Working Paper
Reference
Delay and dilution in the implementation of environmental norms:
business groups and the regulation of car emissions in Switzerland in the 1970s–1980s
PITTELOUD, Sabine
Abstract
During the last decade, we have witnessed increased public concern about vehicle emissions and growing frustration with political inaction and businesses' preference for the status quo.
This paper offers a historical perspective on this debate by shedding light on the political struggle that occurred around the implementation of new regulations reducing air pollution caused by motor vehicles in Switzerland in the 1970s. Relying on archival material from the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry and the Federal Archives, the paper analyzes the processes of dilution and delay that characterized these regulations, and the complex interplay of various influences both in Switzerland and at the European level that contributed to this political outcome.
PITTELOUD, Sabine. Delay and dilution in the implementation of environmental norms: business groups and the regulation of car emissions in Switzerland in the 1970s–1980s. Geneva : Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History, 2020, 14 p.
Available at:
http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:141483
Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.
FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES DE LA SOCIÉTÉ
Paul Bairoch Institute of Economic History
Economic History Working Papers | No. 4/2020
Delay and Dilution in the Implementation of Environmental Norms:
Business Groups and the Regulation of Car Emissions in Switzerland in the 1970s-1980s
Sabine Pitteloud
Delay and Dilution in the Implementation of Environmental Norms:
Business Groups and the Regulation of Car Emissions in Switzerland in the 1970s–1980s
Sabine Pitteloud University of Geneva [email protected]
September 2020
Abstract:
During the last decade, we have witnessed increased public concern about vehicle emissions and growing frustration with political inaction and businesses’ preference for the status quo. This paper offers a historical perspective on this debate by shedding light on the political struggle that occurred around the implementation of new regulations reducing air pollution caused by motor vehicles in Switzerland in the 1970s. Relying on archival material from the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry and the Federal Archives, the paper analyzes the processes of dilution and delay that characterized these regulations, and the complex interplay of various influences both in Switzerland and at the European level that contributed to this political outcome.
Keywords: environmental norms, vehicle emissions, lobbying, business history, Switzerland.
Codes JEL: N54, N84, F64, K32, D72
The Process Tracing of Inertia: An Introduction
Due to recent extreme climate events, we have witnessed increased public concern about environmental issues and growing frustration with political inaction. In many respects, this debate echoes one that took place during the 1970s in several industrial nations when leftist movements and sectors of civil society started to question the post-war economic model and to demand the implementation of environmental regulations. The Club of Rome 1972 report entitled The Limits to Growth is widely remembered as a symbol of these new environmental and sustainability concerns. However, such global initiatives should not obscure the multiple forms of activism that took place during the 1970s and the variety of topics that were addressed with varying degrees of success. Many of the regulation efforts started during that decade are still on the agenda today. Therefore, a study of those past environmental regulation attempts may improve our understanding of current political inertia.
One of the topics that environmental activists and politicians were already addressing in the 1970s and that is still a hot political topic today is the issue of vehicle emissions. In 2019, vehicle emissions accounted for 30% of the European Union’s total CO2 emissions1 and are, therefore, held responsible in large part for global warming. Back in the 1970s, criticisms regarding car emissions were mostly related to air pollution and public health issues within city centers (Kux & Schenkel, 2000, p.199). While the main public concerns differ slightly, the stories of emissions regulation in the 1970s and the 2010s bear many similarities since they involve the same environmental activists (citizens and NGOs), the same business interests (the automobile industry and car retailers) and the same potential regulators (national governments and the European Community).
This paper attempts to shed light on such regulation dynamics by exploring the political struggle that occurred around the implementation of a new regulation to reduce air pollution caused by motor vehicles in Switzerland. This regulation process began at the beginning of the 1970s and continued throughout the next decade. The paper analyzes the processes of dilution and delay that characterized its implementation and the complex interplay of various influences in Switzerland and at the European level that contributed to this political outcome. It thus contributes to the renewed interest among business historians in analyzing business influences
1 European Parliament News, CO2 emissions from cars : facts and figures, 18.04.2019.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20190313STO31218/co2-emissions-from- cars-facts-and-figures-infographics.
(Philipps-Fein, 2009: Waterhouse, 2014; Rollings, 2008) and to the few historical studies dealing with business counter-offensives against environmental activism (Rowell, 1996).
In explaining today’s political inertia, business interests have indeed been major targets. They have been accused of taking advantage of their exit option and their economic power to prevent the implementation of any ambitious environmental policy. In the case of CO2 emissions, major car manufacturers have been charged with fudging their test results, and this so-called diesel gate has added fuel to the criticisms targeting the car industry’s lack of commitment to seriously addressing the environmental question. Nevertheless, in the absence of such open scandals and official investigations, the influence of business on the creation and implementation of environmental regulations is often challenging to document. Difficulties arise from the fact that business tends to be especially influential in “quiet politics,” avoiding direct confrontation in the public sphere or open parliamentarian debates (Culpepper, 2011).
In addition, business representatives are often solicited by politicians and journalists to provide expertise on technical issues, so that it is very difficult to draw a clear limit between the production of scientific knowledge and business lobbying. Business lobbying is even more difficult to distinguish when firms act as “political inhibitors,” (Bartley, 2018) as in the case of car emissions. In such circumstances, business influence is usually assumed because regulation fails to emerge, but the concrete channels through which this alleged influence occurs are rarely exposed. This lack of empirical evidence is problematic since it tends to render the power of big corporations and organized business “mythical” (May & Nölke, 2018). What is more, in the case of environmental norms, the power of obstruction that business allegedly exerts is often the motivation for the invention of new forms of activism and might be even used as justification for civil disobedience or illegal actions.
In assessing the influence of business interests, business historians can take advantage of the fact that certain internal documents may be available in archives after a specified period, allowing for process tracing. Process tracing consists of uncovering interest groups influence by documenting their preferences, their negotiations with decision-makers and the political outcomes of such negotiations (Dür, 2008: 562). This paper builds on this approach, relying on archival material from the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry and the Federal Archives. Thanks to the neocorporatist functioning of the Swiss state (Mach, 2006), consultation procedures have been institutionalized, so it is easy for scholars to identify the main interest groups and their preferences regarding different draft versions of the vehicle
emission regulation. Such an approach has proven suitable in the Swiss case for understanding topics such as institutional forms of corporate governance and cartel law (David & al., 2015;
Mach, 2006), the banking regulation (Guex, 1999), and the shape of the welfare state (Leimgruber 2008; Eichenberger, 2016). In addition to the archives related to the consultation rounds, internal sources such as reports, minutes of meetings, and correspondence are useful for tracking complex influence channels and power games at different levels, such as between different ministries of the Federal administration, between the Swiss authorities and the European Community, or through transnational business networks. In analyzing business influence, historians must be especially attentive to the importance of delays (Fellman &
Shanahan, 2018: 645). With respect to delays and political inertia, process tracing not only allows researchers to compare the date on which a new regulation was first suggested and the date of its actual implementation but also helps them to identify the specific steps that caused the delays and how the different interest groups proceeded to induce such delays. The drawbacks of this process tracing approach are that it makes generalizations difficult since it focuses on one case study––in this case, Switzerland in the 1970s––and that its findings are, by definition, partly contingent on its specific institutional framework and historical context (Dür, Marshall & Bernhagen, 2019). Despite these limitations, this paper aims to shed light on particular mechanisms of business influence that might potentially explain other occurrences of political inertia with respect to environmental norms.
The paper is structured as follows: the first section shows how the question of the regulation of vehicle emissions was put on the political agenda through the launching of a popular federal initiative. It analyzes the reactions and strategies of different interest groups and the federal authorities to this initiative and how those strategies placed certain constraints on the future development of vehicle emissions regulations. The second part of the paper shed lights on the processes of delay and dilution regarding the actual implementation of vehicle emissions regulation. It uncovers complex transnational channels of influence and power struggles within the federal administration. The third part concludes the paper by identifying several mechanisms of inertia that might explain why the implementation of environmental norms is still challenging today, despite strong public mobilization.
The “Albatross Initiative”: A Bird of Ill Omen for Organized Business
As in other industrial nations, environmental activism gained strength in Switzerland at the beginning of the 1970s when pollution problems related to the post-war growth paradigm and consumer society became obvious (Walter, 1990: 250). Air pollution was initially regarded mainly as a health issue in cities but progressively became seen as a global environmental issue related to acid rain and the death of forests (Knoepfel & al., 2010: 289). The institutionalization of the environmental question was still in its early stage with the creation in 1971 of the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment. The traditional political parties, from both right and left, mostly focused on socio-economic issues and were, therefore, not at the forefront in pushing for environmental regulations. In the Swiss case, as many scholars have carefully documented, business associations were very influential and often successful in implanting private regulation mechanisms that prevented state intervention and allowed for flexible pro-business political solutions (Mach & Eichenberger, 2011). Consequently, it is not surprising that organized business had strong reservations about the promotion of ambitious environmental norms. For instance, the Swiss Chemical Society, representing the interests of the powerful pharmaceutical multinationals installed on the Rhine in the Basel region, was monitoring carefully the implementation of norms regarding water pollution.2 Despite the structural strength of the main Swiss business associations and the reluctance of traditional political parties to engage in environmental questions, the Swiss political system, by facilitating the launch of a federal popular initiative, allowed minority groups to put new questions on the political agenda (Mach, 2006). The only requirement was to collect 50,000 signatures to get Swiss citizens voting on a specific modification of the constitution. Environmental activists took advantage of that system and launched five initiatives related to vehicles regulation.
In 1973, the “Working Group for a Clean Switzerland” (Arbeitsgruppe saubere Schweiz) started to collect signatures for their initiative “against air pollution caused by motor vehicles,”
commonly known as the “Albatross initiative” in reference to the wingspan of this bird species.3 In choosing this nickname for the initiative, its initiators wanted to underline its ambitious scope with respect to existing Swiss and European emission limits. The main figures behind the initiative were five men from the St-Gallen canton: three teachers, one caretaker,
2 SHIV, Protokoll der 3. Sitzung des Vororts im Vereinsjahr 1972/73 vom 03.07.1972, p.27 AfZ, IB- Vorort Archiv, 1.3.5.21
3 Theo Kunz, Handelspolitische Interessen stehen im Wege. Initianten wollen ihr Volksbegehren nicht zurückziehen, Luzerner Neuste Nachrichten, 09.03.1977, AfZ, IB wf-Archiv II/7524, Mappe 1.
and one foreman.4 They found enough support in the Swiss population to collect the required amount of signature by September 1974. The initiative then followed the standard political process, which is permitted to take up to 4 years if a counter-project is proposed. The path of an initiative is as follows: validation by the federal chancellery, examination by the Federal Council (i.e., the Swiss government), examination by the two chambers, and a popular vote.
The Federal Council and the chambers can recommend rejection or acceptance of the initiative and may eventually propose a counter-project that points in the same direction as the initiative but is usually more limited.
Regarding air pollution, the Swiss authorities were essentially in favor of stricter regulations.
A federal commission on air quality (Eidg. Kommission für Lufthygiene) was indeed already working on the limitation of vehicle emissions (Kux & Schenkel, 2000: 201). The federal authorities therefore intended to impose their own rhythm and to prioritize common action with other European countries. Switzerland had already signed the regulation N°15 of the United
4 Schweizer Illustrierte, Fünf Davids gegen Goliath, 19.02.1977.
List of initiatives Submission Referendum Result
“Against air pollution caused by motor vehicles” (Albatross Initiative)
1974 1977 Rejected at
61.9%
“For democracy in the construction of national roads”
1974 1978 Rejected at
61.3%
“For twelve Sundays without motor vehicles and plane” (Berthoud Initiative)
1974 1978 Rejected at
61.9%
“For prompting railroad and walking paths”
1974 Withdrawn in
favor of a counter-project in 1979
Counter- project accepted
“Against traffic noise” 1975 Withdrawn in
1979
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) regarding vehicle emissions in 1974. A year later, the Swiss Federal Council presented its own plan to the Swiss parliament to reduce air pollution. This is why the Federal Council, in its 1976 message, called on cantons and Swiss citizens to reject the initiative5. The norms that acceptance of the Albatross initiative would have imposed for the year 1977 were only foreseen for 1982, according to the government’s schedule. The Federal Council, therefore, considered the initiative premature and claimed that its own measures would attain similar goals.
The Albatross initiative was discussed on several occasions by smaller commissions within the two chambers. Some parliamentarians considered the initiative “sympathetic,” while others saw it as a worrisome expression of environmental “fanaticism.”6 They almost unanimously agreed that it was unrealistic and that the Federal Council’s plan seemed much more reasonable. These discussions took place in 1976, and several parliamentarians also expressed the opinion that the initiative should be declared invalid since it would be impossible to respect its implementation deadline of 1977. This deadline issue is representative of the fact that while popular initiatives can bring some potentially abrupt changes, following this institutional path is always a time-consuming endeavor.
During the discussions within the parliamentarian commissions, external experts and representatives of the potential interest groups were appointed to communicate their views.
The panel for the Albatross initiative was composed of representatives of environmental organizations, representatives of the car industry, car retailers, and civil servants working for the federal administration. The views were somewhat contradictory: some of the experts regarded the initiative as perfectly viable since the US and Japan had already introduced similar limits for their vehicles, while the representatives of the car and retail industry argued that the technology was not sufficiently developed and that the introduction of such limits would be detrimental to consumers and the Swiss economy.7 An expert went even so far as questioning whether car emissions were really detrimental to health. The representative of the Division of
5 Feuille fédérale, Message concernant l'initiative populaire contre la pollution atmosphérique causée par les véhicules à moteur Du 8 septembre 1976, 76.078.
6 Procès-verbal de la Commission du Conseil des Etats chargée d’examiner le message concernant l’initiative populaire contre la pollution atmosphérique causée par les véhicules à moteur, du 8 septembre 1976, Séance du 01.03.1977, AF, E3360A#1988/98#596*.
7 Procès-verbal des auditions, Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 12-13.11.1976, , AF, E3360A#1988/98#596*.
Commerce also warned about potential repercussions regarding trade negotiations if Switzerland were to unilaterally impose restrictive norms that would be disadvantageous to the European car industry. It is interesting to note that Monique Bauer-Lagier, one of the first Swiss women parliamentarians, was very disappointed with the output of the hearings because she was expecting much more solid views rather than a group of people pulling in different directions.8
The chambers, by an overwhelming majority, recommended the initiative be rejected and did not propose a viable counter-project, which would have implied fixing vehicle emissions limits in the Swiss constitution. Even pro-environment parliamentarians were convinced of the Federal Council’s intention to take concrete actions to limit the toxicity of vehicle emissions.
The Federal Council publicly promised to implement its plan if Swiss citizens chose to reject the Albatross initiative and hoped that the Albatross committee would voluntarily decide to withdraw its initiative. This mechanism is described by political scientist as the “reactive policy effect” of direct democracy (Gebhart, 2002, 148). The withdrawal option was nevertheless rejected: the initiators feared that the Federal Council’s promises would prove to be empty words since its plan contained only recommendations and no binding measures.
As a result, Swiss citizens were given the final word on the initiative. Opinion polls were initially favorable to its acceptation with about a third of respondents declaring their support.9 During the political campaign, the car retailers' representatives warned consumers about possible repercussions, such as price increases and scarcity of car models. They also stated on many occasions that the Federal Council plan was a far lesser evil. In the press, the Albatross initiators were at times presented as “Davids” fighting against the “Goliath” car lobby.10 Nevertheless, arguments of an economic nature were certainly less compelling in the Albatross case compared to other cases since Switzerland was not the cradle of any important car manufacturers. For this reason, the result was far from predefined. The Albatross initiative was ultimately rejected with 61.9% voting against it in 1977. Many commentators interpreted this
8 Bauer, Commission du Conseil national chargé d’examiner le message concernant l’initiative populaire contre la pollution atmosphérique causée par les véhicules à moteur, du 8 septembre 1976, Séance du 12-13.11.1976, AF, E3360A#1988/98#596*.
9 Die Weltwoche, Das stinkt zum Himmel, « Weltwoche »-Umfrage : Mehrheit für « Albatros »-Anti- Abgas-Initiative, 24.8.1977, AF, E1108A#1987/7#1398*.
10 Schweizer Illustrierte, Fünf Davids gegen Goliath, 19.02.1977.
result as a consequence of the Federal Council’s commitment to take concrete actions against air pollution but not at all as a denial that vehicle emissions posed a real and urgent problem.
Switzerland and the Challenge to “Go it Alone”
After the vote, the implementation of the Federal Council’s plan to reduce the toxicity of vehicle emissions by 1982 became the new political issue. The Federal Council was still hoping to be able to convince the other members of the UN ECE to implement new limits in its N°15 regulation for vehicle emissions, which would have facilitated a supply of appropriate cars and gasoline in Switzerland. Despite the efforts of Swiss diplomats, it soon appeared that several European countries, especially the UK, France, and Italy, were reluctant to implement such limits because of their willingness to protect the European market shares of their car manufacturers. Only Sweden and Germany supported Switzerland’s views.11
Because of its promise to the Swiss population, the Federal Council nevertheless decided to move forward and to study the implementation possibilities with concerned groups, namely car retailers and oil importers. Car retailers, who, during the political campaign, had, in principle, declared to agree with the plan, started to raise questions about its feasibility and especially its tight timeframe. The associations of oil importers (Vereinigung unabhängiger Schweizer Importeure von Erdölprodukten and Erdölverinigung) also stressed that the gasoline required for the types of motor vehicles specified in the plan might create supply problems.12 The question of oil supply was, in those years, particularly salient because of the second oil shock.
Some car manufacturers also raised this supply issue and stressed a trade-off between fuel consumption and the toxicity of emissions as cleaner motors tended to consume more gasoline.
Thus, the technical information available to the federal authorities came mostly from those who had an interest in preventing the implementation of ambitious norms, which makes it very difficult to estimate the extent to which they were exaggerating the technical constraints. The Swiss Union of Commerce and Industry, in its response to the consultation round, summed up
11 Hans Jörg Mettler, Bund korrespondenten in Brüssel, Schweizer Abgasnormen setzen die EG in Trab, Der Bund, 01.6.1981, AfZ, IB Vorort-Archiv, 117.3.2
12 AVIA, Herabsetzung des Bleigehaltes im Superbenzin, an den Vorort des SHIV, 02.10.1978, AfZ, IB Vorort-Archiv, 117.3.1
the car lobby vision and also stressed an apparent conflict of interest between environmental goals and Switzerland’s energy supply.13
Due to these supply considerations, the initial plan was softened and delayed. In 1979, the Federal Council announced that they would proceed in two steps: an initial reduction would be implemented in 1982, and the limits that had initially been foreseen for 1982 would be implemented only in October 1986.14 Acknowledging the political inertia at the European level, the Federal Council also announced that they had no choice but to go it alone (Alleingang).
Their new plan indeed implied that the UN ECE N°15 regulation had to be abandoned by 1981.
As is usual in Swiss institutional functioning, this new schedule for the implementation of the Federal Council’s plan was submitted for a new consultation round.16 On the side of the car lobby, the usual complaints remained on the agenda, including an unrealistic deadline, price increases for the consumer, fewer available models, and more energy consumption due to the new technology.17 European business interests also tried to make their voices heard in
13 Jetzer, Rühl, Vorort des SHIV, Herabsetzung des Bleigehaltes im Superbenzin ; Aenderung der Verordnung über verbotene giftige Stoffe, Art. 2a. , 09.10.1978, AfZ, IB Vorort-Archiv, 117.3.1
14 Département fédéral de Justice et police, Modification des prescriptions sur les gaz d’échappement des véhicules automobiles, qui figurent dans l’ordonnance du 27 août 1969 sur la construction et l’équipement des véhicules routiers (OCE), 30.03.1981, AfZ, IB Vorort-Archiv, 117.3.2.
15 Eidg. Justiz und Polizeidepartement, Bericht und Antrag über Abgasregelung der Motorfahrzeuge, an den Bundesrat, 18.08.1982, AF, E3363A#2006/82#248*.
16 Vorort des SHIV, Aenderung der Abgasvorschriften für Motorfahrzeuge gemäss Verordnung über Bau-und Ausrüstung der Strassenfahrzeuge vom 27.August 1969 (BAV), an die Handelskammern und interessierten Fachverbände, 31.03.1981, AfZ, IB Vorort-Archiv, 117.3.2
17 H.U. Büschi, Automobil Revue, Chefredaktion, an den Vorort des SHIV, 06.05.1981, AfZ, IB Vorort- Archiv, 117.3.2
Different emission limits
CO HC NOx
Albatross-Initiative for 1977
7g/km 0.35 g/km 0.6 g/km
Federal Council Plan of 1974 for 1982
4.9-10.9 g/km 0.33-0.63 g/km 0.6 g/km
New Version of 1979 for 1982
9-14.5g/km 0.69-1.39 g/km 1.25 g/km15
Switzerland. The Committee of Common Market Automobile Constructors (CCMC) sent a statement to the Swiss authorities, asserting that the prices of their cars would rise and that the new motors would consume more gasoline.18 Siegfried Mann, the head of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), wrote to his Swiss counterpart, Gerhard Winterberger, the head of the Swiss Federation of Commerce and Industry, asking him to intervene in favor of the German car industry. Free trade was one of the Swiss Federation of Commerce’s primary concerns since this organization mainly represented the Swiss export industry. Winterberger nevertheless explained to Siegfried Mann that Switzerland could not be suspected of being protectionist since the country had no car industry and that the rules were the same for all competitors. He also stressed that this entire “painful story” (Leidensgeschichte) had started because of the Albatross initiative and the “unwise promises” made by the Swiss government at that time to fight it. Winterberger finally told him that he would stay in touch regarding future developments.19 It is interesting to note that the BDI tried to prevent the implementation of the Swiss norms, whereas the German government was amenable to the introduction of stricter limitations. This probably explains why Siegfried Mann tried to reach out directly to Gerhard Winterberger.
At the political level, the European partners, with the exception of Germany and Sweden, were also far from pleased by Switzerland’s intentions.20 They were eager to protect the European car industry, which was still recovering from its restructuring crisis, and they feared that their Japanese and US competitors would be more effective at adapting to the new norms.21 The European Commission discussed actions that might be undertaken to compel Switzerland to soften its regulation. The Commission did finally not denounce Switzerland’s regulation at the GATT as a covert form of trade barrier, but advised the EC government members to pressure Switzerland on a bilateral basis.22 French and Italian diplomats expressed concerns, urging
18 NZZ, 18.6.1981
19 B. Wehrli, SHIV, Entwurf für Brief an Herrn Dr. S. Mann, 22.08.1982, AfZ, IB Vorort-Archiv, 117.3.2.
20 Hans Jörg Mettler, Bund korrespondenten in Brüssel, Schweizer Abgasnormen setzen die EG in Trab, Der Bund, 01.06.1981, AfZ, IB Vorort-Archiv, 117.3.2
21 Bureau d’intégration, Bruit et gaz d’échappement des véhicules à moteur. Nouvelles prescriptions suisses, Note à M. le Directeur Jolles, 17.10.1980, p.2, AfZ, ML Paul R. Jolles, 7.2.5.2., 729
22 Pierre Louis Girard, Bureau de l’intégration, au Directeur de l’Office fédéral de la police, 30.04.1982, AF, E3363A#2006/82#264*.
Switzerland to show solidarity with the European car industry and underlining that its attitude could jeopardize future trade negotiations.23
For the Swiss Integration Office, which was in charge of foreign economic affairs with the European Economic Community, these reactions were bad news. The Swiss diplomats were worried about possible retaliation measures.24 These new tensions were especially unfortunate since Switzerland’s foreign diplomats had invested much effort in reducing trade barriers in Europe. To this end, the trade ministers of Switzerland, Austria, and Germany were meeting on a regular basis from the mid-1970s on.1 To avoid further escalation of tension and negative implications for future trade negotiations, the Swiss diplomats assured their European partners that the application of the norms would be relatively flexible.25 Their statement, made without previous consultation, irritated the Federal Office for the Environment, which was determined to implement them as planned.26
Finally, to implement the first strengthening of vehicle emissions limitations in 1982, Switzerland officially withdrew from the UN ECE N°15 regulation. It also decided to stop using the European method of emissions calculation and to adopt the one used in the USA and Sweden, which more closely reflected real-life driving.27 Furthermore, Switzerland intensified its collaboration with Sweden, which had the most advanced limitations in Europe, so that the two countries were able to harmonize their norms and car model evaluations by 1983.
Nevertheless, concessions were once again granted. The automobile lobby was permitted by the Federal Council to create a working group composed of several of its representatives to monitor the implementation of the new norms.28 This allowed for a smooth implementation which granted enough leeway to car producers and retailers. For instance, non-compliant brand
23 Démarche italienne ayant pour l’objet l’expression de l’inquiétude du Gouvernement italien face à l’attitude de la Suisse, AF, E3363A#2006/82#256
24 Schweizerische Mission bei den Europäischen Gemeinchaft, Schweierische Abgasvorschriften für Motorfahrzeuge, Reaktion der EG-Kommission, zu den Integrationsbureau, Brüssel, 15.06.1981, AfZ, IB Vorort-Archiv, 117.3.2
25 Berenhard Wehrli (President) und Werner Spillmann (Zentralsekretär), Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Umweltschutz, Umweltschutz und freier Handel, an den Schweizerischen Bundesrat, 19.11.1980, AF, E3363A#2006/82#256*.
26 B. Böhlen, Direktor, Bundesamt für Umweltschutz, Comité miste Schweiz/EG: Abgasvorschriften für Motorfahrzeuge in der Schweiz, an Herr Staatssekretär Paul Jolles, Direktor des Bundesmates für Aussenwirtschaft, 27.11.1980, AF, E3363A#2006/82#256*.
27 Office fédérale de la protection de l’environnement, Pollution atmosphérique par les véhicules à moteur : Situation initiale et chronologie, décembre 1981, AF, E3363A#2006/82#264*.
28 Gazette de Lausanne, Réglementation des gaz d’échappement : groupe de travail pour la 2e phase, 25.06.1982.
new cars could still be sold in Switzerland if they were labeled as second-hand cars.29 Moreover, after the introduction of the new regulation, car retailers finally admitted that their sales had not been impacted; on the contrary, business had never been better.30 The historical record is less pleasing for the environmental activists and the 40% of the Swiss population who had voted in favor of the Albatross initiative. Throughout these processes of delay and dilution, the norms that the Albatross committee wanted to implement in 1977, in the end, only became effective from 1987.31 This might be considered a lost decade.
Identifying Mechanisms of Delay and Dilution: Concluding Remarks
This “lost decade” in the implementation of regulation for vehicle emissions is explainable through three mechanisms in all of which organized business plays an important role:
institutional-led inertia, expertise-led inertia, and collateral damage-led inertia. The first mechanism, “institutional-led inertia”, refers to the time delay caused by the country’s institutional specificities. In the Swiss case, while the initiative right of every citizen offers possibilities for change, the process is long, and organized business plays a crucial role in it.
Business representatives are appointed to attend hearings during which the chambers study the content of the initiative to make recommendations for the vote. Besides, due to the Swiss neocorporatist political system, when a new regulation is about to be introduced, organized business is invited to express opinions during several consultation rounds. Finally, the Albatross case shows that even when new regulation is finally introduced, organized business is involved in its application, which can lead to an additional dilution of its effectiveness.
The second mechanism, “expertise-led inertia”, relates to the uncertainty that policy-makers face regarding technical possibilities. Here again, organized business plays an important role when it comes to regulation that affects them since they usually represent the main source of information regarding the state of technical progress and of available data. For instance, in the Albatross case, it was very difficult for the federal administration to impose new vehicle emissions limits while not knowing exactly how this would affect total oil consumption. Since
29 J.L. Werlen, Touring, Neue Abgasnormen: Nur keine Panik!, 10.06.1982, AF, E3363A#2006/82#264*.
30 L.P. Meylan, directeur d’AMAG Genève, Les nouvelles normes de pollution ? Nous sommes contre, mais prêts, Tribune de Genève, 2.09.1982, AF, E3363A#2006/82#264*.
31 Gazette de Lausanne, Normes plus sévères : il faut attendre, 25.05.1986, E3363A#2006/82#256*.
Japan and the US had already introduced stricter limitations in the 1970s and since car manufacturers and car retailers ultimately did not suffer from the new regulation, it appears that their technical veto was probably exaggerated.
The third mechanism, “collateral damage-led inertia” is linked to the fact that environmental goals are likely to affect other political goals. In the Albatross case, the foreseen new limitations might have impacted Switzerland’s oil supply and Swiss trade relations with its European partners. Since the promotion of free trade was vital for a small open economy such as Switzerland and, therefore, one of the main goals of Swiss political and economic elites, it is therefore not surprising that policy-makers accepted many compromises when implementing the new norms. The Albatross story also exemplifies the fact that national political inertia, especially in a globalized economy, might be partly explainable by external pressures.
Finally, and on a more positive note, the Albatross case also shows that despite deep inertia, environmental activism, even conducted by few citizens, can have an impact. While it is true that the initially foreseen regulation was delayed and diluted on several occasions, Switzerland and Sweden were pioneers in Europe regarding vehicle emissions. The fact that the Federal Council had staked its reputation by promising to implement new limitations prevented political and economic elites from pushing for total abandonment of the project. They were very aware that this would have resulted in a potential political crisis and would have jeopardized public trust in Swiss democracy.
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