La métaphysique de la représentation
Philipp Keller, Université de Genève,philipp.keller@unige.ch séminaire MA, Université de Neuchâtel
jeudi, 10-11.30, B 1.42
Page web:http://www.philosophie.ch/philipp/teaching/perception.php username: philosophy
password: iswhatiliketodomost
Plan des séances (préliminaire)
• le problème classique de la perception
23.2. Introduction: le problème de la perception
8.3. Le problème plus en profondeur: les objets de la perception et la théorie des idées
15.3. Le problème plus en profondeur: le contenu de la perception 22.3. Le problème plus en profondeur: la relation perceptuelle 29.3. Le problème plus en profondeur: les sensibles propres 5.4. Un premier résumé: le réalisme perspectival
• le problème plus général de la représentation 19.4. Les autres modalités sensorielles 26.4. Le problème de Molyneux 3.5. Qualités premières et secondes 10.5. Représentation et intentionnalité 24.5. Différentes formes de relationalité 31.5. Les émotions
Introduction: the problem of perception
Distinguish:
• Ssees thatp.
• Sseesx.
Dimensions of comparison:
1. propositional / non-propositional: but (i) thatpmay be de-se (Ssees that he himself∗is making the mess); (ii)xmay be a fact, or another worldly item of propositional form;
2. conceptual / non-conceptual: but (i) you can regret thatpwithout ‘having’ the concepts needed to understand thatp; (ii) we need concepts to see artefacts, beginnings and endings, social events (the crash of the stockmarket, Maria’s regret);
3. epistemic / non-epistemic: but (i) you can see thatpwithout it being the case thatp; (ii) seeingxmay be taken to be itself an epistemic relation (‘acquain- tance’);
Question: How are we to combine representation with relationality?
Way out? Take the veridicality of perception to be ‘primitive’. Characterise ‘un- successful’ (pseudo-) perception in terms of success-conditions:
(a) A belief thatpis successful (true) iffp.
(b) A perception thatpis successful (veridical) iffpandX. (c) An emotion thatpis successful (correct) iffpandY.
What areXandY? More generally: How do we justify (a) to (c)? It is not enough, e.g., to say that beliefaimsat truth, because both perceptions and emotions do so as well and they needXandY.
Intentionalists believe that mental episodes represent through mediation of some intentional content.
What else is there in perception? Maria and the knowledge argument (call “qualia”
the experienced„ but non-representational aspects, if any, of our mental states).
1. knowing-that vs. knowing-how?
2. different modes of presentation?
3. different concepts?
4. different facts, which stand in some causal / constitutive / determination / grounding relation?
5. different facts, which stand in no such relation?
Step back: both what we feel and what we represent have their perspectivality in common.
Back to the problem of error: How can we account for our perceptual relation with the world given that there are perceptual situations where we are not in con- tact with either the objects nor the properties we locate in the world on the basis of our experiences?
The orthodox picture: direct realism and the argu- ments from illusion and from hallucination
Prephilosophically, many people think: Sense-perception gives us immediate and direct access to the world. Problem: Illusions and hallucinations. If it is possible to perceive things differently from how they really are or even to seem to perceive things that are not there at all, how can perception give us “immediate and direct access” to the world?
Different questions to tackle:
• Epistemology: How do we gain knowledge from perception?
• Philosophy of mind: What is the nature of perceptual experience?
• Metaphysics: What are the objects of perception and what are they like?
When we see, we undergo certain physiological processes and we also have avisual experience. Problem: We also have visual experiences when we are hallucinating.
(Terminological point: “See” and “perceive” are success verbs in philosophy, that is:
When I see or perceive a flying horse, then that flying horse exist.) Macbeth did not see or perceive a dagger before him, but instead
• he merely seemed to see one; or
• he had an experience as of one; or
• he had an experience that represented one.
We can have visual experiences when we are not seeing. These are of two types:
• hallucinatory: We do not see anything, we merely seem to see something / have a visual experience as of something: there is nothing to perceive.
• illusionary: We do see something, but we do not see it the way it really is.
Some cases may be hard to qualify one way or other.
Two big questions in philosophy of perception:
1. How do we differentiate seeing from hallucinating (and other bodily states and events)?
2. What is the nature of perceptual experience?
Two views:
Common factor theorists : Many people have thought that for every percep- tual experience involved in seeing (veridical experience) there is a matching indistinguishable hallucinatory experience. Veridical experiences and halluci- natory experiences are the same in phenomenal character (phenomenal char- acter: what the experience is like to me). So we must give exactly the same account of both experiences. E.g.: Sense datum theories or representational- ism.
Disjunctivists : Others think that we should not give the same account of veridi- cal and non-veridical perceptual experiences.
The argument from illusion
(Pa) An object can appear other than it really is.
(Pb) In these circumstances, we are aware of something that has the prop- erties that the object lacks.
C1: This “something” cannot be identical with the object in the world as these two things have different properties, therefore it must be an ‘inner’ object.
(Pc) There is no relevant difference between cases of illusion and cases of veridical perception.
C2: If an ‘inner’ object of awareness is posited in illusion, then it should be posited
in the case of veridical perception.
(Pd) In perception, we are aware of something ‘inner’.
C3: All cases of experiences involve directly seeing/being aware of an ‘inner’ object (sense-datum) which has the properties that the objects in the world appear to have.
The argument from hallucination
(P1) When I hallucinate I am not (immediately) aware of any ‘worldly’ ob- ject at all.
(P2) When I hallucinate I am nonetheless aware of something.
(P3) Hallucination and veridical perception are phenomenally indistin- guishable.
(P4) Experiences that are phenomenally indistinguishable are of the same type.
(P5) Experiences of the same type have the same immediate objects.
(C) In perception, I am aware of something ‘non-worldy’.
The argument is valid, but almost every premise has been challenged:
challenging(P3) (and perhaps (Pa)?) The idea behind (P5), that every percep- tual experience involved in a non-illusionary perception could be had when one undergoes a hallucination, has been challenged by J.L. Austin: How do we know that indistinguishable hallucinations are possible? Evidence sug- gests that not. Austin in “Sense and Sensibilia”: Dreaming that one meets the pope is not at all really like meeting the pope.
Reply: This argument won’t do, because we are not arguing whether or not we actually have indistinguishable hallucinations, but whether these hallucina- tions are possible at all, i.e. whether they are metaphysically possible. There seems to be no compelling reason why not: Ifxcauses a brain state and this brain state causes me to have an experience of the pope, there is no reason why something else,y, could not cause the brain state that causes me to have an experience of the pope.
rejecting(P4) (and perhaps (Pc)?) It is not the case that experiences that are phenomenally indistinguishable are of the same type. Rather: Having an ex- perience of one type might seem the same as having an experience of another type. This is the disjunctivist claim. We will still go through disjunctivism in the 2nd session.
rejecting(P2) (and perhaps (Pb)?) (P2) says that when I hallucinate I am nonethe- less aware of something. This premise is encapsulated in Howard Robinson’s
“Phenomenal Principle”:
If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which pos- sesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible quality. (Robin- son 1994, p. 32)
One might think this premise is question begging (already assuming what is to be proved). Why can we not reject the phenomenological principle and say instead that we merely seem to be aware of an object that has the prop- erties we seem to see?
Reply: This would then force sense-datum opponents to reject the principle for every kind of experience. So, even when we are having a veridical percep- tion, we only seem to be aware of an object that has the properties we seem to see.
rejecting(P5) Isn’t “Experiences of the same type have the same immediate ob- jects” also question begging? Why can we not say phenomenally similar ex- periences have different objects? Reply: phenomenal principle.
Standard responses
Sense datum theory
The sense datum theorist is a ’common factor theorist’: Same account of experience in hallucination and perception.
The two main arguments for the sense-datum theory are the argument from illusion and the argument from hallucinating.
Two versions of sense-datum theory:
(i) representative or indirect realist theory of perception (ii) irrealist/idealist theory of perception
Realism, roughly, is the view that the objects we perceive exist, and have at least some of the features that we perceive them as having, even when they are not per- ceived. They are mind-independent.
• According to common sense and direct realism, we directly perceive mind- independent object.
• According to indirect realism, we indirectly perceive mind-independent ob- jects in virtue of directly seeing sense-data. Sense-data represent how the world is to us.
For now we will say:
(1) A perceiverPdirectly/immediate perceives an objectOiffPperceives Owithout perceiving any intermediaryI.
During the first half of the 20th century, most philosophers were sense data-theorists (eg B. Russell, A.J. Ayer, C.D. Broad, H.H. Price). Since then theory has mostly been
rejected. Exceptions: Frank Jackson, Howard Robinson.
Three things to know about sense-data:
1. “Sense-data” is a plural term,“sense-datum” is the singular.
2. Sense-data are mental objects present to the mind. They are not patterns of light on your eye or any property of your brain.
3. Terminological problem: G.E. Moore was one of the first sense-datum theo- rists. For him, sense-data are direct objects of perceptions whatever they turn out to be: his question was whether sense-data are physical mind-independent or non-physical mental objects. Nowadays, “sense-data” is used to mean im- mediate or direct objects of perception, and the objects are non-physical and mind-dependent.
Sense-datum theorists claim to offer the best account of the phenomenology of perceptual experience. According to them, both veridical and non-veridical per- ception is a relation between a subject and an object. Sense-datum theory captures an important aspect of hallucination: It seems as if an object with certain features is presented or given to you in experience.
Some have claimed sense-data theory does not give a good account of phenomenol- ogy of veridical experiences:
• it does seem as if we are directly aware of mind-independent objects
• it does not seem as if we are indirectly aware of them in virtue of being aware of sense-data.
This is sometimes called “transparency of experience”: When we see a tree, we can only see the features of the tree not the features of the experience of the tree.
Can sense-datum theory account for the transparency of experience?
Objections to the sense-datum theory: phenomenological Sense-datum theory is committed to:
(2) If things appear to you in a certain way then some sense-datum actually is that way.
It looks like you can never be wrong about the nature of your sense-data: they have all the properties they appear to have.
David Armstrong in “A Materialist Theory of Mind” questions the nature of sense- data.
When I look at a speckled hen, I have a sense-datum with a large number of speck- les. Yet I do not know how many speckles. If sense-data are as they appear to be, then my sense-datum must have an indeterminate number. Objects, even mental objects, can’t be determinate in this way, “it is obvious that to be is to be deter- minate” (Armstrong 1968, p. 220). But if there are a determinate number, then sense-data cannot be just as they appear to be. So either
• the nature of sense-data are indeterminate: should be rejected for metaphys- ical reasons;
• or they are determinate, but then not how they appear to be: against the very idea of sense-data.
Frank Jackson in “Perception” replies to Armstrong: Sense-data are not indetermi- nate; the sense-datum theorist is only committed to
(4) If things appear to you in a certain way, then some sense-datum actually is that way.
not to
(5) If a sense-datum is a certain way, then it appears that way.
Being perceptually aware of some characteristic is a sufficient condition to attribute this characteristic to a sense-datum, not a necessary one.
Other phenomenological objections:
• Is the change of experience really brought about by a change in the object?
• Can sense-data be impossible objects?
• One response would be that sense-data are just two-dimensional.
• Can we account for the change in one’s experience when one sees drawings as two- or three-dimensional?
Objections to the sense-datum theory: ontological
Sense-data are strange entities: They dont seem to be physical objects, neither are they located in physical space, but they appear to have spatial characteristics. They seem to have extension because we describe them using spatial language: the bit on the left is green, the bit on the right is red. We can even describe them as moving.
But where in space do they exist?
Objections to the sense-datum theory: epistemological
Sense-data theories promote scepticism by interposing a ‘veil’ of sense-data be- tween us and the world. When we perceive we are only aware of sense-data: how can we know of the existence of objects in the world?
Two responses available to sense-datum theorist:
1. Sense-datum theory does not suffer worse from scepticism than other theo- ries. Internalist epistemic theories hold that whether a subject knows some- thing is accessiblevia reflection to the subject. KK principle: If you know something, you know that you know it. External epistemic theories (e.g. re- liabilism) hold that whether you know something depends on whether you have used a reliable process (but you don’t need to know that the process is reliable in order to gain knowledge).
• For internalists: Sceptical worries for the sense-datum theorist (he can- not know about real objects) but also for direct realists: they must ad- mit that nothing allows them to determine whether they are perceiving
or hallucinating (they cannot just say we “know” when we perceive be- cause, just as in the argument against sense-datum theorists, the mere fact that one seems to be aware of some object does not imply that in reality, there must be some object of which one is aware.
• For externalists: Direct realists can say that perceiving provides knowl- edge because it is a reliable method. But sense-datum theorists can make same move: Directly seeing sense-data sometimes constitutes in- direct perception of the world. When this happens I perceive and this is a reliable process
2. Sense-datum theorists can appeal to the hypo-deductive model of explana- tion. The best explanation for the sense-data and the regularities in the pat- terns of sense-data is the existence of external objects causing sense data, which sense-data most accurately represent.
Representationalism
Representationalists are common-kind theorists who do not posit problematic men- tal objects.
How is that possible? In veridical experience, the subject stands in direct relation to mind-independent object, but this is not what is important in perceptual expe- rience. What is important is that the experience represents the world. In cases of hallucination or illusion our experience misrepresents the world. But: in all cases of perceptual experience we represent the world.
Representationalism claims that perceptual experiences are representational states:
Experiences represent the world to us via “experiential content”.
Different varieties of representationalism argue about (i) what content is
(ii) what the features of an experience are The Content of Experience
Consider
(a) Julien believes that Philipp is drunk.
(b) David desires that Philipp is drunk.
They have a common form:
(a) X believes that Y (b) X desires that Y
(a) and (b) are different propositional attitudes that have the same content (Y).
X takes a certain attitude towards a proposition (Y), i.e. attitude of believing or desiring.
Propositional attitudes are about certain things. Y specifies the content of the attitude- what it is about: the propositional content.
Commonly held about propositional contents:
1. Contents can be true or false
2. Propositional contents are constituted by propositions and propositions can be expressed by uttering/thinking a sentence. Propositional content: speci- fied by ‘that’-clause and proposition (‘Philipp is drunk’). Propositional atti- tude expressed by beliefs, desires, hopes, fears etc.
3. Different sentences can express the same proposition: “Jack has lost his bag”
/ “Jack a perdu son sac” different sentences, same proposition.
Representationalists claim that perceptual experiences have propositional content.
Suppose Nick has a visual experience such that it seems to him as if there is a green worm on a rock. We have:
(c) Nick seems to see that there is a slimy worm on a rock.
The propositional content of that experience is “that there is a slimy worm on a rock”. When someone has a visual experience it seems to them as if P. The propo- sition that specifies how it seems also determines the content of the experience.
Important: Even if Nick knows he hallucinates, the content of his visual experi- ence is still “there is a slimy worm”.
Idea: Perception is mainly there to give information about the world to a subject, hence experiences represent the world. In hallucination and illusion experiences misrepresent the world.
Varieties of representationalism
Propositional content is also called “conceptual content”: content that can be ex- pressed by a sentence. In order to grasp a propositional content one much grasp the concepts that comprise that content. (To believe there is cheese on the table then you must possess the concept of cheese). All propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires etc) have propositional, conceptual content. Whether or not perceptual experiences have conceptual content, or another kind of content is a big debate.
Conceptual versus non-conceptual content:
1. Conceptual content:
(a) can be expressed by a sentence (b) is either true or false
2. Non-conceptual content:
(a) cannot be expressed by language
Some philosophers believe that experience have non-conceptual content, either in addition or instead of conceptual content. Argument for conceptual content:
Having a perceptual experience is very close to entertaining a belief: because it seems to the subject as if there is a slimy worm, he must have the ability to have the belief there is a slimy worm
Problem 1: Only creatures that possess suitable concepts can have visual experi- ences with a certain content But what about subjects that
• do not possess the required concepts
• do not possess any concepts at all
According to non-conceptualists, ascribing those subjects non-conceptual content seems the only way to make sense of their behaviour.
Problem 2: But what is it to possess a concept? How do we know if a subject possess a concept? There are roughly two kinds of accounts:
• Low grade view: A subject possesses a concept of X, if they can discriminate X from other things and re-identify X on other occasions
• High grade view: A subject possesses a concept of X, if they possess a lan- guage which contains that concept.
Question: Can we argue for a non-conceptual view, where concept is understood in a low-grade way? We have to find an example of a subject having experiences, with- out being able to discriminate the objects of experience beforehand and without being able to reidentify them. Can a subject have visual experiences with contents, when the subject lacks the concepts to specify the contents?
Conceptual content:
1. belief theories of representationalism 2. strong representationalism
Non-conceptual content:
1. weak representationalism 2. strong representationalism
Belief or doxastic theories of perceptual experience
First representationlists tried to hold that perceptions are just beliefs. Example:
Georg Pitcher, David Armstrong.
Argument against belief theory: Most philosophers hold that perceptual and sen- sory experiences (eg pains, itches) are a different type of mental state to the propo- sitional attitudes. Why?
1. Introspection suggests so
2. No distinctive phenomenology with propositional attitudes, but with expe- riences
3. Experiences are often said to be necessarily conscious and occurrent (present) states; propositional attitudes not (we might have subconscious beliefs, de- sires… but experiences?)
4. Considerations about non-conceptual content (if one accepts them).
Motivation for belief theories:
1. to get rid of sense-data and phenomenal character .
2. to provide a type identity /functionalist story about belief and reduce mental states to physical states
David Armstrong in “A Materialist Theory of Mind”: “Perception is nothing other than the acquiring of a belief about the current environment by means of senses”.
Perception here is perceptual experience, i.e. illusions, hallucinations and veridical experiences. Problems
1. “acquiring of belief”- clause
2. Perceptual experiences are necessary conscious and occurrent: they are con- scious events. Beliefs not. Reply A: Acquiring a belief is a conscious event.
Counter-reply: Acquiring a belief can be unconscious too (When I consciously perceived the ceiling of this room, I unconsciously acquired the belief that the room still has a ceiling)
3. Can’t we perceive something and not acquire a belief? Perhaps we already knew it or we don’t believe what we see. Reply A: We have at least an inclina- tion to form a belief. I would have formed a belief if I had not already got it. I would have formed the belief in the absence of countervailing circumstances.
General problem: Perceptual illusions persist even when one knows that one has one and its nature: “Müller-Lyer-Illusion”.
Reductive versus non-reductive representationalism
This form of representationalism is called reductive, because (i) phenomenal char- acter is reduced to having a particular content; and (ii) the having of a particular content is explained in physical terms. Reductive representationalism: Belief the- ories and strong representationalism
Non-reductive representationalism is weak representationalism (Ned Block, Christo- pher Peacocke): Experiences are non-conceptual, but represent; non-reductive:
phenomenal character (not explained in terms of physical and or functional fea- tures); compatible with sense datum view : sense-data represent the world
Strong representationalism (Tye, Dretske): non-conceptual or conceptual; reduc- tive: phenomenal character can be explained in physical terms. Reductive repre- sentationalism is based on the Transparency thesis:
(T) Experiences have no introspectible features that are not also represen- tational contents.
When you have an experience of a tree, you just see the tree- you don’t see “the experience” itself. A TV for example is something that represents without being transparent: it represents the world, but we can also see the TV itself.
1. all features of an experiences represent (no features of the experience that do not belong to the (representing) content
2. phenomenal character is (fully) explained by content of experience
(1) is supported by transparency claim. (2) is supported by the fact that differences in phenomenal character are always accompanied by differences in content and vice versa. When you experience a chameleon that changes its colour, then
• the phenomenal character, i.e. what it is like to have this experience, will change
• the content of your experience will change (i.e. when you believe in concep- tual content, the content will change eg from “there is a green chameleon” to
“there is a red chameleon”).
So, strong representationalists believe that
• experiences have content (conceptual or non-conceptual),
• experiences represent via their content (the content represents the world),
• phenomenal character, i.e. ‘what it is like to have an experience’, and content always change together (when one changes the other changes too).
Some people, like Tye, conclude that phenomenal characteriscontent.
To prove strong Representationalism wrong we must:
• find a feature of our experience that is not representational (does not just rep- resent the world, but is a feature of the representing thing, the experience);
• find an example that involves a difference in phenomenal character withoutor difference in content or vice versa.
Guide to the literature
Overviews:
• Lowe, E. J. (2000) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, Chapter 5.
• Gallois, A. ”Sense-data”, in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy online,
http://www.rep.routledge.com/philosophy/cgi-bin/article.cgi?it=V034. Traditional sense-datum accounts:
• Russell, B. (1912) Problems of Philosophy, London: Thornton Butterworth, Chapter 1.
• Moore, G. E. (1953) Some Main Problems of Philosophy, London: Allen and Unwin, Chapter 2.
• Ayer, A. J. (1940) The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, London: Macmil- lan, Chapters 1 and 2.
Modern sense-datum accounts:
• Jackson, F. (1977) Perception: A Representative Theory, Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press.
• Robinson, H. (1994) Perception, London: Routledge.
Critical discussions of sense-datum theory:
• Robinson, H. (1994) Perception, London: Routledge.
• Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept of Mind, London: Hutchinson, Chapter 7.
• Austin, J. L. (1962) Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Pitcher, G. (1971) A Theory of Perception, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, Chapter 1.
• Quinton, A. M. (1955) ”The Problem of Perception”, Mind, 64, pp. 28 - 51.
Reprinted in Swartz (ed.) Perceiving Sensing and Knowing, Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press, 1965.
• Barnes, W. H. F. (1945) ”The Myth of Sense-Data”, Proceedings of the Aris- totelian Society, 45, pp. 89-118. Reprinted in R. J. Swartz (ed.) Perceiving,
Sensing and Knowing, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.
Sense-data and epistemology:
• Dancy, J. (1985) Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Oxford: Black- well, Chapters 10 and 11.
• Jackson, F. (1977) Perception: A Representative Theory, Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press, Chapter 6.
Perception involves intentional states and admissible content:
• Siegel, S. (2005) “The Contents of Perception”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/perception-contents/>
• Gendler, T. S. and Hawthorne, J. (2006) “Introduction: Perceptual Experi- ence”, in their Perceptual Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Sec- tion: Question 1.
• Hawthorne (eds.) Perceptual Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
• McGinn, C. (1982) The Character of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press,2006 Chapter 3.
• Peacocke, C. (1983) Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Chapter 1.
Overviews of the nonconceptual content debate:
• *Martin, M. G. F. (1994) “Perceptual Content”, in S. Guttenplan (ed.) A Com- panion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell.
• Crane, T. (1998) “Content, Non-Conceptual”, in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge, pp. 640-643.
• Bermúdez, J. (2003) “Nonconceptual Mental Content”, The Stanford Ency- clopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/content-nonconceptual/>
Pro non-conceptual content:
• Crane, T. (1992) “The Nonconceptual Content of Experience”, in T. Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, Cambridge: Cam- bridge University Press.
• Martin, M. G. F. (1992) “Perception, Concepts and Memory”, The Philosoph- ical Review, Vol. 101, No. 4, pp. 745-763.
• *Bermúdez, J. L. (1998) The Paradox of Self-Consciousness, Cambridge, MA.:
MIT Press, Chapter 3.
Anti non-conceptual content:
• *McDowell, J. (1994) Mind and World, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, Lecture III.
Belief theories:
• Pro: *Armstrong, D. M. (1968) A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
• Con: *Crane, T. (1992) “The Nonconceptual Content of Experience” in T.
Crane (ed.) The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Overview of representationalism generally:
• *Seager, W. (1999) Theories of Consciousness, London: Routledge, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.
Pro representationalism:
• *Tye, M. (1995) “A Representational Theory of Pains and their Phenomenal Character”, in J. E. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 9, Atas- cadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co. Reprinted in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge M.A.: MIT Press, 1997.
• Tye, M. (1995) Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
• *Tye, M. (2000) Consciousness Color and Content, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
• *Tye, M. (1998) “Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationism”, in J. E.
Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives 12: Language, Mind and Ontol- ogy, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• *Dretske, F. (1995) Naturalising the Mind, Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press.
• *W. Lycan (1996) Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press, Chapter 7.
• *Harman, G. (1990) “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, in J. E. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., pp. 31-52. Reprinted in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge M.A.: MIT Press, 1997.
Anti representationalism:
• *Block, N. (1990) “Inverted Earth”, in J. E. Tomberlin (ed.) Philosophical Per- spectives, Vol. 4, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., pp. 52-79. Reprinted in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.) The Nature of Conscious- ness, Cambridge M.A.: MIT Press, 1997.
• Block, N. (1996) “Mental Paint and Mental Latex”, in E. Villanueva (ed.) Per- ception: Philosophical Issues, 7, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co. (A similar piece can be found online here.)
• Block, N. 91998) “Is Experiencing Just Representing?”, Philosophy and Phe- nomenological Research, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 663-670.
• Macpherson, F (2005) ‘Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2005, Vol. 70, No. 1, pp. 127-
• Macpherson, F. (2003) “Novel Colours and the Content of Experience”, Pa-152.
cific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 84, pp. 43-66.
On Disjunctivism:
• Haddock, A. and Macpherson, F. (2008) “Introduction: Varieties of Disjunc- tivism” in our Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge , Oxford Uni- versity Press.
• *McDowell, J. (1982) “Criteria Defeasibility and Knowledge”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68, pp. 455-479. (Reprinted in J. Dancy (ed.) Perceptual
Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.) (Also reprinted in J.
McDowell (ed.) Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality, Cambridge MA.: Harvard University Press, 1998.)
• *Snowdon, P. (1980) “Perception, Vision and Causation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 81, pp. 175-192. Reprinted in J. Dancy (ed. ) Perceptual Knowledge Reprinted in , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Reprinted in Nöe, A. and Thompson, E. (2002) (eds.) Vision and Mind: Selected Read- ings in the Philosophy of Perception, Cambridge MA.: MIT Press.
• Martin, M. G. F. (2004) “The Limits of Self-Awareness” Philosophical Stud- ies, 120, pp. 37-89.
• Child, W. (1992) “Vision and Experience: The Causal Theory and the Dis- junctive Conception”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 42, pp. 297-316.
• *Millar, A. (1996) “The Idea of Experience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96 pp. 75-90.
• The essays in Haddock, A. and Macpherson, F. (2008) (eds.) Disjunctivism:
Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press.
In addition to the above reading, two modern collections on Philosophy of Percep- tion that you may find useful:
• R. Schwartz, R. (2004) Perception, Cambridge MA.: MIT Press.
• Nöe, A. and Thompson, E. (2002) (eds.) Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception, Cambridge MA.: MIT Press.
