Bank Ownership and Credit Cycle: the lower sensitivity of public bank lending to the business cycle

Our main results support the conjecture that the ultimate controlling shareholders with excess control rights avoid issuing equity and instead draw on earnings

Hence, by favoring informal lending in regions where In-group trust is high, bank lending is expected to develop at a lower rate as people will be less relying on banks

To ensure that the control group and the treated group are balanced, and that any changes in loans are not due to other factors (Abadie 2003), we add as control variables to

When we consider technical efficiency scores computed with Model 1 (input minimization), we find that banks which are held by minority shareholders (widely- held) exhibit higher

Finally, we consider the capital bu¤er system where the representative bank applies backward-looking provisioning rules and uses a capital bu¤er in order to cover expected losses

In this paper we construct a theoretical model of spatial banking competition that considers the differential information among banks and potential borrowers in order

Using a sample of European commercial banks over the period 2004-2009, we …nd that whether or not a bank practices income smoothing through LLP does indeed depend on its degree

indicators, because bank performance can be expected to be affected by the state of the economy (namely nominal GDP per capita, real GDP per capita, nominal GDP growth, real