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How Can Insurance Companies Compete With Mutual<br />Insurers? The Role of Commitment

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HAL Id: halshs-00410765

https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00410765

Preprint submitted on 24 Aug 2009

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How Can Insurance Companies Compete With MutualInsurers? The Role of Commitment

Renaud Bourlès

To cite this version:

Renaud Bourlès. How Can Insurance Companies Compete With MutualInsurers? The Role of Com-

mitment. 2006. �halshs-00410765�

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GREQAM

Groupement de Recherche en Economie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - UMR-CNRS 6579 Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales

Universités d'Aix-Marseille II et III

Document de Travail n°200 6-46

HOW CAN INSURANCE COMPAGNIES COMPETE WITH MUTUAL INSURERS?

THE ROLE OF COMMITMENT

Renaud Bourlès

November 2006

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How Can Insurance Companies Compete With Mutual Insurers? The Role of Commitment.

Renaud Bourlès

November 9, 2006

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of the existence of mutual firms on the behavior of insurance companies and more precisely to study in which situations an insurance company can enter a market controlled by mutual arrangements. Our approach differs from the existing literature as we integrate the investment choices of the insurance company and the fact that, be- cause it commits on a fix contract, it can become insolvent. In such a situation we are able to characterize the unique optimal choices of the monopolistic company and the conditions favoring its appearance.

Key words: Insurance market, Mutual firms, Commitment, Insolvency

JEL Classification No. : L1, D8, G22

GREQAM, Centre de la Vieille Charité, 2, rue de la Charité, 13 002 Marseille, France. renaud.bourles@univmed.fr

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