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Thèse de doctorat/ PhD Thesis Citation APA:

Narayan Basak, S. (1991). The International Court of Justice and the new-born states (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté des sciences sociales, politiques et économiques, Bruxelles.

Disponible à / Available at permalink : https://dipot.ulb.ac.be/dspace/bitstream/2013/212987/1/a27977b2-ca86-4267-ad51-9eca7b2930e7.txt

(English version below)

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THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND

THE NEW-BORN STATES.

Volume I

SACHINDRA NARAYAN BASAK

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THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND

THE NEW-BORN STATES.

Volume I

674.262 V.1

SACHINDRA NARAYAN BASAK

H 5 *5 5 V

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Préfacé

The emergence of many "new" born States as a conséquence of the process of decolonization which star- ted in the period following the post-Second World War and their impact on the international legal order hâve engaged the attention of many distinguished scholars and international lawyers in recent times. The effects and conséquences of the emergence of numerous States as in­

dépendant actors on the international scene are, no

doubt, many, extensive and profound. I hâve selected for my study only one aspect of this large issue, but one believed to be of fundamental importance for the future development of the international legal order, namely, the attitude of the "new-born" States towards adjudica­

tion of international disputes by the International Court of Justice.

In the first part of this study, the conten- tious and advisorÿ jurisdictions of the Court and the varions sources o^ those jurisdictions hâve been analy- sed and discussed. The cases that hâve been brought be- fore the Court under its contentions and advisorÿ juris- diction, and the participation of States, old and "new- born", hâve been highlighted. The possible effects of the Court's verdicts in the contentions cases and opi­

nions in the advisorÿ cases on the attitude of the "new- born" States vis-a-vis the Court hâve also been analy- sed. In the chapter on advisorÿ jurisdiction, in addi­

tion to explaining the attitude of the "new-born” Sta­

tes towards certain spécifie questions from the avail-

able sources, a study on the views of those States as to

the authority of the opinions rendered by the Court and

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their execution has also been added. In order to pin- point the commitment of States towards international adjudication I hâve incorporated in ray study lengthy tables, both analytical and factual. In the second part of this study, the opinions of the ”new-born"

States on the institutional, structural and functio- nal aspects of the Court hâve been discussed and ana- lysed. In addition, a brief study on the current de­

liberations and reflections on the probable reasons for the general réluctance of States to bring their disputes before the Court for adjudication and the limitations and possibilities of judicial fonction at the présent state of development of the interna­

tional juridical Comraunity has been added.

Identifying the attitude of the ”new-born”

States in some areas has been attended with some dif- ficulties. These States do not belong to a single com­

préhensive philosophical and political System. They are heterogenous; they differ in cultural background, levels of éducation, political orientation and spéci­

fie interests. Moreover, many "new-born" States hâve not yet started expressing their views on many areas under study. Even where some expressions of opinions are noticeable in some areas, one finds that not ail or the majority of the "new-born" States hâve expres- sed views on them. However, at every aspect of the study, a conclusion has been attempted on the basis of the trend of opinion observed.

Except where otherwise indicated, ail trans­

lations from French in this study hâve been done by

myself.

(6)

This dissertation has been prepared under the guidance of Professer Jean J.A. Salmon. He has been a philosopher, a frined and a guide to me ail through. But for his sustained guidance, this work would never hâve been completed. I am also indebted

to Professer Charles Chaumont of the University of Nancy for some of his useful suggestions at the

initial stage of my research. My other great debt is to Mr. A. Pillepich, former Deputy-Registrar of the International Court of Justice, The Hague, who has been generous in granting me several interviews and provided me with several relevant documents which I profitably used.

I wish to express ray gratitude to Mr. Der- nelle and Mme. Debar in the Library of the Ministry of External Affairs, Royal Government of Belgium, for their generous help which went well beyond the bounds of duty. Spécial thanks are due to my friend Mr. P.H.

Chandrasekharan, of the International Labour Organi- zation, Geneva, for his constant encouragement and supplying me with several documents during the course of my research.

I am bound by gratitude to Mr. A. Tripathi, of the Indian Foreign Service, for the pains he took to go through the raanuscript and suggesting many cor­

rections. Spécial thanks are due to Mrs. Laurence Audy Mukharji, who despite her many préoccupations, took pains to t'ype out one Chapter of the manuscript. I am bound by gratitude to a host of friends for their con­

stant encouragement in ray research work. I wish to

express my gratitude to Mme. Freund for typing out the

final manuscript with meticulous care.

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Finally, my thanks are due to my wife Rosette, who bas helped me in more ways than can be recounted here. In addition to helping me in translating French texts into English, she took upon herself the responsibility of typing out al- most the entire manuscript. How indispensable ba­

ve been ber conscientiousness, dévotion, constant tolérance and encouragement, she alone knows.

Summer 1991 S.N.B.

Brussels.

(8)

Abbreviations.

ABA Journal AJIL

BYIL

The Court CYIL

EFTA GAOR lAEA IBRD

ICAO

I&CLO

IDA IFC ICJ ILM • ILO IMF IJIL

ICJ Yearbook

ICJ Pleadings

ICJ Reports

IMCO ITU lYIA

American Bar Association Journal.

American Journal of International Law.

British Yearbook of International Law.

The International Court of Justice.

Canadien Yearbook of International Law.

Européen Free Trade Association.

General Assembly Official Records.

International Atomic Energy Agency.

International Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

International Civil Aviation Organi- zation.

International and Comparative Law Quarterly.

International Development Agency.

International Finance Corporation.

The International Court of Justice.

International Legal Materiel.

International Labour Organization.

International Monetary Fund.

Indien Journal of International Law.

Yearbook of the International Court of Justice.

Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents published by the Registry of the Court.

Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opi­

nions and Orders published by the Re­

gistry of the Court.

Inter-Governmental Maritime Consulta­

tive Organization.

International Télécommunication Union.

Indien Yearbook of International

Affaire.

(9)

JAIL - Japanese Annuaire of International Law.

LNTS - League of Nations Treaty Sériés.

NTIR - Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Interna­

tional Recht.

NYIL - Netherlands Yearbook of International Law.

OECD - Organisation for Coopération and Eco­

nomie Development.

OAS - Organization of American States.

OAU - Organization of African Unity.

peu - The Permanent Court of International Justice.

Proceedings - Proceedings of the American Society of International Law.

RCADI - Recueil des Cours de l'Academie de droit International.

RGDDIP - Revue General de Droit International

RFDDI

Publique.

- Revue Français de droit international RBDI - Revue belge de droit international.

RHDI - Revue hellénique de droit internatio­

nal .

SCOR - Security Council Official Records.

UPU - Universal Postal Union.

UNTS - United Nations Treaty Sériés.

UNCIO - United Nations Conférence on Interna­

tional Organization.

(San Francisco 19^5)

WHO - World Health Organization.

WMO - World Meteorological Organization.

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CONTENTS

Introduction

1. Définition of "new-born" States.

2. The problems of the ”new-born" States.

3. Ideological perspective of the "new-born" States.

Part I

(A) Contentious Jurisdiction

Chapter I; Contentious jurisdiction under Article 36, ParaGraph I of the Statute

1. Jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, para- graph I of the Statute.

2. Contentious cases under Article 36, paragraph I of the Statute and participation of the old and

"new-born" States.

(a) Compromis

(b) Compromissory Clause

(i) The practice of inserting compromissory clau­

se in treaties and conventions during the League era.

(ii) Compromissory clause as provided for in trea­

ties and conventions concluded in the U.N.

era.

(iii) Compromissory clause in bilateral treaties.

(iv) Cases brought before the Court under the compromissory clause of the bilateral trea­

ties.

(v) Compromissory clause in multilatéral treaties and conventions.

(vi) Attitude of States as expressed in multila­

téral treaty making conférences.

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(vii) Cases brought before the Court under the compromissory clause of the multilatéral treaties and conventions.

(viii) Conclusion.

(c) Constitutions of public international organiza- tions and compulsory jurisdiction of the court.

(i) Public international organizations and inter­

prétation of their constitutions.

(ii) Provision for compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in the constitutions of internatio­

nal organizations.

(iii) Acceptance by States of the constitutions of international organizations for compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

(iv) . Cases brought before the Court under the constitutions of international organizations.

(v) Inter-governmental organizations and the question of contentions jurisdiction of the Court.

(vi) Conclusion.

CHAPTER II; Contentious jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute.

1. Contents of Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute.

2. Evolution of the déclarations of acceptance of the Compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

3. Réservations made by States in their acceptance of the optional clause - a typological analysis.

4. Contentious cases brought under Article 36, para­

graph 2 of the Statute and participation of

"new-born" States.

5. Conclusion.

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(B) Chapter III; Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court

1. Provision for advisory opinion under the U.N. Char­

ter and the Statute of the Court.

2. Attitude of the ”new-born” States towards certain spécifie questions in relation to the advisory ju­

risdiction of the Court.

(a) Whether in view of the principle of sovereignty, the consent of States is necessary for advisory proceedings in cases where the legal interests of States are directly concerned.

(b) Interprétation of the Charter.

(c) Matters within domestic jurisdiction of States.

3. Recourse to the advisory process and participation of the old and "new-born" States.

(a) Non-acceptance of proposais by the organs and Specialized Agencies for advisory opinions.

(b) A critical study of the attitude of States to­

wards advisory process.

4. Conclusion.

5. Acceptance and execution of the advisory opinions rendered by the Court.

(a) Réception of the advisory opinions by the re- questing bodies.

(b) Views of the Meraber States as to the authority of the opinions.

(c) Execution of the advisory opinions.

Part II

Chapter IV; Critical examination of the opinions expressed by the ”new-born” States in the international conférences on the varions aspects of the Court.

1. The place of the Court in the System of settlement of disputes established by the Charter of the United Na­

tions.

(13)

2. The contents of international law and its applica­

tion by the Court.

(a) The question of gaps and uncertainties in inter-

■ national law.

(b) Custom as a source of international law.

(c) Resolutions of the United Nations as a source of international law.

(d) General principles of law as a source of interna­

tional law.

3. Practical attitude of the "new-born” States towards international law.

4. The composition of the Court.

(a) Reactions to the judgment on the South-West

Africa 1966 case and the question of composition of the Court.

(b) Procedures of the Court.

Chapter V.

Reasons for réluctance of States to refer their in­

ternational disputes to the Court for adjudication and limits to international adjudication - A reprise.

1. Enumération of the limits to international adjudi­

cation revisited.

2. An examination of the validity of the supposed limi­

tations of international adjudication in the présent State of development of the international community.

3. Prospect of international adjudication.

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Article 3^» paragraph 1 of the Statute of the Court provides that 'only States may be parties in cases before the Court'. Although there is no reference to in- dependent States, both a contextual reading of the instru­

ment and State practice confirm that this is what was meant by the authors. (1) That the net resuit of the provisions of Article 3^ (1) of the Statute is that the capacity to

initiate legal proceedings and to be respondent and gene- rally to appear before the Court is reserved only to States is also clear from the jurisprudence of the Court. (2) Al­

though the Court itself recognized in the Réparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations case that international organizations and above ail

(1) HIGGINS, R., The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations, 1963, 49.

(2) ROSENNE, S., The International Court of Justice, 1957, 235-236.

In a recent booklet entitled "The International Court of Justice" published and distributed by the Regi- stry of the Court the following passage appears at page 32:

Hardly a day passes without the Registry recei- ving written or oral applications from private persons.

However heartrending, however well founded such applica­

tions may be, the ICJ is unable to entertain them and a standard reply is always sent: "Under .Article 34 of the Statute, only States may be parties in cases before the Court". A similar answer is given to the représentatives of nations that do not constitute States and to the re­

présentatives of States, provinces or cantons forming

part of a Fédéral State.

(15)

the United Nations, can and do possess international personality, so as to be able of advancing international daims, that does not mean that these international

organizations possess full procédural capacity before the international tribunals including the Court. (3) It is to be mentioned here that the jurisdiction of the Court stands in contrast with the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the European Court of Human Rights which would be entitled to hear, within their respective fields of jurisdiction, disputes between a State on the one hand and an inter­

national organization, a collectivity or an individual on the other. (4) Private interest can form the subject of proceedings before the Court, if a State relying on international law takes up the cases of its nationals daim to hâve suffered in the latters hands, the

disputes thus becoming between States. (5)

The provisions of Article 34 (1) of the Statute no doubt conforme to the classical viewthat

"international law is primarily concerned with the rights and duties of States and not those of other persons ... States only possess full procédural capacity before international tribunals". (6) These

(3) ROSENNE, S., The Law and Practice of the Interna­

tional Court, vol. I, 1965, 268.

(4) JENKS, W., The Prospects of International Adjudica­

tion,1964, 144-148.

(5) Examples of this type of proceedings before the Court are afforded by the Ambatielos, Anglo- Iranien Oil

Co., Nottebohm, Interhandel, and Barcelone Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd cases.

(6) OPPENHEIM, International Law, vol. I, (Lauter-

pacht ed.) 8th édition, 1955, 20.

(16)

views are however coramonly regarded as the raost out of tune with the requirements of modem international life.

The need to redefine the scope, impact and purposes of international law has been articulated by several dis- tinguished writers. (7) To quote here only a few of the distinguished writers, Professer Jessup stressed the need to reassess the scope of international law in the following words:

"The use of transnational law would supply a larger storehouse of rules on which to draw, and it would be unnecessary to worry whether public or private law applies in certain cases. We may find that some of the problems that we hâve considered essentially interna­

tional, inevitably productive of stress and conflict between Governments and peoples of two different coun- tries, are after ail merely human problems which might arise at any level of human society - individuel, cor- porate, interregional or international". (8)

The shift in the structure of international law has been vividly stated by Jenks;

"The emphasis of law is increasingly shifting from the formai structure of the relationship between States and the délimitation of their jurisdiction to the development of substantive rules on matters of com- mon concern vital to the growth of an international com- munity and to the individuel well-being of the citizens of its member States. We shall also find that as the resuit of this change of emphasis the subject-matter of the law increasingly includes cross-frontiers relation- ships of individuels, organisations and corporate bo- dies which call for appropriate legal régulation on an

(7) For a discussion and bibliography on the subject see

FRIEDMANN, W., The Changing Structure of International Law, 1964, 67-71, 213-245.

(8) JESSUP, P., Transnational Law, 1956, 15-16.

(9) JENKS,W., The Common Law of Mankind, 1958, 17.

(17)

internationl basis (9)

Although procédural capacity before the Court bas been preserved only for States, it is évident that statehood bas to be supplemented by tbe formai membersbip of tbe United Nations. (10) Tbe Court is also open to membersbip of tbe States not members of tbe United Na­

tions on conditions to be determined in eacb case by tbe General Assembly upon tbe recommendation of tbe Se- curity Council in terms of Article 93, paragrapb 2, of tbe Cbarter. (11) Tbe conditions laid down bave bitberto

(10) Article 35, pragrapb 1, of tbe Statute provides tbat 'tbe Court sball be open to States parties to tbe présent Statuts', and Article 93, paragrapb 1, of tbe Cbarter of tbe United Nations provides tbat 'ail Mem­

bers of tbe United Nations are ipso facto parties to tbe Statute of tbe International Court of Justice'.

(11) In tbis connection Professor Kelsen's commente are wortb noting;

"Tbat tbe Cbarter in distinguisbing between parties to tbe Cbarter and parties to tbe Statute, calls only tbe former 'Members of tbe United Nations' is not quite correct. Tbe statement tbat pbysical or juristic persons are members of an organization or Community is a figurative expression. Its meaning is tbat tbese persons are subjected to tbe legal order wbicb constitutes tbe organization or community by

regulating tbe mutual bebaviour of tbese persons. If tbe legal order bas tbe cbaracter of a treaty, tbe persons wbose bebaviour is regulated by it are - as a rule - tbe States wbicb are contracting parties to tbe treaty. Since tbe Statute according to Article 92 forms an intégral part of tbe Cbarter, (in tbe wider sense of tbe term) ail tbe States parties to tbe Statute are

'Members' of tbe United Nations, tbis term used in a wider sense designating tbe total community comprising tbe judicial community wbose organ is tbe Court".

(Tbe Law of tbe United Nations, London, 1950, 80)

»

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been the same in each case. They were laid down for the first time as a resuit of a request by the Swiss Fédéral Council, on that occasion the General Assembly, on 11 December 19^6, adopted resolution 91 (1) which prescrites the following conditions:

"(a) Acceptance of the provisions of the Statute of the International Court of Justice;

(b) Acceptance of ail the obligations of a Meraber of the United Nations under Article 9^ of the Charter;

(c) An undertaking to contribute to the expenses of the Court such équitable amount as the General Assembly shall assess from time to time after consultation with the Swiss Government”. (12)

The date on which the State concerned becomes a party to the Statute is that ol the deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the instru­

ment of acceptance of the conditions. So far four Sta­

tes, namely Switzerland, Liechtenstein,San Marino and Nauru hâve become parties to the Statute in terms of pro­

visions contained in Article 93 (2) of the Charter.(13) Before becoming a Member of the United Nations, Japan was also a party to the Statute of the Court as from 2 April 1954 under the same conditions. (14)

The Statute of the Court also provides that the Court 'shall be open' to States other than parties to the Statute on conditions to be laid down by the Security Council. (15)

(12) ICJ Yearbook, 1988-89, p. 46

(13) General Assembly Resolutions 91 (1) of 11 Decem­

ber 1946, 363(IV) of 1 December 1949 and 806 (VIII) of 9 December 1953, and 42/21 of l8 November 1987.

Ibid, P. 47.

(14) General Assembly Resolution 805 (VIII) of Decem­

ber 1953.

(15) Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute provides:

'The conditions under which the Court shall be

(19)

In virtue of the powers conferred upon it by Article 35, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Interna­

tional Court of Justice and subject to the provisions of that Article,

Résolves that:

1. The International Court of Justice shall be open to a State which is not a party to the Statute of the Inter national Court of Justice, upon the following conditions namely, that such State shall previously hâve deposited with the registrar of the Court a déclaration by which

it accepta the jurisdiction of the Court, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and with the terms and subject to the conditions of the Statute and Rules of the Court, and undertakes to coraply in good faith with the decision or decisions of the Court and to accept ail the obligations of a Member of the United Nations under Article 94 of the Charter;

2. Such déclaration may be either particular or general.

A particular déclaration is one accepting the jurisdic­

tion of the Court in respect only of a particular dis­

pute or disputes which hâve already arisen. A general déclaration is one accepting the jurisdiction generally in respect of ail disputes which hâve already arisen or which may arise in the future. A State, in making such a general déclaration, may, in accordance with Arti­

cle, 36,

open to other States shall, subject to the spécial pro­

visions contained in treaties in force, be laid down by the Security Council, but in no case shall such con­

ditions place the parties in a position of inequality

before the Court'.

(20)

paragraph 2, of the Statute recognize as compulsory, ipso facto and without spécial agreement, the juris- diction of the Court, provided, however, that such ac­

ceptance may not, without explicit agreement be relied upon vis-a-vis States parties to the Statute which hâve made the déclaration in conformity with Article 36, pa­

ragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice;

3. The original déclarations made under the terms of this resolution shall be kept in the custody of the Registrar of the Court, in accordance with the practice of the Court. Certified true copies thereof shall be transmit- ted, in accordance with the practice of the Court, to ail States parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and to such other States as shall hâve deposited a déclaration under the terms of this resolution, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

4. The Security Council reserves the right to rescind or amend this resolution by a resolution which shall be communicated to the Court, and on the receipt of such communication and to the extend determined by the new resolution, existing déclarations shall cease to be effective except in regard to disputes which are al- ready before the Court;

5. Ail questions as to the validity or the effect of a déclaration made under the terms of this resolution shall be decided by the Court". (16)

The Statute, however, in terms of Article 35 (2) make no différence of substance between States which are parties to the Statute by virtue of their membership in the United Nations and States which are parties to the Statute without being members of the United Nations. (17) In the past, particular

(16) SCOR, Ist Year, 76th mtg, 1946, p. 468.

(17) Slight différence of a purely procédural character

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déclarations were filed by Albania (19^7) and by Italy (1953), and general déclarations by Cambodia (1952), Ceylon (1952), the Fédéral Republic of Germany (1955, 1956, 1961, 1965 and 1971). Finland (1953 and 1954), Italy (1955), Japan (1951), Laos (1952) and the Republic of Viet Nam (1952). (l8)

Members of the United Mations are of two kinds - original Members under Article 3 (19) and ad- mitted Members under Article 4 (20) of the Charter.

exist in that certain communications due to be sent to ail parties to the Statute are, in the case of the Mem­

bers of the United Nations, transmitted through the Security Council of the United Nations, whereas in the case of the States parties to the Statute but not mem­

bers of the United Nations such communications are trans­

mitted directly by the Registrar, in accordance with arrangements made by him and the State in question.

See supra note 3 at 273.

(18) See supra note 12 at p. 49.

(19) 'The original Members of the United Nations shall be the States which, having participated in the United Nations Conférence on International Organisation at San Francisco, or having previously signed the Décla­

ration by United Nations of January 1, 1942, sign the présent Charter and ratify it in accordance with Ar­

ticle 110 ' .

(20) '(1) Membership in the United Nations is open to ail other peace-loving States which accept the obli­

gations contained in the présent Charter, and in the judgment of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.

(2) The admission of any such State to member­

ship in the United Nations will be effected by a deci­

sion of the General Assembly upon the recommendation

of the Security Council'.

(22)

Among the original Members of the United Nations are several independent territories of the British Common- wealth of Nations and two of the Republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the Byelorussian SSR and the Ukranian SSR). The question whether entities of these types are or are not States from the point of view of general international law is quite irrelevant for the purposes of Article 3 and Article 4 of the Char­

ter, or Article 34, paragraph 1, of the Statute. No organ of the United Nations, including the Court may question that such political units are States from the point of view of the Statute, regardless of whether they will be so regarded by general international law.

(21)

(1) Définition of 'new-born' States

The Word "new” conveys a meaning which is relative by définition. Different writers hâve not been in agreement as to what entities they consider "new States", though it is generally held that in interna­

tional law "new States" are such States that hâve not traditionally been subject of international law and hâve therefore had little or no say in its making. Yet this définition can be accepted as accurate if we raean by international law that set of established customary rules which find their origins in the "droit public européen" or perhaps in the earlier res publica Christiana. "New States" may then cover ail présent day States except the European States. (22)

(21) ROSENNE, S., Récognition of States by the United Nations. BYIL,1949. p. 440.

(22) SHIHATA,F.I., The Attitude of New States towards the International Court of Justice, International Or-

»

ganization, 1965, vol.XIX, No 2, p. 204

(23)

The l8th and 19th centuries brought forth the full or partial participation in the custom making process of States outside Europe, such as the United States of America, Turkey, Japan and the Latin American States.

Therefore, if one is speaking of international law as understood at the time of the Treaty of Versailles,

"new States” will practically be a descriptive term of States which are mainly in Asia and Africa. (23) Keeping in view the provisions of Article 3^ paragraph 1, of the Statute and Article 93, paragraph I of the Charter, two criteria of what constitutes a 'new born' State among the existing 159 Members (24) of the United Nations, are adopted here and seem to be fairly com­

préhensive. The first is that the country has achieved the status of an indépendant State since 1945; the second, that the country was, upon its admission to the United Nations, a politisai new-comer upon the in­

ternational scene. (25)

It must be emphasized here that the notion of 'newness' in itself is liable to provoke a raislead-

ing impression as many of the States classified as

"new-born" because of their recent re-emergence as in­

dépendant participants in international life, hâve en- joyed a distinguished record of existence and indépen­

dance antedating the colonial period. Most of the Asian States hâve had some form of particular identity for several centuries and many of African States had an indépendant tradition of politisai organization in the precolonial period. The notion of "newness” is then used only to refer to the rather recent acquisition or reacquisition of the attribute of national sovereignty enabling the State to enjoy the full privilèges of

(23) Ibid, p. 205

(24) See supra note 12 at pp. 42-46

(25) FAWCETT, J.E.S., The New States and the United

Nations, The Yearbook of World Polity,vol. III, 1966,

pp. 230-231.

(24)

membership in the Family of Nations. (26) Some of the Asian and African States not only had indépendant

existence antedating the colonial period, but were also members of the League of Nations and as such original Members of the United Nations. These States such as, Ethiopia, India, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Liberia and Thai- land hâve been included in the category of ”new-born”

States, because of their common political and social outlook with the other Asian-African States which at- tained indépendance only after 19^5.

Taking into considération the above mentioned criteria and the explanations thereunder, the following 102 States-Members of the United Nations hâve been put under the category of "new-born” States for the purpose of our study:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola. Antigua and

Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bénin, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'ivoire, Cyprus, Démocratie Kampuchea, Démocratie Yemen, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israël, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Démocratie Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Népal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Paki­

stan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Qatar,' Rwanda, St.

Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grena- dines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Sénégal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islande, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swazi­

land, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzanie, Vanuatu, Vietnam, Yemen, Zaire, Zambie and Zimbabwe.

(26) FALK, R.A., The New States and International Legal

Order, 118 RCADI, 1966, p.lO.

(25)

(II) The problems of the ’new-born' States

It has been rightly pointed out that in understanding the rôle of the ”new-born" States in in­

ternational legal order, it is essential to grasp that the requirements for domestic political life normally takes precedence and shape the participation of these States in foreign affairs. " Appreciating the proble- matics of nation-building in the Afro-Asian world is an essential ingrédient of our understanding of the behaviour of the New States and provides a distinctive basis for interprétation". (27) The problems of the

"new-born" States arise from the fact that for over a long period which witnessed revolutionary changes in the économie, political and scientific life of the

Western world, these countries were under foreign rule.

Primarily it had two results; it changed the course of their évolution, leaving them at the time of their in- dependence in a State of political and social uncer- tainty with their own traditions undermined if not al- together destroyed and with the new ideas imported from the West only imperfectly understood and parti- ally assimilated. Secondly, it had deflected the course of their économie development, subjecting them in

effect to a colonial System of economy. They stepped out of their dependence in a State of économie back- wardness, insufficiently equipped to deal with the

tremendous problems which faced them. (2-8) It must also be noted that colonial rule helped to foster in each country a tiny class of entrepreneurs, the so- called "elite", to whom, considérations of économie development of the country was either irrelevent or

incidental.

(27) Ibid, p. 14.

(28) PANNIKAR,K.M., The Afro-Asian States and their

Problems, p.95.

(26)

The World into which the new political en- tities emerged as independet nations was itself under- going revolutionary changes in every sphere. "It was dorainated by the fear and coraplex and no less than by the hopes and expectations which the new and startling scientific discoveries created for the world. The old World relationship had broker down as a resuit of ato- mic power. Industrial organization and production were undergoing a revolutionary change. In fact, it was altogether a new world to share in which most of them were not adequately prepared. Naturally, the problems

they had to struggle against became infinitely more difficult”. (29)

The 'new-born' States hâve generally begun their existence as independet States in the position of debtors under the traditional legal order. Their authority or their territory or both were burdened with debts, concessions, commercial angagements of va­

rions kinds, the preserve of foreign owned property or other obligations continuing on from the earlier colonial régime. They face the prospect of vast future indebtedness arising from their urgent needs for great quantities of investment capital. It is, therefore, natural that these States would desire to maintain the utmost freedom of future action in relation to their legal obligations. (30) This is not only the common reaction of a debtor, it is also an expression of pride in their new-born sovereignty and of their sense of responsibility for the économie develop­

ment (31) of their countries and the improvement of the standard of life of their people.

(29) Ibid; p.96.

(30) STONE, J., Quest for Survival : The Rule of Law

and Foreign Policy, Harvard University Press, 1961,

pp. 13-14.

(27)

The great majority of the "new-born” States are characteristically under-developed. (32) These coun- tries are also referred to as "developing countries".

In these countries there is a serious gap between their stated aspirations:

(31) The conception of 'économie development' involves noneconomic factor of an économie process. It has a po- litical motivation and is decriptive of the process of social and cultural change which produces results that cannot be measured in économie terms. HYDE, J.N., Econo­

mie Development Agreements, 105 RCADI, 1962, 221-224.

(32) Countries with average per capita income of

U$ 564 in Africa and U$ 711 in Asia are included in the category of developing countries. By this description ail "new-born" States except oil-rich Arab countries, of Middle East, Asia and Africa, and Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Israël, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Seychelles,

Singapore, Thailand and Tunisia, can be considered de­

veloping countries. Among the developing countries there are 29 least developed countries with less than U$ 217 average per capita income. The basic charac- teristic of the least developed countries include

"extremely low levels of labour productivity, scar- city of skilled manpower, inadéquate knowledge about the nature and extent of their naturel resources, low level of physical and institutional infrastructure, the prédominance of subsistence production, dépendance on a very narrow range of primary commodities in their production and export structure, and lack of integra- ted and coordinated industrialization". U. N. Confé­

rence on Trade and Development: Statistical Pocket

Book: UN. 1989.

(28)

a reasonable standard of living for their rapidly in- creasing population, a degree of économie development and diversification which reduce excessive dependence on staple commodities and increase employment, a growth in the literary, the scientific, technical and admini­

strative potential of their population to a point where they can effectively guide and administer a modem

State; and the actual position of their population

which is one of sub-standards of living, (for the great majority) of inadéquate levels of éducation and train-

ing and of excessive dependence on the production and export of raw matériels and staple commodities. (33)

(III) Ideological Perspective of the

"new-born" States

A brief survey of the idéologies of the

"new-born” States is made here, because of the fact that ideological commitments of these States lead them to acts which hâve conséquences in international law.

Ideology has connotations of commitment, both emotional and intellectual, of action-orientation, and of con- scious or unconscious distortion of facts to fit a pre-established doctrine. (3^) Ideology is a pattern of ideas which simultaneously provides for its

adhérents a self-definition, a description of the current situation; its background, and the prospects and the varions impératives which are deduced from these. (35)

(33) loc . cit, p.317.

(3^) SIGMUND(Jr),P.E., Idéologies of the Developing Nations, 1963,3.

(35) MATOSSIAN,M., Idiologies of Delayed Industrial- ization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities, in

J.H. Kautsky (ed), Political Change in Underdeveloped

Countries ; Nationalism and Communism. 1962, 252-253.

(29)

Painfully aware of the unpleasant contrast of poverty, illiteracy and disease of their own States with the affluence of the industrialized States, the leaders of the "new-born" States hâve one compelling task to perform, that of économie development of their countries They are intensely aware of huge international économie

inequalities and also of the danger that these ine- qualities will continue to grow unless arrested. The contemporary desire in these countries towards économie development has emerged as a major political issue.

Their leaders are pledged to press it forward at ail costs and nationalism has in this context an important rôle in articulating and welding to their long slumber- ing masses and inspiring them to their common purpose.

(36) In their effort for économie development most of these States do not either find it necessary or com­

patible with the social and économie objectives to cast their lot entirely with either the ideology of liberal capitalism or that of communism. Drawing from both Western liberalisra and Soviet communism, they forge

their own ideological pattern fqr action and give it characteristics of its own. (37) But it must also be pointed out that there is a willingness on the part of some States in Asia and Africa to borrow from the experi ence of the Communiât States which hâve dealt with their économie and Social problems following the Marxist-

Leninist ideology. ( 38) Recent developments in some

(36) DARJAjK.H., The Rule of Law and Economie Inequali­

ties among Nations, IJIL, 196I, pp. 226-227.

(37) SINHA,S.P., New Nations and the Law of Nations, Leyden, 1965, 28-29.

(38) WATNICK,M., The appeal of Communism to the Under-

developed Peoples, in J.H. Kautsky (ed), Political

Change in Underdeveloped Countries, Nationalism and

Communism, 1962, pp. 316, 318.

(30)

countries in Africa and Asia, point to the unmistak- able fact that Communiât ideology is not without its influence in the solution of économie and social pro- blems and that some countries hâve shown willingness to adopt it. But there is no indication as yet that this influence is widespread among the developing

States of Asia and Africa. It must also be pointed out that many of the developing countries of Asia and Africa, though desparate for some form of development, hâve

become increasingly hésitant in seeking their salva- tion in the achievement of Western type of society. (39)

Most developing African States hâve attempted to define their future course by combining prévalent Western idéologies with their own unique, often single

party, polltical organizations. (40) More egalitarian distribution of income (through progressive taxation, land reform, increased social services and minimum wage laws) is emphasized everywhere along with a major

économie rôle for Government, often defined in terms of a specially adapted concept of socialism, such as,

"African Socialism" of Kenya, "Compétitive Socialism"

of Uganda, "Scientific Socialism" of Congo, the "Ujamaa (familyhood) Socialism" of Tanzania, "Humanistic Social­

ism" of Zambia, "Neo-destourian Socialism" of Tunisia,

"Islamic Socialism" of Algeria and Lybia, "Bathist Socialism" of Syria and Iraq. This egalitarianism is interpreted to include only broader public sector and careful limitation of the rôle of private enterprise

(39) SYATAUW, J . J .' g . , Old and New States: A Misleading distinction for Future International Law and Inter­

national Relations; IJIL, 1975, p. 153*

(40) One specialist in African affaire has commented

that one-party System of Government in African States

does not corne anywhere near to establishing a totali-

tarian régime. For a totalitarian régime to succeed

it is necessary to hâve either a highly developed

(31)

but also equality between geographical régions. (4l) In fact Asian-African developing countries span the entire spectrum of Communist, non-Coramunist and capitalist poli- cy towards ownership of enterprises. Among the countries which hâve adopted the Communist ideology, namely, the labolition of private property and nationalization of the means of production as steps toward achieving the ultimate goal of a classless society, are Laos, Démo­

cratie Kampuchea, and perhaps, Angola and Mozambique.

But indications are there that the latter two countries are prepared to concédé limited rôle to the private en- terprise for the économie development in these two coun­

tries. On the other hand, there are countries, such as, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Philippines and Thailand which hâve pinned their faith in the capi­

talist ideology of économie development of their coun­

tries. These countries rely more on private capital, foreign and indigenous, for the overall économie de­

velopment of their countries. The next group of coun­

tries in order of numerical strength, such as, Algeria, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Bénin, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Congo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Madagas­

car, Zambia, Somalia and Burma, call themselves "social- ists", perhaps, because their beliefs may be rooted

less in Marxism than in nationalism. Largely, because of their expérience with colonialism, they reject capi- talism as identifiable with imperialism and exploitation.

administrative apparatus for coercive purposes or a strong party organized on a monolithic basis. Both these conditions are absent in Africa. See GUPTA, A., Government and Politics in Africa, Delhi, 1975, 70.

(41) Pattern of Development; Report of the Commission on International Development, Baeger Publishers, New York, 1969, 264.

3i

(32)

These countries pursue policies aimed at decreasing the rôle of private property in the econoray and sharply curbing investment by private foreign firms. By far the largest group of countries corne under the category of

"rnixed economy", where private capital, both foreign and indigenous, are allowed to play an equally important rôle in the économie development of the countries, the State controlling certain key sectors of production.

These countries are Botswana, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya, Sudan, Chad, Ghanal, Nigeria, Niger, Togo, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Upper Volta, Papua New Guinea, Singapore,

Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq. These countries aim at more balanced blend between the private and public sectors. (42)

It appears that socialism in many of the Asian- African developing countries is a flag of convenience that açcomodates technocrats and market-minded economist.

But despite ail diversity in socialist ideology in Asian- African countries, there is one idéal common to ail.

That is their firra commitment to egalitarianism. What- ever the braftd of Socialism, ail aim at social equality and rapid économie development. Their socialism is ad- dressed to the problem of modernization. Their socialism has a background of anti-foreign feelings resulting from their past colonial expérience. State-planning is re- garded as a legitimate national inerest in these coun­

tries. A "plan" is well described as essentially a stra- tegy of State-interference with the play of market for­

ces, so conditioning them as to give the economy a clear- ly upward push. (43) The policy-makers of the Afro-Asian States maintain that national planning is necessary in order to croate pre-conditions for économie progress in their countries.

(42) Ibid, p. 265.

(43) See supra note 36 at p. 278

(33)

It is also to be added here that socialism has almost a doctrinaire resort to nationalization in most of the "new-born" States, particularly in Asia.

(44) Nationalization concerns itself with bringing about a transfer of a eountry's resources from the private to the public sphere. (45) Foreign private capital in many of the Asian-African countries are looked upon as ves­

tige of the colonial bondage that must be done away with if the countries are to be really free to enjoy the re­

sources. This factor may also be of importance in coun­

tries though formally independent, were under strong foreign influence which they were too weak to resist.

(46) Nationalization in these countries is designed to assure national direction of the économie development.

It is also regarded useful in attaining social equality and in disintegrating the alliance of domestic capital­

iste with foreign capitaliste. Large scale nationaliza- tions hâve not, however, occured in the African States.

There is also little evidence of impending large scale nationalization there. However, Controls on private business are undoubtedly considered necessary and some

■^f these States leaned heavily in the direction of Sta­

te control. (47)

(44) See supra note 37 at p. 63.

(45) CARLSTON, K.S., Law and Organisation in World Society, 1962, 5.

(46) LISSITZYN,0.J., The Less Developed Nations, in The Strategy of World Order, No 2, Falk and Mendelo- vitz /ed), New York, 1966, p. 251.

(47) See supra note 37 at p. 64.

(34)

Part I

(A) Contentious Jurisdiction

Chapter I; Contentious jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph I of the Statute

(1) Jurisdiction of the Court under Article 36, ParaRraph I, of the Statute

The title of jurisdiction "ail matter spe- cially provided for in the Charter”, may, at first sight, seem to be an important innovation as compared with the provision in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice. The first question one is led to pose in this connection, is what matter of this kind is specially provided for in the Charter?

An examination of the provisions of the Charter estab- lishes the fact that it contains no 'matters spe­

cially provided for'. (48) Commentators hâve, therefore

(48) Rosenne is of the opinion that the only matter

of this kind specially provided for in the Charter is

the advisory compétence regulated by Article 96. But

the Word "jurisdiction” is not usually employed in

relation to advisory compétence. The Court has given

no encouragement to the idea. See supra note 2 at

342 (footnote).

(35)

termed the stipulation as "an error in drafting"

and as "superfluous" when read with the other ex­

pressions in the Article 'treaties and conventions' in force. (49) But as Professer Anand has pointed out, the significance of the stipulation can be understood if it is remembered that addition to the Statute was made at the Washington Committee of Jurists in the spring of 1945 before the Charter was adopted, (50) apparently on the assumption

that some form of agreed jurisdiction would be con- ferred on the Court by the Charter. (51) At the San Francisco Conférence attention was drawn to the fact that the Charter did not confer jurisdiction in any case and délétion of the words 'matters specially provided for in the Court' was moved. But another view was expressed in the Conférence that what is now Article 36, paragraph 3 of the Charter (52)

(49) HAMBRO, E., The Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, RCADI 1950, 177.

(50) ANAND, R.P., Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,New Delhi, 1961, 133.

(51) The Report of the Committee of Jurists stated:

"This text reproduces Article 36 of the Statute with an addition in case the United Nations Charter should make some provision for compulsory jurisdiction".

UNCIO, vol. XIV, 668.

(52) 'In making recommendations under this Article the

Security Council should also take into considération

that legal disputes should as a general rule be re-

ferred by the parties to the International Court of

Justice in accordance with the provisions of the

Statute of the Court'.

(36)

related to compulsory reference to the Court by the Security Council and it was therefore agreed that the words should not be deleted. (53)

However, whatever might hâve been the his- torical reason for the insertion of the words "ail matter specially provided for in the Charter” to the Article 36 of the Statute, the jurisprudence of the Court, built on the practice since its inception, shows that it does not add anything substantial to the jurisdiction in the Court. In the Corfu Channel case an important controversy was raised in regard to the interprétation of the stipulations in Article 36 (1) of the Statute. The application of U.K., in- stituting proceedings submitted following a recommen­

dation by the Security Council that the dispute should be referred to the Court, contended that the Court had jurisdiction under Article 36 (1) of the Statute.

(54) The Court by a majority of eight to seven held the letter of the Albanian Government as sufficient for exercising jurisdiction and did not consider it necessary to discuss the question of compulsory

(53) UNCIO, vol. XIII, 284.

(54) The application of U.K. datpd.22 May 194? con­

tended "that the Court had jurisdiction under Article

36 (1) of its Statute as being a matter which is one

specifically provided for in the Charter of the United

Nations on the grounds: (a) that the Security Council

of the United Nations at the conclusion of proceedings

in which it dealt with the dispute under Article 36

of the Charter, by a Resolution decided to recommend

both the Government of the United Kingdom and the

Albanian Government to refer the présent dispute to

the International Court of Justice; (b) that the

Albanian Government accepted the invitation of the

Security Council under Article 32 of the Charter

to participate in the discussion of the dispute and

accepted the condition lai,d down by the Security

Council, when conveying the invitation that

(37)

in a strong separate opinion dwelt on the question of compulsory jurisdiction: They pointed out that the issue was the outcome of the Charter. Article 36 of the Charter erapowered the Security Council to recommend the parties to refer their disputes to the Court. They were not con- vinced that there was hereby established a new case of compulsory jurisdiction. They based their conclusions on (1) the normal meaning of the word "recommend" in diplomatie practice, (2) the general structure of the Charter and the Statute which founds the jurisdiction of the Court on the consent of States, and (3) the terms used in Article 36, paragraph 3 of the Charter and to

its object which is to remind the Security Council that legal disputes should normally be decided by judicial methods. The judges found it impossible to accept an

interprétation according to which this Article, without explicitly saying so, has introduced more or less surrep- titiously a new case of compulsory jurisdiction. (56)

In view of the rather persuasive opinion ex- pressed by those seven judges and in view of the widely accepted view that a recommendation by the Security Council in terms of the Article 36 (3) that a matter be referred to the Court does not give the Court jurisdic­

tion without the consent of the parties, it is difficult to corne to the conclusion that the insertion of the

Albanie accepta in the présent case ail the obligations which a Member of the United Nations would hâve to assume

in a similar case; (c) that Article 25 of the Charter provides that the Members of the United Nations agréé to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the présent Charter". ICJ Pleadings, Corfu Channel case, vol. I, 8.

(55) Vice-President Basdevant and Judges Alvarez, De Vissher, Winiarski, Badawi Pasha, Zoricic and Krylov.

(56) ICJ Reports, 1948. 31-32.

(38)

words 'ail matters specially provided for in the Charter' had added anything to the jurisdiction of the Court. (57)

The Court has jurisdiction over ail 'cases' and 'matters' which the parties refer to it and which are specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force. The two non-technical terms 'cases' and

'matters' stand in contrast with the technical term 'legal disputes' appearing in Article 36 (2). It may, therefore, be interpreted that the parties may refer any case or any matter to the Court if they want a judicial decision on it and any treaty or convention may specially provide for the jurisdiction of the Court over any case or matter. (58) In any case, the consent of the parties to the dispute is the ultimate source of the Courts's jurisdiction. The Court has also an inhérent jurisdiction in terms of Article 36, paragraph 6 of the Statute (59) to décidé, where necessary, any dispute as to its jurisdiction. But the Court can exercise this inhérent jurisdiction only when a case has been referred to the Court and the questions to be decided by the

Court "can include the concrète case which the parties hâve referred or whether the invoked treaty is in force or does provide for the given matter to be referred to the Court, as between the parties to the litigation". (60)

(57) Rosenne also cornes to the same conclusion, but he justifies the rétention of the words on the ground of their political value. See supra note 2 at 3^^

(footnote).

(58) Ibid, 332.

(59) 'In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court'.

(60) See supra note 2 at 332.

(39)

As to the meaning of the expression 'treaties and conventions in force' it was made clear by the Per­

manent Court that "treaties in force" include "not only the treaties in force now but any given time in future"

and again interpreted as meaning treaties in force on the date of the institution of the proceedings. (6l)

The treaty must be in force on the date of the litigation between the parties or a treaty giving one or both

parties to the litigation a recognized third-party right to invoke jurisdiction of the Court. Moreover, the treaty must provide for reference of the dispute to the présent Court and not to any other international judicial or arbitral tribunal. This is because the jurisdiction of the Court is based on the consent of the parties that the Court itself should décidé the dispute and not on a general consent that any international tribunal should décidé it. In case the' treaty in force ceases to be in force before the verdict is given by the Court, it will not affect the continuation of the proceedings inclu- ding any dérivative proceedings which might follow. (62)

(61) PCIJ, D2, Add.I, 76.

(62) See supra note 2 at 333*

In the Losinger case the applicant's déclaration accept- ing the compulsory jurisdiction expired shortly after the institution of the proceedings, and the respondent's déclaration expired on the very day on which the pro­

ceedings were instituted. There was no dispute between the parties as to the validity of the déclaration on the date of the application. In the Phosphates in Morocco case the fixed period of the déclarations of both parties expired after the filing on the application and before the hearings, but no question arose as to the effect of this on the Court's jurisdiction. PCIJ, A/B, 67 and 74.

The above rule was, however, challenged by Guatemala in the Nottebohm case where the respondent's

(Liechtenstein) acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction

expired shortly after the proceedings had been instituted.

(40)

The scope of the jurisdiction of the Court un- der Article 36 (1) of the Statute has been considerably enlarged through Article 37 of the Statute which stipu­

lâtes as follows;

"Whenever a treaty or convention in force pro­

vides for reference of a matter to a tribunal to hâve been instituted by the League of Nations, or to the Per­

manent Court of International Justice, the matter shall, as between the parties to the présent Statute, be re- ferred to the International Court of Justice”.

It is important to mention here that the phrase 'the matter shall be referred' wrongly suggests that the parties are obliged to litigate before the new Court, which was not the intention as pointed out by Professor Verzijl. (63) It is not the matter that shall be

on the ground that once the time-limit of the accept­

ance had expired, the Court had no' jurisdiction "to treat, elucidate or décidé cases which would affect Guatemala", and that Article 36 (6) of the Statute only gave the Court power to décidé whether a given dispute fell within the categories enumerated in

paragraph 2 of that article. Rejecting the limitative interprétation of Guatemala, the Court made the fol- lowing remarks:

At the time when the Application was filed, the Déclaration of Guatemala and Liechtenstein were both in force. The regularity of the seising of the Court by this Application has not been disputed. The subséquent lapse of the Déclaration of Guatemala by reason of the expiry of the period for which it was subscribed, cannot

invalidate the Application if the latter was regular;

consequently, the lapse of the Déclaration cannot de- prive the Court of the jurisdiction which resulted from the combined applicaation of Article 36 of the Statute and the two Déclarations". ICJ Reports,1953i 122.

-(63) VERZIJL,J.H.W., The Jurisprudence of the World

Court, vol. I, 1965, 549.

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