana, the educational level of the unit head has a a greater effect upon production, implying that higher wage incomes, linked

to education, may influence the amount of money that can be invested in

agriculture. 51/

60. In other Sub-Saharan countries schooling is negatively correlated with agricultural production. Hopcraft, writing on Kenya, a?*1™ *ha* ™£e

is not much evidence of improved farm productivity attributable directly to the schooling experience and there is some evidence of the/J^0* *~

When it comes to applied knowledge about farming practices and husbandry techniques, there is no evidence that the farmer who has received some formal education is better off than the one who has not . ££'

61. Using a sample of a thousand cash crop farmers, together with a control Proup of 200 whodid riot, the circumstances and characteristics associated

with the adoption of innovations among Nigerian peasant farmers was

examined... Thirty eight per cent of the sample had never ^toto school at all, less than half read newspapers and about a third received printed extension material directed specifically at farmers. The most effective influences on the farmers, however, were personal contacts, rather than the influence of extension agents. The literate group, which accounted^

for 6C per cent of the sample, with access to printed materials, did not appear to be notably more innovative than the illiterate group. 53/

62. Vith regard to non-agricultural work, there is soa* evidence that the

*ore schooled individuals have a higher propensity * J**"" f™ ^ *°

urban areas. In Ethiopia, for example, '60 per cent of the children who

fiT5I= ditit fch ^nis"atlv^^^L

urban areas. In Ethiopia, for example, 60 per cen

attended school fiT5I=ra district fchoa ^nis"atlv^^^L fourth _{h did} t hd only ^letrf^J£**

attended school fiT5I=r ^

become farmers and of those who did, most had only .^J£

*rade 54/ In Botswana, the tendency to migrate increases with education,

fnatioii SurviT^TMl^ation, conducted by the Central Statistical Off ce,

reveals that the biggest group of migrants is aged 15-34, with a level or education of, standard 1-7 or less. 55/ In Guinea Bissau the Eastern region is characterized by a predominantly seasonal migration to Senegal

for the groundnut harvest, and a recent study of a f*^*f* ^"a-

Valley put the seasonal manpower loss at 14 per cent of the ta po ula tion. 56/ In Sierra Leone, many young farmers left their ;*"•£•• *° . trvdiamond minino and the rice harvest suffered accordingly. 57/ In iteU,

the tosTof era production, particularly of agricultural equipment caused

bv season migration is substantive. This, in turn, stimulates further

uigraUon ^non-subsistence cash cropping, in order to obtain the money

for these purchases. 58/

63. Judging from the available evidence, therefore, "it is scarcely an exasperation to say that the effect of education, from primary to the

university!" to draw boys away from the farms to the towns and cities .

As President Nyerere has argued elsewhere. 59/

"When I wrote about education in 1967, I said that the school leaving certificate was used as a passport to leave the rural areas and go to urban areas. Every year a number of young men and women, leave their homes and become a kind of exile in their own country. Most of the exiles you find in Dar-es-Salaam are rural people. All education has done for them is to bring them

to the'eities and leave them there. It is a kind of P"-"*""?'

to be told to go back to the villages, tlow this is a real failure

and it is much more painful because we understood the problem but

went about it the wrong way..." 6£/

- 25 -

64. While the majority of the educated abandon the drudgery of the rural areas for the ammenities of the towns, the extent to which schooling is of use to those who remain behind is questionable. The child who goes to school and remains to live in his own village is suddently plunged into a foreign cultural environment, into which he does not fit. This non- integration is a trauma, because it causes physical and psychological uprooting.* "The schooled youngster plays a far less active role in the economic and socio-cultural life of the village than the unschooled child.

The child who goes to school in his own village might be even more uprooted or disoriented than the child who has left, since the former is living in daily conflict between tV7O very different socio-cultural systems'.1. 6jy The parents and adults are cognizant of this effect, so much so that they are "sceptical of schools because they say, the child who goes through it is lost in every way - for the family, the village, future work". As their awareness increasess the farmers are making a concerted effort to "save" the child. It is a worthy but an uphill battle,

65. In conclusion, it may be said that the desire and ambition of African Governments to free their people frora the shackles of poverty has yielded little if any fruit. The systems of education adopted were either

inherited from colonial administrations, or imported wholesale. Unfor tunately, the products of these systems have been very expensive in

terms of the benefits they have brought to society, not because education was not an important vehicle for the alleviation of poverty, but because its aims and content, its structures and values were of the wrong type.

In the words of the final report of the 1976 Lagos Conference: "The time is no more when Governments feal that educational development can be achieved through the numerical expansion of enrolment in institutions of a conventional nature, which would reproduce and perpetuate the aims, content and programmes inherited from the previous generation and from the colonial past. What is now at stake and under way is a fundamental rethinking of educational systems, so that they can mould the African man of tomorrow, rooted in the culture of his continent, but prepared for participation in the building of a modern and prosperous Africa, contributing towards the establishment of the new world order with the rest of the international community," 62/

66. Education has been sold by the aid agencies to Africa as the main instrument for bringing about rapid economic transformation, &3J and assistance was mainly directed to the development of higher education.

67. During the period 1974-30, the DAC/OECD member countries have concentrated almost half of their bilateral official assistance to education in LDCs on increasing the capacity of the overall educational system, followed by vocational training (14 per cent) and higher

The phenomenon was analyzed during the Libreville and Kinshasa Conferences of Ministers of National Education from the French-speaking countries of Africa and Madagascar„ According to an analysis made by a pedagogic research group from the French Ministry of Co-operation, it is possible to observe a "threvshold of psychological disintegration in a child after three years of schooling"-