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(1)

Coalition games on interaction graphs

Nicolas Bousquet

Zhentao Li

Adrian Vetta LIRIS,

Lyon

DIENS, Paris

McGill University,

Canada

(2)

Coalition games v

I : agents

Input:

(3)

v

v(I)

v(S)

v(T)

v : valuations

Coalition games

I : agents

Input:

(4)

v

Goal: Distribute total wealth to agents to avoid

blocking coalitions.

v(I)

v(S)

v(T)

v : valuations

Coalition games

I : agents

Input:

(5)

Goal: Distribute to avoid

Coalition games

v(I)

v

v(S)=2

v(T)=8

2 2 1

0 3

2 1

1 1

v(I)=13

v(T) > x(T)

(6)

T is blocking

Goal: Distribute to avoid

Coalition games

v(I)

v

v(S)=2

v(T)=8

2 2 1

0 3

2 1

1 1

v(I)=13

v(T) > x(T)

(7)

for disjoint S, T T is blocking

Goal: Distribute to avoid

Coalition games

v(I)

v

v(S)=2

v(T)=8

2 2 1

0 3

2 1

1 1

v(I)=13

v(T) > x(T)

(8)

Goal: Find x s.t.

LP formulation

2 2 1

0 3

2 1

1 1

v(I)

where

(9)

core : all x satisfying this Goal: Find x s.t.

LP formulation

2 2 1

0 3

2 1

1 1

v(I)

where

(10)

Communication

(11)

Communication

(12)

connected

= possible disconnected

= impossible

Communication

(13)

v(S)=0

connected

= possible disconnected

= impossible

Communication

(14)

Example graphs

Same as unrestricted

(15)

Only coalitions of size 1

Example graphs

Same as unrestricted

(16)

Goal: Find x s.t.

Least core

core : all x satisfying this

(17)

Goal: Find x s.t.

Least core

-core : all x satisfying this

(18)

: minimum with non-empty -core least-core : -core

Goal: Find x s.t.

Least core

-core : all x satisfying this

(19)

= Relative cost of stability : minimum with

non-empty -core least-core : -core

Goal: Find x s.t.

Least core

-core : all x satisfying this

(20)

Packing-covering LP

Covering LP

s.t.

(21)

s.t.

Packing LP

Packing-covering LP

Covering LP

s.t.

(22)

s.t.

Packing LP

Packing-covering LP

Covering LP

s.t.

(23)

optimum

integral opt is

s.t.

Packing LP

Packing-covering LP

Covering LP

s.t.

(24)

Main question

Question: Given a graph, what is the worst possible ratio

over all valuations?

(25)

Main question

Question: Given a graph, what is the worst possible ratio

over all valuations?

(26)

Previous bound: treewidth

- this inequality holds for all games - treewidth of

Meir et al.

(27)

Treewidth

A B

C

D E F G

H

(28)

Treewidth

A B

C

D E F

G

H

Tree decomposion of

(29)

Treewidth

A B

C

D E F

G

H

Tree decomposion of

A B C

C C

B B

B

D E

E E

E F G G

G H

(30)

Treewidth

A B

C

D E F

G

H

Tree decomposion of

A B C

C C

B B

B

D E

E E

E F G G

G H

- subtree of nodes containing

(31)

Treewidth

A B

C

D E F

G

H

Tree decomposion of

B C

C C

B B

B

- subtree of nodes containing adjacent

vertices intersecting subtrees

(32)

Treewidth

A B

C

D E F

G

H

Tree decomposion of

A B C

C C

B B

B

D E

E E

E F G G

G H

- subtree of nodes containing of width 3-1 = 2 adjacent

vertices intersecting subtrees

(33)

- vinewidth of

Vine decomposion of of width 3

Vinewidth

B A

C DFE

A B

C D E

F

adjacent vertices

intersecting or adjacent subtrees

(34)

Our new bounds

- this inequality holds for some game - this inequality holds for all games

- vinewidth of

(35)

Upper bound

Proof idea:

(36)

Upper bound

Proof idea:

(37)

1 5

Upper bound

Proof idea:

(38)

1 5

Upper bound

Proof idea:

root root

(39)

1 5

Upper bound

Proof idea:

1

Find min payment to make x feasible.1

Pay that to all vertices in that node.

root root

(40)

1 5

Upper bound

Proof idea:

1

Find min payment to make x feasible.1

Pay that to all vertices in that node.

root root

(41)

1 5

Upper bound

Proof idea:

1

Find min payment to make x feasible.1

Pay that to all vertices in that node.

root root

(42)

1 5

Upper bound

Proof idea:

1

Find min payment to make x feasible.1

Pay that to all vertices in that node.

3 3 root root

(43)

Lower bound

(44)

Duality theorem:

vinewidth = maximum thicket order

Lower bound

(45)

thicket: pairwise intersecting connected subgraphs

order: smallest hitting set

Duality theorem:

vinewidth = maximum thicket order

Lower bound

(46)

thicket: pairwise intersecting connected subgraphs

order: smallest hitting set

Duality theorem:

vinewidth = maximum thicket order

Lower bound

(47)

Lower bound proof

thicket: pairwise intersecting connected subgraphs

order: smallest hitting set

(48)

Lower bound proof

thicket: pairwise intersecting connected subgraphs

order: smallest hitting set

(49)

Lower bound proof

So

thicket: pairwise intersecting connected subgraphs

order: smallest hitting set

(50)

Lower bound proof

And So

thicket: pairwise intersecting connected subgraphs

order: smallest hitting set

(51)

Lower bound proof

And So

thicket: pairwise intersecting connected subgraphs

order: smallest hitting set

(52)

- this inequality holds for some game - this inequality holds for all games

Our other bounds

(53)

Packing gap

(optional)

(54)

Packing gap

(optional)

Find a grid minor in G of size polynomial in tw(G)

Chekuri Chuzhoy

(55)

Packing gap

(optional)

Find a grid minor in G of size polynomial in tw(G)

Chekuri Chuzhoy

Prove

(56)

Packing gap

(optional)

Find a grid minor in G of size polynomial in tw(G)

Chekuri Chuzhoy

Prove

Build a game using this thicket in just the minor.

(57)

Covering gap

(optional)

(58)

Covering gap

(optional)

Take the best thicket H and a best hitting set X for it.

(59)

Covering gap

(optional)

Take the best thicket H and a best hitting set X for it.

v(S) = 1 if S is union of elements of H and intersects > half of X

(60)

Covering gap

(optional)

Take the best thicket H and a best hitting set X for it.

v(S) = 1 if S is union of elements of H and intersects > half of X

Assign 2/|Y| to all X

(61)

Covering gap

(optional)

Take the best thicket H and a best hitting set X for it.

v(S) = 1 if S is union of elements of H and intersects > half of X

Assign 2/|Y| to all X

(62)

Thank you

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