Book Chapter
Reference
The place of non-trade concerns in international trade
MARCEAU, Gabrielle Zoe, MARQUET, Clément
MARCEAU, Gabrielle Zoe, MARQUET, Clément. The place of non-trade concerns in international trade. In: Rita Trigo Trindade, Rashid Bahar et Giulia Neri-Castrane. Vers les sommets du droit : Liber amicorum pour Henry Peter . Genève : Schulthess éditions romandes, 2019. p. 379-390
Available at:
http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:146534
Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.
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G
ABRIELLEM
ARCEAU/ C
LÉMENTM
ARQUET∗The Place of Non-Trade Concerns in International Trade
Table of Contents
PageIntroduction ... 380
I. The Traditional Rules of the GATT 1947 ... 381
II. The WTO and its New Goal of Protecting Sustainable Development ... 382
III. The Possibility of Using a “Stick”: Justifiable Trade Restrictions ... 382
A. Article XX GATT: Historical Balance and Coherence ... 383
B. The New Possibilities Covered by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade ... 386
IV. The “Carrot”: Conditioned Trade Preferences ... 388
Conclusion ... 388
Bibliography ... 390
∗
380
Introduction
For a few years already, Henry Peter’s focus of research has been on philanthropy and the integration of social and environmental concerns into the life of companies, lawyers and other private actors. This is a lens through which various sets of rules can be analysed. In keeping with his research interest, we propose looking at how non-trade concerns (NTCs) can be taken into account in the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before it, have long been criticised for an alleged lack of openness to non-trade concerns. More specifically, the incorporation of issues related to human rights, the environment, public health, labour, culture into the international trade law framework was regularly the target of public outcry. Some painted a grim picture of the GATT, asserting it was closed to such NTCs and could, in turn, contribute to various ills, such as environmental disasters, lowered food standards or social dumping. With the WTO, things have changed and, if anything, many developing countries’
representatives would argue that the recent jurisprudence on exceptions and justification, and under the TBT Agreement was too flexible in allowing policy space for non-trade concerns.
This chapter will show how the traditional GATT rules, against discrimination and border restrictions other than tariffs, have somehow limited governments’
right to legislate to favour non-trade concerns. This was particularly the case in light of the prohibition of distinctions based on “process and production methods” (PPMs) and the narrow reading of exceptions and policy justifications.
However, the WTO has expanded the scope of the policy space left to governments to give priority to non-trade concerns measures.
In the first part, we explain the traditional basic provisions of the GATT. In the second and third and fourth parts we point to changes brought by a new reading of the WTO exceptions, conditions attached to trade preferences and new provisions allowing governments to use trade measures as incentives to favour policies related to non-trade concerns. Those cases take the form of augmented and/or conditional and/or restricted market access framed along regulatory distinctions based on non-trade concerns.
It should be noted that this chapter by no means intends to be an exhaustive presentation of the way in which the WTO deals with non-trade concerns. Rather, it will simply provide an overview of some of the main disciplines that can be used by WTO Members to promote certain values.
Introduction
For a few years already, Henry Peter’s focus of research has been on philanthropy and the integration of social and environmental concerns into the life of companies, lawyers and other private actors. This is a lens through which various sets of rules can be analysed. In keeping with his research interest, we propose looking at how non-trade concerns (NTCs) can be taken into account in the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before it, have long been criticised for an alleged lack of openness to non-trade concerns. More specifically, the incorporation of issues related to human rights, the environment, public health, labour, culture into the international trade law framework was regularly the target of public outcry. Some painted a grim picture of the GATT, asserting it was closed to such NTCs and could, in turn, contribute to various ills, such as environmental disasters, lowered food standards or social dumping. With the WTO, things have changed and, if anything, many developing countries’
representatives would argue that the recent jurisprudence on exceptions and justification, and under the TBT Agreement was too flexible in allowing policy space for non-trade concerns.
This chapter will show how the traditional GATT rules, against discrimination and border restrictions other than tariffs, have somehow limited governments’
right to legislate to favour non-trade concerns. This was particularly the case in light of the prohibition of distinctions based on “process and production methods” (PPMs) and the narrow reading of exceptions and policy justifications.
However, the WTO has expanded the scope of the policy space left to governments to give priority to non-trade concerns measures.
In the first part, we explain the traditional basic provisions of the GATT. In the second and third and fourth parts we point to changes brought by a new reading of the WTO exceptions, conditions attached to trade preferences and new provisions allowing governments to use trade measures as incentives to favour policies related to non-trade concerns. Those cases take the form of augmented and/or conditional and/or restricted market access framed along regulatory distinctions based on non-trade concerns.
It should be noted that this chapter by no means intends to be an exhaustive presentation of the way in which the WTO deals with non-trade concerns. Rather, it will simply provide an overview of some of the main disciplines that can be used by WTO Members to promote certain values.
I. The Traditional Rules of the GATT 1947
GATT rules are traditionally limited. They focus on non-discrimination in the treatment of like products (in particular discrimination based on the origin of goods) and the prohibition of border restrictions, other than tariffs. Those should be collected on a non-discriminatory basis against all like products from GATT/WTO Members, below negotiated bound levels.
The main purpose of the old GATT was to prohibit tax and regulatory discrimination between imported products and domestic products which are similar or like. However, there remains a large leeway in the interests that a Member can protect when two products are not like. For example, a government can decide not to tax children books but to tax adult fiction books, or to tax them at very different levels, so long as all children books and adult fiction books are respectively treated the same way with regards to regulation.
The main problem under the GATT rules was the fact that the discrimination focused on products and assumed that products that are physically similar are presumed to be like and therefore they could not be regulated differently or less favourably. In other words, discrimination and distinction between similar products could not be based on the way in which the products are made (PPMs).
This is often where non-trade concerns tend to be found. For example, two products may look alike but one may be produced in violation of environmental or human rights treaties while the other similar product is made in compliance with the same treaties. Traditionally these two products would be considered like and should be regulated in the same manner. Thus, these two like products could not be taxed or regulated differently on the basis of their manner or method of production.
This is where the exceptions of the GATT and some of the new flexibilities of the WTO, discussed hereafter, find their relevance. Otherwise, governments are free to set up the taxation or regulatory system of their choice, not to tax certain items or to select the taxation and regulatory system of their choice. This is still true today.
The GATT also prohibits the use of import or export border restrictions (ban or quotas). The GATT authorizes the collection of import tariffs so long as they are collected 1) below negotiated binding levels, 2) and applied on a non- discriminatory manner. Again, the exceptions now allow governments to collect different import tariffs or to impose import bans, as long as they do so for one of the policy reasons listed in article XX GATT, or in the context of the TBT Agreement discussed in the following sections of this paper.
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II. The WTO and its New Goal of Protecting Sustainable Development
With the entry into force of the WTO, the exceptions/justifications to the basic rules highlighted above now allow WTO Members to invoke a series of policy considerations. Those can justify discriminations or restrictions imposed via trade measures that embody non-trade concerns.
The new preamble that appeared in 1995, which refers, among others, to
“sustainable development” was read as giving “colour, texture and shading to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement”.1 From this stems a broad array of manners in which Members can address NTCs in their national and international rules and commitments.
In this perspective, the next sections will look at the two main types of actions that Members can take, and their treatment in WTO law. These two categories, which could be colloquially deemed “stick” and “carrot”, will focus on the types of incentives used. In other words, the first section will analyse the extent to which a Member can attempt to protect the values mentioned above through trade restrictions. Is it possible to refuse the importation of goods entailing a large carbon footprint? Can a government prohibit the exportation of cultural goods?
The third section will address the more supportive counterpart, that is the ways in which governments can positively discriminate, through increased market access, in order to encourage certain behaviours linked to NTCs.
III. The Possibility of Using a “Stick”: Justifiable Trade Restrictions
Whether governmental action takes the form of an increased tariff duty on the importation of cars with a large carbon footprint, an import ban on sneakers manufactured in violation of human rights or labour standards, or the prohibition of exporting cultural goods, there is a good chance that the measure would violate one of the basic market access provisions.2
II. The WTO and its New Goal of Protecting Sustainable Development
With the entry into force of the WTO, the exceptions/justifications to the basic rules highlighted above now allow WTO Members to invoke a series of policy considerations. Those can justify discriminations or restrictions imposed via trade measures that embody non-trade concerns.
The new preamble that appeared in 1995, which refers, among others, to
“sustainable development” was read as giving “colour, texture and shading to the rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement”.1 From this stems a broad array of manners in which Members can address NTCs in their national and international rules and commitments.
In this perspective, the next sections will look at the two main types of actions that Members can take, and their treatment in WTO law. These two categories, which could be colloquially deemed “stick” and “carrot”, will focus on the types of incentives used. In other words, the first section will analyse the extent to which a Member can attempt to protect the values mentioned above through trade restrictions. Is it possible to refuse the importation of goods entailing a large carbon footprint? Can a government prohibit the exportation of cultural goods?
The third section will address the more supportive counterpart, that is the ways in which governments can positively discriminate, through increased market access, in order to encourage certain behaviours linked to NTCs.
III. The Possibility of Using a “Stick”: Justifiable Trade Restrictions
Whether governmental action takes the form of an increased tariff duty on the importation of cars with a large carbon footprint, an import ban on sneakers manufactured in violation of human rights or labour standards, or the prohibition of exporting cultural goods, there is a good chance that the measure would violate one of the basic market access provisions.2
As mentioned, historically, it was considered that taking into account the “process and production method” of a given item would usually result in a WTO- inconsistent measure.3 In other words, unless the non-respect of human rights standards or environmental norms could be identified in the physical characteristics of the final product, no distinction could be made between this product and a “virtuous” one.
A. Article XX GATT: Historical Balance and Coherence
The first category of justification to a discrimination between two products based on a NTC can be found in article XX of the GATT. This article embodies the
“General Exceptions” that can justify a violation of another part of the Agreement.
Indeed, this article lays down an exhaustive list of categories of NTCs that could justify a trade restriction. A government taking such measures first needs to demonstrate that it passes the test of one of these subparagraphs. Among these, we will briefly look at articles XX(a), XX(b), XX(d) and XX(g) that refer to the right of governments to protect morality, health, environment and other domestic policies that are WTO consistent.
Between the entry into force of the GATT, in 1948, and its integration into the WTO, in 1995, the case law surrounding article XX was particularly restrictive. In the US – Tuna GATT panel reports, it was decided that article XX of the GATT could not be used as a justification for the protection of values outside one Member’s jurisdiction unless an international treaty existed and dealt with the possible trade restrictions that could be imposed to protect the health of citizens.4 More recent case law has changed the approach.
As the first step of an analysis, such a priori WTO-inconsistent measures should be demonstrated to be “necessary”. This “necessity test” entails a weighing and balancing of the importance of the value at stake, the contribution of the measure to the protection of this value, and the trade restrictiveness of the measure.5 Further, no less trade-restrictive and reasonably available alternative measure
384
should exist.6 In these circumstances, a measure will be deemed “necessary”. This test is a requirement applicable to each of the three subparagraphs. However, they all address different substantive issues.
Article XX(a) focuses on measures necessary to the protection of public morals.
That is, the “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation including measure for public order preserving fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public policy and law”. 7The exact scope of this exception is unclear, but still quite broad. Indeed, the AB considered in 2014 that public concerns against animal cruelty could fit into this subparagraph.8 This means that various NTCs ranging from human rights to cultural diversity and preservation could arguably also be justified under this provision.
In turn, article XX(b) deals with a slightly different set of issues, although some overlap with the previous subparagraph is possible. Here, governments can justify restrictions as long as they are necessary to protect “human, animal or plant life or health”. An open interpretation could lead to the inclusion of many non- trade concerns into this provision. For instance, low labour standards raise the question of their impact on the health (or even life9) of the workers. Similarly, pollution levels could be taken into account.10
Article XX(d) plays a different role. Indeed, rather than explicitly lay out a specific value that can be protected though trade restrictions, the subparagraph offers a more general approach. If allows for restrictions necessary to enforce other laws, when these are otherwise compliant with WTO rules. For instance, should a Member enact a law aiming at the avoidance of certain criminal activities,11 other measures taken to ensure compliance with it could thus be WTO-consistent. It remains to be seen how wide the scope of this provision is. For instance, one could wonder if trade restrictions stemming from laws aiming at the protection of the cultural heritage could fall under subparagraph XX(d). The respective importance of the values protected will weigh differently on the “necessity test” mentioned
should exist.6 In these circumstances, a measure will be deemed “necessary”. This test is a requirement applicable to each of the three subparagraphs. However, they all address different substantive issues.
Article XX(a) focuses on measures necessary to the protection of public morals.
That is, the “standards of right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation including measure for public order preserving fundamental interests of a society, as reflected in public policy and law”. 7The exact scope of this exception is unclear, but still quite broad. Indeed, the AB considered in 2014 that public concerns against animal cruelty could fit into this subparagraph.8 This means that various NTCs ranging from human rights to cultural diversity and preservation could arguably also be justified under this provision.
In turn, article XX(b) deals with a slightly different set of issues, although some overlap with the previous subparagraph is possible. Here, governments can justify restrictions as long as they are necessary to protect “human, animal or plant life or health”. An open interpretation could lead to the inclusion of many non- trade concerns into this provision. For instance, low labour standards raise the question of their impact on the health (or even life9) of the workers. Similarly, pollution levels could be taken into account.10
Article XX(d) plays a different role. Indeed, rather than explicitly lay out a specific value that can be protected though trade restrictions, the subparagraph offers a more general approach. If allows for restrictions necessary to enforce other laws, when these are otherwise compliant with WTO rules. For instance, should a Member enact a law aiming at the avoidance of certain criminal activities,11 other measures taken to ensure compliance with it could thus be WTO-consistent. It remains to be seen how wide the scope of this provision is. For instance, one could wonder if trade restrictions stemming from laws aiming at the protection of the cultural heritage could fall under subparagraph XX(d). The respective importance of the values protected will weigh differently on the “necessity test” mentioned
above, but these NTCs might nevertheless be taken into account to justify an otherwise WTO-inconsistent measure.
Turning to paragraph XX(g), the “necessity test” is replaced by the requirement a measure be “relat[ed] to”. This requires “a close and genuine relationship of ends and means between that measure and the conservation objective of the Member maintaining the measure”.12 While not identical to the test of “necessity”, there is still a close proximity between the notions.13 Members can restrict trade in order to conserve “exhaustible natural resources”. While this notion was likely understood as relating to minerals such as oil or coal in 1947, in WTO law, it has been interpreted as including living resources such as turtles into it, thereby allowing for their protection through trade restrictions.14 Since “clean air” was also considered an exhaustible natural resource,15 it seems that a clean and temperate environment would also fit into this provision.
Such measures must in addition be applied in good faith under the so-called chapeau of article XX GATT.16 In essence, the chapeau is a test of the good faith of the Member enacting a measure.17 It serves to determine whether the measure is truly aimed at the protection of the value at stake or if it was a protectionist decision under a guise, or even a violation of GATT provisions for wholly other reasons than those laid out in the subparagraph. The text of the chapeau prohibits
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail”, as well as “disguised restrictions on international trade”.
While the exact delineation of each of these conditions is blurry,18 they nevertheless cover a wide range of possible issues. For instance, in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the Appellate Body ruled that Brazil could legitimately restrict the importation of a certain type of tyres for health purposes, but its measure was not coherent. As a matter of fact, Brazil was prohibiting importation from anywhere
386
but its MERCOSUR partners. This was considered to be an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.19
All in all, the current interpretation of article XX leaves wide-ranging flexibilities to Members in their approach to non-trade concerns. However, and this is where the problem might lie, the measures enacted by the governments need be coherent and applied in good faith.
B. The New Possibilities Covered by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Upon the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, which gave birth to the WTO in 1995, a slew of new chapters were added to the GATT. Some of them expanded the disciplines relating to trade in goods, and among them, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
Article 2.1 TBT embodies the same non-discrimination obligations as those found in article I and III GATT, albeit with a narrower focus.20 However, the lack of
“article XX-like” provision led the AB to a reading of article 2.1 and 2.2 TBT that could be likened to article XX GATT.21 However, one of the main conceptual differences between the two articles is that article XX GATT is construed as an exception. In contrast, article 2.1 and 2.2 TBT are rather conditional rights. This changes the dynamic regarding non-trade concerns. Indeed, rather than having to go through the process of finding a violation which could then be considered justified, the NTC is embodied into the analysis of the violation in the TBT.22 Article 2.1 TBT has been interpreted as allowing regulations that restrict and even discriminate between similar products so long as such impact stems from a legitimate regulatory distinction.23 Legitimate regulatory distinctions would seem to include any legitimate objective in particular those subsumed by the WTO goal
but its MERCOSUR partners. This was considered to be an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.19
All in all, the current interpretation of article XX leaves wide-ranging flexibilities to Members in their approach to non-trade concerns. However, and this is where the problem might lie, the measures enacted by the governments need be coherent and applied in good faith.
B. The New Possibilities Covered by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
Upon the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, which gave birth to the WTO in 1995, a slew of new chapters were added to the GATT. Some of them expanded the disciplines relating to trade in goods, and among them, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).
Article 2.1 TBT embodies the same non-discrimination obligations as those found in article I and III GATT, albeit with a narrower focus.20 However, the lack of
“article XX-like” provision led the AB to a reading of article 2.1 and 2.2 TBT that could be likened to article XX GATT.21 However, one of the main conceptual differences between the two articles is that article XX GATT is construed as an exception. In contrast, article 2.1 and 2.2 TBT are rather conditional rights. This changes the dynamic regarding non-trade concerns. Indeed, rather than having to go through the process of finding a violation which could then be considered justified, the NTC is embodied into the analysis of the violation in the TBT.22 Article 2.1 TBT has been interpreted as allowing regulations that restrict and even discriminate between similar products so long as such impact stems from a legitimate regulatory distinction.23 Legitimate regulatory distinctions would seem to include any legitimate objective in particular those subsumed by the WTO goal
of maintaining sustainable development.24 This requirement of “even- handedness”25 has been recognized by the AB itself as very similar to the chapeau of article XX, discussed above, controlling the good faith of the country adopting such technical regulation.26 The AB also underlined that “Article 2.1 does not operate to prohibit a priori any obstacle to international trade”.27
Coming back to the question of non-trade concerns, article 2.2 TBT offers a broader range of value that Members can protect through trade restrictions. This provision refers to any “legitimate objectives” followed by a list. One should note that this list is non-exhaustive (unlike article XX GATT) and thus would allow for more non-trade concerns to be taken into account. Cultural protection, human rights or labour rights could be legitimate objectives that favour sustainable development.
Importantly, article 2.4 requires Members to base themselves relevant international standards, where they exist. However, should they fully comply with said standard, they will be deemed not to create unnecessary obstacles to trade through article 2.5 TBT. Applied to the topic of this chapter, this provision means that where a Member conforms to a standard relating to labour, health or the environment for instance, it would be presumed to comply with its obligations. Thus, NTCs-based trade restrictions arising from this measure would not violate the TBT.
Articles XX GATT and 2 TBT offer a fairly broad range of options. Now, trade measures based on non-trade concerns can restrict trade in prohibiting, for instance, the importation of goods that do not respect certain environmental, health or labour standards, or that are imported or exported without regards for cultural protection considerations.
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IV. The “Carrot”: Conditioned Trade Preferences
Trade actions taken by governments with regards to non-trade concerns can also be used as “carrots”. The possibility to provide preferences to products from some Members and not others is, in itself, a violation of the most favoured nation clause found in article I:1 of the GATT.28 However, the Enabling Clause permits a donor country to impose requirements and conditions attached to its market access preference so long as (a) an identical treatment should be provided to all similarly- situated beneficiaries,29 (b) the distinguishing criteria should be based on objective criteria30 and (c) the preference should address “development, financial or trade needs”.31
In practical terms, this means that developed Members can promote certain non- trade concerns through preferential tariff treatment. For instance, assuming that labour or environmental concerns can be considered to promote development needs, a donor Member could enhance access to its market for developing countries complying with certain multilateral agreements on the topic or unilaterally determined labour or environmental criteria.32 As long as the criteria are set out objectively and similarly-situated beneficiaries are treated identically, the measure would be WTO-consistent. For example, it could be argued that beneficial tariff treatment based on the ratification of the Paris Agreement by the other Member would be a WTO-consistent measure, notwithstanding its prima facie violation of article I:1 GATT. Therefore, through incentives, governments can take into account non-trade concerns, even beyond their own borders.
Conclusion
In spite of the WTO’s reputation, one should have a closer look at the actual rules of the regime. Indeed, such criticism discounts two central elements in WTO law.
The first one is that be it about the environment, cultural heritage, health or labour standards, there are options for Members to enact protective legislation while
IV. The “Carrot”: Conditioned Trade Preferences
Trade actions taken by governments with regards to non-trade concerns can also be used as “carrots”. The possibility to provide preferences to products from some Members and not others is, in itself, a violation of the most favoured nation clause found in article I:1 of the GATT.28 However, the Enabling Clause permits a donor country to impose requirements and conditions attached to its market access preference so long as (a) an identical treatment should be provided to all similarly- situated beneficiaries,29 (b) the distinguishing criteria should be based on objective criteria30 and (c) the preference should address “development, financial or trade needs”.31
In practical terms, this means that developed Members can promote certain non- trade concerns through preferential tariff treatment. For instance, assuming that labour or environmental concerns can be considered to promote development needs, a donor Member could enhance access to its market for developing countries complying with certain multilateral agreements on the topic or unilaterally determined labour or environmental criteria.32 As long as the criteria are set out objectively and similarly-situated beneficiaries are treated identically, the measure would be WTO-consistent. For example, it could be argued that beneficial tariff treatment based on the ratification of the Paris Agreement by the other Member would be a WTO-consistent measure, notwithstanding its prima facie violation of article I:1 GATT. Therefore, through incentives, governments can take into account non-trade concerns, even beyond their own borders.
Conclusion
In spite of the WTO’s reputation, one should have a closer look at the actual rules of the regime. Indeed, such criticism discounts two central elements in WTO law.
The first one is that be it about the environment, cultural heritage, health or labour standards, there are options for Members to enact protective legislation while
remaining WTO-consistent. However, and this brings us to the second point, one should not forget that the WTO is a Member-driven organisation. This is a crucial idea that underlies how responsibility lies upon individual governments rather than the organisation as a single entity. Members do have options to promote the respect of certain values. However, it requires two things from them, which might be difficult to achieve.
The first requirement is that their policy actually aims at protecting the NTCs at stake, rather than their own domestic industry. It is easy to enact a law and present it as a measure protecting the environment, or workers’ rights. Nevertheless, if the actual objective is simply to enforce protectionist policies, WTO law will be a hurdle. Members should protect values, not use them to divert the spirit of the organisation. The second element needed from Members is political will. Where governments might give beautiful speeches about NTCs, enacting laws and reaching international agreements on those values is a wholly different affair. And in this regards, critics of the WTO and concerned citizens have a say. Through formal or informal channels, they can make their voices be heard, and thus promote NTCs on both the national and the international level.
However, coming back to Henry Peter’s work in the field of philanthropy, one can only note that while WTO rules on international trade allow governments to deal with a series of non-trade concerns, serious challenges exist against international trade, globalisation and the WTO. It can be demonstrated that trade can lead to growth and development and has brought wealth to trading nations, but many individuals complain louder and louder about their precarious situation. This can be due to the fact that the benefits of trade are not always redistributed properly among people within each country. Additionally, there are no international rules about redistribution of benefits and no place where individuals can complain about the lack of national distribution of the benefits of trade, a matter traditionally considered to be of strictly domestic nature. This discourse may need to evolve as the growing dissatisfaction of many people is now crossing frontiers. However, the differences between multiple national economic systems make such exchanges on redistribution extremely complex. Remains to be seen if philanthropic considerations or larger systemic upheavals might change this in the future.
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KÜNZLI,NINO ET AL., Public-health impact of outdoor and traffic-related air pollution : a European assessment, 2000, p. 795 ss
MARCEAU,GABRIELLE /MOROSINI,FABIO, The Status of Sustainable Development in the Law of the World Trade Organization, in Arbitragem e Comércio Internacional : Estudos em Homenagem a Luis Olavo Baptista, 2013, p.
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