Global change, sustainability, governance: constructing an integrative framework for steering transitions

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Thesis

Reference

Global change, sustainability, governance: constructing an integrative framework for steering transitions

MONKELBAAN, Joachim

Abstract

The main research question in this research project is: What are the essential elements and the organizing logic of an integrative framework that is suitable for analysing sustainability governance from a global perspective and for implementing the related transitions? This transdisciplinary research approaches this question from three main avenues. First, the research is based on the premise that applying a combination of innovative governance theories is needed in order to improve the analysis of sustainability governance. Secondly, this research explores the interests of core actors in one ‘lay of the land' study on climate governance and in two unique case studies on ‘globalisation of sustainable energy technologies' and ‘aviation and climate change'. Thirdly, the research draws inferences on some areas in which the study and practice of sustainability governance need to be expanded. The findings together form the basis for a new approach to sustainability governance: Integrative Sustainability Governance (ISG). The ensuing ISG framework includes indicator frames within the theoretical pillars of power, [...]

MONKELBAAN, Joachim. Global change, sustainability, governance: constructing an integrative framework for steering transitions. Thèse de doctorat : Univ. Genève, 2015, no. Sc. 4892

URN : urn:nbn:ch:unige-825799

DOI : 10.13097/archive-ouverte/unige:82579

Available at:

http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:82579

Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.

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UNIVERSITE DE GENEVE FACULTE DES SCIENCES

Institut des Sciences de l’Environnement Professeur Martin Kumar Patel

Institut des Sciences de l’Environnement Dr. Alexandre Babak Hedjazi

Global Change, Sustainability, Governance:

Constructing An Integrative Framework For Steering Transitions

THESE

Présenté a la Faculté des sciences de l’Université de Genève

Pour obtenir le grade de Docteur ès Sciences, mention Sciences de l’Environnement

Par

Joachim Monkelbaan Des

Pays-Bas

Thèse no. 4892

GENEVE Imprimerie Voltaire

2015

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iii Abstract: Prevailing forms of governing transitions appear to be unable to address the unsustainability of rapid global change effectively. The fragmentation of governance along the vault lines of governance levels, sectors, interests and approaches is becoming an important barrier to addressing the urgency of steering towards radical decarbonization.

Therefore, the main research question in this research project is: What are the essential elements and the organizing logic of an integrative framework that is suitable for analysing sustainability governance from a global perspective and for implementing the related transitions?

This transdisciplinary research approaches this question from three main avenues.

First, the research is based on the premise that applying a combination of innovative governance theories is needed in order to improve the analysis of sustainability governance.

Secondly, this research explores the interests of core actors in one ‘lay of the land’ study on climate governance and in two unique case studies on ‘globalisation of sustainable energy technologies’

and ‘aviation and climate change’. Thirdly, the research draws inferences on some areas in which the study and practice of sustainability governance need to be expanded.

The findings together form the basis for a new approach to sustainability governance:

Integrative Sustainability Governance (ISG). The ensuing ISG framework includes indicator frames within the theoretical pillars of power, knowledge and norms. Other main findings are that the transformation of crisis into transitions needs to find a place in risk management; that systems deliberation can complement democracy in addressing wicked problems; and that insights from behavioural science can play a crucial role in successful transitions. This dissertation concludes by demonstrating the applicability of the findings to ‘SDG Hubs’ or innovative platforms for collaboration and knowledge exchange on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

This dissertation was written within the dynamic context of negotiations on the post-2015 development framework, an Environmental Goods Agreement, a market-based measure for reducing emissions from the global aviation sector, the Paris Climate Agreement, and an acceleration in the number of national and local sustainability initiatives. The combined findings may inform effective and coherent implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals.

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iv Key words: global change, sustainability, governance, transitions, deliberation, polycentricity, aviation, systems thinking, adaptiveness, resilience, climate change, energy, trade.

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v

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List of abbreviations

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

APP Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate ASEAN Association of South-East Asian Nations

BCAs Border carbon adjustments

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa CCS Carbon Capture and Storage

CDM Clean Development Mechanism CFGS Climate Friendly Goods and Services

CITES Convention on International Trade in Endagnered Species CO2 Carbon dioxide

COP Conference of the Parties

EC European Commission

ECJ European Court of Justice

EGA Environmental Goods Agreement

EGS Environmental Goods and Services ELFAA European low cost airlines association

ETS Emissions Trading System

EU European Union

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FLEGT Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade

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vii FSC Forest Stewardship Council

GANs Global Action Networks

GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP Gross Domestic Product

GHG Greenhouse Gas G2A2 Green Growth Action Alliance

ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization

ICLEI International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives ICTSD International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development IEA International Energy Agency

IMF International Monetary Fund

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ITA Information Technology Agreement ISG Integrative Sustainability Governance

IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature

kWh kilo Watt hours

LCR Local Content Requirement

MBM Market-based mechanims

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

MFN Most-favoured nation

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viii MNC Multi-national corporation

NGO Non-governmental organisation NTB Non-tariff Barrier

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PPP Public-Private Partnership

PV Photovoltaic

REEEP Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Programme RSPO Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

SET Sustainable energy technology

SETA Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement SETIs Sustainable Energy Trade Initiatives SIA Sustainability Impact Assessment SME Small- and medium-sized enterprise

TCG The Climate Group

TM Transition Management

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environment Programme

UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNWTO United Nations Word Tourism Organization

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ix US United States

WBCSD World Business Council for Sustainable Development

WEF World Economic Forum

WWF World Wildlife Fund

WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development WTO World Trade Organization

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Table of Figures

Figure 1 Renewable energy portfolio installation trajectory for 2000 Watt net available energy per

capita in 2100 ... 10

Figure 2 The rate of emissions decrease required for reaching the 2 degree target... 12

Figure 3 The potential of different types of technologies to contribute to emission cuts in a 2 degrees scenario instead of a 6 degrees scenario through 2035... 14

Figure 4 Sustainability as the overlap of social, economic and environmental dimensions. ... 17

Figure 5 Mebratu's model of the different dimensions of sustainability. ... 18

Figure 6 Research characterised by the motivations that inspire it. ... 24

Figure 7 The abductive research cycle for this dissertation. ... 31

Figure 8 Overview of sociological approaches. ... 34

Figure 9 Transition management cycle ... 62

Figure 10 Static multi-level framework. ... 63

Figure 11 Dynamic multi-level framework. ... 64

Figure 12 Multi-phase framework ... 67

Figure 13 The Evolutionary Cycle of the Societal System and the Forces Driving Transitional Change ... 68

Figure 14 The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework. ... 79

Figure 15 Social-Ecological Systems (SES) Framework. ... 80

Figure 16 The experimentalist governance cycle. ... 90

Figure 17 Key properties of the main theories that form the basis for the Integrative Sustainability Governance framework. ... 96

Figure 18 Institutions and processes involved in boundary work on international sustainable development decision-making ... 117

Figure 19 Trade and climate change linkages... 140

Figure 20 Chinese exports of PV cells (national TL 85414020) by market of destination, 2009- 2012... 145

Figure 21 The options for and relations between SETIs, a SETA and the WTO. ... 146

Figure 22 The division of jobs and value along the supply chain of silicon PV. ... 151

Figure 23 Timeline of the developments in the global regulation of aviation and climate change. ... 167

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Figure 24 The global aviation sector has committed to carbon-neutral growth from 2020. ... 184

Figure 25 Simulation of an electrically propelled airplane. ... 185

Figure 26 The Evolutionary Cycle of the Societal System and the Forces Driving Transitional Change for the SET case. ... 201

Figure 27 The Evolutionary Cycle of the Societal System and the Forces Driving Transitional Change for the aviation case. ... 202

Figure 28 Knowledge democracy. ... 228

Figure 29 The Collaboration Continuum. ... 245

Figure 30 The relation between power and knowledge. ... 256

Figure 31 The decision-making process based on systems thinking. ... 274

Figure 32 Risks of climate-related impacts ... 290

Figure 33 Model for integrated risk management... 291

Figure 34 Multi-phase framework, including crisis as a driver of transition. ... 311

Figure 35 New proposed relation between 'Criches', Regime and Landscape. ... 312

Figure 36 The Integrative Sustainability Governance (ISG) framework... 319

Figure 37 Author's arrangement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). ... 320

Figure 38 The water-energy-food nexus and the main pressures on it. ... 333

Figure 39 The relationship between action and discourse. ... 339

Figure 40 A discursive model of institutionalisation. ... 340

Figure 41 Public goods, common pool goods, club goods and private goods at different governance scales. ... 353

Figure 42 The climate change regime complex. ... 357

Figure 43 Climate clubs. ... 358

Figure 44 "Now everyone can fly" ... 363

Figure 45 Enthusiasm about the Environmental Goods Agreement. ... 364

Figure 46 Long haul aircraft fuel efficiency gains since 1950 as an index (100) of De Havilland DH106 Comet 4. ... 365

Figure 47 Potential CO2 savings resulting from different types of (bio)fuels. ... 366

Figure 48 The dominanceof China in projected energy demand growth... 370

Figure 49 Approaches to understanding three modes of sustainability governance. ... 372

Figure 50 The vulnerability of different countries to climate change. ... 378

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Figure 51 Stock of social capital and stages in the networked governance process. ... 381

Figure 52 Accountability and legitimacy. ... 383

Figure 53 Sequence of the learning cycles in the concept of triple loop learning. ... 387

Figure 54 The dynamics of reflexive modernisation. ... 388

Figure 55 Agency, structure, values and indicators. ... 390

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List of Tables

Table 1 Overview of the types and number of interviews ... 40

Table 2 Multi-level framework in terms of different types of power exercise. ... 72

Table 3 SES variables. ... 81

Table 4 The Montreal Protocol as an exemplar of global experimentalist governance... 89

Table 5 An overview of the main actors in the case study on trade in SETs. ... 165

Table 6 Environmental problem solving storylines in the SETs trade case study. ... 172

Table 7 Environmental problem-solving discourses in the aviation and climate change case. .. 181

Table 8 Ways of performing authority... 197

Table 9 Key actors and storylines of Chapters 5 and 6. ... 209

Table 10 The AQAL model with the five framework conditions for successful metagovernance. ... 279

Table 11 Tools for analysing power in transitions... 305

Table 12 Key methodologies in this research in different research settings. ... 336

Table 13 Dryzek's discourse categories in the field of sustainability based on their reformist, radical, prosaic and imaginative nature. ... 342

Table 14 Typology of problems. ... 343

Table 15 Overview of consecutive and parallel research steps. ... 345

Table 16 Modalities of governance... 349

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Foreword

This research is the result of my first decade of working in the field of sustainable development, and it shows pathways to my future research endeavours. This dissertation was only possible thanks to the cooperation with numerous interviewees and colleagues. I am immensely grateful to my primary supervisors Alexandre Babak Hedjazi and Martin Patel who made this project possible. Arthur Dahl and Sgouris Sgouridis provided for continuous support and inspiration, and Matthias Finger provided comments that were crucial for finalization.

I extend my sincere gratefulness to my loving family and my parents who raised me with a ‘world-embracing’ vision. My sister Rebecca provided professional-level assistance in organizing my references.

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to June and Jeena. I am grateful to June’s parents for providing a warm home in which I could make big ‘jumps’ to start each year of research. I would like to thank June from the bottom of my heart for her continuous love and support for making my project ‘sustainable’ through practicing exactly the qualities propounded in this dissertation: collaboration, deliberation, adaptiveness, reflexivity and empowerment.

The generous support from the Fondation Ernst et Lucie Schmidheiny enabled me to finalize this dissertation.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research positioning: where does this research project come from?

We have arrived at a critical juncture when it comes to governance for sustainable development. Policymakers have been crafting the 2030 Development Framework including a set of Sustainable Development Goals (or ‘Global Goals’), a global climate agreement, the Environmental Goods Agreement, a market-based measure for reducing emissions from the global aviation sector, and numerous smaller initiatives around the world. These initiatives will provide the basis for sustainability governance for many years to come. This dissertation is an attempt to investigate ways for governing such initiatives more effectively and coherently.

Within the area of sustainability governance, there appears to be a particular need for perspectives on forms of governance that are fit for working towards improved sustainability in complex, dynamic and interdependent global societies. This dissertation aspires to take some meaningful steps towards empirical identification and theorisation of such forms of governance while simultaneously embedding the findings in accepted theory and practice.

This research is built on the premise that a global, ‘world-embracing’ outlook on sustainability challenges such as climate change is required at all levels of governance. There is a clear need for dealing with climate change, poverty, environmental degradation and other global challenges in an integrated manner. (Davis et al., 2013; WEF, 2015b) At the same time, traditional global governance¹ is said to be in decline. (Patrick and Bennett, 2015) The fact that the development of traditional international law is stagnating (Pauwelyn et al., 2014) is one indication of that decline. Governing global challenges therefore requires innovative shifts in thinking and acting. Global governance today goes beyond state-to-state diplomacy, international treaties, or intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) like the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Alongside these established elements of global politics, institutions are emerging that range from global networks of local government officials to codes of conduct for private corporations, and partnerships of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), governments, corporations and other actors.

1 The term ‘global governance’ is generally used to describe specific forms of governance at the planetary level and processes of (intergovernmental) world politics, although there is no consensus on its deﬁnition (Commission on Global Governance, 1995).

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3 The first section of this introductory chapter provides an overview of the substantive aspects of climate change and sustainable energy and, in particular, the challenges and opportunities involved in transitioning away from fossil fuel use (decarbonisation). Then it defines the concept of global change and two of the most contested terms in the entire social sciences (Jordan, 2008): ‘sustainable development’ and ‘governance’.

1.2 Substantive issues: climate change and sustainable energy

Within the main focus on sustainability governance, this dissertation mainly covers the strongly interlinked areas of climate change and sustainable energy. Sustainable energy here goes beyond renewable energy and can include energy efficiencymeasures (and sometimes nuclear power and fossil fuel combustion with carbon capture and storage or 'CCS'). The arguments for choosing climate change and sustainable energy as the main substantive issues for this research are as follows.

First of all, carbon dioxide emissions from power generation, transport, households and industry play a dominant role in humanity’s ecological footprint. (WWF, 2012) Climate change is one of the ‘planetary boundaries’ that have been trespassed (Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015). Thus, addressing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions provides a crucial opportunity for increasing the chances of sustaining the planet’s biocapacity.

Secondly, besides environmental effects, climate change can have severe economic² and socio-political³ impacts. Because of the numerous linkages between climate change and (sustainable) energy, taking action on climate change inevitably will impact the ways in which we use energy and organise our industries.Beyond industry, energy use is connected to many other issues that humans rely on, such as food production and water distribution and use (the 'water-

2 According to the Stern report, the costs of climate change can be up to 20 per cent of global GDP, which is much higher than the costs of mitigation which are around 0,06 per cent of global GDP per year. (IPCC, 2014a) In contrast, the financial crises and bailing out banks as a result of the 2008/2009 financial crisis cost tens of trillions of dollars.

As Hugo Chavez said in his speech at COP 15 in Copenhagen, "If the climate were a bank, we would have saved it by now"

3 According to Hsiang et al. (2013), changes in temperature and rainfall across countries can be associated with a rise in crime, conflict and war.

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4 energy-food nexus'⁴, also see Annex 1). However, transitioning to more sustainable forms of energy can deliver benefits in terms of economic growth, job creation, limitation of the damage from climate change, and health improvement. (Greenpeace, 2015)

Third, climate change is often ranked as the most ‘global’ and morally challenging⁵ of all sustainability problems, calling for clearer understandings of the role and shape of effective and equitable governance from a global perspective. At the same time, climate change and sustainable energy are suitable subjects for global governance and international cooperation because they continue to be seen as less strategic for many governments than for example national security and defense. Therefore they make an excellent object for cooperation between countries, and can be stepping stones for cooperation in other areas.

The fourth reason to focus on these issues is that the author has worked for more than a decade at the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), the European Commission and several other institutions on the linkages between climate change, sustainable energy, trade and transport. This dissertation therefore enables him to critically assess his own observations and ideas, draw on his network for interviews, and to base his action research approach on his daily work with governance actors.

Fifth, the negotiations on climate change in the UNFCCC⁶, and on an ‘Environmental Goods Agreement’ (EGA) within the WTO framework and a global market-based measure

4 One example of an area where there are strong systemic linkages is the area of combined energy and water supply.

Water pumps require significant amounts of water, water desalination is a highly energy intensive process, hydro power requires a steady flow of water and the production of coal (not to mention shale gas) requires enormous amounts of water, and thermal power plants use enormous amounts of water. Not thinking in a systemic way about water and energy will have “potentially calamitous implications for business, society and the environment” (KPMG, 2013).

5 Because GHGs mix globally in the atmosphere, their impacts are spread around the world independent from the location of emissions. This also means that any governance level taking action – a region, a country, a state, or a city – will incur the direct costs of mitigation, but the direct benefits from averted climate change will be distributed globally. Therefore, “the direct climate benefits a jurisdiction reaps from its actions will inevitably be less than the costs it incurs, despite the fact that global climate benefits may be greater – possibly much greater – than global costs.”

(Stavins, 2014) It is in the interest of no country to take action on the global commons problem of climate change, but each country can reap the benefits of any countries that do take action (a classical free-rider problem). This explains why global cooperation on climate change is essential.

6 By the start of COP 21, 180 countries had submitted the post-2020 climate actions that they intend to take under a new international climate agreement, known as their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs).

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5 (MBM) for aviation emissions in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) have regained significant momentum and pertinence right before and during the writing of this dissertation.⁷ Both the EGA and the MBM for aviation provide important opportunities for leveraging global governance for limiting GHG emissions.

Sixth, despite a flurry of initiatives in the area of climate change and sustainable energy, coordinated governance approaches have been either non-existent or ineffective. One reason for this ineffectiveness is that different pathways that are proposed for energy transitions⁸ by heterogeneous actors are often mutually exclusive (Verbong and Loorbach, 2012) and have made fragmentation a common phenomenon in energy and climate change governance.⁹ Another reason is that “energy is more than a sector, policy, or field; it is instead a cross-cutting issue area that envelops a distinct set of governance challenges” and that “energy is, among all policy fields exhibiting externalities of a global scale, by far the most complex, path dependent, and embedded one" (Goldthau and Sovacool, 2012: 232).¹⁰

7 The US executive announced on 2 June 2014 that it will cut carbon emissions from existing power plants by 30 per cent over 2005 levels by 2030, and within 24 hours the Chinese government hinted that it plans to cap carbon emissions. In November 2014, the U.S. and China together announced that the former would reduce its emissions by 26-28 per cent below 2005 levels by 2025 while the latter would reach a peak in its emissions by 2030 at the latest.

Further, the EU decided in October 2014 to cut its emissions by 2030 by 40 per cent compared to 1990 levels.

8 Sgouridis and Csala (2014: 2609) define sustainable energy transitions as: “a controlled process that leads an advanced, technical society to replace all major fossil fuel primary energy inputs with sustainable renewable resources while maintaining a sufficient final energy service level per capita.” Besides the energy transition, Rogers and Daines (2014) identify three other major global transitions: the “urban population transition”, the “nutrition transition” (in terms of greatly increased consumption of animal products and other high-value foods), and the “agricultural transition” from small-scale subsistence farming to large-scale commercial operations.

9 For the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), a fragmented world is the worst-case scenario for the future, as such a world would be failing to achieve global development goals, and make little progress in reducing resource intensity, fossil fuel dependency, or addressing local environmental concerns such as air pollution. A regionalised world would lead to reduced trade flows, and institutional development would be unfavourable, leaving large numbers of people vulnerable to climate change and many parts of the world with low adaptive capacity. (O’Neill et al., 2012)

10 Goldthau and Sovacool (2012: 233) refer by energy to “the socio-technical system in place to convert energy fuels and carriers into services—thus not just technology or hardware such as power plants and pipelines, but also other elements of the ‘‘fuel cycle’’ such as coal mines and oil wells in addition to the institutions and agencies such as electric utilities or transnational corporations that manage the system.”

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6 These six elements make sustainable energy and climate change suitable arenas for developing integrative¹¹ modes of governance. Climate and sustainable energy governance have local, national, regional and global aspects, are driven by both public and private sector action, and affect geographical, temporal, and jurisdictional governance scales. Altogether, this can raise insights on multi-level, multi-sectoral, and multi-actor governance.

This is not to derogate from other sustainability challenges such as poverty¹² and inequality¹³, hunger, loss of biodiversity, habitat destruction, (e-)waste, depletion of fish stocks, air and water pollution, top soil erosion¹⁴, deforestation and desertification, rising food prices, resource and water scarcity (Steffen et al., 2004, MEA, 2005; WEF, 2015b), socio-economic imbalances (Jackson, 2009), public health challenges, conflict, decreasing social trust and social capital (Putnam, 1995) and institutional failure (Scharmer, 2007a).¹⁵ These challenges are often

11 Whereas "integrative" in this research stands for the process of bringing different dimensions of governance together, "integrated" signifies an output which results from combining different parts. To be integrative means gaining perspective and acknowledging the partiality of any analysis of complex (sustainability) problems. (Hirsch and Brosius, 2013)

12 According to the Brundtland report, 'sustainable development' contains the concept of 'needs', in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given. Despite the economic rise of developing countries, many (particularly young) people are unemployed, and 3 billion in severe poverty.

13 The World Economic Forum’s Global Risks 2014 report ranked income disparity as the most likely risk to cause an impact on a global scale in the next decade. One sign of the growing economic inequality in the world, which according to the World Economic Forum’s Global Risks 2014 report is the most likely risk to cause an impact on a global scale in the next decade, is that the richest 85 individuals in the world have the same amount of wealth as the poorest 3,6 billion people; another sign is that the richest 1 per cent of the global population holds more wealth than the other 99 per cent together. (Oxfam Novib, 2015) Turchin (2010) claims that the growth of a civilization or empire depends on social cohesion, and acknowledges inequality as a fundamental barrier to social cohesion and predicts political instability and impending crisis in Western Europe and the US peaking in 2020.

The interests in the topic of inequality is also reflected by the popularity of Piketty’s (2014) book ‘Capital in the Twenty-First Century’. Piketty argues that wealth will concentrate if the rate of return on capital is greater than the rate of economic growth. Over the long term, Piketty thinks that inequality can lead to economic instability. James Robinson has criticized Piketty for focusing too much on statistical data without proving causality and correlation.

Instead, Robinson argues that it is ‘inclusive institutions’ (access to education and the market, autonomous organisations of free citizens, property rights, and political pluralism) which provide for economic incentives, opportunities for all and solid economic growth. (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012)

14 According to the FAO, the global amount of arable and productive land per person in 2050 will be only one quarter of the level in 1960, and there will be no top soil left in 60 years due to chemical intensive farming techniques, deforestation, and global warming. (Arsenault, 2014)

15 There are passionate debates ongoing on the question whether humanity can ‘break’ the planet. Brook et al. (2013) suggest that while human society modifies and, often enough, permanently and abruptly changes the dynamics of local and regional ecosystems, the collective impact of all this on a planetary scale is too often overstated. A growing body

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7 closely connected both with each other and with climate change and energy issues.¹⁶ The following two sections expand further on the substantive challenges and opportunities related to decarbonisation.

1.2.1 Decarbonisation challenges

Global energy demand is expected to double by 2050. (World Energy Council, 2013) As a result, global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions are projected to increase at least until 2030 (IPCC, 2014a)¹⁷ and might double by 2050 compared with 1990. (ibid.) Such an increase in emissions would result in a 4 to 6 degrees Celsius rise in global temperature as a result of self-reinforcing¹⁸ warming. While adaptation of ecological, economic and social systems to slightly rising temperatures should be feasible, the 6 degrees Celsius average rise in global temperatures that the world is headed for by the end of this century can trigger the breakdown of many of those systems.

(World Bank, 2012, 2013; IEA, 2014) The IPCC foresees for instance that many parts of the world will suffer from flooding, drought, the loss of biodiversity¹⁹, coastal erosion, wildfires, the spread of new diseases and a reduction in crop productivity. UNDP foresees that the number of people that will be displaced as a result of climate change ranges from 200 million to 1 billion. (UNDP, 2009: 45)

of research over the last several years has suggested though that there are very real planetary boundaries beyond which the entire terra machina starts to break down. Barnosky et al. (2012) have argued that population growth, destruction of natural ecosystems, and climate change may be driving Earth toward a planet-wide tipping point that would have destructive consequences absent adequate preparation and mitigation.

16 Climate change and energy are linked with a range of other environmental issues: ocean acidification, biodiversity loss, deforestation, water, the ozone layer, land use changes and short-lived chemicals.

17 To the surprise of many experts, preliminary data from the IEA show that the growth in global CO2 emissions from the energy sector stalled in 2014 despite global economic growth of 3 per cent. This is significant as it marks the first time in 40 years that CO2 emissions have stalled or fallen in the absence of an economic downturn. The IEA suggests that global efforts to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions through energy efficiency and renewable energy (particularly

in China) may be having a larger impact than previously thought.

http://www.iea.org/newsroomandevents/news/2015/march/global-energy-related-emissions-of-carbon-dioxide- stalled-in-2014.html

18 Examples of climate change feedback are the melting of the polar caps which leads to the heating up of sea water, which reflects less heat than ice; methane which evaporates as the tundra permafrost and arctic areas heat up; and increased incidence of forest fires which cause GHG emissions.

19 15-37 per cent of all species may become extinct by 2050 due to climate change. (Thomas et al., 2004)

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8 The challenge that the world faces is that in order to limit global warming to the globally determined²⁰ target of maximum 2 degrees Celsius, by 2050 GHG emissions will need to be cut by 50-85 per cent while satisfying the doubling demand for energy. At the same time, billions of people are expected to join the middle class (OECD, 2010; EU, 2012) and its carbon-intensive lifestyle.

It has been suggested that with existing technologies, a global energy system that depends for 100 per cent on renewables would be feasible.²¹ However, as e.g. Trainer (2007) argues, it is challenging to support a growing consumer society of 9 billion people by using current forms of renewable energy.²² ‘The’ energy transition involves moving to energy sources with lower power density, which can reduce the average productivity of the economy as a whole. This makes the energy transition a tough political challenge and implies the importance of the social-political acceptability of lower economic growth in the short run.²³ Building up the required stock of renewable energy further calls for up-front inputs of fossil fuels and can increase emissions from the manufacturing of renewable energy equipment in the short term.²⁴

20 Following decisions by the EU (1996) and the G8 (2009) to adopt the 2°C stabilisation target, almost all parties to the UNFCCC have now agreed to pursue the aim of limiting global warming to 2°C above the pre-industrial level at the UNFCCC conferences of parties (COP) in Copenhagen (COP 15) and Cancun (COP 16). It is important to note that the 2°C target was rather arbitrarily chosen and according to Victor and Kennel (2014), it is both politically and scientifically wrong-headed. (also see Section 4.2.3 below)

21 See e.g. WWF’s ‘The Energy Report: 100% Renewable Energy by 2050’, available at http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/climate_carbon_energy/energy_solutions22/renewable_energy/sustaina ble_energy_report/ and the Greenpeace ‘Energy [R]evolution’ report, available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Global/international/publications/climate/2015/Energy-Revolution-2015- Full.pdf

22 This is mainly due to the intermittent nature and inefficiency of renewables such as solar and wind, and even apart from the lower Energy Return on Energy Investment (EROEI). In terms of biofuel, the current view among the main researchers is that it should be possible to produce about 7 GJ of ethanol from each tonne of biomass. Developed country per capita consumption of liquid fuels represents 128 GJ per year, requiring 16.3 tonnes of biomass each year.

With an optimal biomass yield of 7 t/ha/y we would need 2.6 hectares of land growing biomass to provide for one person’s net liquid and gas consumption. 9 billion people would need 24 billion hectares of biomass plantations.

However, the world’s total land area is only 13 billion hectares. (Trainer, 2007)

23 UNEP’s (2011) idea of the Green Economy includes for example the idea of investing in the natural capital base.

According to UNEP’s modelling this may lead to lower economic growth in the short run, but higher growth in the long term.

24 If an energy system, in addition to declining EROEI, faces a decline of fossil fuel supply, it may be faced with an

‘energy trap’ as replacing the lost fossil fuel input with renewables will require up-front energy investment to build the renewable energy infrastructure, which multiplies the decline of available fossil fuels. Also see http://physics.ucsd.edu/do-the-math/2011/10/the-energy-trap/

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9 However, Sgouridis et al. (2015) find that a global transition from a fossil-based energy economy to one based on renewable energy is feasible despite the fact that such a transition requires an upfront energy investment that subtracts from the net energy available to society. The realization of a global low-carbon transition requires a doubling of the ratio of investment²⁵ in renewable energy from less than 0.2 per cent to 5.6 per cent in 2055. Figure 1 shows possible energy trajectories that can provide 2000kWh net per capita (the lower limit energy need for maintaining an acceptable quality of life in a technical society) by 2100. Delaying the replacement of fossil-based energy with renewables may deteriorate the security of energy supply in the long term as it will be more challenging to find the energy inputs for producing renewables once the exploitation of fossil fuels slows down or declines. Therefore, it is urgent to efficiently use fossil fuels for building up renewable energy equipment. (ibid.)

The idea of ‘solar breeders’ is intended to overcome this challenge. A solar breeder is a solar power plant that uses its own energy to build more solar power plants. Such a plant could become not only energy self-sufficient but a major supplier of new energy. In theory it can reproduce exponentially, hence the name ‘breeder’.

25 Renewable energy investment ratio is the fraction of the energy which society invests in building renewable energy capital over total available energy.

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10 Figure 1 Renewable energy portfolio installation trajectory for 2000 Watt net available energy per capita in 2100

Note: (a) SET-compliant primary energy supply evolution (in PWh) for providing 2000W average net power per capita by 2100 to a population of 10.8 billion. Fossil fuel emissions comply with a 990 Gt CO2 cap peaking in 2020 and phased-out by 2075. (b) RE portfolio installation rate profile (in TWp/year). Inset shows the evolution of the weighted-average, composite RE EROEI (black line) with an initial value of 20 and the EROEI values for each technology. (c) Installed RE Capacity (in TWp). Inset magnifies the 1990-2014 historical values (dotted lines) versus the modeled curves. (Source: Sgouridis et al., forthcoming)

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11 Global investment (in monetary terms) in renewable energy meanwhile should be four to ten times higher than its current value to realise a sustainable energy transition. (Sgouridis and Csala, 2014) An additional $1 trillion per year is needed between 2012 and 2050 to finance a low- emissions transition (IEA, 2014) that can limit global warming to 2 degrees Celsius and avoid the worst effects of climate change.

The impacts of a global energy transition on employment are uncertain. Based on input- output models, some studies focused on renewable energy and net employment creation in Germany suggest that energy transitions may diminish overall employment because of crowding out effects of government subsidies for renewables instead of private investment in cheaper forms of conventional energy generation, lowered purchasing power of consumers and firms, and the indirect impacts of higher electricity prices on upstream industries. (Frondel et al, 2010) Other studies (e.g. Mathiesen et al., 2011; Lehr et al., 2012) foresee positive impacts of renewable energy development on employment in Denmark and Germany respectively, in particular in the export industry related to renewables. Greenpeace (2015) foresees that a transition to 100 per cent renewable energy by 2050 could by 2030 result in the creation of 20 million additional jobs in the global energy sector compared to following existing policies and would result in fuel savings of 1,1 trillion USD annually. Still, the cost of fossil fuel subsidies is around 5,2 trillion USD per year if all negative externalities of fossil fuel use are counted as subsidies.²⁶ (IMF, 2015a) Subsidies for renewable energy are only a fraction of that amount.²⁷ Diverting hundreds of billions of dollars in subsidies from fossil fuels to renewable energy and cutting energy waste would reduce expected annual economic growth rates by just 0.06 per cent.²⁸ (IPCC, 2014a) Moreover, it is estimated

26 Direct subsidies for fossil fuels are about USD 500 billion per year. However, including all externalities including damage caused by climate change and air pollution raises the cost of fossil fuel subsidies to USD 5,2 trillion per year.

Total subsidies for fossil fuels are higher than those for renewable energy, but per unit of electricity generated, subsidies for renewable energy are higher.

27 Global subsidies for renewables reached USD 121 billion in 2013. (IEA, 2014) It should be noted that the fossil energy sources that are subsidized most (mainly liquid fuels for transportation) in many cases do not directly compete with the renewable generation of electricity.

28 This would add up to a 5 per cent smaller global economy by the end of the 21^st century compared with business- as-usual scenarios.

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12 that removal of fossil fuel subsidies could result in a global reduction in carbon emissions of about 13 per cent. (IMF, 2015a)

Nevertheless, delaying climate action by 2030 would increase costs of decarbonisation by 50 per cent compared with immediate action (Figure 2). (World Bank, 2015a) According to the World Bank, not waiting for technological development and ‘magic bullets’ to curb emissions but early stage investment and commitments can drive the cost of climate action down. The cost of solar power, for example, fell dramatically because a global market for solar PV panels was created (also see the case study on trade in sustainable energy technologies in Chapter 5).

Figure 2 The rate of emissions decrease required for reaching the 2 degree target.

For example, in the pessimistic scenario, if emissions peak in 2025, emissions have to decrease by over 8 per cent per year after 2025. In the optimistic scenario, emissions still would have to fall by almost 6 per cent per year. (Source: World Bank, 2015a)

The world for now remains ‘locked in’ to an unsustainable fossil fuel metabolism.

(Dangerman, 2013) For many governments it is difficult to carry out energy transitions as they receive more revenues from stakes in the fossil fuel industry (including from the numerous state- owned enterprises in the energy sector) and taxes from that industry than from the renewable energy industry. Energy transitions therefore are likely to result either from widespread crises or strong, top-down policy coordination and the early implementation of long-term transition scenarios. (ibid.)

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13 Finally, projections of continued increases in GHG emissions may be unrealistic if the supply of (affordable) fossil fuels will be limited in the longer term. (Aleklett, 2012) Tverberg (2012) claims that economic decline and financial collapse (as a result of either too low or too high oil prices²⁹) would come earlier than a decline in oil supply and would lead to a drop in emissions.

This effect was noticeable in 2009 when global emissions went down for the first time in decades due to the financial crisis in that year.

1.2.2 Decarbonisation opportunities

Climate change has traditionally been framed in terms of international negotiations, economic restraint and historical responsibility. The rationale behind developing renewable energy goes beyond climate change mitigation and includes growth of the clean tech sector, green jobs³⁰, providing access to sustainable energy for all³¹, and enhancing energy security and independence.

Lower prices for sustainable energy technologies (SETs) are claimed to contribute to green growth, competitiveness and a reduction in tax-payer support for energy, freeing up government resources for other purposes.

As an indication, according to the IEA (2014) replacing fossil fuels with renewables as the world’s primary source of energy could save the global economy USD 71 trillion until 2050. And according to the World Bank (2014), addressing climate change would help grow the world economy, adding up to USD 2.6 trillion a year to global GDP in the coming decades.³² These calculations do not include all other benefits of cutting fossil fuel use such as improved health³³

29 Whereas a low oil price leaves oil companies with no incentives for exploring new oil wells in order to secure long- term supply, the global economy may not be able to continue growing fast enough to service debt payments when oil prices are too high.

30 Renewable energy tends to create more jobs –particularly in the services sector - per unit of generated electricity than traditional fossil-fuel based energy. (Wei et al., 2010; UNIDO and GGGI, 2015)

31 There are 1.6 billion people without access to modern forms of energy today.

32 Also the UK’s Committee on Climate Change shows that decarbonisation would result in substantial cost savings:

http://www.theccc.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/1720_EMR_report_web.pdf

33 Massive savings to health-care spending can be had if governments implement a cap-and-trade carbon reduction program. (Thompson et al., 2014) And in developing countries, according to the IEA (2010), ‘‘there are more people dying from smoke from biomass for cooking than from malaria or tuberculosis today. By 2030 over 4000 people will die prematurely every day from the effects of indoor smoke’’. Better access to modern cook-stoves such as those

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14 and energy security.³⁴ Wind power for example is in many cases already cheaper than both coal and gas when health impacts are factored in. (Ecofys, 2014)

According to the IEA, renewable energy can contribute to about 15 per cent of the total mitigation of GHG emissions in 2020. Most potential for decreasing GHG emissions in the short to medium term lies in improving energy efficiency according to the IEA (as highlighted in Figure 3 below).

Figure 3 The potential of different types of technologies to contribute to emission cuts in a 2 degrees scenario instead of a 6 degrees scenario through 2035.

(Source: IEA, 2013)

based on solar or cleaner biomass fuels can reduce mortality from indoor air-pollution caused by inefficient firewood or charcoal-based cooking and can also halt deforestation caused by firewood collection.

34 E.g. the US spends USD 50 billion per year on military to keep access to the Persian Gulf. (Stern, 2010) US interests in the Gulf are expected to decline as the US becomes less dependent on oil from the Middle East. China’s dependence on oil from the Middle East oil on the other hand is expected to increase sharply.

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15 1.3 Global change, sustainable development and governance: definitions

1.3.1 Global change

The term ‘global change’ refers to planetary-scale changes in the Earth system. The Earth system consists of the land, oceans, atmosphere, polar regions, life, the planet’s natural cycles and deep Earth processes. (IGBP, 2010) These constituent parts impact upon each other. The Earth system includes human society, so global change also refers to large-scale changes in society.³⁵ (ibid.) Because this research looks both into the topic of planetary-scale change (mainly through climate change) and its interactions with human society and governance, the global change perspective is a suitable one. The ideas of global change and planetary boundaries also fit with the concept of the

‘Anthropocene’ - a new geological epoch in which humanity is driving global (environmental) change.

1.3.2 Sustainable development

Sustainable development is an intrinsically complex, normative, subjective, ambiguous and contested notion. (Loorbach and Rotmans, 2006) The distinction between ‘sustainable development’ and ‘sustainability’ is that sustainability is commonly understood as a destination or end-state, and sustainable development is a means of getting there.

The most-often quoted definition of “sustainable development”³⁶ was coined by the World Commission on Environment and Development (the “Brundtland Commission”) in its 1987 report

“Our Common Future” as

“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." (p. 43)

This definition is normative (future generations should have the same possibilities), subjective (it requires an assessment of future needs), and ambiguous (it does not specify what

35 More in detail, the term “global change” can encompass: population, climate, the economy, resource use, energy development, transport, communication, land use and land cover, urbanization, globalization, atmospheric circulation, ocean circulation, the carbon cycle, the nitrogen cycle, the water cycle and other cycles, sea ice loss, sea-level rise, food webs, biological diversity, pollution, health, over fishing, etc. (IIASA, 2010)

36 The term “sustainable” was used already in 1905 when Gifford Pinchot used it in describing “sustainable yield” as a criterion for harvesting timber on a long term continual basis. (SOAS University of London, 2015) The term

‘sustainable development’ was used in the World Conservation Strategy (published by IUCN, UNEP and WWF) in 1980.

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16 human needs are nor what needs to be sustained and how). (Martens and Rotmans, 2005) This apparent ambiguity of the concept of sustainable development may be one of the reasons for its widespread acceptance because it can be used to cover heterogeneous needs (Baker et al., 1997;

Adams, 2001).

The question “is the term ‘sustainable development’ sustainable?” is increasingly coming up. Some analysts argue that sustainable development is inherently contradictory and irreconcilable (Kates et al., 2005) and should be reconsidered or even abandoned (e.g. Richardson, 1997: 43) as it no longer adequately serves the implementation aspects of environmental governance. (Vinuales, 2013) McDonough and Braungart (2010) earlier argued that 'sustainable development' has helped to make things 'less bad' but not to do the 'right things'. For Loorbach (2014), the concepts of sustainable development and sustainability are "part of the problem" and contribute to the lock-in of inherently unsustainable social arrangements as thinking in terms of 'sustainability' and 'problem-solving' contributes to visions of optimizing and sustaining these prevailing arrangements. Pepper (1999) therefore has argued that sustainable development is a cynical tool rather than an environmental policy; it can be used for countering environmentalists’

dissatisfaction and criticism on existing practices. For Hopwood et al. (2005: 40), the vagueness of sustainability discourses “allows for business and governments to be in favour of sustainability without any fundamental change to their present course.”

There is further criticism on the generally accepted understanding of sustainable development which is based on the supposedly separate existence of environmental, economic and social 'pillars' or dimensions which only partly overlap in Figure 4:

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17 Figure 4 Sustainability as the overlap of social, economic and environmental dimensions.

According to Mebratu (1998), this model suggests that environmental, social and economic systems are independent and can be treated as such (reductionism), and within the zone where the three systems interact sustainability can be achieved whereas outside of it, there is a zone of contradiction (bivalence). Instead, Mebratu proposes a model (Figure 5) of sustainable development³⁷ which is based on the understanding that the economic and social cosmos are dependent on the (a)biotic cosmos³⁸:

37 The nested, hierarchical concept as put forward by Mebratu (amongst others) is gaining traction also in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) deliberations. See e.g. Griggs et al., 2013

38 Nair (2014) outlines a hierarchy of needs in terms of capital which can be closely linked with Mebratu's model of sustainable development as outlined above in Figure 5: first, there is natural capital (water, air, flora and fauna, geology, soil etc.); second, there is human capital (welfare and wellness, health, ideas, motivation and creativity); third is social capital (institutions that allow people to reach their potential including education, law and order, health care, religion etc.); and fourth is economic capital. Based on this hierarchy, Nair argues that the preoccupation with economic-capital based inequality (e.g. as a result of Piketty’s book – see footnote 13 supra) is unjustified as economic capital has no value if it destroys or does not contribute to the other forms of capital.

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18 Figure 5 Mebratu's model of the different dimensions of sustainability.

This research posits the following working definition of global sustainable development, which is active and acknowledges that sustainability is not an end point to be reached, but a process that requires constant maintenance:

sustainable development is a continuous and collective effort for bringing the advancement of human civilisation in lasting balance with planetary support systems.

1.3.3 Governance: relevance and definition

“Sustainable development is above all about governance.” - James Meadowcroft (2012)

This quotation from Meadowcroft and also Hulme's (2009: 310) insight that "the climate crisis is more like a crisis of governance than a crisis of the environment" show the critical role that governance plays in addressing sustainability and climate change. In a ranking of 21 emerging global environmental issues for the 21st century, UNEP’s 2012 Foresight Process indeed ranked

‘Aligning Governance to the Challenges of Global Sustainability’ as the top priority. ‘Governance’

is seen as critical for the realisation of sustainable development in general (e.g. Ayre and Callway, 2005; European Commission, 2009).

Global change, sustainability, governance: constructing an integrative framework for steering transitions

Thesis

Reference