ECA/OAU/PHSD/SDU/EGM/WD1
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UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR AFRICA Public Administration, Human Resources and Social Development Division
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
Ad-hoc Expert Group Meeting on the
Impact of Economic and Social Changeson the African Family
(Africa Hall, Addis Ababa, 13-17 December 1993)
THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES ON THE
AFRICAN FAMILY: POLICY AND PROGRAMME IMPLICATIONS (Agenda Item 1)
ON THE
AFRICAN FAMILY: POLICY AND PROGRAMME IMPLICATIONS
Paper Prepared by:
Public Administration, Human Resources and Social Development Division (PHSD) Economic Commission for Africa
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGES
I. INTRODUCTION: THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN FAMILY:
STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS AND ROLES
II. THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CRISES IN THE 1980S
III. THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES
IV. THE AFRICAN FAMILY IN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND
STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL 17
V. THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
ON FAMILY STRUCTURES FUNCTIONS A!!D ROLES 20
VI. SOCIO-POLITICAL CHANGES AND THEIR IMPACT
ON THE FAMILY * 25
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 28
FAMILY: POLICY AND PROGRAMME IMPLICATIONS
I INTRODUCTION: THE TRADITIONAL AFRICAN FAMILY:
STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS AND ROLES
Structures
1. The traditional African Family has been difficult to define because of the meaning it assumes in different contexts. The western concept of the family consisting of husband, wife and children, i.e., the nuclear family, is not even conceptualised in many African cultures.
Persons are not isolated from their families of origin or affiUation. They are perceived as
belonging either to a lineage or to a kinship grouping.2. The term extended family has been used widely as typifying the African family. In fact it carries the ambiguities just mentioned. In practice it may refer to the minimal lineage of a grandfather and his male descendants, or a grandmother and her female descendants.
The patrilineage or the matrilineage both leave out the children of the female or male members respectively after each generation. The extended family may also be referring to close kinsmen, and thus may include close affinal relations, in addition to those related by blood. Sometimes the term extended family is used to refer to the household. In communities not seriously truncated or dispersed, the household is essentially a kin group, and may include a few outsiders who for various reasons have been accommodated within the
household and treated as surrogate parents or brothers and sisters.3. This apparent confusion in the concept of the family arises from the general fact that most African societies consider it bad form to discriminate against persons who have identified with them and behave for all practical purposes as members of the lineage or kin group. For certain purposes, however, the extended family becomes more sharply defined.
For example, on issues of inheritance or succession to traditional office, it is usually the lineage that counts, and any "family" member who is not a direct descendant of the significant ancestor or ancestress for that purpose will be excluded. On the other hand, for funerals and weddings, for example, the kin group becomes active and each section,
consanguine or affinal, may have specific roles to play.4. A further reason for the elastic use of the concept of extended family is that in the past
there was little geographical mobility, and despite rules of exogamy, sooner or later, mostpeople became related within their traditional communities. Endogamy, which was also
widely practised ensured that any two persons could be related in more than one way. For
example a man may note that his father's half-brother (uncle) is also a cousin on his mother's
side and a nephew-in-law on his father's side. In short, the hard core of the extended family
is the minimal lineage (patri-or matri) but with close affinal relations joining in as family
depending on the occasion. The elasticity of the concept of the extended family, while
creating problems for modern administrators, is however a source of strength, for it ensures
that a person can always fall on a wider circle for assistance and support if the more
immediate family members are absent through death or emigration.-2-
5. The nuclear family concept has no formal place in many African cultures. There is of course, social recognition of a man and his wife and children. But the African concept of marriage places emphasis not so much on the conjugal couple but on the union between the two families or lineages of the couple. Institutions like the kyj£3j£ and the sGTQiale are intended to ensure the permanence of the union between the two family groups, by replacing the deceased husband or wife.
6. Traditionally, most marriages were potentially polygynous, and the practice is still
common in many African societies. Some men stay on the same compound with their multiple wives and children. Others keep each wife and her children in different residences or even different towns. Thus you sometimes have one family, but two,three or more households.7. The phenomenon of the single-parent family is increasing. Many of these family
heads are women - widowed, divorced, separated, concubines, or simply women who wanted
children under pressure from the extended family, but did not want husbands " to push themaround". There are also cases of consensual unions where couples come together and co-habit on a temporary basis, for convenience. Sometimes it is the case of young couples unable to meet the high cost of marriage payments, but unwilling to wait. Some of these consensual
unions are later transformed into recognised marriages.Functions and roles of the Family
8. The family, whatever its internal structure, is acknowledged universally as the basic social unit. It is the oldest and most resilient. All attempts made from time to time in human history to find an alternative to the family have foiled. This is not only because it represents man's first natural social inclination dating back even to the higher mammals, but because the multiple functions of the fondly ensure its usefulness and uniqueness and therefore its indispensability.
9. The functions of the traditional family in Africa are a reflection of what is universally
known. In more developed countries, new institutions have emerged which take on some of
the traditional functions of the family, and make it possible for people to loosen their dependence on the family. In many developing countries the traditional functions are still heavily relied upon, especially in Africa. A quick run-down of the major functions of the family will illustrate the point:Procreation: this may well be the original function of the family, and for the security and care of offsprings, the family remains the best.
Marriage: this can theoretically be contracted by any two people, but in Africa it is difficult to evade the family which is still responsible for the traditional rites of engagement and marriage. Without the acknowledgement or recognition of the two families concerned, a marriage has no real social or customary validity.
Naming of a child is a family responsibility following certain rites or a set of practices for particular ethnic groups. There are also patterns or rules for naming children. In many instances the prerogative of naming belongs to the grandfather of the child. The naming of a child also confers on a child an identity and a social status derived from the status and reputation of the family.
In the main, arrangements connected with the major rites of passage, naming, puberty rites, engagement and marriage, motherhood or fatherhood, and finally funerals, are all family functions with particular family members performing specific roles. Modei*rdzation has left much of this still in place.
10. Funerals are still a most important family function, and as people get older, they are drawn back to the family by the need for a decent funeral. Funeral homes and the work of professional undertakers have not yet usurped the legitimacy of the family in this role even in the urban centres in Africa. Death in the family, especially of adults, often necessitates arrangements for inheritance and succession. The lineage has a primary role here, and the elders in the lineage then determine, according to custom (which may or may not be influenced by Christianity or Islam), who should succeed whom, or who should receive what or be responsible for the estate of the deceased, including responsibility for the children, the widows or widowers as the case may be. The practice of the levirate (marriage of the widow to a member of her deceased husband's lineage) and the sororate (marriage of a close female relative of a deceased woman to her widower husband as a replacement) are the responsibility of the lineage elders or extended family.
11. Land for farming was normally allocated by the extended family. Over the years, much land has been alienated from lineages and clans to public authorities for allocation and redistribution. Nonetheless, the family's hold on land is still quite pervasive. In many African societies, a family without an ancestral plot of land or house is virtually dead.
12. By far the most visible function of the family is the day to day care of its meml>ers in the provision of food, clothing, shelter and general health provision. Although these services can be provided by other institutions or agencies, such as restaurants and bars for food, hotels and rental units for shelter and nursing homes for health care, the unique function of the family as a historic provider of intimate care and sustenance has remained unassailable. For most people in developing as well as industrialised countries, home and household are still co-terminus with family. In Africa, with the majority siill living in rural settings, the family is still the main unit of care and material provision. In times of crises - unemployment, sickness, poverty, old age, and bereavement - most people fall back on the family as the last resort for social and emotional security.
13. The character of a nation in its human dimension is the cumulative product of the socialization processes through which its citizens have passed from childhood to adulthood.
Basic character formation and the inculcation of acceptable social values and attitudes are determined in the early years of life. These foundations are laid in homes and families.
From habits of feeding, dressing, sleeping, personal hygiene and household sanitation, to manners, speech, attitudes and the inculcation of virtues, socialization in the family represents a unique and sacred contribution to the formation of the collective consciousness of the
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people. Thus, any changes that threaten or undermine the socializing role of the family, equally present a prospect for social and political instability of the community or nation.
14. It is within the family that the traditional culture is imparted, the foundations of primordial loyalties are built, and individuals develop a cultural and ethnic identity. Co operation, mutual assistance, self-help, all find their initiation in the family setting. In many parts of Africa who you are is still defined as what family you belong to. It is also wittiin the family that members learn to assume and perform roles appropriate to their status -
whether as father, mother, boy or girl. As their statuses change with growth and maturity,
growing children learn to assume adult roles and responsibilities.15. In the traditional African family, males are the dominant decision-makers. Even in matrilineal societies, women defer to men in major decisions. This is not to say that women are entirely without a voice. They may, and do, lobby to get their views across. But formally, the final decisions are the prerogative of men. Gender is still the significant factor in the division of labour in the family. Fathers and adult males in general are expected to
be the main providers of resources for the maintenance of the household. They are also
expected to take up work outside the home, such as fanning, fishing, hunting, rearing sheep or cattle, or providing their labour as manual or skilled workers. Mothers are expected to stay at or near the home looking after the children, cooking, cleaning the home, doing the laundry, fetching water and firewood, etc. But in addition, women play a major part in the production of food, cultivating vegetable farms and staple foods, rearing cliicken and other birds. In West Africa, women are the main sellers of food items as well. This gives the women some economic power to counter-balance, to some extent, the pervasive dominance of men in the authority system in communities and families. This traditional division of labour between the sexes in Africa, is of course, replicated in other traditional societies throughout the world, with minor variations in detail.16. By and large, the traditional African family was a self-sufficient social unit, able to provide for its members all or most of the main necessities of life. Where expertise of one kind or another was needed, the wider lineage or kinship network would be invoked. Over the last few decades, however, there have been serious erosions of these patterns of existence.
Some are the result of gradual and expected changes due to modernization. Others, as will be discussed later, are the consequences of dramatic and traumatic changes forced on the people by factors mainly beyond their control.
II. THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CRISES IN THE 1980S
The Beginning of the 1980's
17. The decade of the 1980*s brought first hope, and then deep disappointment to most
countries in Africa. The serious reviews of the economic situation in Africa at the end of the
1970's and the beginning of the 1980*s had led to new strategies being developed and adopted by African governments as guidelines to help promote sustainable development. TheMonrovia Strategy for the Economic and Social Development in Africa, the Lagos Plan of
Action and the Final Act of Lagos, and the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade were to be the blue-prints for action.
18. Unfortunately, some of the same constraints that attained the modest successes of the 1970's, re-appeared in 1980*s with devastating consequences. The escalation of oil prices that first occurred in 1974, was to be repeated during 1979-80. The Sahelian drought of 1973 - 74 which decimated cattle and human populations from the Atlantic ocean to the Red Sea, not only manifested itself again, but this time extended to many parts of Eastern and Southern Africa. Political instability including civil wars and insurgencies were to continue to plague the region.
19. Against these constraints, the African economies experienced a variety of difficulties.
Recovery from the damaging effects of the oil price rise in 1974 had only partially taken place when the second one occurred. The world recession that resulted from this led to a contraction of demand for Africa's raw materials. This had a multiplier effect on other aspects of the African economy, though with differential impact. In the region as a whole, GDP fell by 1.4 percent during 1980 - 82. But the countries most affected, were in fact the oil-exporting African countries. Far from benefitting, their high dependence on imports, and the deliberate cutback in oil production to sustain high prices resulted in a decline in GDP of 5.6 percent in 1981, and 1.0 percent in 1982. The worst affected turned out to be the African members of OPEC who as a whole suffered a dramatic decline in GDP of 9.6 percent in 1981 and a further 2.4 percent in 1982. The recession as a whole seemed to have mostly affected the North African sub-region, recording negative growth rates of 6.0 percent and 0.6 percent in 1981 and 1982 respectively.
20. The effects of the world recession on the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) was less dramatic, because their developing economies are less integrated into the world system and so are less sensitive to the world recession. These countries recorded a GDP growth rate of 5 percent in 1981. But this could not be sustained and 1982 saw a decline in GDP growth rate of 1.8 percent.
21. Sectorially, the picture that emerged ranged from modest growth in some sectors to severe decline in others. Agriculture is the mainstay of many African economies. About 60 to 70 percent of the people are engaged directly or indirectly in agriculture and agro-based activities. Unfortunately, Africa's agriculture is mainly rain-fed. Thus any serious vagaries in the rainfall patterns can spell a boom or a disaster. Prospects for agricultural recovery at the beginning of the decade were poor. Per capita agricultural output fell by 2.5 percent in 1981 and 0.7 percent in 1982. Thus even before the severe drought of 1983, serious food deficits were beginning to occur.
22. The poor agricultural performance affected performance in the industrial sector. To begin with, import capacity declined because of declining income and the need to import more food meant restricting imported inputs to support the industries. The scarcity of external resources, shortage of spare parts, etc. resulted in many industries operating at less than half their installed capacity. Other consequences followed: growth in the manufacturing sector declined, the services sector contracted, infrastructural bottlenecks became common, and a general scarcity of goods and other resources became pervasive.
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23 The implications of all these adverse economic factors were a general slow-down of economic activity. As personal, private and public incomes declined, wages stagnated or declined in real terms, workers were laid off in both the private and public sectors, and the standard of living began to slide downwards. Domestic savings naturally suffered a decline, dropping by 10 percent in 1981 to 1982. Capital formation which had grown by 4.4 percent in 1980 was to fall by 9.1 percent in 1981 - 82. The oil-exporting countries, ironically, suffered an even greater decline in oil revenues and capital formation by 15.4 percent during
the same period.
24 A further consequence of poor agricultural performance and the higher oil prices was an alarming widening in the trade gap. A combination of factors led to this. Whereas agricultural performance had been poor, world commodity prices also fell. The contrast was dramatic In 1980 the trade surplus was US$ 19.8 billion. In 1981 and 1982 this fell to a deficit of US$ 4.1 and US$ 2.8 billion respectively! In the face of this three were drastic cuts in imports except for essential items to sustain life, minimum services and investments.
This in most cases could only be done by draining their reserves and further borrowing from external sources on less favourable terms. The records show that the total reserves which stood at US$33.7 billion in 1980 fell to US$21.9 in 1981 and US$ 15.7 billion in 1982.
Thus Africa's debts were further increased, and the heavy debt-servicing burden became even heavier while her capacity for economic recovery worsened. The pauperization of the African populations was being sustained. GDP per capita was recorded at -2.0 percent, -6.0 percent and -3.3 percent in 1980, 1981 and 1982 respectively.
The Drought of 1983 - 85
25 It was against the above background of a worsening economic situation that the catastrophic drought manifested itself from 1983. The few modest gains made in 1982 were largely wiped out. This time the drought was more widespread and affected many countries in Western Eastern and Southern Africa. Severe domestic food shortages were experienced affecting not only livestock, but human populations, especially children and fam^es.
Earnings from export crops also fell. Overall, agricultural output fell by 3.0 percent in 1983 There was a modest recovery at 1.3 percent in 1984 and a more promising growth of 4.6 percent in 1985. In the manufacturing sector the performance level fell from 7 percent in 1982 to 0.7 percent by 1984. Again there was an encouraging recovery of 4.6 percent
growth in 1985.
26 As would be expected, the effect of the drought was felt more severely in West and Eastern Africa. In West Africa, GDP growth fell by 6.8 percent in 1983, and 3.1 percent in 1984 In East and Southern Africa, GDP growth declined from 2.0 percent in 1982 to 0 4 percent in 1983, but there was a recovery of 2.4 percent in 1984 and 3.3 percent in 1985.
Central Africa was less affected and recorded a GDP growth rate of 3.4 percent in 1983 and 4 1 percent in 1984. In 1985 the rains returned and agriculture began to recover. On the whole there was a general recovery in 1985 in other sectors as well throughout the region.
The social consequences of these sudden and massive falls in GDP on the social situation will
be discussed later in this document. Note should be taken, however, that both private and
public expenditure fell drastically. Dwindling revenues led to serious revision of public
programmes, and to a fall in employment levels. In the private sector consumption expenditure fell, and with it private savings were wiped out, and living standards fell.
Economic migrants became a noticeable phenomenon.
27. An inventory of the economic situation in Africa at the midpoint of the decade was far from consoling. In fact it was seriously disturbing. It once more revealed the fragility of the African economies. The 1983 - 84 drought exposed the inability of many African governments to build up any significant food reserves following the experience of the 1974 Sahelian drought. The balance of payment difficulties had become intractable. Heavy borrowing to avoid disaster merely exacerbated the debt burden. In July 1985, the OAU Heads of State, after addressing the situation, adopted a set of proposals to help arrest and hopefully correct the parlous economic and social situation. This was known as Afncals Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986 - 1990 (APPER).
Partial Recovery in 1986 - 90
28. The second half of the decade, 1986 - 90, witnessed some partial recovery from the disasters of 1983 - 84, but the significant recovery of 1985 could not be sustained. In fact in 1987 another drought in some countries of Eastern and Southern Africa causal a serious decline in the growth of the GDP. Thus the growth in GDP in real terms was only 1.2 percent and 1.5 percent for 1986 and 1987, which meant that per capita GDP was actually negative. Already the new programme adopted in 1985 was tailing to live up to promise.
29. There were some encouraging outputs, however. Food production increased by 5.9 percent in 1986. Meat production had averaged 3 percent, more or less keeping pace with population growth. Performance in the sub-regions was uneven. East and Southern Africa generally did better in agriculture, attaining a growth rate of 5.2 percent. North Africa followed with a modest 2.9 percent. Central Africa recorded 2.4 percent and West Africa only 1 percent.
30. Overall agricultural performance: in 1987 was poor, although in North Africa high yields in cereals were attained. In the industrial sector 1986 showed a modest increase to 5.7 percent over 1985 which recorded 4.6 percent. In manufacturing, value-added Central Africa recorded a growth rate of 7.3 percent, North Africa 6.2 percent and West Africa 5.6 percent.
Performance in 1987 showed a little decline at 4 percent for the region. In transport and communications value-added in 1986 was only 0.8 percent and 1987 saw no real change.
31. The region was adversely affected once more by the slump in the oil market and falling commodity prices for Africa's products. It is estimated that the region lost US$19 billion in 1986 alone. 1987 witnessed a further fall of 5.7 percent in export earnings.
Inevitably, debt service obligations escalated, rising to US$ 25 billion per annum, or approximately 55 percent of export earnings. The size of Africa's external debt, anil the failure to effectively control it, has seriously undermined the ability of African governments to be in charge of their economies, by limiting their options, and deepening their dependency.
Some donor governments have generously written off some debts for some countries. But
these have not been large enough nor wide-spread enough to change the general picture of deep and crippling indebtedness in the region.
32. It had become clear by 1988, that the programme for economic recovery was not achieving its objectives. The reasons were not only internal - policy shortcomings, droughts, civil strife, political instability, but also external - falling commodity prices, manipulation of
the oil market, and the crippling debt burden. The decade of the 1980's began with African governments approving, among others, the Lagos Plan of Action and the International
Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade in ;*n effort to arrest the region's declining fortunes and set her back on the road to economic and social recovery.But the decade began with a disastrous performance, (see figure 1) . Indeed 1987 proved to
be another disastrous year followed by a modest recovery in 1988 - 1990. What has been the impact of these persisting economic reverses on the social scene? This will be considered
in the next section.
III. THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES
33. The decade of 1981 - 90, saw many economic reverses for Africa. On the whole, the annual growth rate of the GDP hardly matched the population growth rate.
Figure 1:
Developing Africa:
Annual Growth Rate of OOP, 1981-1980
1931 1982 1983 1&84 1985 199Q 1987 1988 1989
Source: Survey of Economic and Social Conditions in Africa.
The first four years of the decade were disastrous for most African countries. The very encouraging recovery of 1985 could not be sustained. As a result, GDP per capita in all areas were lower in 1990 than they were in 1980. This steady decline in productivity had very serious consequences. For one thing, governments had to cut down drastically on their annual budgets and abandon many development projects. The recession affected employment, incomes and wages. The private sector of the economy fared no better. Poverty spread across the board, standards of living dipped sharply, especially for the low income categories.
Education and health services deteriorated. Housing failed to keep pace with demand and over-crowding increased significantly. Poverty and famine spread to all parts of Sub-Saharan
Africa.
34. On the political front, much of the social and political unrest can be directly attributed to the persisting economic crises. The continuing and deepening poverty fans frustration, desperation and insurrection. Political unrest, riots, violent protests, and civil wars have become a common feature of the African scene. These in their turn have further disrupted
the economy and exacerbated the hardship for the people. From Mozambique and Angola to Ethiopia, the Sudani and Somalia, civil strife dominated the scene. In West Africa, Chad
and Liberia were the main scene of sustained conflict. But coups d'etat were more frequent, another manifestation of widespread dissatisfaction. Less damaging to the physical environment, coups are none the less traumatic and disruptive, and create a climate of uncertainty and unease not conducive to economic and social progress. It is worth examining a few key indices to see how these have reflected on the character, functions and welfare ofthe family.
Inflation
35. This is one of the more visible signs of growing economic hardship. Part of Africa's inflation is imported. Inflation in the industrialised countries led to higher import prices in Africa. This was the case, for example, in 1988, when the annual rate of inflation in the region as a whole rose to 21.3 percent. The rate was less severe at 15.7 percent in 1987.
Inflation rates and causes of inflation differed from country to country. Some were mainly the result of currency devaluation as part of the IMF prescription for structural adjustment to ensure more realistic rates of exchange. It was also partly intended to raise producer prices of export commodities to encourage productivity. Many countries devalued their currency several times during the decade. In Mozambique the metical declined in value from Mt4Q for $1 at the beginning of 1987 to Mt645 for $1 by the end of 1988. In Ghana the cedis fell in value from C2.75 for $1 in 1981 to more than C230 to the $1 by 1990 (and to C500 to $1 by October 1992).
36. The inflation was also partly fuelled as a result of deficit financing through accelerated money supply to meet rising wages. Some of the most affected countries were Malawi,
Somalia, the Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Ghana. All
these countries suffered very high inflation rates during certain years in the decade. In Uganda for example, consumer prices increased at a rate of 191.1 percent during 1988. InSierra Leone inflation topped 170 percent during 1986/87.
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37. Whereas general inflation was widespread through the region, not all countries suffered from sharp currency exchange rates. Countries like Kenya, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Swaziland, Tunisia and Zimbabwe managed to keep their currency rates relatively stable. The countries of the franc zone or CFA countries, because of their tight regulations had more stable currency rates, and in fact registered modest appreciation of their currency rates vis-a-vis the U.S.dollar during the decade.
38. It had been anticipated that a price had to be paid for the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) which as many as 30 African countries had accepted during the decade.
Each country had its own special programme, but the general features have been the same.
These are aimed at establishing the basis for sustainable development, and achieving a balance of payments equilibrium. The specific measures include moving the economic structures towards a free market system, promoting privatisation of publicly-owned enterprises, reducing inflation shifting internal terms of trade in favour of producers as against consumers;
controlling imports by means of pricing policies, exchange rates, interest rates and taxes on imports, boosting export production, and reducing budget deficits. As it turned out, the price paid for attempting these adjustments has been unduly high in human terms, and the rewards have been rather meagre. Figures compiled by the World Bank give little room for comfort.
There has been no noticeable increase in real incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa over the past
30 years.
Table 1: GROWTH OF REAL PER CAPITA INCOME 1960 -2000*
Country Group High Income Countries Developing Countries Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East & North Africa
1960-70 4.1 3.3 0.6 6.0
1970-80 2.4 3.0 0.9 3.1
1980-90 2.4
1.2 -0.9 -2.5
1990 2.1 -0.2.
-2.0 -1.9
1991 0.7 -0.2 -1.0 -4.6
1990-2000 Esjt.
2.1 2.9 0.3 1.6
* Taken from World Bank. World Development Report 1992. p.32.
39. In fact the last decade saw a steady deterioration. Whatever happened to "the revolution of rising expectations"? Projections up to year 2000 suggest a mere 0.3 percent growth in incomes. What is perceived is a prolonged and unredeemed pauperization of the peoples of Sub-Saharan Africa. Another World Bank compilation shows that 47.6 percent
of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa were below the poverty line (approximately $370 annual income per capita) in 1985 compared to 47.8 percent in 1990. By the year 2000 the
percentage population below the poverty line would rise to 49.7.(WorId Bank Report 1992.p.30).
40. The SAP has come in for much adverse comment for failing to assess the social costs and make adequate provisions to moderate the severer consequences of the programmes. It
must be said that without the SAP there was no guarantee that the economic situation might not have worsened. In fact SAP was introduced precisely because the pre-existing policies could not prevent the economy from deteriorating. Nonetheless, to subject large populations to sustained economic stress when the rest of the world was making steady progress on an already high economic base amounts to a structured provocation. One "peaceful" outcome is the rapidly rising incidence of economic migrants from poor countries to the gulf countries or industrialised centres of the world.
Income and Wages
41. The deteriorating economic situation spawned a vicious circle. Low productivity led to low wages and low incomes. Low incomes reduced demand for goods and services. This further depressed the market for the low income sector. Private savings for most middle and low income groups evaporated. Government incomes contracted more often than they expanded. As governments struggled to balance their budgets and restructure their economic base, one requirement was to contain their expenditures. This led to retrenchments in the public services, and sometimes redeployment to economic cul de sacs. Wages were often frozen or sometimes reduced. Such increases as were grudgingly given, were quickly negated by the rising inflation. Almost everywhere real wages went down, while unemployment and underemployment spread.
42. The informal sector also suffered similar contraction in incomes. Because the public sector employed a high percentage of the work force, and generally paid better wages initially, the retrenchment of workers and the contraction of wages affected demand in the private sector which equally began to suffer. There w»« less demand for labour in housing, carpentry, and many private sector jobs;. The flow of remittances from the higher-wage urban sector to support relatives in the rural sector ebbed or stopped altogether.
43. The decline in wages was also affected by the removal of food subsidies in many countries which led to high prices for staple foods largely patronised by the lower income groups. For example, in 1986 the removal of the subsidy on maize in Zambia led to an increase in the consumer price by 120 percent from K35 per bag of 90kg to K77 for the same bag. This triggered off violent protests and the government; had to rescind its decision.
Sierra Leone witnessed an even worse case when the cancellation of the subsidy on rice led to an escalation from Le85 to Le34O between 1986 and 1987 for a 50kg bag of rice.
44. For many employees, the monthly wages could not even meet the monthly food bills, let alone other necessities. This led to many employees taking up secondary jobs to augment their incomes, or exploiting their positions to extort bribes and other considerations from the clients. In Ghana for example this became a way of life. School teachers ran private classes after school hours for the same pupils for a fee. To ensure demand for such classes, formal teaching during the day was deliberately watered down. Wage reductions were sometimes part of the adjustment package in certain sectors. This was the case in a number of countries.
In Madagascar, reduction in wages led to very low morale in the public sector. In Cote d'lvoire, and in Togo there were similar reductions amid loud protests. It was estimated that the Togolese public servants suffered a 20 percent depreciation in their standard of living.
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45. The assumption sometimes made that necessity is the mother of invention does not always apply when people are driven into economic depression. Whether or not they show
inventiveness and strive for survival depends on circumstances and cultural attitudes. Where
people see little signs of hope or change for the better in the foreseeable future, they are likely to sink into a state of resignation. Pictures of people starving to death often conveys this haunting image of helplessness and hopelessness. There was evidence of innovation andinventiveness in the informal sector. Some appropriate technology projects were sponsored by both government and NGOs. But there was no financial backing and no sponsorship for
mass production. Thus many initiatives were lost.Employment
46. While those in employment were suffering a reduction in real wages, access to jobs was also becoming increasingly difficult. SAP has meant retrenchment of many employees
in the public sector. Admittedly, many public sector department and corporations accommodate excess staff. For example, in 1988 - 89 separate exercises carried out onKenya Airways and Ghana Airways revealed that both carried redundant staff and several
hundred had to be laid of. Some retrenchments in the public sector affect "ghost" workers and simply imply cleaning up the employment registers. On the whole, the employment situation deteriorated significantly during the decade. In 1980, unemployment in the labour force was estimated at 5.3 percent. By 1988 this had risen to 13 percent. Underemployment in 1980 affected 40 percent of the labour force. By 1988, 50 percent of the labour force was in this category. This is in feet a very disturbing situation if half of able-bodied persons are only partially engaged in meaningful work and are therefore on wages which cannot follysupport them.
47. Many of the people who were retrenched as a result of SAP could not easily get alternative employment. In Ghana's SAP, over 45,000 civil servants and teachers were
earmarked for redeployment. Under a remedial package supported by the World Bank, new job opportunities were to be created for those laid off. Unfortunately, in many other African
countries, for the millions who lost their jobs, or had recently entered the labour force, there were no alternative programmes and resources; to accommodate them. Sometimes after being declared redundant, affected ex-employees have to wait several months, sometimes years, to receive their redundancy payments. Many receive theirs in installments. Given the fact that most were still unemployed, the payments were consumed as wages, and the intention to use the lumpsum to begin a business or new life was never realised.48. Retrenchments in the public services have a serious impact because in most African
countries the public sector is a major employer. In Mauritius during 1985, as much as 55
percent of employees were in the public sector. Other examples were Kenya with 48 percent,Senegal with 45 percent, Botswana with 39 percent and Burundi with 37 percent. The
expectation that the private sector in a market system will quickly expand to absorb many of
the unemployed has not materialised. Both privatisation of public enterprises, and local
private enterprise have not yet made an impact. Job creation has lagged t>ehind the sujjply
of new entrants into the labour force. It is not uncommon in Senegal, Ghana or Kenya, for
example, to come across young university graduates who have been walking office corridors for up to two years vainly looking for work.49. Given the grim forecasts for employment and economic growth in Africa for the next two or three decades, the flow of economic migrants to the industrialised countries is not likely to ebb. The gap between the rich and poor countries is getting wider and wider. In 1990 GDP per capita for Africa was $630, but more man 24 out of 51 countries had per
capita GDP of less than $400. (W<ffW Pank Atlas 1991)- Europe as a whole had GNP per
capita of $12,990, and North America had $21,580. The phenomenon of economic migrants to Europe and North America from the poorer countries of the worid is not likely to stop if conditions do not improve significantly in the third world. The prospects for conflict on the issue of economic migrants should be urgently addressed.50. In Africa's bid for economic and social development, education has always been given high priority as a key and indispensable factor. On attaining independence, many countries invested heavily in education to spread enlightenment generally and to train the manpower necessary for the different tasks of governance and development. Here too the economic stringencies eventually made their mark. Investment in education fell at all levels during the decade of the 80's. In general, per capita expenditure on education fell drastically from $41 in 1980 to $15 by 1988. This decline was reflected in school enrolment which declined from an annual growth rate of 8.1 percent during 1970 - 80 to 3.9 percent during 1980 - 87. a breakdown of the figures shows that enrolment t the primary level suffered the most. (See Table 2)
Table 2: ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH IN ENROLLMENT (PERCENTAGE)
Years Primary
Secondary Higher
1970 - 80 7.3 11.9 13.1
1980 - 87 2.6 8.5 7.7
Data compiled from ECA:The Status of Social Development in Africa in the 198Q's and Prospects for 1990's. p.5
51. The cut-back in educational expenditure has affected not only enrolment, but physical structures, furniture, equipment, supplies and maintenance. The consequence has been the deplorable state of many educational institutions. Standards of teaching and training have fallen, and teachers are often demoralised. Governments face a real dilemma. Investment in primary education will reach many more people, and ensure that a wider social spectrum is given a chance to start properly in life. For most people from poor families this is their passport to semi-skilled jobs. It is impoitant also to ensure that access to education is evenly spread out to all parts of a country and embraces all ethnic and religious groups, otherwise the resultant discrimination could lead to political dis-affection.
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52. Secondary and higher education are relatively more expensive and reach a much smaller proportion of the age cohort. For example in Botswana the 1983 figures on educational expenditure showed that 43.0 percent of the total was spent on primary education and covered an enrolment equal to 88.1 percent of eligible students. The secondary school expenditure was 29.1 percent, but covered only 11.1 percent of eligible students. At the higher education level, 23.7 percent of the total expenditure covered only 0.8 percent of possible enrolment. This is the case in most African countries. For equity, emphasis should be placed on primary education. Higher education appears to be a rather expensive investment which usually favours persons from the privileged classes. On the other hand, how can Africa make the big strides in development with 1.0 percent or less obtaining higher education? Yet this small proportion sometimes cannot even find suitable employment. It raises questions about the relevance of some educational programmes. Sometimes the problem is not with the acquired skills, but the absence of appropriate infrastructure to utilise needed and available skills to promote national interest.
53. Another unhappy feature of education in the region is the generally low proportion of women in schools. Drop-out rates are high for girls. Traditional attitudes still prevail, and when parents find they cannot meet the fees or other financial requirements, they tend to pull the girls out of school. Sometimes the girls are simply pulled out to be married off, and that is the end of their educational career. This denial of education is a factor in the low status and productivity of women, their limited involvement in the development effort, and their low participation in the decision-making process.
Health and Nutrition
54. The relationship between nutrition, health and productivity is well established. As incomes rise, people tend to eat better; good nutritional status provides better resistance to endemic and contagious diseases. Healthy people work better. Morbid and sick people have low output, due to high absenteeism, and sheer lassitude at work. In the home women are responsible for the health of the family and a healthy family ensures that less time, energy and resources are spent on nursing care at home. As health promoter, the woman is responsible for feeding the family properly, maintaining proper sanitation and personal hygiene in the household, and ensuring tliat clean water is available for use in the home. An unhealthy woman can threaten the quality of all these services, and indeed the health status of the family. Higher incomes make the utilization of better medical care possible, assuming adequate facilities are available. It has also been established in a number of studies that the educational status of a woman has a significant impact on infant and child mortality rates and the nutritional status of families. Thus, as cuts are made in educational expenditure by governments, leading to declining school enrolment rates, which also affect girls more than boys, the future health status of families and communities is being undermined.
55. Structural adjustment and the economic crises have both contributed to the lowering of the health status of many African countries. In the region as a whole, the share of health expenditure in recurrent total government expenditure dropped from 25.2 percent in 1986 to 19% 1988. (Ref. ECA: The Status of Social Development in Africa in the 1980's and Prospects for the 1990*s March 1991.) Already, Africa has the highest infant and child
mortality rates and the lowest life expectancy. For Africa as a whole the infant mortality rate was 142 per 1000 births in 1979. By 1990 this had declined to 99 per 1000. Compared to Asia and Latin America,the differences are quite high, let alone Europe or North America.
(See Table 3).
Table 3: INFANT MORTALITY AND LIFE EXPECTANCY 1979 AND 1990
Region
Africa Asia
Latin America Europe
North America
Infant Mortality per 1000 1979
142 102 75 17 13
1990
99 68 54 11 9
Life Expectancy 1979
49 60 64 72 74
1990 Male
52 63 64 71 72
Female 55 66 70 78 79
Source: Compiled from Population Reference Bureau: Population data Sheet 1981 and 1222.
56. These regional figures mask country differences. In 1990, while the small island countries like Mauritius, Reunion and Seychelles had low infant mortality rates of 20.4, 13 and 13 respectively, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ethiopia, and Mozambique had high rates of 148, 151, 139 and 136 respectively. Life expectancy for countries like the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Sierra Leone, Niger and Angola is calculated below 45 years.
57. Maternal mortality rates have also been high. Half of the 24 countries with available statistics in the region recorded maternal deaths at more than 500 per thousand. An ECA study: The Impact of Maternal. Child Health and Family Planning on Fertility. Childhood Mortality and Maternal Health (1989) reported that between 1980-84 the maternal mortality rate estimated for Ghana was 1074 deaths per 100,000 births. Other rates were 1680 for Benin, 1500 for Nigeria and 800 for Zaire.
58. Against such a background of low health status in the region any drastic cuts in health expenditure in the public sector is bound to have disturbing multiplier effects. Such cuts affect medical staff, physical facilities, equipment, and supply of drugs and the general quality of health services. The frequent freezing of wages and falls in real income due to inflation has led to low morale among medical staff. Some doctors and nurses have had to go on strike in some countries to have their salaries and conditions of service improved.
Private hospitals tend to be expensive, so the deterioration of services in government hospitals and health facilities is hardest on low income groups and families.
59. As noted earlier, per capita food production has been falling over the entire decade.
The severe drought of 1983-85 only dramatised a disturbing trend. Food shortages and the
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removal of food subsidies in many countries as a result of SAP led to food prices escalating.
Once again the poor suffered most. Households responded by reducing both quantity and quality of food intake. Families resorted to other cheaper food substitutes, sometimes with lower nutritional contents. The result was a lowering of both nutritional and health levels.
Between 1980 and 1985 many countries recorded significant falls in calorie intake, especially during 1983. In many such situations children suffer most. Prolonged malnutrition is known to have an effect not only on children's physical growth, but also eventually on their intelligence quotient. The combined effect of drought, reduction in incomes, civil strife, which renders food supply scarce or uncertain, is an unhealthy and weakened population.
Hundreds of thousands of African children in the next generation will not only have missed their education, but would not even be able mentally to cope with whatever opportunities are available to them.
60. Forced to shun the hospitals, many have returned to traditional medicine. Some governments have recognised this trend and attempts have been made to bring traditional medicine into the national medical programme as alternative medicine. Medical Research
Institutes in Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana and Tanzania for example, have been consulting with
native doctors to utilise some of their lore. But much more will need to be done about the methods and training for traditional medicine before it can be fully accepted and incorporated in the national medical programme.61. The AIDS pandemic is another disturbing phenomenon. Given the low incomes, poor and overcrowded living conditions, and inadequate nutritional levels and health services, what are the prospects for effectively containing the spread of this dread disease in the region? There is no cure on the horizon yet and even if it comes, the signs are that it will be expensive. The only recourse is prevention through sustained educational and motivational programmes. Already some severely affected groups and communities have become quite
fatalistic about AIDS. In some of the most affected areas, as in parts of Uganda and
Tanzania, the disease has decimated the able-bodied members of village communities, leaving behind only little children and old people to fend for themselves. The disease is most prevalent among young people between the ages of 20 and 40 years. Their loss is a severe loss in economic and social investment for their families and in Africa's future.62. There is another dimension to health that is not easily quantified. This is mental
stress. The drastic economic and social changes which have engulfed many people during
the decade have left their psychological mark on individuals and families. The thinning and
greying of people, the vague and distant looks in people's eyes, tell the story of the traumas people have been through. These traumas change people. Some are toughened by the experience and as a result reach out to levels of endeavour and empathy they were not aware of before. But others wilt under the experience, broken men and women who continue to live on without hope or aim. Yet other become embittered by the experience and exhibit negative and sometimes destructive traits of character and myopic concerns that betray anysocial conscience that they may have had. This latter category gradually becomes a major
social problem in some cases.IV. THE AFRICAN FAMILY IN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND STRATEGIES FOR
SURVIVAL
63. How has the African family fared under a worsening economic environment? As the basic, oldest, and smallest social unit of the human population, the family has survived thousands of years of economic and social evolution and revolutions. In spite of this time- tested resilience, when the family is under serious strain, its members suffer and its cohesiveness is threatened. The effects of the economic crisis on the African family has been varied according to location, circumstances and causes. What has been common to alt has been the steady pauperization, especially of the middle and lower class families. Illiterate and unskilled workers had little to trade off as demand for manual work slackened. Even the better educated and those with technical and cither marketable skills could hardly manage as the purchasing power of their incomes fell drastically. Families with several income-earning members could only fall back on their combined income to sustain their households.
64. It is often thought that when there are food shortages, rural dwellers would be the last to suffer. On the contrary, falling commodity prices of agricultural products hurt many rural farmers. The severe droughts wiped out the livelihood of entire farming communities.
Subsistence farmers usually keep just enough of their produce to last until the next farming season. When the rains fail therefore, their families are left with little to fall back on. At the height of the droughts, famine struck hundreds of such families, especially in Ethiopia and Somalia, with a devastating blow, causing the death and displacement of hundreds of people and livestock and the destruction of land and fauna. Under the circumstances, it was common for the stronger members of the families, usually young men and women, to head for the urban centres, leaving behind the old and very young to cope with the situation. Even when the rains returned, there was no commensurate return of the young to their rural families. The death, displacement or dispersal of family members seriously undermined the cohesiveness of families and left many of them traumatized and vulnerable.
65. The ability of families to cope wiith the economic crisis has depended on their earning capacity as well as their own resourcefulness. Did they have skills and knowledge that could be converted into other income-generating activities? Families adopted a variety of strategies for survival. Unscrupulous traders, especially in foodstuffs and other commodities in high demand during the economic stress, exploited the situation to make quick money. They were quick to sense shortages and as a result bought up any little surplus with the objective of hoarding to sell later a higher prices, which many families could not afford. Many people, especially women, moved into the informal sector as petty traders to sustain their families.
For some, this was mere tokenism, as their trade hardly sustained them due to stiff competition or lack of sufficient capital.
66. Invariably a blackmarket system developed. In East Africa it was known as magflndp while in Ghana it was called Kalabule. Women traders became adept at this especially in West Africa, where traditionally they already have a strong foothold and dominated the food and textile markets. They simply extended the range of their wares to include all kinds of imported items. One interesting consequence of this was that in many fanulies, the women gradually took over as breadwinners. Influence and authority in the home gradually shifted to the women. It was not uncommon in some West African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria
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and Sierra Leone, to find a senior civil servant or graduate teacher whose less educated wife earned an income several times greater than his. Earning capacity was no longer commensurate with educational level. There were times when taxi drivers earned more than university lecturers. The prestige of liigher education, in terms of income, seriously diminished. Devotion to scholarship, already affected by deteriorating facilities in the universities and colleges, lost its appeal as potential scholars struggled to make ends meet to sustain their families.
67. Some breadwinners were forced to take on secondary jobs in addition to their paid office work, to the detriment of the productivity of office work. Widespread bribery and corruption became part of the coping mechanism for those who were in positions to use them.
Pilfering, embezzlement of funds in both public and private enterprises became common.
As a strategy for survival, it was sometimes unofficially condoned. Some families took to backyard gardening, others became weekend fanners, commuting to their villages to work on family land, or new plots they had bought or leased. Invariably they secured the services of unemployed family members to assist. Some even experimented with fish ponds at the height of the economic crisis and famine. Kiosks selling foodstuffs, soft drinks, fruits and a variety of other goods mushroomed all over the cities and towns - on roadsides, pavements and empty plots.
68. The large numbers of children who became school drop-outs, or did not go to school at all, also took to all forms of petty trading. Some took to begging and petty thieving. In the larger towns, many children left to cater for themselves by harassed parents took to the streets in gangs. The benign ones engaged themselves as street vendors, weaving their way in and out of traffic to sell to passing motorists. Their profit margins were low. But at least it bought most of them a meal for the day and kept them busy. They considered the danger of traffic accidents minimal in their condition.
69. The other type of street boys and girls were a serious problem. They operated in organised gangs with rules of their own. Some were cut off from their families altogether Others visited home periodically and even miinaged to make financial contributions to their families. For a number of these youngsters, childhood was traumatically over at a tender age, as they became wiser than their age and saw themselves as adults in the struggle for survival. They sold if they could or else: stole. All in all, the economic malaise has led to a new breed of street children and youth in many African countries, which is increasing in number with population growth and high rates of urbanization. For a growing number of youth and young men and women, work is a chancy thing and settling down to raise a family is still a distant horizon. Frustration arid resentment among the young are rising and the social consequences are not reassuring. Recourse to desperate measures like drug peddling, prostitution, involvement in syndicates, a general disregard for social norms and moral values are trends creating concern for families, law enforcement agencies and social workers in several African countries.
70. Some street youth gangs train their members in fighting, pick-pocketing, breaking into parked cars or other tricks, with or without weapons like knives or iron rods. Others resort to begging or providing petty services such as car guarding and washing or as porters to city shoppers. Street children and youth are now a common sight in many African cities. Addis Ababa, Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, Lagos, Accra, Dakar, Cairo, all their gangs. In
Uganda a group emerged known as buyaayfi. Originally the term referred to peddlers and users of njaye (cannabis satival But the term also came to apply to their way of life. "It
came to mean a state of normlessness, where there were no binding ethics on individuals in pursuit of their personal survival. It was descriptive of their state of anomie, alienation land dehumanization." (Ref. L. Ngabo-Lutaaya: Rnyaaye as an Adaptive Response to Social,
Frnnomic and Political Pisorgflniration in Uganda. M.A. Thesis Univ. of Nairobi, 1982).These new social formations are closely-knit groups, developing a sub-culture of their own, playing supportive roles to each other and taking on the functions of a family. Regarded as social outcasts, their relationship with their families of origin, especially those from respectable homes has became tenuous. They survive, but they are another burden on the
social conscience.
71. The growing phenomena ofthe brain-drain and economic migrants to the industrialised countries are another way of relieving not only the unemployment pressure in many countries in the region, but also the poverty of many a family. The flow of remittance to many countries from relatives who have gone out to seek " greener pastures" is not an insignificant contribution to households and to the economies of some countries. Thus for example, the repatriation of Egyptian workers from the gulf States during the 1991 Gulf war led to considerable hardship for many families. As a response to family poverty, the extended family undertook to sponsor or encourage a member to go overseas to secure a better-paid job and send remittances home. Those who could not afford the cost of travel became stowaways. Not all economic migrants fared well. Stowaways caught at sea were sometimes deliberately thrown at sea and left to drown. Other migrants foiled to secure meaningful
employment, and became destitute and a social problem. Some of these were repatriatedback home from time to time. Countries like Britain, the Netherlands, France, Germany and
those in the Mid-East have sizeable communities of economic migrants doing both whitecollar and blue collar jobs as skilled and semi-skilled workers. It is these who send
remittances which, however meagre they may seem at their adopted countries, become respectable sums as a result of the sharp deterioration of the African currencies.72. Not all families are so fortunate. Some have to depend on relatives in nearby urban centres for smaller remittances. Rural folk often send their young sons and daughters to say with urban relatives as domestic help. These are usually poorly paid or not at all. But at least they are fed and housed, and they are not a burden on their parents.
73. The squeeze on housing, and rising building costs have led to high rents for rental units. Families who own or rent houses cope by letting or sub-letting rooms to their tenants.
Relatives seek family members in town and crowd in on them making individual and family privacy difficult to maintain. The intention is to say with relatives while looking for
accommodation, but many never manage to secure their own accommodation. Few new houses are built. New housing in some cities like Freetown, Accra and Nairobi are mainlyowned by nationals working abroad. Many young men and women hire rooms and share the
costs, because they cannot afford rooms of their own. Some governments however, are nowsupporting new housing schemes to meet the accumulated demand. Coping with poverty sometimes meant that there was no maintenance for houses. Many houses have thus deteriorated badly, sometimes dangerously. This is the case for both public and private
buildings.
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74. Among other measures adopted to cope with poverty was the simple ones of wearing clothes much longer than usual, and mending them for continued use. The market for imported second-hand clothes mushroomed in many cities, but many families still could not afford even the cheaper second-hand clothes. The situation became so critical in some rural communities that family members were forced to take turns sharing one piece of clothing.
Begging has taken on both traditional and new forms. There are those who pretend to be blind, maimed, or otherwise disabled. There are those with well rehearsed hardship stories, and there are those ostensibly collecting funds for fake charities. The industry seems to pay well.
V THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS ON FAMILY STRUCTURES,
FUNCTIONS AND ROLES
and Shifts in Family Stnirtiir^ Functions and Roles
75. The proven resilience of the family as an institution has often belied the many predictions about its dissolution or transformation. This resilience derives from its purpose, structure and functions. So long as human beings long to continue their race, ethnic group or clan, they will seek ways and means of ensuring some reasonable way of promoting procreation and the upbringing of their children. Survival also requires coping with daily needs of food, clothing and shelter. These in turn require economic activity to produce or to buy the necessities of life.
76. The structure and functions of the family are then determined by historical circumstances and the values which best support the process of survival. Thus family structures and functions assume a permanence based on perennial needs. The mechanisms or procedures for meeting these perennial needs are modified or adapted to changing circumstances in order to ensure that the perennial needs that a family serves continue to be
met.
77. The family has a uniqueness of its own. The actors come and go. They change then- status and roles from childhood, to adolescence, to adulthood and old age. They change from
being dependent children to become married adults with children, and eventually with
grandchildren; from son or daughter, to father or mother, to grandparents or even great grandparents. The family also has a capacity to absorb both truncation and growth.
Members leave, some die. New people join the family as wives or husbands or newly born children. Orphaned children are absorbed by other families. Lonely widows or widowers are attached to other families of close or distant relatives depending on circumstances.
Whenever a society undergoes changes which are either traumatic or sudden or both, there is fear that the family will be adversely affected. In fact, the family also exists as a system for weathering such traumas through affective as well as material responses. Thus the recurring economic crises in Africa, and the sharp deterioration in lifestyles has challenged the family's ability to cope. Although no unique patterns have emerged, the incidence of less approved patterns has manifested itself.
78. The functions of the family and the roles of family members have been undergoing change not so much in terms of new functions and roles, but in terms shifts in emphasis and changes in priorities. The many functions of the family are still valid: procreation, sexual gratification, child rearing, caring, feeding, caring for the aged and disadvantage*! family members, socialization, training and placement in work, marrying-off members, and finally burying deceased members and inheriting their property. Many of these functions are no longer the strict preserve of the family. For example, schools take over part of the training functions of a family. Literate and educated parents may then find that they now have to study the school curricula in order to help their children with the homework. The roles of the parents have changed, but the family is still responsible for seeing that the children receive suitable education. Thus, depending on the status and circumstances of the family, and whether it is a nuclear or extended family, the roles of the family members will also become subject to different changes and shifts in emphasis.
79. As the men leave the rural areas to find work in the towns, the women learn to take full charge of the homes and adjacent farms. The men discover on their periodic return home, that being an intermittent husband can seriously undermine their authority as fathers and marginalise their role in the home. Some men resent this and try to re-assert their authority through violence. Violence between couples is reported to be escalating in some countries. As women take advantage of the recession which has affected many men in the formal structure and exploit the informal market for quick gain, conflict between couples are on the increase as women begin to challenge the traditional dominance of men. In West Africa, market women have traditionally controlled the informal markets as well as their incomes. What has happened in the decade under discussion is that the trend has become more pronounced.
80. The trend from the extended family to a contracted extended family and eventually to a nuclear or conjugal family has been observed over a long period of time, but this trend can be attributed more to education and changing lifestyles than to economic crisis. Christian missionaries had been predicting the demise of polygamy since the beginning of the century.
Economic crises can arguably put a break on men acquiring multiple wives, but in most African countries, polygamy is still widely practised. On the other hand, not all people become poor in such crises. A few may retain their wealth or even augment it. Therefore, women would find being a second or third wife to a man of means preferable to being a single wife in a starving home. It may even prove more viable where working co-wives pool resources together to maintain the household.
81. The exodus, especially of many young people from the rural areas, has certainly reduced the size of the extended family in situ. Where young people migrate far from home and to widely-placed localities, and in the absence of good communications, many relatives appear lost to their families. The remnant of the extended family tends to stick more closely together for mutual support. It is re-inforced from time to time by members who have succeeded materially. Despite the trend towards nuclear families as households, there is always prestige accorded to the man or woman who identifies with his/her extended family and helps them. There is a definite stigma against those who ignore their extended families altogether. They are considered selfish, arrogant and ungrateful and may risk a reprimand or sanctions from the family or clan.
