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New trends in Multihazards Probabilistic Safety Assessment for nuclear installations: the H2020-NARSIS Project

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HAL Id: cea-02572415

https://hal-cea.archives-ouvertes.fr/cea-02572415

Submitted on 13 May 2020

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New trends in Multihazards Probabilistic Safety

Assessment for nuclear installations: the

H2020-NARSIS Project

Evelyne Foerster, Behrooz Bazargan-Sabet, James Daniell, Pierre Gehl, Philip

J. Vardon, Varenya K. Duvvuru Mohan, Giuseppe Rastiello, Luka Štrubelj,

Florence Ragon

To cite this version:

Evelyne Foerster, Behrooz Bazargan-Sabet, James Daniell, Pierre Gehl, Philip J. Vardon, et al.. New trends in Multihazards Probabilistic Safety Assessment for nuclear installations: the H2020-NARSIS Project. EGU General Assembly 2020, May 2020, Vienne, Austria. �10.5194/egusphere-egu2020-5860�. �cea-02572415�

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EGU2020-5860

https://doi.org/10.5194/egusphere-egu2020-5860 EGU General Assembly 2020

© Author(s) 2020. This work is distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

New trends in Multihazards Probabilistic Safety Assessment for

nuclear installations: the H2020-NARSIS Project

Evelyne Foerster1, Behrooz Bazargan-Sabet2, James Daniell3, Pierre Gehl2, Philip J. Vardon4,

Varenya K. Duvvuru Mohan4, Giuseppe Rastiello1, Luka Štrubelj5, and Florence Ragon1

1DEN - Mechanics & Thermal Study Unit, CEA, Paris-Saclay University, 91191, Gif-sur-Yvette, France

([email protected])

2BRGM - Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières, 3 Av Claude Guillmin, Orléans, 45060, France 3KIT – Karlsruher Institut fuer Technologie, Kaoserstrasse 12, Karlsruhe 76131, Germany

4TU DELFT – Tecnische Universiteit Delft, Stevinweg 1, Delft 2628 CN, Netherlands 5GEN - GEN energija d.o.o., Vrbina 17, 8270 Krško, Slovenia

The methodology for Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) of Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) has been used for decades by practitioners to better understand the most probable initiators of nuclear accidents by identifying potential accident scenarios, their consequences, and their probabilities. However, despite the remarkable reliability of the methodology, the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident in Japan, which occurred in March 2011, highlighted a number of challenging issues (e.g. cascading event - cliff edge - scenarios) with respect to the application of PSA questioning the relevance of PSA practice, for such low-probability but high-consequences external events. Following the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, several initiatives at the international level, have been launched in order to review current practices and identify shortcomings in scientific and technical approaches for the characterization of external natural extreme events and the evaluation of their consequences on the safety of nuclear facilities.

The H2020 project “New Approach to Reactor Safety ImprovementS” (NARSIS, 2017-2021) aims at proposing some improvements to be integrated in existing PSA procedures for NPPs, considering single, cascade and combined external natural hazards (earthquakes, flooding, extreme weather, tsunamis). It coordinates the research efforts of eighteen partners encompassing leading universities, research institutes, technical support organizations (TSO), nuclear power producers and suppliers, reactor designers and operators from ten countries.

The project will lead to the release of various tools together with recommendations and guidelines for use in nuclear safety assessment, including a Bayesian-based multi-risk framework able to account for causes and consequences of technical, social/organizational and human aspects and as well as a supporting Severe Accident Management decision-making tool for demonstration purposes.

The NARSIS project has now been running for two years and a half, and the first set of deliverables and tools have been produced as part of the effort of the consortium. Datasets have been

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collected, methodologies tested, states of the art have been produced, and various criteria and plans developed. First results have started to emerge and will be presented here.

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