minister's scandal. then incrcnsing uftcrthc minister resigned.

Resp on s iven ess inCana dia n Fed eralMinister ialResignat ion s fwmI9-l5-2011 By

Matth ewByrn e

Athesissubmitted tothe Schoo lofGrad ua teStud ies

in partialfulfilmentofthe req uirementslorthe deg ree of

Master of Arts Depar tment ofPolitica lScience/FacultyofArts

Mem o rialUniversityof cwfoundland July, 2011 StJohu 's,Newfo und landandLabrado r

ABSTRACT

Responsivene ssliteraturehasfocussed primarilyon therelationshipbetween public opinion and policyoutputs,Thethermostaticmodel in particularprovides botha comprehensiveandwell supported frameworkfixthis relationship.This thesis adds to theresponsivenessliterature by exploringthe potentiallythermos tatic relationship between publicopinion and ministerial resignationsinCanada from 1945to20 11.The impactor changes or publicopinionon resignationsisexplored qualitativelyto highlightrelevantvariable s.Thisanalysis is complemented withthe use orhonourratiosto testotherpotentialcausesor resignation siha:

have been highlightedin thequalitative analysisand resignationliterature.Fina lly.regression modelsare usedto determinethesignificance orthe impactor publicopinion on ministerial resignations and resignations on publicopinion. Thoughnosignifi cant relationship isfound ,the complexitiesor ministerialresignations and public opinionareexplored and illuminated.

ACKNO W IJ:DGEMENTS

Theautho r wouldliketo thankDr.Kell yHlidooklorthesuperv isionorthisthesis andongoing suppo rt.aswellasDr.MatthewKerbylorpro vidin gdataandadv ice.andfinallythe Soc ial Sciencesand HumanitiesResear ch Counci l fortheirfinancialsupport.

TABLEOF CONT EXT

Abstract Acknowledge ments l.ist ofTablcs

Listorl-igures Introduction

Chapter I

ResponsiveRepresentation andSubstantive Democracy Precond itions orResponsiveness

Representative Behavio ur

PublicOpinion SignalstothePublic Responsiveness

ScholarlyFindings ThcThermostaticModc l ChuptcrZ

BasicWestminster InstitutionsinCan ada EarlyConceptsor MinisterialResponsibility ChangesinCanad ian Democracy

iii vi vii

10 10 16 21

25

25

2X

:15 :IX

Rcconccptualisin gConceptsof DemocraticAuthorityand MinisterialRespon sibility

PrimeMinister and MinisterialResponsibility Context of Research- MinisterialResignation s Chapter]

QualitativeAnalysis:LawrenceMacAulay RelevantVariableIdentification

ReasonforResignat ion Typo logy Party Prime Minister Gender

Government Status(Ma jority/Minority) Age

Province ofConstituency Chapter 4

RegressionMethodsand Result s Discussion

Conclusion References

41 46

so

55 56 61

7ll

76 77 7li 79 li2 li2 92 Illi Ill]

LIST OF TABL ES

Table I Hon ourRati os ofS e lected Variables (l:;

TahlcZDescriptiv e Statistics(O LS RegressionAnaly sis) X6 Table:; OLSEstima tesof Regr essionEff ectsonGovern ing PartyPopularity 9()

Table 4OLSEstima tesof Vari able son Resignati on s 91

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure1 Typo logyorRes ign ati onIssue s 71

INTRODUCTIO N

Thisth.:sisisaboutsub sta ntiw d.:mocra.:y.l'a rtiw larlytowhat.:xt.: ntgowlllm.:nt outp utsar.:i n llu.:n.:.:d by publi.:opinio n. Itis easyto assume thatacountryisdem ocrat icju st becausetherearc free andfairelecti ons. Some academ ics haw eve nde fineddem ocracyby the institutionofelections (Schump ctcr 1950 ).It isnot tosay thatelectionsarc not essen tialto democracy,butarcthey asufficientcond itio n?Ilowaboutwhen thegovcn unc nt isnot even directlyelec ted?The ans we risnot a simpleyes orno.Itdepend s onif a substa ntive mea su re of democrac y exists. Substantiwd.:mocracy, a go v.:rna nc.:syst.:mt hat.:mpow.:rsth.:population, maybe createdthro ug helec tio ns,but it cann ot simply be assume d that electio ns willcreate a substan tive democ rat icstate.Therefore , somefundam en talclem ent ofsubs tantive dem ocra cy mustbese lec ted and measured to determineif'the iustitutionsof a countrydo infactcreate substantive democracy.Therehas conse que nt ly been agrow ing efforttomeasu redemocracy.

Forago vernment to betru ly democrat ic,manyscho la rsbelievethat itSoutputssho uld repre sentthe articulationofthe publicwill (Rousseau1762,MiIlI X6 1, Lijphartl9X4,a nd Dahl 2(00).Th.:rda tio ns hip b.:tw.:.:n public o pi nio na ndgo v.:rnm.:nt po licyoutputs hasthere fore recei vedcons idera bleatte ntio n.This bodyo f r.:s.:archh as cr.:at.:d consid.:rab k wnt row rsy b.:caus.:itr.:stsonth.:rat h.:rdubiousass umptio nsthat th.:p ub licis:(I)knowkdg.:abk.:nough to bothformandcomm un ica te linn opi nio ns aboutgo vernmentoutputs and(2)resp o nd10 change singo vernmentoutputs.D.:spit .: th isd.:bat.:,att.:mp tst od.:mo nstrat .: a r.:spon siv.:

go v.:rnm.:nt,r.:q uiring a r.:spons iwpub lic.hav.:d.:t.:n n in.:d thatinfactthcgo vcnuu cnt docs r.:spo ndto publicopi nio n( W kzi.:n I995;Stimso n, Mack u.:n,a ndE rickso n I995).Howe ve r, thisr.:spon siw n.:ss sh ouidno lb.: o v.:rstat.:d.Itwould s.:.:m tha tr.:sp on siv.:n.:ss isn otth.:n o rm, butrath.:roccursulllkrc.:rtaincircumsta nc.:s(Burst.:i n2003).Governmentoutputstendto show

responsivenessto public opinion inissuesthatarcsalient andrequireonlysimpleanalysis.That should not bemistakentoonlymeansimple issues,but rathcr simpicresponses.Wkzicn(19()5) developedthethermostaticmodelofresponsivenesswhichrcquired the publicsimplyto desire moreor lessspendinginbroadpolicyareasasopposed tospecific issuesrequiringcomplex responscs. LJnfortunatcly,allgovcrnlllentac tivitycannot be lllcasuredin oroadspending categorie s,Thesearch flJrrc sponsivenessin oth cr activities is alsorequircd.

Theprima rygoalofthisthesisistoattempt toidentifygovernmentresponsivenessto public opinionintheresignationofcabinetministers aswellaspublic responsivenessto cases whcrclllinistcrsresignin Canada.Thisthesis seeks toprobe asmall, out novel,relationship oetwccnpuolic opinion andgovernlllentaction.lt is argued thatt hcreisno responsiven ess in ministerial resignationsinCanada;however, itisnotcdthat a lack ofobservationsor lackofunit homogcncitYlllayaccountllJrthcl ack ofsigniticanceinthcfind ings.Furt hcr.jrlinksthc literatures ofdelll ocraticreprescntationandlllinisterialt urnover toaddressabroaderconcernin dClllocraticgovcrnancc:puoliccontrolovcrrcprcsentativcb chaviOUL Likcpolicy.thc compositionofgovcmmcnt in Westminsterdemocraciesisnot performed directlyby the clcctoratc tlranks19S7).Instcad,ckcted representativescreate thcgovcrnmentcom positionlili' the electoratemuchlikethecreationofpolicyisindirect throughelectedofficials.Thisissueis increasingly importantasthegovernmentcreatesmostlegislationand oversees the adm inistrationoft hegovernmentapparatus(Mallory 1(71).Consequently,a democratic governments houldalsoi nd udeanarticulationof thc public willi n thccompositionofthe government. Whereth cpuoli chasno mcchanismt oen llJrcc the sek ction of cabinel lllinistersor articulatetheirchoiceo fcandida tes, thes tudy ofresponsivcness ingovernment compositioncan only bemeasured in the deselectionofm inisters.Thep ublic cancallllJrtheresignaliono f

2

cabinetministersthattheydonotprefer,Thegovernment can thereforedemonstrate responsivenessbyforcingthe resignation ofcabinet ministers,Shouldresponsivenesshefound inthcdcsclcetionofcabinctmi nistcrs.itca nbcsaidt hatt hc publichassome controloverthe choiccs of thosc whorcprcscnt thcm andcrcatc policy onthcir bchalf.

Chaptcrl willdiscussthc importanc c andn aturc ofrcsponsivcncss inrepresentative democracies.The plausibilityo f govcrnmcnt and public responsivenesswillbediscussedby asscss ingthcnaturc ofclitc bchaviour andthelimitsof publicopinion.Thischapter willalso pw vidc ahricf ovcrvicw oftindings conccrningrcsponsivcncss.whichl cadstothcsclcctionof thermostaticresponsivenessasthe preferred modelforthis study.Chaptcr2willfocuson the development ofthcCanadian politicalprocess andgoverninginstitutionswhichwillidentifythe mechanismsand individualswhichwillneedto beexplored when considcring thcdccisionto lllrcc acahinctrcsignation int hc modcrnCanadia nco ntcxt.Anoverviewo fmi nisterial resignation literaturewillidentify whatdata shouldbe collectedand howit shouldbecodedto cvaluatc rcsponsivcncssin ministcrial rcsignations.Finally.thcmcthodologyofDcwan and Dowding(2005)willbe introducedasasubstitute for measuringthe impact ufpublic opinionon ministerial rcsignationsandtheimpact ofth eseresignations on publicopinion.Thoughthe methodologywillnotbe identical, the results shouldactas acomparison with the nitcd KingdomwhereDcwanandDowding(2005)foundrcsponsivcncss docsoccurinm inistcrial res ignations.

ChaptcrJand 4 pw vidc thcspcciticmcthodology and rcsultsof this study.ChuptcrJ includcsaqualitativcanalysisoft hcrcs ignationo ftlJrlllcrLibcra lCabinet MinisterL awrence MacAulay.This rcsignationprovidcsancxamplc thatclcarlyillustratcs public opinion

favouring thegoverning partydropping

aftera

minister's scandal. then incrcnsing uftcrthc minister resigned.

Italso highlights

motives and constraints on resignations other than public

opininnfl uctuations.

Thisanalysisi sfiJllo\V<:dbyas<:ri<:sof variabksthataff<:ct r<:signation s.

IIonourratios. the number ofresignations

divided by the total number ofresignation issucs.u re calculated for each attribute of relevant

variables to determine which

variables arc

signifi cant.

Chapter4

providesthe Dewan and Dowding (2005) ordinary

leastsquares regressions

performed on

the Canadian case andareverse regression

to

determine ifpublic opinion

affected resignations . Adiscussion is

includedidenti fyingpossible reasons

why no responsiveness

seems

to bepresent

in ministerial resignationsinCanada.

Thist h<:sisco nclud<:sthal th<:conc<:n trationof pow<:r tot h<:

l'rimcMinistc ro f

Cnnnda

may

threaten the

foundations ofindividual

ministeria lresponsibility.Ew n the publicseems to

car<:v<:rylittl<:aboutth<:activiti<:sofcabi n<:tminist<:r

sunkss th<:yar<:involwdinsom<:s<:rious scandal.

CI I I-RESPO NSI VEESS

Theinterrelatio nshipof publicopinionandgovernment activityiscentraltofuncti onal democracy.Indirectdemocracies,theinstitutiona lrclationshipbctwccn thcpublicund gov ernment outputsisclear;the publicmakesgo ve rnance decision s.Unfo rtunately,modern dem oc raciesdo notfuncti onso directly:inthe modemsense.de mocracyrefersto repre sentative democra cy(Lijphart 1994).Thischapter will introd uce thegove rnme ntrespo ns ive nessasthe measure of substantive democrac yin representative systemsofgovernmenl.Agovernment respon si vetopublicopinionrequiresa pub licto be motivated andab le torespondtogo vern ment actio n a nd ago vernment that ismotivatedand ablc to respondtopub lic opinio n.This cha pter alsodemon strate sthattheseconditio nsarc possible.A literatl1l'ereviewonrespon sivenessthen concl ndest hat the the rmostatie mo del is bes ts uited for understand ingthe eo mplcx re latio ns hip between public opinio n andgovernmentoutp ut.Thethermostat icmodelthus beco mes a des irabletool fo rmeasurin g substantive democracy.

ResponsiveRe presen tation andSubstantiveDemocracy

Theword democra cyis derivedfrom tworoute wordsdeII/O.\'andcratos.Theseancient Greekword smeanpeopleand pow erresp ecti vel y.Co nseq uentlythe firstusageof the word democrac y referred toa system of go ve rnance wherebythe pcoplehadthc public pow er.Inthe timeof ancientAthenian democracy,thismeantdirect democracy.Eachind ividua l citizenwho had the time,interest,andcapaci tyto partici pateingo ve rnance couldgo to thcpuh licsquarcfor publicdebate.Not onlydid the citizenvote on everymajordecision,butwas alsofreetofully ta ke part in all majcrdclibcrationsrManin19')7).The Athenians valued their politica l equality

5

so muchthatthey fe lt it was bette r to selec tpub licofficials rand oml y bylotthan to vote.They were conce rnedthat elec tio nswouldenha ncethe pow er of theelite.A fewoffices wereselected by popular elect io n.but theirtenur eswer elimi tedtoprevent anyind ividu a lfromattaininglong- term power overothe rs.If a citize n was believe dtohave accumulate dtoomuchpowe r or influ cn cc.jhcn thepub liccouldvote tohave that citizen ostracized(Forsdyke2 005).Thismeant thai thecitize n hadtoleave Athe nsand thesurro und ingcountrys idefor10years. The punis hme nt forreturnin g early wasdeath.

Evenin the mostdemocr atic ofstates. institutionswereput in plac etomanage democracy.For practica l reaso ns these inst itut ionswcrech anged.The ostraci smwaseventually rem oved .moreposition swereelected andterm s ofoffic e extended(Forsdy ke2005: Manin 1')lJ7).This allow euh ighl y compet entpeople tohave increa sedintluen ceforthe ben e fit oft he wholestate.Despit e the factthatAthe ns made thesecha nges. rcprc scn rativcdem ocr acywas still nol considered democracy atall(Aristo tle !'o /itics). TheRom an sused electio ns to select politicalelites.but they too separate thispracti ce from thetcr mdcm ocracy.Despite the antidemocratic sent ime ntoftheRom an elite. modern electoraldemocrncics wcrc foundcdwith eleetedre pres enta tiontofilc ilitate de mocra cy( Ma ninllJlJ7).The modern rep resen tative democracy is thus diff eren tthanthe anc ient electo ra ldcm ocr acy or dircctdcmocracy.

The separat io nof electio nand dem ocracybyancientAthenian sandRomans sho uldcall into ques tio n thedemoc rat icnature of modernrepresen tativ edemocracic s.Notw iths ta nd ing variatio nso f me aning ass oe iated w ith "liberaluemocr acy" . there rema ins a li muamental componcntofthcrcrm dcmocracy.Thatis. if representative democraciesare in fact democratic,

then therepres entatives must someho wsimulatewhatthe full pu hlic would havcothcrw isc don c : theymustbe responsivetopubl ic opinion.

Pitkin(I')67)pro vide s anappropriateoutla yf llr variou s wnceptionsof representa tion that havebeen pro pos ed by infl uentia lscho lars leadin gup to Pitk in'stimc.Mostimportantly, Pitkinhighlights that institu tion s canno tgua ran teeperfec t represen tation,ne itheris

"representatio n"a concept that iseasil ydefined.However, throughoutPitkin' sdiscu ssionof issuesreleva nt to repres entatio nand thetypesandcompo ne nts0Irepresent ati on.someide asof whatis req uiredfordemocrati crepr esent ati on areexplore d andhighlighte d.

Institutionsarerequiredto filcilitatedemocraticdecisionmaking. No nearc perfect. Atheniandirectdem ocr acywas a veryclos eappro xima tio n exce ptthat it excluded allwomen, minor s, foreigners,andslaves(Ma ni n 1(97).Furt her,thos e cit izen swho could notafford to leavetheir wo rktoattend countlesspublic meetin gswere largel y exc luded fi-OI11all but themost important debates.Represen tati vedem ocratic ins titutio ns facediffer entchallenges.notthe least of which is Aristo tle's perspe cti vethatelecti on s canonly create aristocracy oroliga rchy:

ho we ver ,throughtheiranalysis there isroo mloroptimismconcernin g subs tantive democra tic representatio n.

Pitk in(1967)highli ght s the importanc e of author iza tio nof repr esen tati ves.This form ali stic approach tounderstand ing re presentatio n requireslittlemorethan that.

Unfl lrtunatd y, as astanda lone prineipkof representation,having only electio nsas aninst itut ion to legiti mate representati ves gu arante esnothingm orethan aeontinuou sparad c of represe ntatives.Theserepre sentati vescouldact inany waythey see fit betweendeetion s.This

hardly creates a substa ntive democra cy:however electora lselectionisprefe rabletoself- selection.

.lustasimportant.Pitkin alsohighlightsthedevelopmen t of"standingfor"thosethatarc beingrepresentcu.Pilkinstalest hat lhiscanbesymbo licor descr iplivc.First.x ymbolically speaking,ifarepresenlalive looks likeconsliluenls,lheymayhave enhanced legilimacybecause therepresented feel a closerlinktotheir representative ,Furexumplc.umcmbcrofu minoruy groupmayfeelbetterrepresente dbya member ofthatgroupbecauseIhe representativeactsasa symbolforthereprese nted member.Descriptive representatio n,where the represent ative' s personal characleristics represenl lhecommon membersofa riding may alsocnhancclcgitimacy.

l laving co nunoncharacteristics means thaithcrcprcscnta tivcwill likelyhaveacommo n cxpericnccand unuerstanding andlhussharc intcrcsts whichshe canthenbctter rcprcscntat an electoralassemb ly.

Pitkinfurthe r and more impnrtantlysuggcststhairepresentati vesshnuldvac tfur 'tthosc they represent;a capacit ythat could be enhanced bydescriptive rcprcscntat ion,butwhich holds mure subslantiveimplications!llrrcpresentation. "Acting!l)r"necessitatcsaction;lhatthe represe ntativeactson behalfo fth ose thatarereprese nted.This concept isnot a simpleone;

Pitkingoestoconside rablelengthsto descr ibethe familiesof analogiesthatexist10describ ethe relationship ofacting! llra group.Sheco neludes,thoughs he does sowithcaveats.lhal lhe representativemustact inthcvinrcrcs ts"of thosethatarcrepresented.This isnot easybecause thereprcse nted havc diffe renta nusometimescont1iclingi nterests.Further ,oneperson islimited incapac ityund cannotfullyrepresenteven a singleotherp erson.Thcgualof dcmocrntic institutio ns.according10Pitkin, istobestfacilit aterepresentation Ill!'the citizenrybythe

rep resen tati ve s.The institutionsshouldbe changedintime to better serve thisideal.

Neve rthe less,there remain sasignificantdebate over how the representat iveisbestable to acttill' the represe nte d . Tlw r.:pr .:smta tiv,: colild at t.:mp t todo wh atp libl ic o pin ionf:lvoursordo what the representat ive bel ie ves is inthe best interestofthepub lic.Thisdeba tehas been labell ed the mandat e-independenceco ntro ve rsy and is oftenattributedto Edmund Burkcs1770Spccch !o theEl ectorsofBristol.

After beingelectedto theBritishPa rlia me nt,Bu rkc o ffc rsaspccc h to thosc w ho ha vc ckctcdhim asthcirrcprcscntativctot hc l lo liscof Commons.Hurkcdiscusscsthc main controv.:rsicss urro undi ng w ha tarc p rcs .:nta tivcs ho u ld do in l'a rl iam.:nt. llccxp la inst ha tt hc representati veisresponsibletodo what he thinksis inthebest intcrcstsofthc constituc nts.This isbcca us c thc co ns tituc nts ha vc sc k c tcdso m.:onc w ho thcy thi n k is particularlyableto cond uct th.:irpll bl ic bu s in.:ss on thc irb.:hal f.If thcconsritucnt sdisa grccwith thc rcprcscn t.u ivc.jhc rep rese nta tivesho uldstill do whathe deemsismost app ro p ria te for thc publicfll urk c 1770) . Burke chos e totCJIIow his own opinionsrather thanthe public'swhen actingastheir r.:p rcs.:nt a tiv':,th ollghhc w asnot r.:-d .:ct.:d.

Since Burke,manyinfl uentialscholarsincl udingRou ss.:all ( 1762), Mill (IX61),Lijphart (llJX4).and Dahl(20 00 ) indicate that democ racy sho u ldincorporateanarticulation of public will. Fora r.:prcsc nta tiv.: dc m ocracy to b,:s llbs ta ntivc ly d ':llIoc ra tic th.:go v.:rn mc nt lllllst hc resp on si ve to publicopinion,Forthistobcth.:casc,th.: governlllcntlllusth.:abktoknowthc public' saggrcga t.: pret c r.:nccs an d bc mot ivat.:dto act ac cord ingtothose preferences.

Precond itions ofRes ponsiveness

If weacce pt that representative democracy sho uld produceagov c rnmcnt that is

responsivetopubl ic will.pub licsentimen t,pub licopinio norsornesuch phrase,then weshou ld explore if andhowa governmentactsrespon sivel ytopublieopinion.The Iirst ste p is to explore the basiccomponents ofrespo nsi vego ve rn ment.Elec ted representativesmust bemotivatedand able to respo nd to public opinio n.The public in turn musthavepreference soropinio ns that arc stable, rati onal and canchangegiven new infonnation.lfc ithcr ofthcsc cri tcriacnnno t be met.

thenrespon sivenesscannotex ist and anycovariationofpublicopinionandgov ernment output must be driven byso me othervariableor coinc ide nce.Representativebehavio urandpub lic opinion will thusbe explored.

Rep resent ativeBehav iour

Diseu ssi on sofel itebeha viourhavebeen eommon s inee the time o ftheancientGreek philosophers.These discussionsweremostlyno rmative considcratio nsabouthow elitessho u ld actandthepotentialconseque ncesof these actio ns on thestate. Theseearly scholarssuc h as Socrates (T he Republic)and later duringthe Renaissan ce,Machi avelli(The Prince) , rel iedon

analogyand histor ical examples todemon st ratewhyrulers sho uldrnakc dccision s invario us ways tha t refle ctedtheneedsof the polity.Thesenormati vebased arg uments,tho ug h they some times discu sseddemocracy,byno meansincluded theneedforformalmechani sm sto ensurethe rulersbehavedthisway.Theysimply ind icatedthatifinterestswereno tscrvcd.jhcu thepolityor leaderswouldsuffer.Laterscholars who consideredthe role of the representative. suc hasBurke( 1770)andPitkin ( 19(7),addressedthese concerns in theirworks.These work s

10

continuedto lack a theoreticalframework thatdescribedwhyeliteswouldbehaveina way beneficia l to the publicthatcould be empiricallyverified.Downs'AnEconomicT!lcO':I'

o r

f)CII10(T(/ (:1'(1957)wasancurlyattempt to make thechange from normarive analysisto empirical.Theresult was a seminal additionofeconomic theoryto politicalscicncc.

TheEco nomic Theoryof DemocracyproposedbyDowns (1957)is both deductive and positive.Unlike the more normativemodelsthat preceded it. this modelfocuseson what elites doand why.insteadof what they should do andwhy.Aswell.it providesa testable theory that can befalsified,AsDowns admits,therearesome problems with theassumptions.These problemsare in largcpa rt crcated bceause econom icthcorics of'bchaviourarc hcavilysimplificd.

Thercsultisa eonside rable inerease inparsimonyatt heex pcnseofex planatorypower.The discussiono frepresenta tivcbehaviourt hatti.Jllowslargclycentresonrationalehoicctheories becauseelitestend to havethe incentive andcapacit ytoact rationallyin pursnit ofthe ir interests.

Psychologicalandcognitive theorieswhichoftenchallenge rationalchoice theoriesalsotendto ident ifyelitesas those most capableofacting rationallyand in aself-interested way'.Inthe later sectionconcerningpublicopinion.rationalchoicc cxplanatio nswillbccomplcmcntcdwith a greater inclusion of psycholo gicalandcognitive theoriesto dctcnninc theplausibilityof public responsiveness.

Economics theoriesrequirethcassumprionthat individua lsaremotivatedto pursuetheir interestsrationally.Thatis.they are able to chooseapreferenceorrank orderpreferencesina seriesof alternatives.Further.as resourcesarc scarce.individuals not onlypursue thatwhich they seekto max imize.butalso minimizetheircosts. Thuspreferences arc maximizedandcosts

'Thes elheoriesarediscussedinl hePublic Opinio nsecl ion laler in l hischa pter.

11

minimi zed (Flanagan I<J<JX).Iftheprcferenee whieh is soughttobe maximizedeanbe iden tifi ed,thenthe meansbywhicharationa lacto r willattempttomaxim izethatprefer en cecan beidentifi ed.Downsappliesthistogo vernment by assumi ngthat dem ocra tic electoral go vernments want tomaximi zepublic support.Inthecontextofmod ernrepresent ative democrac ies,par tiesmustalsobeconside red.Dow nsassumesthatthegoalofa gov crningpurty istogainre-e lectionandthegoalof oppositionpartiesisto f0I111govern me nt.Eachpartyseeks to maximizepub licsuppo rt.Parties arc there fo re seen toprodu cepolicyas a mcans towin electionsratherthanwinningelecti o ns toproducepol icy (Downs1<J57).

Some havequestion edtheno tionthatindividu alsarc highlyrat ionul.withxctordcrs of pre ferences.and thatthey alsohavetheca pac ity tologicall yorganizc competingideas (Conve rse I<J64).Psychologists andcognitivesc ientistshavespentco nsi dcrablc cffortunde rsta ndingwhat hasbeentermed'bounde dratio na lity'.lna ncfflJrt to reduce thecosts ofdecisionmaking, humansrelyonintcllcctualdecisionmakin g short cuts cal ledheuri stics(l' opk inl()<JI ).llmvcvcr, thereismore ev ide nce that clit esare particularlyadepta tfultillingthe irrationa lchoice expectations. EvenConverse(1()64)identi fiedtha teducate delitestendtoho ld interna lly cohere ntsystems ofbe liefsand arc ab leto abst rac tlyevaluatenew infonnationandideasin termsoftheir pre-existin gpreferen ces.Politicalelite arcthere foreable to proposepolicytha tis rationa llydeterminedto bemorefavoura bleforre-e lectionthanalternativepoliciesthatmaybe seenus bette rforsociety.

Despitethe tactthat many scholarshavefoundrational cho iceexplanationsfor eliteand governmentbeh avi our tobe valua ble,theparsimonycomeswith a loss 0fcxplana tory pow cr whic hgives rise to exc e ptio ns (Lupia,Mct.ubbins,and I'opkin2( 00).One suchexcept ionthat

has brought aboutincrcascd attcntiont o clitcbchaviouri sminoritygovcmmcntsin

parliamentarysystems.Given that in a minoritygovernment. the opposition'scombinedstrength cxcccdsthcmajorityofthc pariiamc nt,itis uncicar whyt hcsc partics do notli.m:cani mmcdiatc electionto mount a newattempt atachieving government.Strom(llJlJO)re-exam inesthe motivcs ofoppositionpartics andi sablcto cxplainth isb y cxpandin gth cirmax imandst oinclud c

officeand policy concessions.Assuch, hc argucs that many particsarc wclla warct hat thcy cannot obtain governmentand thlls thcsc sccond ordcrp rcfcrcnccs arc attainablethrough minority govcrnmcntorcoa lition.Thc minoritygovcmmc nti ntu m has lostoll to nachanccto formacoalition andensurestablegovernment with some concessions.Stromagain determines that thisisdue to rationalfuture electoral motivation.Minority governmentsarcofte nableto performwell,thoughtheyarc lessdurable thancoalitionsormajoritygovernments.Most importantly.mi noritygovcrnmcnts tcnd tooll tpcrti.mllt hcircoali tiona ltcrnativcs inthcir next election. Minority governmentsarethusacting asrational cho ice theorieswould expectthem to, blltllnd cr certainin stitlltional constraints and condi tions.

Despitetheexceptions to rationalchoicccxpcctatio nsofclitc bchaviouraddrcsscdhy Strom(llJlJO),theclitesof political partiesdonot alwaysseem tobehave in ways thatmaximize public sllpportti.lrth eirparties. Scparatin gpartybehaviourfromthebehaviour ofthecl ites that

leadtheparties isnecessaryto better understand whythcird ccisionssornctimcsdocsnot appcar tobesimplypllblicsllpport maximizatio n.Advocatesof policyrcsponsivcncssunderstandthat thegovernmentproduces outputs thatdonot alwaysserve tomaximize publicsupport(Soroka andW lezicn2 0 10).This toocan be understoodwhen consideringthecomplcxit icsofmotivcs facingpolitical elites ingoverning parties.l'rincipnl-agcncythcory.also known as agency

th.:ory.isamod.:lingt.:.:hniq u.: import.:dfrom.:wnomicswhichsh.:ds ligh t on the conflicting mo tivcs ofpol itical .:lit.:s. sp.:cificall yth.:kad .:r o fth .: go vnningpart y (Mi lb2005).

Ag.:ncyth.:ory.lik.:th.:r.:stofratio na lchoic.:t h.:ori.:s.isd.:riv.:dfrom economics.

Specifica llyitconcer nsthe relat ion shipbetwe ena princ ipalwhoprovidcs compc nsa tio ntoan agentwhoperformssome sortofserviceonthe princip a lsbch al f'{Milkr2(05).ln th.:cas.:of representativedemocracy. ind ivid ua ls run in compctitivcclcc tio ns for ago vc rnmcntotficc.In .:xcha ng.: filr pr.:st ig.:.comp.:nsatio n.a nd po w.:r. th.:s.:i nd ivid ua ls(ag.:nts ) provi d.:s.: rvic .:s lilr the public (principal).Opponentsperforma monitoringfunctionby bringingto lightthe shortcom ings ofthoseelected ,Thishelp sprevent shir ki ngofagentrespo ns ibilities(Laver 1( 9 1). Most democracies req uirea groupof individua ls that arcelecte dor runni ngfor electio n to usscmblcas u politica l part y.If tog.:tlwr th.:y ltJrlll go v.:rnm .:nt.th.:n th.:ysplit th.: r.:wards andt h.:r.:s po ns ibiliti.:sof thatag.:ncy.In practi cethisnorm all y r.:qu ir.:sth.: s.:k cti on o f a leadershipgro up from withi nthe party to actually form thego ve rnment (Laver1(91).This leade rshipgroup isin turn the primary agent tothcclcc ro ratcandthc agcut tothc part yus a whole.Asaresult policies offered arcchose nin an effortto satisfy both0Ithese principalsin .:xcha ng.:lill·conti nui ngto ho ld th.:ot1ic.:.

To remainingo ve rnment. the lead ersh ip of thego verningparty mustanticipatefuture electoralreprisa lsifth eyfailtopro videpo pular outputs.Conse q ue ntly, go vernment may be expected to cons ult heavily withpub licopin ion whenproducin gpolicy output s.especia llyin sa lient issues or issues thatthreate n tobeco me salientifhandle dpoorly (Burstei n200J).The lead ershipmust also provide outputs thatarcfavo urabletothe partyasa wholc.This normall y invo lwsabalanc.:ofoutputsthatrdkc tst h.:int.:r.:stsofitsm.:mb.:rs hipa ndwill not threat en

lossofgovernment in the next election(Laver and Shcps lc 1996 ).This balancecanbe difficult, butagovernmentt hatproduces popularo utputst hat maxi mizeitspublics upportis unlikelyto lose itspartysupportas aresult. Co ntinuedgoverning bythe partyis usually populara mongstits memhership. ltguaranteesg reaterc apacity!l) ro utputs !:lvourablc !ot hemespccially o n nonsalicntissues.Consequently.a governmentcanbe expectedtoprodu ce outputsthat are responsive topublic opinionandstillbehaveinahighlysclf-intcrestedway.

Thego verning partyandtheeliteswho runithave ample motive to he responsive to the pub lic ifi n!:lctt he puhlicw ill he responsive lot hciractions.Furt hcr.jhcgovcmmcnthas thc resources necessarytoindcnti fyaggrc gatcpublicopinionand publicopinionchanges.This informa rio ncan becommunicated tothegovernment rather easily throughnutionalmcdi apubl ic opinion polls.ordirect communicationfrom members ofthepublic(Soroka and WlczicuJulu).

Itis.however. not enoughforthegovernment to respondto public opinion.The public must alsohave rationalprefere ncesthatareresponsive to thegovernme nt'sactions.Theymust be aware of whatthegovernment isdoingandchangethcirprctercn ccs uccordingly. The public' s ability tomeetthesedemandsismore question ablethan thcgovcrmuc nts . The discussionofp ublicopinio nwillconsider rational choiccthcorics.Lut alsofo cu smorchcavily on psychologicalandcognitivetheoriesofbehaviourbecause they callinto question thepublic 's capacity to act responsivel ytogove rnmentoutput.

l' ublicOpinion

Itwould bedesirabletobeable tostatethatthe publiceither docsor docsnothavethe capacity torcspond togovcrnlllcnta etions.lnstcad,i ts ccllls as if thc public docs havc this capacity,butwith anulllbcr of scriousl illlitations.T obcttcrundcrstandwhen and wherea public islikelyto be responsive togovernmentactivity.itis essentialtounderstandhowthepublic makesandchangesitspreferencesandattitudes.

Toreview Downs( 1957),e ach individuals houldacti nawayt hatisbo thrationaland self- interested. ThoughDownsfocu sesonvoterchoice,the logicof the public ' sdecisions should not change between elections whenasked who theywouldsupport.Eachindiv idual shouldconsider theactionsofgovernmentandsupportthe governing partywhen it actsin a way that favoursher owninterests.Unfo rtunately.information islimited andcanbe costlytoacquire.

Each individual,whenconsideringtheirpartysupport mustconsidcrtwocountcractingfacro rs.

First.thepotentia lbe ndi tsof their aetions.Thelevel of support that an individual can muster.

onevole,is almost toosmall toeverhave asignifi canteffect.The second.the costofaccurately choosingwhich party supports the individual' sinterestscan be high.Acquirin gand understand ingallth eparties' policies and plat ti.JrI11 s. gainingth eunderstand ingofthe implications to theindividualandfinallyevaluatingthefollowthroughiscostly.Dowlls ( 1957) suggests that the individuallllelllber o f the publicthus rclies onanUlllber o flllechanisllls to redueethecostofobtainingi nfi.lllllation.First,thelllos tr clevantinti.JrI11ationisselectedby political parties.interestgroups and lllediati.lr distribution.Second,itis translllittedti.l r iowcost through payand free media. Thirdrhcrcarc a numberof individualsandgroups thatwill analyseit and provide theresults.Eventhe decisiontointerpret what results are desirableis

simplified throughtheusc ofideologies:thatis, simplifi cdabstractions ofwhat wouldagood society is andwhatit takesto create it (Downs1( 57).

Unfortunately,Downs'<opr imistic cvaluation has beencalled intoquestion.pcrhaps most pointedlybytheconceptof thevoter paradox.Evenintheevent ofanelectionwhenthe public has the most infl uenceingovernment, theweightof costand benefitofvotingseems toindicate thatarational individual wouldneverputany timeintovotingchoiccs,Despitethe lowe red cost ofinformatio n. the actualweightof onevote in decidinga reproscntativc. Jct uloucin determinin gpolicyoutputissosmall that no effort is justifi ed (Blais 2( 00 ).Despitethisfact, manyindividualsstillvote.This seemingly irrationalchoicecalls into question thepublic's ability to behaverationally.Anexplorationof psychologicalandcognitivecxplanationsufpuhlic opinionand behaviourmayhelpto determine if the public can actresponsivclytugovcrnmcut activity.

Psychologicaltheories apply particularlywell toindividuals andin types of aggregate behaviourlikevoting(Easton19(5).Converse(1964)hasdemonstratedthat peopleholdbeliefs whicharcnotlogically consistentwitheithertheirinterestsoro thcrrclutcd bclicfs.Thoughthis maynotbe trueof all pcoplc.Convcrscdcmonstratcsth.usomc pcoplc arc morcsusccptihlc to idiosyncratic beliefs than others.Unfortunately for the publicwho rely on politicalelitesto controlthegovernment, theyarcthe most likcly twithsomc cxccprions) toholdlogically inconsistent beliefs andbeliefs that do not reflecttheirself-interest.Converse(1964)explains thatthisisdue to loweredaccess to information andeducatio n.Thoughtherearcconsiderable waysinwhichindividualsca naccess inflll"Jna tiona nd improve theira bilitytovoteforaparty that most closely reflectstheirpreferences, Converse andEaston'sfindings seriouslycasta

shado wonthe uscof economi cmodel sto understandmasspreferencesand votingpattern s.In factConverse claimed that whenansweringquestionsonprefe rence. nearly XO'Yt,of Americans seemed togenerate anopinionon the spot. l lctermedsuch instances"nonattitudes".

If up to XO'%of citizensdemonstraten onatt itudes. then20'Y., ha vevalid altitudes and preference s.Manyof theearlierpsychologicaltheorieswere equallyaspessimistic about the public ·s capacities.Theyti.lCussedon individualdifte rencesandhow the y attr ibute attitude forma tio nand persua sion (Cacioppo and Petty19X2).This group oftheor ies also leadsto the conclusion thatthepubliccannotbe responsivetogovcm mcntoutputs.There isadifficultywith understandi ngaltitudeformationand persuasion asuniqueto eachindividual;that is itevery individualisfundamcntall ydiffcrcnttbcnhowcanaggregate responsivcncss ota populationbe understoodpredictablybypolitical elites? Partieswould be forcedto compete using rando m prom ises of outputs andjust hope thatthey arc congruentwith therandomprefer ences of some large groupofvoters,Outputs would nolongerbeideologicalor rationa l,but ratheran ecle ct ic rando m mix of policy.Fortunately,thoughindividualdifferencesarc pronouncedand complex.

politicalpsychologistshave managedtoli ndimportant di tkrences thatca n be understoo da nd categorized.

Newm an(19X6) proposed the Three Component Model ofpublic sophistication.The threecategoriesarcsalience.knowledge.und conccptual ization.Thesefact or staken togeth er determ inetowhatextent anindividualis capable of making sophisticatcdassessments of policies andothergovernment outpu ts.The higher upthis scale.themorelikely anindividualwillactas rationalchoicesuggests.Thismodelinterestinglyhighlights similarcharacteris ticstoPettyand Cacioppo (1')X6)dual-processmodel of persuasion.PcuyundCaciopposmodclsuggests that

individ ua lswho have both theabilityand moti vati on arc prone touscwha tthcy tcn n thecent ra l route topersuasio n.Thatis.theyrelyon theconte ntofarg umentstoformorchangethcir attitudeonapar tieular issue.\Vhenindividual s arenotable orm otivated .theyrelyonsimple heuristicsorcues to form their opinions . The selec tio nof route isnot entir elybasedon indivi d ua l differen ces thatarc longlastin g. butratherrouteselec tio nisdecid edby ind ivid ualson anissuc-hy-issuc basis.Thisdisti nct ion is impo rtantbccuuscthcquali tyotinfonna tionava ilahle tothepublic maydetermin e whe the ror not the publi chasthccapucitytosclcctattitudcsor preferenc es rationally.Italsomak esthe distin ction tha tsalient issu eswillbringahoutration al decisionmakingina waythat non sali cntissueswill no t. These dist inctionswill become importantwhenconsidering thequalit yandavailabilityo fintl muat iondisscm inatcdthroughthe media.

Further.Page andSha piro(1992)offer aresponseto earlier claims ofanirrational public, speeifk allyConverse·sno nattitudes.T heir ti nd ings.based onsurve yresear ch.bringthe exp erim Cllta l bas edwor kofNewman( 19X6 j.and PettyandCacioppo(19X6j toaelllalrealworld fi nd ings .Itwasfoundthatthesurvey designofmany earlierscho lars led to wnsidcru blccrror ratherthanmeasuri ngrando mfluct uationsinpublic opinion.Theseerrorsrangedfrom ambiguityin tllre ed cho ieea nsw ers.w ns iderahle keypune hingrespo nseerro rs.a nd the pressure of the test -like surveysituation. Laterrese archcorrectedfor theseerrorsandfound prom ising result sfo rapublic that basrat ion al andstableattitudes and prctcrcnc cs.Throughvery comprehens iveanalysis ofotherscholars'findings.theanalys isof a large datasetofpublic opinio n o navariclyof issues.anda fl1Cuso n manyreleva ntf:lCtors.PageandShapiro(1992) foundoptim isticconclusionsconcern ing the public 'saggre gat eabil itytomeettheneed sof respon siven ess.The public.they found,have realandcohe rent prefer en ceswhich arcstable.but

19

change in undcrs tandablea nd predic tablcways.These opinionsreflecttheirsenseof the public goodand their own interests.Page and Shapirodo warn howeverthat theseopinionsarenot ideal. The publicissusceptibleto notnoticingissues that are notsalient. Thepublic mayalso be misledby government.and donot alwayscontemplatealarge varietyofa lternatives.

Later criticismsofPageand Shapiro(llJlJ2) havedemon strated weakncsscsin thcirwork.

Kuk linsk iand Quirk(2000)foundthat the publicrelyheavily on theuse of heuristics suchas framin gandcuesto form theiropinio ns. These framesand cuesare normally disseminated to the public throughnational mediawhichlacksthe capacityto provide highlydescriptive analysis.These information shortcuts make the public susceptible tomanipulationandthus potentiallyunableto create their rationalself-interest,Thoughthiscriticismis valid.

responsivene ssonlyrequiresthatthepublicrespond stogovernmcntaction.not that it respond s in a waythatsystematically favour sthemajor ity.

Theafo rementionedfindingsindicate that a publiccanbe respon sive.butonlywhen citizens are motivatedto pay attention to anissueandqual ityinformatiun onthcissuc is available.simplifi ed,and accurate.Thoughpromising.manyofthese ncccssaryprccondit ious requirethatthemediaprovi dethe rightinfiJrlnationaboutissuesthatwilicaplllrethepublic's attentionandthuscreate saliency.Failingthis. the public cannotbe expectedto beresponsive.

Thoughnotmenti onedtothispoint.thereisalsoa componcntofr hemag nitudeofa n issuet hat mustbemettostimulate thep ublic·sinterestine ngagingit.Stimson(ll)lJl)proposesthata zone of acquiesce nceexists ona traditiona l pol icydimension.So longas policies1:\11withinthis zone.thepublic largelydoesnotbelievethat changeisrequired.On theother handwhen current polic yfallsoutsideof thisrange.either thro ughchangesinpolicy outputor changein the

boundaries ofthezone ofacq uiesc encerange ,the nthe publ ic inc reas inglydem and s either mo re orlcssoutput in thatpo licy do ma in.Conscq uc ntly. pub lic o pinio n may only influencepo licy outputs when thedifference betweenpublicpreferenceandactualoutp utis udcqua tc lylnrgcand noticeable,

Thepublicitwould see m isalsom oti vatcd and abl ctobcrcspon sivc.Unlike the go vc rnmcnt whichgcts its in l"lJnnation thro ugh mcans suchaspolling.thcpub licmust receiveits inliJrlnationabo utgovc rnmcnt activitythro ug ha morcco mplcx rout e.The mediaismost rcspon sibl c filr scndinginfiJnnati ontothcpublicaboutgovcrnmcntactivit icsand changcsin gove rnment outputs.Thccomp lcxi ticsofthcsc signa lsmus talsobe consideredto ensurethe info rmatio nis ava ilable inausefulformatforthepublicto rcspoud to.

Signals to the Public

Importan tissu es arc brought to mostpcoplcs attcntio n throughthe media.However, intcrprctationisalsorcq uircdsothatmcmbcrsofthc pub liccanco ntcx tua lizcthclooscl:lctsthat arcpresentedto them(Shapiro1991\).Themediain turn must also provideinterpretations of factstothe public.Itisimpor tant thcntoundcrstand how this in l"lJnllation isdisscm inatcd thro ugh themed ia and howthe publicmay respo nd tothese signa ls. Though mostschola rsha ve idc ntilic d thatsomcs ma ll mi nor ityof thcpopulation wi ll prod ucc hig hly inform edand rat ion al opinio ns bas cd o n adcq uatc infiJrln atio n. thcrcs t.who makc up thc bu lk ofthcaggrcg. uc public opinio n.will createtheir opinio nsina differentway.

l'ereeptions of cred ibility are very impoI1ant whenindi vidual s rely on the media lilr in fonnationandintcrprctarion.Thish eur ist iehclps individuals todeeiph er whatinterp reta lions should hea llowed toa lter thcir attitudes.l'ageandShapiro ( 1992 ) tilllndt hat commentaries hy journa listsand exper tswerethe mostpersuasive sources of inlimnation in the media.Though the reasonsliJrthe enhaneed persuasivenessofjournalists in particu larco uld heamhiguous.

thesetwogroups are oftenseenas unbiasedandcompetentwhicharecharactcristicshighly importantto persuasio n.Govern ingandoppositio n partieswerefoundtohe considerab ly lcss persuasive.Thistoo makessensebecausetheir biases and personal motivesarewell know n.

Theymust rely onother mechanismsto persuadethepublic that their policicsor partyarcco rrcct andworthsupporting or that theircompetition isnot.In Downs'parlance.thiswould increase theexpectedpartydiffer entialbetween governing party and oppositionparty and thus incrcasc the likelihoodthatvoters willabstai nfrom votingforthcoppoucntor changcthcirvotc altogether.

Outsideofissue publics andelites, the generalpublic requ iresinform .u i ondisscmin .u ion fromopinion lcadcrstl.uzarsfcldand Katz1(55)or through simplifi ed messagesdissemin ated thro ugh themedia.Thefocu sin this studyisthelatter. If the publicgenerallyusesheuristicsin their attitudefonnationa ndpersuas ion. then it isimportanttounderstandhowgovern ing part ies andoppositionpartiesattem pttoeffeetivclyuse heuristiesi nl hemedia.\V heretheyarealready considcredhiasedand not persuas ivcon theirownme ritsassoureesofcommunication( l'ageand Shapiro l ')()2).then theeontentof themessageis importa nt tou nderstand.

Theframing ofi ssues isapredominant andeffe ctivetool in thisregardto helpthe public understand complexandcompeti ng issucstShapiro 199X).Framin g effectsoccurw henanissue

isdi scu sscdinthecontextofothcrco nsidcrations.Thcissuciscmh cdtkdinconsidcrat ionof

some thing else.For example,if ahategro up rally isdescribedin tcnn s

offrccdom

of speech,it sho uldga in moresupport thanifi tisdescribedintermsof puhliesa fety(Ne lso n.Cla wson,and Oxley1997).Theelieitationofopinions con cernin gthe valueorfreedomofspeech cau se incr easedsuppo rt whereaselicitation of the dan gerof hategro ups to public safetyreduced it.

Fram es are an importantyet concerningtoolforpersuasion.Ononehand,properly framed issue sprovidetheright informationso thatindividualswhoknow littleaboutan issu e can contcxtualizcitandtititin the ir betterdevelopedmoregeneral beliefsystems .Un fortunately.

when leveragedexclusiv e lyfor persuasive reasons,framcscaubcuscd toman ipul atc discussions onissues and persuad e ind ivid ua lsfrom theirratio na l pre fer en ce(Kuk linsk ia ndQ uirk2002).

Frami ngeftect saresopowerfi ilt hatt heyareconsideredto heoneoft hecentra lmeansofelite influe nce(Druckmanand Nelson2(03) .The prominenceandeffective nessof frames has thus ca use dconcern thatsubs ta ntive democrat ictheorywhichrestson the articulation ofpreferences is threa tened bymauipulat ivcrhetoric (Page and Shapiro1992:Kuklinski and Quirk2( 02) .

Ex pe rimenta l research on framin g effects hasthus prolifera ted. The nature and effect of frames has gai nedserio usattenti o n.Becausemostinvesti gationconcerningframe shasheen expe rimenta l, there has beenconcernfor the externalvalidity oft hetindings.Cho ngand Druckman(2007)demonstratedthatin compctitivccontcxtsvstrongcr frumc swcrc morc persuas ivethanweaker onesandrepetitionhadno impact afterex posurcto compcti nglramcs.

l lo wcvcr.j t sho uldbcnntcdthat frami ngisnot anallpowerf ul limn or persuasio n.

Druckm anandNcls o n(2 003 ) lillllld thatth c eft e ct s o r com petingcl iterhctori c arc negatedbyconversationswithotherwho holddifferingpointsolvicw .Thislind ingis

particularlyimporta ntassali cnt issucsandparticularly thoscrclcvanta tclcctio nti mc will bc suhjccttopuhlic discussio n.Framcsa lsolacksignificantcffcct whcna nissucisofgrcat pcrsonal importancctothc rccipic nts( l'r icc.N ira ndCappc lla2005)and whcnthesourceis not perceived ascredible (ilartma nand Wchcr 200'l ).Thesefin dings drawattention to theimportanceof politicalparticsassourccso ffr amcsand how thc puhlic mayrcccivct hcsc lramcs.Siothuusand dc Vrcese (2010)found that party sponsorship muttered on framesthat wereconfl ictissues between parties.An individual who identitieswithapartywillexhibita greaterframingeffectif aframcis gcncratcd fromthutparty and willnot beal"tCcted hy frames ofo ther parties.Unlcss onconsensus issues .Thosewhoarenotstronglyattachedtoa political party should notbeas effected bythe source of the argumentandmorelikely to beaffected by thccontcnt. Soframing ismost inlluentialonvoters who aremostlikelytobewillingtochange their partypreferences at election time.

To conclude.thepublicdoes appeartohave thecapacityto beresponsive to government activities.Throughinformatio n disseminated by the media.simplifiedthrough heur istics. and verifiedthrough public discussion.thepublicas anaggregate candecide ifitspreferencesare metorncedtobechangedi no ne dircct iono ra nother. lt is howeverimporta nt torc mcmber that for thepublicto be responsiveto governmentactivities. theseactivities must concernsalient issuesthat havebeen communicated through mediatedsourcesandthat arcpreferabl y simplistic.

Responsiveness

ScholarlyFindings

The public and their representatives bothseem to have the capacity to respond to the

actionsofoneanother, when certainconditio nsarc met. Respon siveness

is thus plausibl e.

Scholarl yworkontheopinion-policy

relationship has

also generated some

positive results.This literature

is

dive rse and demonstrates that

opinion docsaff ect

policy,butagain

onlyunder certain conditions.

lndircct methods have been used tosuggest that representative democracy docs includc

anarticulation of

the public will.

A

numberof scholars have considered the relationship between

pub licopinionand party/representative

rhetor ic or thecontent

ofpo licy document s (Cohen 199'):

Rottinghaus 2(06).Though a positive relationshipbetwee n

thetwo seemsto reflecttheimpactof public opiniongovernment activities. this may

not bethe ease.

Allthis demonstrates is

that the

governmentis infactableto

understand what the public

may want.

but

it does

not meanthe

governme nt will do

it.

This relationship

may only be as deep

as

rhetori

c.

Olherseholars have tilCussedo ncomparing

attitudes of publieallye leeted officials

and

publicopinion.

Again.a

positive relationship was

foundtVcrbaandNic

1972: Ilili and Ilinton-

Anderson 1995 ).

However. it

is importantto

note thatsharing

commo nopinionsdoes

not equate

actingonthem.

Weissberg (197X)has identifie d that in

theUnited States. representatives do

in

factvotein ways simila r to

the preferences of their constitu ent s. This relationship is known as dyadic rcprcscnt.u ion. Though thepresen ceofdyadierepre sentation supportsa

sub stant ive element to representat ive democrac y,

it does not

guarantee that the actions ofgovernmentwill in factbe

responsive to the public's opinions. This problem is particular ly

rele vant when

25

consilkringthco pinio n-po licy rc latio ns hipin sy stcms whcrc thc rc isheavypart y contro love r vot ing.InCanadafo rexampl e,represen tativesvote accord ing topartylines, thosethat donot canbe remo vedfromthe caucus (Savo ie20 10 ).Dyad ic votingwou ld not belikelyin such systems.

Othe rs havefound ,suc h as Sha piroand Pagc(I') li3) ,thatbcyonddyad icvo tingthc rc isa co rrelationbetween public opi nionand pol icyoutputs(Soroka and Wlczicn2(07).Dcspitc thc covar iat io nof policy outputs andpublic opinion.when assessingtherelationsh ipbetwee ntwo variabl es.itisimpor tant nuttomistak e corre lationforcausa tio n.Thedem ocratic respo nsiveness mode lreq uiresthat poli cymakersmustbereceptive tochangesin public opinion,thro ugh intere stgroups. politicalpart ies,opinio n polling.or other direct comm unica tio n(Petry1991;

Manza andCook2002 ).One!~Ictorthatcouldcausc acorrclationbctwccnpuhlicop in ion and polic y output isthatthro ughregularelections.new electe dofficialsreplaceoldoncswhose opi nionsarcno longercon gru entwith theelec to rates.Assuch. responsivenessisnotmotivat ed bychangesinpublic opinion.butthroughrcplaccmcntsofclcctc dofficiuls.Bartcls ( 1991 )found

tha t inthcUnitedStares Congress,on issuesofd efencespend ingthat withoutmuchturno veri n clcc tcdofli c ia ls thc rc was aconsidcrab k co rrcspondcncc bctwccnpublic opinioncha ngeami policyoutputscha nge.Thisconc lusio nsuppor tsresp on siveelected repres entatives.

Furt her , po licyrcsponsivcncsshasbccn cstabl ishcdintheUnitcdStates, Canada.

(fcrmany .aud anumhcro f o thcrcountrics(Burstc in2003 ).Po licy res ponsive ness hasalsobccn foundina varictyofU.S .ins titutio nsincl udi ng Co ngress.the Presiden cy. and even thejudiciary andacross domain s(St imson,Mackucn.und Erickso n 1')<)5;Burstcin2(0 3) .Ofe q ua l importancc!l)ridc ntifyingacausalrc lation ship.thcrcspo nsivcncssof rcprcsc nta tivcstcnds to

foll owtrend sin public opinionthatfluctuate temporally atthesame paceas thc rcprcscntati vcs electoral cycle.Elected officials,withshortertenures in office,arcmore responsivctoshort- tcrm lluc tuations in publicopinion.Courtju dgcs.who havcscvcn-ycartcrms.tc nd to rcspond more slowly andto longer-term trends inpublic opinio nchangcjStimsonMack ucnandErikson 1995).

Amorc co mpc lling piccc of cv idcncc tosupport thc causalrclationshipbctwccnpuhlic opinionand govcrnll1cntactivityisdctcrll1inin glcmporalprcccdcncc. lfpuh licopinionisto causc a chan gcinpolicyoutpul.t hcnt hcchangcinpub licopinionmustprcccdcthcchan gcin policyoutpUl. lfgovcrnmcntactionwc rc tochangcpuhlico pinion.thc n thctc mpora l dircc tion wouldbe reversed,Time series regressionanalysishasdemonstrated thatpuhlicopinion changc docs int;lct occurpriortothc chan gcsin govcrnmcnloutpul.Manystudic s(SorokaandWlczicn 2( 10)us ct his timllof rcg rcss ion whcrchy thc corrcla tion of two varia hlcsismcas urcd witha timelag~ .

Thc conunonthcorc tica largumcn t leve raged is thatelectedofficialsrespondto changes inpublicopinion duct o thc anlicipa tion oftilturc clcctoral con scqucnccsjSrimso nMack ucn.

andErickson 1995; Wlczicn I995).Thisrelationshipstands to reasononlyif thcclcctoratcin turnresponds togo vern mentoutputs.As outlinedin thcpublic opinionsection,there is dcbatc concerning thepublic' s capacityto doso.Burstcin (2003)warn sthatresponsivenessisnot thc norm.butis only evident sometimes,Sorokaand Wlczicn(20 10) alsoacknowledgethat three

factorsmustbe considere dto understa nd howpublic rcsponsivc ncssmayworkandwhcn.II

maywork becauseonlya sma ll numbcr of individualsn ccdt o chan gcthciropiu ions toruovc

'Timelagsfor opinio n-po licyrel at ionship sare generally3monthsunlessgovern me ntou t put requ iresa greater perio doftimeto implemenl.

aggregatepublic support or opinion,politiciansuscheuristics such usframingand cuestohelp simplifyissuesforthepublic,andthepubliconlyneedtofocusonalimited numbcrofruajor issueswhichbecome salient.That is,responsiveness on policyissuescanoccur,but only when the public cares,

Without public rcsponsivcncss,politicians havc no inccntivctofo llowpublicopinion.

Consequently, foropinion to infl uencepolicy outputs, policyoutputsmustinturn produce changesin public opinion.Thcscchangcs musta lsocorrcspond with thc dircction and magnitudcofthc changcsofthcpolicyoutput.Thatis,ifthe public wants an output andgetsit.

the public mustshowsomefon n ofsatis fuctio nwiththisoutcomeandsomcformof dissatisillction if thcydonotrcccivcit.Theflow ofinformation in turn must runfrom the public to the governmentandfrom thegovernmenttothe public.Hothmustrcspond.

TheThermostati cModel

The ThermostaticModel of Responsiveness providesacomp rehensivemodel which takesintoaccount all thcallJrcmcntioncdrcquircmcnlsofrcsponsivcncss.It alsoworks given thcrcstrictionsp laccdo nc litc andp ublicrat ionality.Conscqucntly,thcl11cthodsofthist hcsis willbe based on thcThcrmostuticModel.ltsdcscriptionfollows.

ThermostaticResponsiveness.a modelfirstproposedbyWlczicn (1995),is the 1110st compk tc modelo f rcsponsivcncss cllITcntly in llsc.First,pllblicopiniono na nissllc canbc lIndcrstoodas normally distribu tcd notu nlikc[)owns'undcrsta ndingofthcmcd ianvo tcr. Thc median isknown asthe ideal pointof policypreferenc eonthegiven issue.Thispointislocated

on athermometer ofoutput.Like policypreference.actualpolicy output canalso be placed on the samethermometer. Themagnitudeanddirectionofdiftercnccbctwcentheidealpublic preferencepointandactualoutput isknown as the public'srelativepreference.

Asignal issent to policymakers indicating thepublic's relative prclcrcn cc and the magnitude oft he difference between that pointandactualpolicyoutput. If responsiveness is prcscru.jjovcrmucntwill changeoutputinthedirectionof the publicsidcalpointwhich rcflccts the magnitudeofdifference.Anew andsmallerpublic relativepreferencewill thusbe established.The publict hen receivesa negativekedbacksignali ndicati ngthe policyresponse and thusadjusts its ownsignal toreflectthe newmagnitude and dircctionoft hcpublics relative preference .Withoutaresponsivep ublica nda leedbac ksig nal,policymakers would lacka rewardor punishmentfortheir responsivenessorlack thereof.Policyoutputswould not bc linked to publicsupportforthegoverning party and thusnodi fferencein electoral outcome wouldbe realizedforreduci ngthe public'srelativepreference.

The thermostaticmodel hasbeensuccess fu llyimplementedbyWlczicn(1995).Issues wheres urwys have asked the public ll)r their desire regarding more or k ssspending have been usedtogaugethe public'spreferencein largespending domains,Further. reliableinformar iunon actual spending can be easilyobtained.Time-seriesregressionanalysisisconductcdtl)rpolic y responsivenesstoallowforbudgetaryprocessesthatoccuroverthe courseofayear. Thesame istrueforpublicrcsponsivcncss. atimclagis requiredforchungcsingovcrumcntoutputstu bc reflectedinpublicopinion.Thermostatic responsiveness hasbeenfoundto occur inthe United States(Wlczicn 1995),the United Kingdom (Soroka and Wlczicn 2(05).andCanada(Soroka and Wlczicn Ju lO).Increasedissue saliencyhas beenfoundto incrcasc rcsponsivcncssas it

makcs thcclcctoralconscquc nccof policyo utputsmorclikclytoaffcctvotcsandthus incrcasc thepotentialofan electoral penaltyfor failuretoproducethe rightamountof policy.Also, institutional arrangcmcntswhichd cmonstratc clearl incso fac coun tahil ityincrcascpu blic rcsponsivencssandpo licyrc prcscntation(Soro kaan d Wlezicn2 010).

There arclimitatio nsto these findings.Public opinionisaffectedbyvariablesotherthan policyoutpllts, such aslcadcrshipattrihlltcs (Savoic 2010).1'0licyolltput s arcal so afti:ctcdhy variahlesothcrthanpllhlicopinion,suchasthcpolicyprdi:rcnccsof partyelites (Laverand Shcpslc1996 ).Further.governanceisnotlimited to policy domainsof'large spending.

Thcrcli.lrc,othcravc nucsrcquirc cxplorationusing thisgeneral model.

This study willexploreoneoftheseavenues.Anoftenignoredaspect oftheelectora l system in Westminsterdemocraciesis thatthe electoratedocsnot clcct thcgovcmmcnt. itclccts thcllousc ofCommons.From that, a prime ministeris selected.Inturn, thatprime minister selects acabinetofministers.Thiscabinetproducesmostofthe legislationthatis passcduud also oversee stheadm inistratio nofgovcrnmcnr dcpartmcnts (Franks19X7).ThcCanndiancusc providcsancxcc llcntopportunity toinvcstigatcpotcntial rcsponsivcncssi nt hcco mpositionof government.Togetherwithactual policyoutputs,this functionis ofprimary importanceof'the governingsystem.Cabinetministcrs ovcrscc thc opcrations ofgovcrnmcnt andthuspolicy implementationas well as the production of policyfrom thcir admini strativc jurisdictions.This isparticularl yimportantasthcscindividualrcprcscntativcsarcrcsponsih lcli.lrpolic youtplltsthat do not reachhigh levelsofsalience.Policyoutputsrequireresponsiveness10public opinionto substantiatc dcrnocratic representation,analogousto thisisthcsuhstantivcd cmocratic sclection

ofgovcmmcutitscl fIfno respo nsive nessexistsinthccompositiunofcabinctinCanada.jhcn gow rJlm.:nts .:k .:tion is notd.:mocratic justb .:caus.:th.:l lous.: ofC ommonsis d .:ct.:d.

Tothi s ':I1lLthis studywiliappl yth.: th.:rmostaticmodd ofr.: sponsiv.:n.:sstomiuistcrial resignationsinCanada. Thoughit wouldbeuseful tounderstand responsivenessin theselection ofministers,thiscannotbe measure das theyhavenotbeen ab letodem on strateiftheycan producewhat the public wants.Onth.:oth.:rhand,ifth.:public.:xpr.: ss.:sdi ssatist;lctionwitha minister.The ministercanbe forced to resign.Thereforethermostatic responsiveness maybe sccninminisrcrial rcsignntions.Minist.:rialp ositions cannot b.: ti lkd or r.:mov.:d on ascak th.:

public cannotwant gr.:at.:rorkss.:rd.:gr.:.:s of a giv.:nmini st.:r.Rathcr.fhcpuhlic cuncithcr want a ministerto stay or to resign.Thethermostatic analogyisthusnot entirelyaccurate.A lightswitchmode lmayhe more appro pria te.Thoughtheaggregatepublicpreferenceis stillone ofdegree ,thegov ernment'soptionforresp on seisdichotomous.Likea lightswitch, which can be turnedon oroffbut not in bctwccn; uminister canbeallowed to continuc toholdhisposition orbeforcedtoresign.Forthesakeofconsistency withtherationale behindWlczicnst!')lJ5) mod.:Ltll<:t':rJnth.:nn ostati<:r.:sponsiwn.: ss will continu.:tob.:us.:dt od.: s.:rib.:r.: sponsiv.:n.:ss in ministerialresignations.

An.:x plorationofth.:Ca nadiancas.:wi ll b.: undcrtakcn to d.:t.:rmin.:ifr.:sponsiv.:n.:ss .:xists in Canadianlllini st.:rialr.:signations.ChaptcrLwil ltil<:nsonth.: institlltional cont.:xtof Canada. bothforma landinforma l,andonministerialrcsignations as a topic diffcrcnt thanothcr actions ofg ov':rJllll.:ntandthlis warrants fLII1h.:r.:xploration.

CI12-M INISTER IA LRESIG NATI O NSINCA NA DA

Ministcrialrcsignationshavc largc lybccnovc rlookcdi n discuss ionsofgovcrllmc nt rcsponsi vcn css.butthcy canbc impol1antl()rcnsuringth cpublicgctssomcaccountabilityin thcir govcrllmcnt lcadcrs.T hcclccto ratccansclcctandrcmovcMcmbc rsofl'arl iamc nta t elec tio n times.This isthe centralmechanism ofd emocratic representati onin electoral democracy.Ho wever.anticip atio noffutureelec tio nshasbeendem o nstratedto motivatepolicy rcspon si vcnc ssbctwccnclcctions(Stimson.Mackucn . undEricksonl lJlJ5).Theelector ate thcrc!()rchassomc powcrtoinll uc nccgovcrnmcntactions bc twcc nclcctionst hro ughth is mechanism.This lindingisintcrcstin gasit may rclat c toth ctcnurcofmini stcrs in thc govcrumcnt.In Wcstm instc rparl iamcntar y systcms.thc clcctoratcsc lcctsM cmb crs o fth c l lou sc ofCommons,but itdocsnotsclcctagov cnlmcnt(Russc1l200X).Themech anism s of govcrnmc ntsclcctionoccura ftcrthcscatsinthcl louschav c bccna1I0catcdviathc clcctora i system.Thc sclc ctionanddcsclc cti on o fth cmcmbcrso fthc govcrnmcntmayalsofo tlowa

similardemocrat icprocess,Throughtheantici pa tio noffutureelec tio ns.ministersmaybe selected whoarc believedto maintainor incre ase gove rnmentpopul arityandthoscthatdo not may in turnbc rcplaccd toprcvc ntorcorrcct potential oractua l Iosscsinpublic support(Dewa n andDowd ing2( 05 ).Ifso.thcclcctorat cmay inl;lcthavc som cdcgrcco f cont rol o vcrthc compositionof govcrnmcnt bcyond thcsclcc tio nof Mc mbcrsof l'a rliamcnt.

Toinvest igateresponsiveness inministeri alrcsignatio ns in Canada.itis import a ntlirstto cx plo rc thcCanud ian dcmo cr ac y.Anoverviewoft heCanadianpoliticalsy stcm w ill li rstbc rct)uircd to undcrstand ho w thcconccptso f rcprcscntatio nhavccvo lvcd and ho w po wcr has bcc n distribut ed.Thisoverviewwillbe f()lIowc d by adcscri ptio n oft hcc ha ngcsthathavc occurrcd

andtheconseque nces forrepres enta tio nandgov ernance.Thechapt ercontinueswithasho rt discussion ofhowministerialresignations can beunderstood asthe ultimatereprimandfor violationsofministerialresponsibilityand how theiractual usagemay change theunderstanding of thcresponsibilityof ministcrs.ltendsbyconcludingthat thcDcwanandDowding(2005) modcluscdt odctcrmincth cimpact ofpnblic opinioll ollmillistcrialrcsigllation shouldbcuscd to measure thcrmostnticresponsivenessill ministerial resignation inCa nada.

Basic WestminsterInstitutionsinCanada

Canada inheriteditsgoverning institutionsfromthe UnitedKingdom.Itisthusa Wcstlllinstcr pariialllcntarysys tcm.Though Westminster systemscan haveadiverse set of institutionalam lllgcmcnts,thcy allillhcrit collvcntiolls or iginally dcvclopcdi n thcU nitcd Kingdom.AbricfdcscriptionofCanada'stlJrlnal institutionsfoll ows.

Canadahas anumberofgovernanceinstitutions.Theseinclude,butarc notlimitedto a monarch( and thc monareh's represcntativc,an ullelcctcdScnate,anclcctcd l lnuscotCnmmous, andjudieiary(Franks,19 X7).Due to the unclcctcd natureofall butthe l luuscofCommons,if dcmocraticrcs ponsivcllcss isto bcfuund inCallada'sgovcrnancc institutions, thcnit wouldbe found inthcHouscofConuuons.

lnhcritcdfromtheUnited Kingdom,theCanadianelectorate selects themembersof'the llousc ofCommonsthroughafirst-pa st-th e -postelectoralsystem (Mallory197}).Thecountry isdividedintogeographical ridingsthat togetherencompasstheentirecountry withnooverlap of constituency.Thebord ersofeachridingarcselectedsothatthepopulation ineachisroughly

eq uiva lent,thoughgive n populationchange and the need to distribute ridingsona provincial hasis,thcrcisnotablevariancc inpoplilationsinridings.Thcmcmbcrsofthcclectmatcincach ridingmay each castasingle ballotforasing le candidate.Thecandidate that receivesthemost votes in therid ing w insascat and thus a vote in thel lousc ofCommons.Thefullcomposition ofthcl lo uscofC o mmo ns isselcctcd this waywith cach ridi ng co ntribllting o nc rcprcscntativc.

Throughpcriod icelcctions,thcclectmatcofcachridingdccidcsifthcirrcprcscntativchas adequatelyrepresented them.If so, thcM cmbcr o fP ari iam cntmaybc rc-elcctcd,bllt if thc electoratedec ides thata compe tingcand idatemay mukcabcttcrrc prcscntativct hcnthc Mcmbcr of'Purliarncntmaybc rcplaccd.

Formally,thisis tlll::Sclect iona nd dcs clec tion mcc ha nismfm rcprcsc ntalivc dcmocracyin Canada, however at thispoint the elec torate hasselectedthecompos itionofthc l lousc of Commons, huthasno tchoscn ago vcrllm cnt (R usscIl200 X).C.o vc rllmcntse lec tio n maythen he indi rcct ly intlucnccd by c lcctoralprcssurcas polic ics arc.lfs o, thc lllccha nisms o f this proccss must beunderstood . Unlikc thcsc lectio nan d dcs clcc tio n o f thcl lo uscofC o mmo ns.the process ofsel cct inga nd dcsc lecti nggo vcrllmcnt isbascdmorconunwrittcnconvcntionandhaschangcd over time(CaI1y,Cross,and Youn g2(02).

EarlyConcepts ofMinisteria l Respon sib ility

Thc Wcs tminstcr l'a riia mc ntarysystcm dcvc lopcdt hro ug hconvcntio noverhundreds of yea rs in the United Kingd om.I'arliam cnt s selectedaprimesminister andcabine twhich providcda ncxcc ut ivc ti ll1ctio na nd lead rolein pol icydevel opm ent.The prime ministerwas sclec tcd as aMcmhcr o fl'ari iamcntwho co uld ltll"lllago vc rllmcnt that could maintain thc

35

supportof thc l louscofCommons.Cabinet ministriesweregivenout as patronage topopular Mcmbcrs ofParl iamcntin cxchan gcfor supporl.Aconccntration ofpowcr inthi scxccuti vcwas inhcritcdfromthcoriginalpowcrofthcMonarc hy,butu nlikcl hcMonarc h,lhcprimcm inistci rcquircsthcussistancc of'a numberofcabinetministersto administcrthc largc govcnuucnt apparatus aswell.Theseministcrsarcdrawnalmost exclusively from the electedl lousc of Commonsw hich providcssomc dc mocratic rcprcscntatio ni n thc cxccutivc, albciti ndircct.

Conscqucntly,t hc rcsponsibility of ministcrsa lso dcvclopcd al this time(Woodhouse1994 ).

MarshalandMoodic(1971)identifyfour trendsinthc discussionofministcrial responsibilit y.First,ministcrsarc sccntobclcgallyrcs ponsiblcIoracts otthcCrown bccuusc theCrown isnot responsiblein person.Sccond,ministcrsarcbothrcsponsiblcand subord inatc to theCommons.Third,ministcrshavcmoral culpability for theiractions.And fourthministers arcconstitutionallyaccountable toParl iament, which can force penalticsfor disapp roval.Thcsc trcuds clcarly rcflcct thc traditionofapowerfulmonarchyand Parliament in thc carlyBritish system, Dcspitcconsidcrablc changc,lhcsctrcnds shapcdmodcrn convcntionso fmini stcrial rcsponsibilitythatwou ldguidcthccmc rgcnccofmorcdcmocraticgovcrnmcnt.Two typesof govcrnmcnt rcsponsibility cmcrgcd bascd on thc afiJrcmcntioncd rcsponsibility of ministcrs:

collectiveministerial responsibilit y and individualministerialresponsibility (SutherlandIl) l») ).

Thcsc two convcntionsmorc adcqu atclyd cscribc thcm odcrn conccpt ofm inistcrial responsibi lity.

Collcctivc ministcrialrcsponsibilityis thci dca that thc primc ministcr andc abinct ministcrsasacollcctivc govcrnmcntproposcthcvast majorityoflcgislationandarcrcs ponsiblc forthe executivefunctionofParliamcntand in turn defend thcirdccisionsinfront ofthcllousc

ofCo mmons. Each minister actsasp'U1 ofthiscollec tive.lfm ajo rmotion s arc dcfcutcdth cn

thegovernment issa idtohavelostthe supportofthe Ho use of Commo nsandmustresign

(Sut herland 1991).This conve ntio norig inate dfrom the need to protectindividualmin istcrs from beingisolated andattacke dbytheCrown (Ward]9 X7).lnmodc rn usc. uprimc ministcr mayprotect anindivi dualministerfromattackbyextendi ngcollectiverespo nsib ilityand allo w ingthegovcrumcntas awhole to takercspo ns ih ility forapoli cy cho icc oructiontak en as anexecutive,Throughcollec tive resp on sibilit y,the who legovern me ntcanbefo rced to resi gnif itloscsthc supportofthc l lo uscofCommons.

Asopposc d toco llcctivc m inis tcrialrcs po ns ibility,thcrcisa lsoi nd ivid ua l m inistcria l responsibility.Aministcrwas rcsp on sible Ii.Jr all actsperform ed by the departme ntove rwhich theministerheld respon s ibility,Thro ugh this mechanism,thecivil service and administrationof

governmentappa ratus havea democraticresp on sibilit ythroughthc clcctcdMcmbcro f

Parliament who has been assigned totakcthat rcspo nsibi lity txutherl and1991 ).The capacityof a ministertounderstand all thcopcrut io nsand workingsof hisdcpartmcnt wasoriginnllya realisticexpec tatio n.Aministcrwas.aton ct imc.abletodomu chthcmini stry's wor kh imsc If orwiththcass ista nccofas ma llstaff( Dc nto n I979) .lfa ca bi nctministcrmadca ncrror,hc couldbcli.Jrccdtorcsignwh ilct hcrcstofthcgovcnlmc ntco uldcontinuc.

Hythc mid-u inct ccnth century in theUnitedKingdom ,Parii amcnt cxp cri cn ccdits pinnacleofinfl uence.Ministcrial rcsp on sibilityand accounl ab ilitywas casicst to understand,A ministcrcoul d bcrca listica llycx pcctc dtou ndcrsta nda ll thcworki ngsof hisdep artmen t andthus could be held acc o unta ble fi.lrthc action s ofthccntircdcpartmcnl.Thellousc ofCo m mo ns

could holdtheministerto account and directly!lJrCChis resignation(Woodhousc1994 ).The rcsu!t was thatallmcmbcrs ofthc govcrnmcntwc rc individually accountabletothcl lousc.

Hcforcpartiesandparty discipline,thcoricsofrcp rcscntativc authorityandrcsponsihility wcrccusicrtoundcrstand.Thc clectoratcau thorizcd anMl'to act oni tsbchalfth rough an election.All theMl'sasagroupselectedamongst thcmsclvcsa primcministcrw hocould maintuin supportoft hc llousc.This primcm inistcrsc lectcd thca dditionalca binct ministcrs t0 furma government.Thcgovcmmcnt,asagroupan dasi ndiv idllalmi nistcrs,wlTcaccountable to the llousc ofCommons,TheIlousc couldvotc to cithcr !lJrccthc rcsignationofthc governmentas awholeorvote toIlJITCthcresignationof anindividualcabinet minister,The Mcm bcrs ofl'arliamcntwcrcth cnhcldaccollntablctothcir individual constitucnts !lJI·thcir actions in Parliament throughthenext clcctionIRhodcs.Wanna and Wcllcr2(09).

Thc convcntionsofministcriul responsibilityin Wcstminstcrl'arl iamcntary systcmswcrc inheritedli'OInthcscd cmocrati cauthority andrcsponsibility rclationships.By IX67inCanada, 1;lctionsof Mcmbcrsof l'a riiamcnt wcrccoa lescinginlo morcstablea llianccs bascdont hc common interestsofthosethey represented.Further, departments were becominglargcrand morc complcx whichwollidm akcthcrclat ionships bctwccndcmocralic authority and minislcrial rcsponsibilitymorc complex(Fran ksI9X7).

ChangesinCanadian Democracy

Anumbcrof nlCtorshavcc hangcdt hc naturcofWc stminstcrdcmocracY,in Canada.Thc asccndcncyofpartics,changesin mediatechnology, andchangiug dcmograph icsandcleavages

have allaffectedtherelat io ns hipbetwee ntheelec torate,Memb ers ofl'arliarncntcahinct ministers ,andthe primemin ister (Carty,YoungandCross2( 02 ).Theresult has beenmajor changesin thelines ofdemocratic authorityandgov cnun cnt rcsponsibility.

Thoughthetime ofParliamenta rysupremacy intheUnited Kingdo m was over by the timeofConfe de ration in lX67, Me mberso f l'a riia me ntwe res tillvo tingaga ins t the iro wn par ty ona regularbasis (Franks19 X7). This cameto an end whenpa rt iesbegantoso lidifypo wer.

Untilaro und 1917.parties onlyexistedwithin the Parli ament.MembersofParliam entwould compete in highl ylocalizedelectionsand patronage wasusedto bindthem intosomewha tstable parties(Campb ell andChristian 1995).The parti esthatlimn edfromcombin ingfacti ou s,though theywere namedafterideologie s.werenevera sentrenched insocictythro ughidco lngic sand classasinotherco untries.Thisset thefoundationforthe modernCanad ianbrokera geparties (Wo linelz2002 ).

Around thelat e1910 sand the1920 s extra- pa rliame ntary par ties begantogrow .The Liberals and thenProgressiveCo nse rvatives begantose lect theirleadersat partyconventions.

Mediawas still highl ylocalizedandother thanthe actual party lea dcr.vcrypowcrful rcgioual bossesemergedwho becamepowerf ulcabinetministers inex changcforga ining rcgional suppo rt 1(1I'theparty.The parti es rel iedon thesepopul ar individ ua lsand person al conncct ion sto win

suppor tfromtheelectorate(Cart y,YoungandCros s 2(02).The partieswere primar ily vote seeking and were evenwillingto make alignmentsonbothsides ofcleavag es in anattempt to gain more votes. Exce ptfortheleaderand region al bosses,mostMcmbcr s ufPar liamcntrelied on party labeltow in a seat morethan parties reliedon individual cand idates.Thiswas consideredthe golde nageof parties (Blumlc rand Kavan agh1999 ).