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Spread Spectrum-based Watermarking for Tardos Code-based Fingerprinting for H.264/AVC Video

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Spread Spectrum-based Watermarking for Tardos Code-based Fingerprinting for H.264/AVC Video

Zafar SHAHID, Marc CHAUMONT and William PUECH LIRMM, UMR CNRS 5506, Universit´e Montpellier II

[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]

Problem Statement

OBJECTIVE: Protect H.264/AVC video with fingerprinting against illegal distribution.

PROPOSED SOLUTION: Embed Tardos fingerprinting code in

H.264/AVC using spread spectrum (SS) embedding while taking into account the reconstruction loop.

OUR APPROACH: The proposed solution consists of the following steps:

I Tardos fingerprinting code is generated offline for each user.

I Fingerprinting code is embedded into DC coefficients of all 4 × 4 blocks.

I Spread spectrum watermarking is used for embedding fingerprinting codes.

I Reconstruction loop is taken into account during the embedding process.

H.264/AVC

H.264/AVC [1] is the state of the art video codec and performs better than previous standards owing to many new tools including:

I 4X4 integer transform.

I Better entropy coding techniques:

I CAVLC

I CABAC

I Quarter pixel motion estimation.

I Multiple block size motion estimation

I Multiple reference frames.

Tardos fingerprinting code generation

A fingerprinting code is analyzed based on its code-length m, maximum

number of colluders c0, false-positive (1) and false-negative (2) values. For binary asymmetric Tardos code, the length of code is given as

m = 100 c02 ln (1

1) and 1 and 2 is given as 2 =

c0 4

1 , as proposed by Tardos [2].

For code generation, we have the following three steps:

I For a code of length m, we generate random and independent probabilities {p(i)}1≤i≤m with the distribution f (p) = 1

π

p(1−p) for p [0, 1]. Practically p is between t and 1 t with t = 10−3 and has high frequency on the edges:

Freq

0 1

P(i)

I The next step is to generate Tardos code. For the case of binary Tardos code, each line of S is filled with 0 or 1 with Prob[S(i, j) = 1] = p(i). Each column is a fingerprinting code for separate user. For n users with m code-length, it is a matrix of size m × n:

p1 p2

1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 pi

pm

S

j n users

I For accusation process, a sequence Z is extracted from the pirated copy and an accusation score Aj is associated with user j given as:

Aj =

m

X

i=1

U (Z (i), S(i, j), p(i)) ,

where

U(1, 1, p) =p

(1 p)/p U(1, 0, p) = p

p/(1 p), U(0, 0, p) =p

p/(1 p) U(0, 1, p) = p

(1 p)/p.

I Aj for accused users may be modeled with a Gaussian centered at µ = 2mcπ , while Aj for innocent users may be modeled with a Gaussian centered at 0. Accused users (the traitors) have a score above µ

m (i-e 2mcπ

m), where

m is the standard deviation of the Gaussian.

Spread Spectrum Embedding in H.264/AVC

Reconstruction loop is taken into account for Tardos code embedding:

+ Integer

transform Quantization Watermarking

Entropy coding

Predictor +

Inverse integer transform

Inverse quantization

+

Inverse integer transform

Inverse quantization

Entropy decoding Predictor

x(i, j)+

e(i, j) yˆ(u, v) yˆw(u, v)

yw(u, v) ew(i, j)

xr(i, j) +

ˆ

yw(u, v) yw(u, v)

ew(i, j) +

x0(i, j) +

x0(i, j) +

xw(i, j)

Watermarked Bitstream

SS embedding is performed on DC coefficients in the following manner:

0 1 4 5

2 3 6 7

8 9 12 13 10 11 14 15

y0 y1 y2 y3 y4 . . . yl

=

x0 x1 x2 x3 x4 . . . xl

+1

−1

−1 +1 +1 . . .

−1

(-1)S(i,j)

with S(i, j) is a message bit to be inserted with value 0 or 1.

Experimental Results

I H.264/AVC JSVM 10.2 in AVC mode Intra 4 × 4 MB mode along with CAVLC.

I Parameters n = 100, 1 = 10−3, c0 = 20, m = 92104.

I Payload is 10 bits/frame. Hence 9211 CIF frames (369 seconds of video at 25 fps) are used to embed the code.

Actual Avg Min Max

Minmax Median Modneg 35

25 15 5

2 5 8 11 14 17 20

No.of colluders

PSNR

For colluder set S, the jth pixel of colluded video z(j) is:

zave(j) = P

k∈S λkyk(j), zmin(j) = min{yk(j)}k∈S zmax(j) = max{yk(j)}k∈S zmed(j) = med{yk(j)}k∈S

zminmax(j) = (ymin(j) + ymax(j))/2

zmodneg(j) = ymin(j) + ymax(j) ymed(j).

Number of colluders detected

K Avg Min Max Median Minmax Modneg

2 2 2 2 2 2 2

5 5 5 5 5 5 5

8 8 8 8 8 8 6

11 11 10 10 10 10 7

14 14 13 13 13 13 9

17 16 15 16 16 16 10

20 18 18 18 19 18 11

Visual Analysis:

Original Fingerprinted Avg(17) Modneg(8)

Conclusion

I Colluders can be traced in a colluded video having acceptable visual quality.

I Tardos code with SS technique is an efficient video fingerprinting framework.

I The presented results can be improved by using informed watermarking and fine-tuning the parameters.

References

1: ITU-T Rec. H.264 ISO/IEC 14496-10 AVC, Tech. Rep., Joint Video Team (JVT), Doc. JVT-G050, March 2003.

2: G´abor Tardos, Optimal Probabilistic Fingerprint Codes, in Proc. ACM symposium on Theory of computing, New York, NY, USA, 2003.

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