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Metrics in audio security and privacy

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Metrics in

Audio Security & Privacy

Andreas Nautsch EURECOM

TReSPAsS-ETN TE2

2021-01-21/22 — Virtual Event.

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Outline

● Audio Security

○ Automatic Speaker Verification Anti-Spoofing Challenge 2019 (ASVspoof 2019) https://www.asvspoof.org/

○ Kinnunen et al.: “Tandem Assessment of Spoofing Countermeasures and Automatic Speaker Verification: Fundamentals,” IEEE/ACM TASLP 2020, DOI: 10.1109/TASLP.2020.3009494

● Audio Privacy

○ VoicePrivacy 2020 Challenge

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Audio Security Metric

tandem Decision Cost Function (t-DCF)

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Speech ⇔ SC37 dictionary :) tar ~ mated, bona fide, …

non ~ non-mated, non-attack, ….

spoof ~ presentation attack, logical access spoof, … miss ~ FRR, FNMR, BPCER, … false alarm (fa) ~ FAR, FMR, APCER, …

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Audio Security: The Setting

● Anti-Spoofing

○ “Physical Access” Replay attacks (see Voice PAD)

○ “Logical Access” Voice synthesis/morphing/conversion attacks (not PAD)

● In-Scope

○ Tandem operation of countermeasure (CM) and ASV sub-systems

○ Throughout formalised assessment

● Out-Scope

○ Informal descriptors by error rates

○ Purely CM-focused performance

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Audio Security: Expected Cost as Metric

● Quantification of beliefs

○ What is the impact of a decision outcome?

○ How likely is a decision outcome?

● Expected class discrimination risk

○ 𝔼 [ risk | costs, class priors, classification rates ]

○ Risk minimisation: sweep thresholds, take minimum

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Audio Security: Tandem Classification Rates

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Audio Security: Metric Normalisation

● Better comparability (other costs/priors)

● What are the extreme actions?

○ CM & ASV: all-pass

○ CM: no-pass

○ CM: all-pass & ASV: no-pass

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1 1

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1

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Audio Security: t-DCF Examples

● ASVspoof 2019 Challenge

○ Cost & prior parameters as per challenge

○ Synthetic ASV & CM scores

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Audio Privacy Metric Zero Evidence

Biometric Recognition Assessment (The Privacy ZEBRA)

Picture taken in 9 Heidelberg Zoo, 2020

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Audio Privacy: The Setting

● Pseudomise audio speech data

● Decoupling layers & taking the perspective of an adversary

● Existing metrics do not suffice!

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● Population level: Empirical Cross-Entropy (ECE)

○ Idea: prior entropy ⇒ evidence ⇒ posterior entropy

○ Cross-entropy of classification by scores from ground truth

○ Zero evidence: prior ECE = posterior ECE, regardless of prior π

Audio Privacy: Zero Evidence as Metric

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● Individual level: Zero Strength of Evidence

○ Forensic sciences: likelihood ratio

○ Who is stronger: prosecutor or defendant?

Coin-tossing simulation:

all scores are equal

“prior = posterior ECE”

Figure based on

wikimedia.org Ideal if equal — across individuals: worst-case privacy disclosure?

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Audio Privacy: ZEBRA Examples

● VoicePrivacy 2020 Challenge

○ Task: speech recognition should work — voice biometrics not ⇒ modification of raw audio

○ ASV: pre-trained kaldi x-vector recipe

○ B1: DNN baseline

○ B2: signal processing baseline

Expected privacy disclosure (population)

Worst-case privacy disclosure (individual)

Categorical tag

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Summary & Conclusion

● Summary

○ Audio security: cost-based approach for expected risk minimization

○ Audio privacy: relative information & strength of evidence approach

● Conclusion

○ Constrained cost as a guide for the CM optimization given a biometric system

⇒ taking a holistic perspective

○ Audio privacy must achieve privacy for every single one; are we a marginalising society?

⇒ expectation & worst-case estimates

● Security vs. Privacy: seek positive-sum solutions; not zero-sum solutions

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