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metaphysics workshop on facts and events

University of Geneva, 29 April - 1 May

organisation: Kevin Mulligan, Gianfranco Soldati, Michael Esfeld, Philipp Keller

Thursday, 29 April (B302):

10h15-12h tutorial and student discussion session 14h15-14h30 introductory session

14h15-15h45 Philipp Keller, „The Metaphysics of Adverbs“

16h15-18h30 Terence Parsons, What Events and Facts are like"

20h dîner at the „Café Galley“, bd St Georges 42 (paid individually)

Friday, 30 April (B302):

10h15-11h30 David Filip, „Facts, Events, Objects & ASCs.Which of them are idle?"

13h walk to and lunch at the „Perle du Lac“, 128, rue de Lausanne 14h30-15h45 Fabrice Correia, „Neale and the Slingshot"

16h15-18h30 Stephen Neale, „Facts, Events, and Propositions"

20h dîner at the „Universal“, 26 bd du Pont-d'Arve (paid individually) Saturday, 1 May (B302):

10h15-11h30 Luc Schneider, „The Particulars of Meaning"

11h30-13h Questions for Terence Parsons and Stephen Neale

13h15 lunch at the „Pizzeria Italia“, 4 bd des Philosophes (paid individually) 14h30-15h45 Anna Sierszulska, „Meinong's Facts"

16h-17h round table

18h30 fondue at the „Bain des Pâquis“, quai du Mont-Blanc 30

For any questions, call Philipp Keller: 078 6092579 (+41786092579 from abroad)

More information at http://www.unige.ch/lettres/philo/enseignants/philipp/services/summerschool.html L'Universal: 022 7811881, La Perle du Lac: 022 9091020, Bain des Pâquis: 022 7381616, Italia: 022 3282970

financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation and supported by Iris

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