Causation and future reference

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Causation and future reference

Bridget Copley

To cite this version:

Causation and future reference

Bridget Copley (SFL-CNRS/Paris 8)

Ecole Normale Sup´erieure

Aristotle’s dilemma: One future or many futures?

Onefuture?

(1) a. Ability to occur with modal adverbials:

(i) There will possibly be a sea battle tomorrow. (ii) *There must possibly be a sea battle tomorrow. (iii) There was possibly a sea battle yesterday. b. Truth value judgments: I will leave for Toulouse on

Wednesday.

c. Future Law of the Excluded Middle (FLEM)/bivalence:

Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or there won’t be a sea battle tomorrow.

[ ] now

]

[

Aristotle’s dilemma: One future or many futures?

Manyfutures?

(2) a. Intentions: I will marry you.

b. Truth value judgments: It will rain on February 15th. c. Non-determinism: the possibility that things could

(have) turn(ed) out differently, closely related to . . . d. Contingency on the past/present: the intuition that

the future depends on the present

e. Involvement of past/present tense: Yesterday I thought the Red Sox would win tomorrow, but today I think the Yankees will win tomorrow. cf. German wollen f. Aspect: . . .

Aristotle’s dilemma: One future or many futures?

(3) many-futures will q: on all the most normal worlds

compatible with the facts at t, q holds (toy version; see Giannakidou and Mari (2018))

     H H H H H H H H_H H H H   [q] [q] [q]

}

I But even if Giannikidou and Mari are right, does the single future option never occur? What would constitute evidence that it occurs?

I (Let’s agree that we care about the morphosyntax-semantics

interface: simple/absent morphology goes with simple denotations.)

I Here I will argue that for a certain phenomenon (English

futurates), we need the single future option, in the form of a causal chain.

(4) a. The Red Sox play the Yankees tomorrow.

b. #The Red Sox defeat the Yankees tomorrow.

I In part this is because there is no morphology to go with a

quantificational denotation, but also because some complex meanings related to causation arise: authority, unplannability, etc.)

I We will need a distinction between grammatical (denotational, explicit) and conceptual (interpretational, implicit) meaning

I Many branches: possibilities explicit and causation implicit

I Single branch (causal chain): causation explicit and possibilities explicit

Grammatical vs. conceptual

grammar conceptual level

narrow syntax compositional semantics

interpretation of lexical items (lexicon)

interpretation of other terms (model)

semantics

Example: smoke

narrow syntax compositional semantics conceptual semantics

V label λsλx . x smoke in s interpretation of smoke

Futurates (Copley 2008)

narrow syntax compositional semantics?? conceptual semantics??

Operator (?) λx λpλw λt . x is committed to p in w at t interpretation of x ,p, w , and t

(presupposed: x directs p in w at t) interpretation of in and at

interpretation of committed to, direct interpretation of λ and .

Futurates (Copley 2018)

narrow syntax compositional semantics conceptual semantics

v label λpλe . ∃e0: e Cause e0 interpretation of Cause

interpretation of λ, and . interpretation of e as a dispositional state

interpretation of p as the description of an outcome in a disposition dispositional structure

Chomskyan and Humean impulses

Chomskyan impulse: simple grammar ⇒ simple interface ⇒ simple denotations ⇒ complex concepts

Humean impulse: simple concepts ⇒ complex denotations ⇒ complex interface

Resolution of the tension: more complexity at the conceptual level, less in the denotation. In the case we will see, manipulation of possibila is implicit (interpretation), causation is explicit (in denotation)

Recall the two options:

1. Many futures in denotation: manipulation of possibila is explicit (denotation), causation is explicit (interpretation)

2. One future (causal chain) in denotation: manipulation of possibila is implicit (interpretation), causation is explicit (in denotation)

Branching with a single future

A starting situation/event, ceteris paribus ( = normalcy + closed-world assumption),

causes (via laws of physics/rational behavior) a final situation/event of a certain description

Introduction

Futurates have future reference in the absence of future-oriented morphology, with a “planned” or “settled” flavor, as in (5). The need for a plan seems to suggest an animacy requirement for an entity that can make the plan.

(5) a. I make the coffee tomorrow.

b. The Red Sox play the Yankees tomorrow.

(6) a. #I get sick tomorrow.

b. #It rains tomorrow.

c. #The Red Sox beat the Yankees tomorrow.

But: idiosyncratic inanimate exceptions (“natural futurates”):

(7) a. The sun rises at 6 tomorrow.

Introduction

A similar case we will look at is have causatives, as in (8).

(8) a. Madeleine made me wake up early.

b. Madeleine had me wake up early.

(9) #The book had me wake up early.

But: idiosyncratic inanimate exceptions:

(10) The book had me waking up early/laughing/on the

I Goal today: propose causal theories of futurates and have causatives.

I To get to that goal, we will need a notion of dispositional

causation: a disposition (or a dispositional state) does the causing. Dispositions include but are not limited to intentions.

I This leads to an apparent problem with the syntax-semantics

interface: Dispositions are semantically complex (authority, control, ability, plans, settledness . . .), but futurates and have causatives are morphosyntactically simple.

I Solution to problem: We accommodate all of the dispositional

meaning even though not all of the dispositional structure is represented in the denotation.

Properties of futurates

(11) a. I make the coffee tomorrow.

b. The Red Sox play the Yankees tomorrow.

(12) a. #I get sick tomorrow.

b. #The Red Sox beat the Yankees tomorrow.

(13) a. The sun rises at 6:00 tomorrow.

b. The tide is high at 6:00 tomorrow.

Two other properties of futurates are worth mentioning here before we move on to an analysis.

Properties of futurates

First, past progressive futurates permit an extra adverbial which modifies the intention or plan of the director.

(14) Yesterday, the Red Sox were playing the Yankees tomorrow

Properties of futurates

Secondly, in a number of ways futurates behave like present-oriented derived statives.

(15) Judgments for epistemic readings (deontic/teleological

readings irrelevantly ok)

a. The Red Sox must play the Yankees tomorrow.

b. The tide must come in at 6:00.

c. #I must get sick tomorrow.

d. #The Red Sox must beat the Yankees tomorrow.

(16) a. The Red Sox play the Yankees tomorrow.

b. The Red Sox are playing the Yankees tomorrow.

(17) a. The sun rises at 6:00 tomorrow.

b. #The sun is rising at 6:00 tomorrow.

(18) a. I live in Paris.

I Together these generalizations suggest that there are (at least) two eventualities represented in the structure of futurates, and the higher one, which is stative, represents the director’s plan or intention.

I Contra Dowty (1977, 1979); Kaufmann (2005); Copley (2008,

2009), but following Copley (2014), futurate meaning is not associated with any overt morphology.

I Crosslinguistically, futurate readings should only be possible with

aspects that can take statives as their argument. In particular, progressives that disallow statives in general should also disallow futurate readings.

The structure of futurates

(19) Basic verbal structure, to be rejected (contradictory

temporal constraints on e):

now(e) present tense

agent(x , e) Voice

e cause e0 v

[[tomorrow ]](e) adverbial

The structure of futurates

now(e) present tense

e cause e0 vextra

agent(x , e0) Voice

e0 cause e00 v

[[tomorrow ]](e0) adverbial [[. . . ]](e00) . . .

The structure of futurates

What’s the extra causal relation?

I Intuitively, direct causation.

I This means that the director’s intention directly causes the agent’s

action. Is this ok?

I Yes, as certain events do not “count” as intervening but merely

enabling events (Wolff (2003), see also Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1994)): cf. turn on the TV with an intervening event of clicking on the remote

I In futurates, the agent’s intention, as well as any act of

communication between director and agent, can be seen in this way, so they do not pose a problem for the idea that the extra causal relation is direct causation.

I This suggests that the sense of authority is just what we get when

an agent action is directly caused by someone else’s intention (as if it were their own). Creepy, but accurate.

The structure of futurates

Ok, so it is direct causation. Now what?

I If the causal relation must be direct, there must be temporal

contiguity (no gap) between cause and effect (Fodor (1970); see Martin (2018) for a more nuanced recent discussion)

I Our causing eventuality e is stative (an intentional state)

I This permits double access (En¸c, 1987) for the causing eventuality

between the present and future time, which allows temporal contiguity between cause and future effect, satisfying direct causation

I Double access also makes sense because the director does not

normally change their intention before the agent’s action takes place

Generalizing from intentions to dispositions

The existence of natural futurates suggests a dispositional rather than a merely preferential analysis of intention for futurates (and see also Condoravdi and Lauer (2016)).

Fara (2001): N is disposed to M when C is true just in case N has some intrinsic property in virtue of which N Ms when C.

(21) Structure of a (dispositional) intention:

a. an intender y, who is the holder of . . .

b. an intentional state e, which in certain circumstances

directly causes . . .

c. an eventuality e0 . . .

d. that instantiates the eventuality description p

intended by y

In a very informal sense, and without relativizing it to the intender or the speaker, we can say that the certain circumstances are ceteris paribus (“(all) things are equal”) circumstances—nothing unforeseen intervenes.

Generalizing from intentions to dispositions

(22) Dispositional structure

a. y is the holder of e

b. e is a state that directly causes e0, ceteris paribus

c. e0 instantiates p d. y is disposed toward p (23) y e a. e’ b. p c. d.

Generalizing from intentions to dispositions

(24) Futurates:

from denotation from dispositional structure

y is the holder of e, disposed toward p

e is a state, directly causes e0 is a state held by y, directly causes e0ceteris paribus e0 is directly caused by e and is an

argument of the obligatory tem-poral adverbial

is directly caused by e ceteris paribus, instantiates p

Have causatives are similar to futurates

Sense of authority:

(25) a. Madeleine made me wake up early.

b. Madeleine had me wake up early.

Unplannability:

(26) a. Obama made/#had Clinton collapse last Tuesday.

b. Obama made/#had it rain.

Idiosyncratic inanimate causer exceptions to the apparent animacy requirement:

(27) a. #The book had John laugh.

Have causatives on the model of futurates?

(28) Initial hypothesis (to be revised): Have causatives with an

extra v head, like futurates VoicehaveP XX XXX      y VoicehaveP XX XXX      have vextraP XX XX     vextra VoiceP XX XX     x VoiceP P P PP     Voice vP H H   v . . . @

Problem 1: Not all have causatives are stative.

(29) a. Mary has John laugh. gen/hab only

Problem 2: Underspecification of have and dispositions

Underspecified have: Freeze (1992); Belvin and Den Dikken (1997); Ritter and Rosen (1993); Harley (1998); McIntyre (2006), among others

(30) HAVE(y, z) asserts of y that it is in some relationship to z

If there is both an extra Voice head (have) and an extra v head below it:

(31) a. haver(y , [[vextraP]])

b. [[vextraP]] = λe . e cause e0& e0 cause e00& [[. . . ]](e00) Wrong meaning! y e a. e’ b. p c. d.

Problem 2: Underspecification of have and dispositions

(32) no extra v head (correct meaning)

VoicehaveP hhhh ( ( ( ( y VoicehaveP hhhh ( ( ( ( have VoiceP hhhh ( ( ( ( x VoiceP hhh ( ( ( Voice vP P_P   v . . . (33) haver(y , [[VoiceP]])

(34) [[VoiceP]] = λe0 _{. agent(x, e) & e cause e}0 & [[. . . ]](e00)

Right meaning! y e a. e’ b. p c. d.

Explicit and implicit ingredients of dispositions

So, how can have causatives make reference to dispositions if they don’t have an extra head introducing an extra causal relation and dispositional state?

Idea: by evoking parts of the dispositional structure, we get the whole thing

(35) Futurates (= (24)):

from structure in (20) from dispositional structure

y is the holder of e, disposed toward p

e is a state, directly causes e0 is a state held by y, directly causes e0 ceteris paribus

e0 is directly caused by e and is an argument of the obligatory tem-poral adverbial

is directly caused by e ceteris paribus, instantiates p

p is instantiated by e0 is what y is disposed toward, is instantiated by e0

(36) Have causatives:

from structure in (32) from dispositional structure

y bears a relation to p is the holder of e, disposed toward p

e is a state held by y, directly causes e0ceteris paribus

e0 is directly caused by e ceteris paribus, instantiates

p

What-can-cause-what for have causatives

We still need to rule out the “mere authority” readings of these:

(37) a. John had the branch break the window.

(Folli and Harley, 2005)

b. The teacher had the plastic wrap cover the food.

(Bjorkman and Cowper, 2013)

c. Madeleine had John sneeze.

(38) What-can-cause-what constraint #1

For any e such that e is an intention, if e cause e0, ∃x :

agent(x , e0) UNLESS e is the intention of a

director/playwright/author/creator toward their fictional creation

What-can-cause-what for have causatives

The other main example we need to explain is that of inanimate exceptions such as (39a) and (40a), which can be compared with the minimally different (39b) and (40b).

(39) a. The book had John laughing.

b. #The book had John laugh.

(40) a. The pepper had John sneezing.

b. #The pepper had John sneeze.

(41) What-can-cause-what constraint #2

For any e0 such that ∃x : agent(x, e0), if e cause e0,

Conclusion

I I argued for a causal theory of futurates and have causatives, using

dispositions.

I Futurates have an extra v head and no extra Voice head, while

have causatives have an extra Voice head and no extra v head.

I Each evokes different parts of the conceptual structure of

dispositions, with remaining parts accommodated:

I Futurates: The extra v introduces an explicit (dispositional) state and a causal relation; the disposer is implicit.

I Have causatives: The extra Voice explicitly intoduces the disposer as having a relationship to an eventuality description, and the dispositional state and causal relation are implicit.

I Simple morphosyntax can go with complex meaning.

I What-can-cause-what constraints operate on the logical

What can we conclude about future reference?

I It’s possible to have future reference by means of a causal chain in

the denotation with branching in the interpretation

I As always, there is more than one way to skin a linguistic cat—an

understanding of the grammatical/conceptual divide helps us come up with hypotheses

I Practical advice: pay close attention to discrepancies between the

truth and assertibility conditions of apparently similar items in different languages (42) Non not ´ e is a at scuola. school Sar`a be.Fut.3Sg malato. ill ‘He is not at school. He must be ill.’

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