UNIVERSITE DE GENEVE
INSTITUT UNIVERSITAIRE DE HAUTES ETUDES INTERNATIONALES
THE TRANSFER OF DUAL-USE OUTER SPACE
TECHNOLOGIES: CONFRONTATION OR
CO-OPERATION?
Thèse
présentée à l’Université de Genève pour l’obtention du grade de Docteur en
relations internationales
par
Péricles GASPARINI ALVES
(Brésil)
Thèse No. 612
GENEVE 2000
Epigraph
The first of December had arrived! the fatal day! for, if the projectile were not discharged that
very night at 10h. 46m.40s. p.m., more than eighteen years must roll by before the moon
would again present herself under the same conditions of zenith and perigee.
The weather was magnificent. ...
The whole plain was covered with huts, cottages, and tents. Every nation under the sun was represented there; and every language might be heard spoken at the same time. It was a perfect Babel re-enacted. ...
The moment had arrived for saying ‘Goodbye!’ The scene was a touching one. ... ‘Thirty-five!—thirty-six!—thirty-seven!—thirty-eight!—thirty-nine!—forty! Fire!!!’
Instantly Murchison pressed with his finger the key of the electric battery, restored the current of the fluid, and discharged the spark into the breach of the Columbiad.
An appalling, unearthly report followed instantly, such as can be compared to nothing whatever known, not even to the roar of thunder, or the blast of volcanic explosion! No words can convey the slightest idea of the terrific sound! An immense spout of fire shot up from the bowels of the earth as from a crater. The earth heaved up, and ...
View of the Moon in orbit around the Earth, Galileo Spacecraft, 16 December 1992
image002
Courtesy of NASA
‘The projectile discharged by the Columbiad at Stones Hill has been detected ...12th December, at 8.47 pm., the moon having entered her last quarter. This projectile has not arrived at its destination, it has passed by the side; but sufficiently near to be retained by the lunar attraction. ...
‘However, two hypotheses come here into our consideration.
‘1. Either the attraction of the moon will end by drawing them into itself, and the travellers will attain their destination; or, —
‘2. The projectile, following an immutable law, will continue to gravitate round the moon till the end of time.
‘At some future time, our observations will be able to determine this point, but till then the experiment of the Gun Club can have no other result than to have provided our solar system with a new star. Extracted from the Chapters
“Fire!” & “A New Star”
From the Earth to the Moon
Jules Verne 1865
Acknowledgments
The decision to write a Thesis dissertation may not be too difficult to make, especially since
obtaining a Doctoral’s Degree at the end of a Thesis process is an encouraging stimulus.
However, ideas are always easier to conceive and announce than to implement: writing a
PhD. Thesis is no exception. Nonetheless, despite the many difficulties one may encounter in
writing a dissertation, the level of satisfaction that may be enjoyed when arriving at the finish
line is often greater than any obstacle encountered on the way. This has been my own
experience.
The road I took to write this manuscript was not always an easy one to ride on. I have
encountered many obstacles which made this endeavour evermore difficult than it could have
been otherwise. Some of these obstacles were predictable, since they were clearly in
confrontation with my démarche. In retrospect, they have not been strong enough to stop me
from moving mountains in a crusade of words and deeds. Other obstacles, however, were
considerably more difficult to surmount for reasons which are not worth mentioning here.
Fortunately, my efforts and determination were stronger than their opposition and the
prospective reader shall judge if it was worthwhile the effort to finish this work.
I would like to mention those who facilitated the completion of this work and my first thanks
goes to those who played a fundamental role in supporting my original ideas and efforts.
Namely, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, then Director of the United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and at present UN Under-Secretary-General for
Disarmament Affairs, who always supported my work and ceaselessly advised me to continue
pursuing my studies. His successor, Mr Sverre Lodgaard, always hinted that I should pay
more attention to potential contributions that confidence-and security-building measures could
provide to the technology transfer debate; and Patricia Lewis, current UNIDIR Director,
supported my efforts to complete this manuscript. Additionally, special thanks are also
addressed to Professor Serge Sur, former Deputy Director of UNIDIR, for the long hours of
conversation on space and related matters during my tenure at the Institute. His comments and
support were very much appreciated.
My sincere and warm thanks must go to Mr Curt Gasteyger, Emeritus Professor and Director
of the Programme for Strategic Studies and International Security at the Graduate Institute of
International Studies (IUHEI). Besides being one of my teachers at IUHEI and Director of my
Thesis, Professor Gasteyger was also Director of two other works of mine at the Institute: a
Memoire de Diplôme in 1988 and Memoire de diplome d’etude superior (DES) in 1993. It
was therefore a pleasure and indeed an honour that he accepted to be the Director of my PhD.
Every since the early stages of this Thesis, Professor Gasteyger provided me with important
strategic advice as regards both the general line of thought of this work and issues of
substance. I must note here that he did not always agree with my description or appreciation
of events and ideas, but his doubts only encouraged me to better clarify my views. This
feature of our student/professor relationship was quite challenging and extremely important to
stimulate my thoughts. Additionally, I should also like to attest my gratitude for Professor
Gasteyger’s institutional and moral support throughout my many years of studies at IUHEI,
without which I would probably not have been able to carry-out this work.
I also thank all of those who assisted me in visiting various space and space-related factories
and installations throughout the world, interview scientists and technicians on-site. This
proved to be extremely useful since for me, as a student of international relations, I was
neither trained nor exposed to detailed technical aspects of outer space technologies.
The support of Véronique Marie Clément Alves, my wife, was also essential for me to face
the challenge of writing a PhD Thesis and I thank her many hours of patience and active
support for me to carry on this important but tedious work.
Miss Riche Pannetti of Geneva deserves special mention in this acknowledgments. Miss
Pannetti has assisted me making the necessary language corrections and indeed polishing the
English to be appreciated in its own merit. She has not measured efforts in helping me and
often exceeded regular working hours to finish one more sentence, paragraph, page, chapter...
Unfortunately, for reasons of time, she did not have the opportunity to finish all the
corrections. I also thank her for being a true friend at good and difficult moments.
Last, but not least, while apologizing for those whom I may have unintentionally omitted, I
should like to state that the responsibility of the statements in this Thesis are my own and
neither of those whom I have mentioned nor of the Institution I work for.
List of Acronyms and Symbols
ABL Airborne
Laser
ABM Anti-Ballistic
Missile
ACDA
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (USA)
ACRS
Arms Control and Regional Security
ADCP
Air Defence Communication Platform
AEGIS
Ship-mounted weapons system
AG Australian
Group
AGRE
Active Geophysical Rocket Experiment
AHWG
Ad Hoc Working Group
ALCM
Air-Launched Cruise Missile
ALERT
Attack & Launch Early Reporting to Theatre
AMI
Active Microwave Instrument
ANSC
Alliance New Strategic Concept
ANSP
Australian National Space Programme
AN/TPS Ground-based
radar
AOC
Air Operations Centre
AR Altimeter
Radar
ARABSAT Arab Corporation for Space Communication
ARGOS
Data Collecting System
ARR
Andøya Rocket Range (Norway)
ARTEMIS
Advanced Relay TEchnology MISsion (ESA)
ASAR
Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar
ASAT Anti-Satellite
weapons
ASB
Australian Space Board
ASBM
Air-to-Surface Ballistic Missile
ASI
Italian Space Agency
ASLV
Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (India)
ASO
Australian Space Office
ATSR
Along-Track Scanning Radiometer
ATSR-M
Along-Track Scanning Radiometer & Microwave Sounder
AUSSAT Australian
Satellite
Bae British
Aerospace
BEAR
Beam Experiment Aboard Rocket (SDI)
BM Ballistic
Missile
BM/C
3Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications
BMD
Ballistic Missile Defense
BMDO
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
BMFT
Federal Ministry for Research and Technology (Germany)
BMI
Ballistic Missile Interception
BNSC
British National Space Centre
BPI Boost-Phase
Interceptor
BRAZILSAT Brazilian Satellite
BSA
Brazilian Space Agency
BSTS
Boost Surveillance and Tracking Satellite
BUR Bottom-Up
Review
BW Biological
Weapons
BWC
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
C
2Command and Control
C
3I
Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence
CALT
China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology
CASDN
National Defence Scientific Steering Committee (France)
CAST
Chinese Academy of Space Technology
CASTR
Chinese Academy of Space Technology Research
CBERS
China-Brazil Earth Resource Satellite
CBMs Confidence-Building
Measures
Cbo
Collision Bodies (ASAT weapons)
CCD
Charge Coupled Devise
CCI
Constellation Communications, Inc.
CD
Conference on Disarmament
CFE
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
ChR
Chemical Rockets (ASAT weapons)
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CII
International Export Certificate (Brazil)
CIS
Commonwealth of Independent States
CLTC
China Satellite Launch and TT&C General
CM Cruise
Missile
CMC
Central Military Commission (Japan)
CNAD
Conference of National Armaments Directors
CNES
National Centre of Space Studies (France)
CNIE
National Commission of Space Research (Argentina)
CNR
National Research Council (Italy)
CNRS
National Centre of Scientific Research (France)
COBAE
Brazilian Commission for Space Activities
COCOM
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control
CONAE
National Commission of Space Activities (Argentina)
COPUOS
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
COSTND
Commission of Science and Technology for National Defence
CPE
Circle Probable Error
CPI
Permanent Inter-ministerial Commission (Brazil)
CRC
Command Report Centre
CSA
Canadian Space Agency
CSBMs
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures
CSC
Central Special Committee (Japan)
CSCB
Clouds of Small Collision Bodies (ASAT weapons)
CSG
French Guyana Space Centre
CSS Chinese
Surface-to-Surface
CTA
Aerospace Technical Centre (Brazil)
CTBT
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty
CTS
Communications Technology Satellite (Canada)
CVE
Verification of Delivery Certificate (Brazil)
CW Chemical
Weapons
CWC
Chemical Weapons Convention
CZ Chang
Zheng
DAMs
Direct Ascending Missiles (ASAT weapons)
DARA
German Space Agency
DARPA
Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (USA)
DEDU
Development and Educational Communication Unit (India)
DMA
Ministerial Armaments Delegation (France)
DoC
Department of Commerce (USA)
DoD
Department of Defense (USA)
DOS
Department of Space (India)
DoS
Department of State (USA)
DPI
Dual Pilot Implementation (US/USSR)
DPKOS
Department for Peace-keeping Operations
DPRK
Democratic People’s Repubic of Korea
DRDL
Defence Research and Development Laboratory (India)
DRDO
Defence Research and Development Organization (India)
DRS
Data Relay Satellite (ESA)
DSP
Defense Support Programme
DST
Defence and Space Talks (US/Russia)
DT Dual
Trust
EAD
Extended Air Defence
EAGLE
Extended Airborne Global Launch Evaluator
EAR
Export Administration Regulation (USA)
ECCO
Equatorial Constellation Communications
ECOSAT
European Control by Satellite
ECS
European Communication Satellite (ESA)
ECSRC
Executive Committee of the Space Research Council (Pakistan)
ELDO
European Launcher Development Organization
ELINT Electronic
Intelligence
EMFA
Joint-Armed Forces Ministry (Brazil)
EmSC
Emerging Space-Competent State
ENCD
Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
EOSAT
Earth Observation Satellite Company
ERINT
Extended Range Intercept Technology
ERNO
ERNO Raumfahrttechnik GmbH (Germany)
ERS
Earth Resource Satellite
ERTS
Earth Resources Technology Satellite (USA)
ESA
European Space Agency
ESCS
Emerging Space-Competent State
ESMON
Earth-to-Space Monitoring Network
ESRO
European Space Research Organization
ETM
Enhanced Thematic Mapper (LANDSAT)
EtSC
Established Space-Competent State
EU European
Union
EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community
EWS
Early Warning System
FOBS
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System
FOC
Faint Object Camera (Germany)
FSA
Free-Standing Agreement (US/USSR)
FTR
Flight Test Range
FY Fiscal
Year
GBI Ground-Based
Interceptor
GBR Ground-Based
Radar
GEM
Guidance Enhancement Missile
GEO Geostationary
Orbit
GEODSS
Electron-Optical Deep Space Surveillance System
GLBM
Ground-Launched Ballistic Missile
GLCM
Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
GOCNAE
Organizing Group of the National Commission for Space Activities
(Brazil)
GP Geneva
Protocol
GPALSs
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (USA)
GPS
Global Positioning Satellite
GPSCWG
Global Protection System Concept Working Group (US/Russian GPALs)
GSLV
Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle
GSTo
Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit
HAWK
Homing All The Way Killer
HEU
Highly Enriched Uranium
HOPE
H-II Orbiting Plane (Japan)
HORUS
Hypersonic Orbital Research and Utilization System
HRV
High Resolution Visible (SPOT)
HTK Hit-To-Kill
IAEA
International Atomic Energy Agency
IAG
Industrial Advisory Group
IAI
Israel Aircraft Industries
IAVAC
International Agency for the Verification of Arms Control Agreements
IBSS
Infrared Background Signature Survey (SDI)
ICBM
Inter-continental Ballistic Missile
ICJ
International Court of Justice
IDC
International Data Centre
IEC
International Export Certificate
IGMDP
Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (India)
IIAE
Instituto de Investigaciones Aeronáuticas y Espaciales (Argentina)
IIC
International Import Certificate
IMS
International Monitoring System
INC
International Notification Centre
INCSR
Indian National Committee for Space Research
INF
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty)
INLC
International Launch-Notification Centre
INPE
National Institute for Space Research (Brazil)
INSAT
Indian National Satellite
IRA
Israeli Space Agency
IRBM
Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile
IRIS
Indian Remote Sensing Satellite
IRIS
Italian Research Interim Stage
IR-MSS
Infra-Red Multispectral Scanners
IRS
Indian Remote-Sensing Satellite
ISAS
Institute of Space and Astronautical Science (Japan)
ISAS
International Satellite for Ionospheric Studies (Canada)
ISMA
International Satellite Monitoring Agency (French proposal)
ISRO
Indian Space Research Organization
ISSA
International Space Science Academy
ISTS
Institute for Space and Terrestrial Science (Canada)
ITA
Technological Institute of Aeronautics (Brazil)
ITU
International Telecommunication Union
JEM
Japanese Experiment Module
JMA
Japan Meteorological Agency
JSLC
Jiuguan Satellite Launch Centre (China)
JTAGS
Joint Tactical Ground Station
KEK
Kinetic Energy Kill
KSC
Kagoshima Space Centre (Japan)
LANDSAT Land use satellite (NASA)
Laser
Light amplification by simulated emission of radiation
LEAP
Light Exo-Atmospheric Projectile
LEO
Low Earth Orbit
LIGHTSATs Light Satellites
LISS
Liner Imaging Self-Scanner
LittleLEO
Little Launcher of Low Earth Orbit (UK)
LLV
Lockheed Launch Vehicle
LM Long
March
LPSC
Liquid Propulsion Space Centre (India)
LPSC
Liquid Propulsion Systems Centre (India)
MAAI
Ministry of Aeronautics and Astronautics Industry
MAc
Mass Accelerators (ASAT weapons)
MAD
Mutual Assured Destruction
MAI
Ministry of Aerospace Industry (China)
MARECS
Maritime European Communications Satellite (ESA)
MBB
Deutsche Aerospace (Germany)
MCB
Manoeuvrable Collision Bodies (ASAT weapons)
MDAHG Missile
Defence
Ad Hoc Group
Mdr
Mass Drivers (ASAT weapons)
MEADS
Medium Extended Air Defence System
MECB
Brazilian Complete Space Mission
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market
MIC
Ministry of Industry and Commerce (Israel)
MIRV
Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicle
MIT
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MITI
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
MOA
Memorandum of Agreement
MoD
Ministry of Defence (Israel)
MOE
Ministry of Education (Japan)
MOPT
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (Japan)
MOS
Marine Observation Satellite (Japan)
MOST
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (Japan)
MOT
Ministry of Transport (Japan)
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
MPLMs
Mini Pressurized Logistics Modules (Italy)
MRV
Mutual Re-entry Vehicle
MS Multispectral
MSDS
Marconi Space and Defence Systems (UK)
MSS
Marconi Space Systems (UK)
MSS
Mobile Servicing System (Canada)
MSS Multispectral
Scanners
MTCR
Missile Technology Control Regime
MTOPS
Million Theoretical Operations Per Second
MURST
Ministry for the Universities and Science and Technology (Italy)
NAC
North Atlantic Council
NACC
North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NADC
NATO Air Defence Committee
NAL
National Aerospace Laboratory (Japan)
NASA
National Aeronautics and Space Agency (USA)
NASDA
National Space Development Agency (Japan)
NASP
National Aero-Space Plane (USA)
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDRE
Norwegian Defense Research Establishment
NGSV
Argentinian New Generation Space Vehicle
NIPR
National Institute for Polar Research (Japan)
NMD
National Missile Defense (USA)
NMTs
National Technical Means of Verification
NNRMS
National Natural Resources Management System (India)
NOAA
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (USA)
NORAD
North American Aerospace Defense Command (USA)
NORSAR
Norwegian Seismic Array
NPA
Non-Proliferation Agency (US Senate bill)
NPS
Nuclear Power Source
NPT Non-Proliferation
Treaty
NPWG
Non-Proliferation Working Group (US/Russian GPALs)
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USA)
NRSA
National Remote Sensing Agency (India)
NRSC
National Remote Sensing Centre (China)
NSC
Norwegian Space Centre
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers Group
NSP
National Space Plan (Italy)
NST
Nuclear and Space Talks (US/Russia)
NTC
Noshiro Testing Centre (Japan)
NTMs
National Technical Means
NTNF
Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
NTWD
Navy Theatre-Wide Defence
NUPI
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
NWFZ
Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone
OECD
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPANAL
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the
Caribbean
OREX
Orbital Re-entry Experiment
OS Outer
Space
OSCE
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
OST
Outer Space Treaty
OTH-B Over-The-Horizon-Backscatters
PAC
PATRIOT Advanced Capability
PAN Panchromatic
PARCS
Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System
PAROS
Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
Committee
PAXSAT
Canadian Peace Satellite
PFS Pre-Feasibility
Study
PLO
Palestinian Liberation Organization
PLS
Personnel Launch System
PNDA
E
Brazilian National Policy o
n the Development of Space Activities
POC
Point of Contact
PRL
Physical Research Laboratory (India)
PSLV
Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (India)
PTBT
Partial Test-Ban Treaty
QRP
Quick Reaction Programme
R&D
Research & Development
RADA
RSAT
Radar Satellite (Canada)
RAMOS
Russian American Observation Satellites
RECOSI
Regional Cooperation for Satellite Imagery
RoK
Republic of Korea
ROTE
X
Robotics Technolog
y Experiment (Germany)
RPM
Retro Propulsion Module (Germany)
RS-1/2
/3
Rohini Satellite-1, 2 or 3 (India)
RSMA
Regional Satellite Monitoring Agency
SAC
Space Application Centre (India)
SAC
Space Activities Commission (Japan)
SAC-B
Argentinean Scientific Applications Sa
tellite-B
SAD
Space Activity Division (Sweden)
SALT
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SAM Surface-to-Air
Missile
SAR
Synthetic Aperture Radar
SBC
Sanriku Balloon Centre (Japan)
SBIRS
Space-Based Infrared System
SBM Security-Building
Measures
SBT Sea-Bed
Treaty
SCD
Data Collecting Satellite (Brazil)
SDI
Strategic Defense Initiative (USA)
SDIO
Strategic Defence Initiative Organiz
ation
SDP
Space Development Programme (Japan)
SERE
B
Society for the Study and the Realiza
tion of Ballistic Vehicles
SFU
Space Flyer Unit (Japan)
SHAP
E
Supreme Headquarters of
Allied Powers in Europe
SHAR
Sriharikota Space Centre (India)
SIPA
Satellite Image Processing Agency (France)
SIPRI
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SL Space
Launcher
SLBM
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
SLV
Satellite Launch Vehicle
Smi
Space Mines (ASAT weapons)
SMT
S
Space and Missile Tracking Sys
tem
SNAE
National System of Space Activities (Brazil)
SNSB
Swedish National Space Board
SOI
Statement of Intent
SPAS
Shuttle Pallet Satelli
te (Germany)
SPOT
Earth Observation Satellite (France)
SR Sounding
Rocket
SRAM
Short-Range Attack Missile
SRC
Space Research Council (Pakistan)
SROS
S
Stretched Rohini Satellite Series (In
dia)
SSC
Space Surveillance Centre (USA)
SSC
Swedish Space Corporation
SSOD
United Nations Special Sessi
ons on Disarmament
SSR
Remote Sensing of the Earth (Brazil)
SSV
Single Stage Version
STA
Science and Technology Agency (Japan)
STAR
S
Strategic Tactical Airborne Range System
START
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty
STFNP
Special Task Force on Non-Proliferation (US Senate bill)
STRV
Space Test Research Vehicle
STS
Space Transportation System
SUPA
RCO
Space and Upper Atmosphere
Research Commission (Pakistan)
SYRACUSE Système de Radio-Communication Utilisant un Satellite (France)
TACDAR
Tactical Data & Related Applications
TACS
Theatre Air Control System
TBMD
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
TCWG
Technology Co-operation Wo
rking Group (US/Russian GPALs)
TD Theatre
Defence
TEL
Light Space Transport (Brazil)
THAAD
Theater High Altitude Area Defence
TM Thematic
Mapper
TMD
Theater Missile Defense
TNCD
Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament
TOAM
Tactical Air Operations M
odule
TSS
Tromsø Satellite Station (Norway)
TT&C
Tracking, Telemetry, and Control
TT&T
Telemetry, Telecommand & Trackin
g
UAV
Unmanned Air Vehicle
UDSC
Usuda Deep Space Centre (Japan)
UNDC
United Nations Disarma
ment Commission
UNDDA
United Nations Department for Dis
armament Affairs
UNIDIR
United Nations Institute for Disarmament R
esearch
UNITRAC
E
International Trajectography Centre (France)
UNOOA
United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs
UNPO
United Nations Peace Operation
UNSCOM
United Nations Special Commission
UOES
User Operational Evaluation System
USSR
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Uvs Unmanned
Vehicles
VAP
Vehicle Evaluation Pay-load
VLS
Satellite Launching Vehicle
VNIR
Visible and Near Infra-Red
VSAT
Very Small Aperture Termin
als
VSSC
Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (India)
WA Wassenaar
Arrangement
WEU
Western European Union
WFI Wide-Field
Imager
WMD
Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPO
Warsaw Pact Organization
WSO
World Space Organization
XSLC
Xichang Satellite Launch Centre (China)
() Unverified
data
[] Doubtful
estimation
..
Data unavailable or inapplicable
1. Outer Space Technology Transfer: The Present
Dilemma
The right of any State to develop outer space technologies, be they launching capabilities, orbiting satellites, planetary probes, or ground-based equipment, is, in principle, unquestionable. In practice, however, problems arise when technology development approaches the very fine line between civil and military application, largely because most the technologies can be used for dual military and civil purposes. This dichotomy has raised a series of political, military, and other concerns which affect the transfer of outer space technologies in different ways, and particularly between established and emerging space-competent States. Accordingly, for many years several States have sought ways and means to curb the transfer of specific dual-use outer space technologies, particularly launcher technology, while still allowing some transfer of these technologies for civil use.
However, controlling outer space technologies has never been an easy task. It has become increasing complex, not least because of the fundamental changes in international relations which have and continue to occur in the 1990s. Indeed, the nature and potential use of outer space and related technologies are such that, collectively or individually, States are often faced with the dilemma of having to choose between what could be an illegal transfer and permissive; between what could be a genuine civil use application at a certain point in time—but could be used for military purposes in another—and applications which are overtly or implicitly military in character. For example, the development of space weapons for offensive uses can be seen as a threat to international security and peace, despite the fact that they may, in actual fact, be components of defensive or deterrent strategies. Similarly, while the development of space launcher capability is not perceived as such a threat, access to this technology—because it could contribute to the acquisition of ballistic missiles—is often considered as detrimental to regional and/or global stability.
A further factor is the changing collective perception of what constitutes military space. For example, the development of military-grade satellite technologies is often perceived as the acquisition of military technologies because, inter alia, military-grade satellite technologies have been traditionally used by some States to support their military doctrines. At present, international market access to military-grade satellite data is becoming more common and new civil and security-related applications emerging. Joint manufacturing ventures are also on the increase since they are now considered politically attainable, militarily desirable, and economically viable. Moreover, military outer space activities—whether space-based or not—are also used within the framework of United Nations Peace Operations (UNPOs), or as part of the security strategies of regional military alliances.
Thus, the question of which specific aspects of outer space technology transfer could constitute a threat to international security acquires greater relevance. To answer this and related questions, it is necessary to consider complex fundamental issues, evaluate the political, military, technological, and economic ramifications of this matter, and assess the purposes and situations for which the transfer of outer space technologies are intended.
Nevertheless, the development of outer space technologies continues in a quagmire of conflicting interests and technology transfer control rationales. First, there are political-military considerations where a State’s decision to develop military outer space or related applications can be assessed not only as a function of perceived levels of threat to its security, but also as a need to respond to or leap ahead of potential technological innovations. Second, are the fundamental conceptual differences in appreciation among States of the right to possess different weapons and weapons systems for defensive or offensive purposes. Has a State which possesses military space technologies the right to restrain another from obtaining such capabilities? This is not a question limited to the dual-use issue. It has been at the heart of the haves/have nots debate in all the non-proliferation talks (nuclear, chemical, and biological issues and, to some extent, certain conventional weapons as well) for decades. Third, there are the economic implications, whose impact is perhaps the least well-known and debated of all. These economic implications include reluctance on the part of some States and/or organizations to promote increased competition in outer space manufacture. Concomitantly, the very competitive space industry exercises a measure of control on technology transfers via its industrial secrecy policies and market advantage strategies.
In the midst of these and other interests the transfer of dual-use outer space technologies is caught between selective control regimes on the one hand and the absence of a universal agreement—of mutual interest—on the other. Dual-use technology transfers do not take place in a vacuum. Presently, they are affected by the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the search for a new world order. Additionally, since major nuclear and chemical disarmament efforts are underway, non-proliferation will receive increased attention in future security debates— notably with respect to the strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, new nuclear- and delivery systems-related (e.g., missiles and other rockets) agreements. The new era has required a reassessment of national priorities related to international security which affects the way global and regional geopolitical policies are conceived. Such a reassessment has led to a greater interest in civil-related issues, an approach which is more amenable to cope with development and environmental problems.
While this new political direction may eventually stimulate a constructive turn in international relations, there is still an unanswered question: how can international security and peace in both the short and the long term be ensured? Central to this concern is the transfer of dual-use outer space technologies in general, and of delivery-vehicles in particular. For the time being, discussions on dual-use outer space technologies lack creativity; political will to promote diplomatic initiatives is also
lacking. This situation does not necessarily further international security, nor does it foster co-operation in the civil use of dual-use outer space applications.
2. Thesis Rationale and Hypothesis
It is in the specific context of the impact on international security caused by the transfer of dual-use outer space technologies that the rationale of the present thesis is argued. Currently, the relationship between the suppliers and the recipients of these technologies is based on selective control regimes which, in many instances, give rise to conflicting political situations. In the main, control regimes have been established to curb the development of ballistic missiles, military reconnaissance satellites, and other weapons and weapon systems. The argument could also be made, however, that economic considerations have also stimulated these control regimes. Polemics aside, the problems caused by these regimes are such that there is an urgent need to rethink their mode of implementation, added to which is the fact that control regimes have also hindered, both directly and indirectly, the development of certain civil-oriented space programmes.
The hypothesis of this document is that the interests of both suppliers and recipients in the transfer
of dual-use outer space technologies can best be served not through selective control regimes but through joint co-operative measures, because it is the most efficient way to control civil-use of outer space technologies, while at the same time ensuring their transfers. In order to prove this hypothesis,
this document will therefore:
1. appraise the specific, progressive steps required to achieve co-operation between suppliers
and recipients of space technologies;
2. assess the measures that would offer more transparency in technology transfer and thus
lead to greater predictability of the end-use; and
3. examine measures which could build-up confidence and security among States in so far as
outer space technologies are concerned.
In developing this rationale, this thesis does not undertake a detailed analysis of all outer space and related technology transfers, since it would be a tedious exercise which falls outside the scope of this paper’s main objective. Rather, the discussion is limited to an appraisal of the relationship between technology-supplier States—i.e., those which reached competence in outer space activities between the 1950s and the 1970s—and potential recipient States—which are currently developing their first generation of indigenous space launchers, satellites, and/or ground stations. The debate in this document starts in the dawn of the space age and ends in the year 2000.
3. Methodology and Proposed Solutions
It is clear that the objectives set forth above are not easy to reach. After all, the dual-use debate is not new and its complexities are also quite well known. It is therefore necessary to first clarify what outer space technologies actually are and what their dual use may entail. Understanding the technical intricacies is essential: for instance, are space launchers ballistic missiles? Unfortunately, the importance of the answer to this question is not always appreciated, for in it lies some of the fundamental reasons for controlling access to rocket technologies. Equally necessary is a survey as to which countries are most likely to export or import outer space technologies. Such an exercise would also be valuable in identifying countries which have assigned their outer space technologies to the military sector, since they are often the strongest proponents of control regimes related to technology transfer.
In view of the need to evaluate and clarify the political and strategic implications of access to outer space technologies on international security, this thesis highlights the consequences that the dual use of outer space technologies can have on (a) the spread of weapons technologies and (b) the military use of space assets. More specifically, it appraises and clarifies some of the ramifications which are often discussed in the context of the non-proliferation debate. It also pays particular attention to launching vehicles capable of carrying nuclear or other payloads of mass destruction and the space component of such issues as Earth-orbit satellites versus space probes. Reconnaissance satellites are especially pertinent since their role in the next century has yet to be fully assessed and appreciated.
At the same time, the focus of this thesis is an examination of several existing and future technology transfer control regimes, although the detail is narrowed to more space-related relevant instruments and arrangements. First, it is important to learn more about technology transfer issues and the role of national legislation. For example, central to the control regime debate is the discussion on the evolution, or lack, of national legislation covering dual-use outer space technologies, as well as a discussion on their orientation and scope. Which countries have developed or are developing legislative measures in this area? Are legislation on control regimes legally sound and implementable in practice, and to what extent? Second, at a time of fundamental change in the nature and order of international relations, the wisdom of ad hoc control regimes must not escape scrutiny. Although experts are very much aware of these problems, the future of control regimes remains uncertain, so what are their potential implications for international security? Hence, a reassessment of the problems surrounding existing control regimes must be made – both in terms of their foreseeable improvement and/or a possible new universal multilateral agreement, and within the context of an uncontrolled regime.
This further argues the need for new international mechanisms to safeguard the transfer of dual-use outer space technologies, while not fuelling proliferation opportunities for weapon systems. This argument is not just ideological thinking. It could constitute the basis of a policy that could be implemented if certain specific initiatives are taken. To build confidence between suppliers and recipients of outer space technologies, adhesion to bilateral agreements on space technologies and activities, arms limitation agreements on weapons of mass destruction, and other measures would offer increased transparency in the development of outer space activities as well as higher levels of predictability. Of course, the roles of both suppliers and recipient States in unilateral, reciprocal measures would have to be carefully evaluated. Concession issues would need to be given the highest priority in order to improve predictability and the creation of crisis management mechanisms.
Multilaterally, there should also be agreement to establish a dialogue mechanism between suppliers and recipients, to enable mutual political objectives to be complemented by compliance and enforcement procedures. Central to the debate would be a discussion of fundamental, practical questions. For example: is it appropriate to undertake multilateral negotiations? If so, in what form and at what type of forum should they take place? Whether a World Space Organization (WSO) could solve outer space technology transfer problems also finds legitimacy in this context.
However, scrutinizing ways of creating new relationships between suppliers and recipients in the transfer of dual-use outer-space technologies can easily be a zero-sum-game endeavour. The challenge is to instigate impartial and innovative thinking. Moves favouring co-operation simply for the sake of ensuring the transfer of dual-use technologies are not the answer here! Moreover, while international organizations have their role, they are not a panacea, as the comprehensive test ban treaty discussions have shown. The costly, complex exercise that led to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) should not be taken as a precedent.
In conclusion, the question of whether there should be a better restructuring of outer space technology transfer would now appear to be irrelevant without a better understanding of the present relationship among States on the vital outer space sector of the security debate. The quest for improved relationships in respect of technology transfer and dual use must first start with an assessment of the political, military, technical, and economic implications of outer space technologies. Any such assessment must therefore consider the relevance that access to these technologies has for different geopolitical situations. Only by co-operation can the supplier/recipient relationship be established in a sound, durable manner. However, any such co-operation must be reinforced by agreements to ensure transparency and predictability on issues which directly affect the security and development of individual States or groups of States.
The right of any State to develop outer space technologies is, in principle, unquestionable. In practice, problems arise when technology development approaches the very fine line between civil and military application, largely because most the technologies can be used for dual military and civil purposes. This dichotomy has raised a series of political, military, and other concerns which affect the transfer of
outer space technologies, and particularly between established and emerging space-competent States. Accordingly, several States have sought means to curb the transfer of specific dual-use outer space technologies, particularly launcher technology, while allowing some transfer of these technologies for civil use. This document argues that the interests of both suppliers and recipients States can best be served not through selective control regimes but through joint co-operative measures, because it is the most efficient way to control civil-use of outer space technologies, while at the same time ensuring their transfers.
Part I
Dual-Use Outer Space Technologies:
The
Terminology
The meaning and scope of certain terms, many of which are used interchangeably to describe specific objects and behaviours in the transfer of dual-use technologies can confuse the experienced reader just as much as the novice. Mutual understanding of these terms is therefore crucial in understanding the issues related to this paper. The purpose of Part I is therefore to define the terminology to be used below. Among the many terms with multiple meanings are technology transfer, dual use, outer space (as distinct from air space), ballistic missile, delivery vehicle, space launcher and sounding rocket.
There is also a need to explore the latest developments in capabilities and the identification of different categories of competence. The question of who does what in outer space will accordingly be addressed at some length. A description of what are called Established Space-Competent (EtSC) States
is also appropriate, not only because of these countries’ capability to manufacture space equipment, but also because of their capacity to supply outer space technology to the international market.1
However, it is not enough to describe the EtSC States alone. Hence, the Emerging
Space-Competent (EmSC) States, known as technology-recipient States, are also identified. The
relationships, routes, and progress of EmSC States in their quest for outer space capability do not necessarily resemble those of EtSC States, although the past, present, and prospective growth of their national space programmes are unquestionably interwoven. In many instances such progress is an essential factor in the technology transfer debate. This is particularly true of the actual and potential military capabilities of EmSC States.
1/
In this paper, capability means the ability of a State, organization, or institution to put
together the administrative (organizational), industrial, and financial R&D techniques to
organize and finalize given systems or components, such as the design, manufacture, and the
ability to deploy and operate these systems and components.
Chapter 1: Definition of Terms
The transfer of dual-use outer space technology is such a vast subject that an entire thesis could be devoted to its terminology alone. However, for obvious reasons, the present paper will focus on the meaning of technology transfer and dual use, describe how these terms are applied in the context of outer space, and examine how dual use can be effectively identified among different applications.
A. Technology Transfer
The term “technology transfer” may be used in a variety of circumstances because there is little agreement among experts on its actual meaning. While some experts contend that a clear-cut meaning can be identified, at least one other school of thought argues that the term “technology transfer” is meaningless. There may be some justification for the latter argument since technology transfer could be used, in a general sense, to imply the movement of technology from a supplier to a recipient. This may seem to be an oversimplification, but it is actually quite a complex statement. First, those involved in transfer can be individuals, companies, States, or any other type of enterprise. This complicates the issue in that “technology transfer” defines neither the supplier nor the recipient, thus creating an “identity” problem when the issue of legal responsibility has to be addressed.
A further complication is the fact that the word “technology” is itself vague. Is it an abstract concept or can it be identified as a tangible asset? The answer is not necessarily readily evident. A “grey area” between the two concepts would provide a greater degree of flexibility in definition according to the circumstances at stake. For instance, a transfer could involve complete or selective movement of know-how regarding a given system, manufacturing equipment, finished product, or service (see Diagram I.1.A). As the Diagram illustrates, technology transfer can also affect a prospective recipient’s increased capability to become autonomous and, therefore, also become, in its turn, a supplier in the future. However, it is also important to note that mere movement of goods or services may not necessarily enable the recipient to access the technology. For instance, a recipient may engage in technology transfer but unable to absorb it because of insufficient scientific, human, financial, or other fundamental technological resources. Thus, “technology transfer” would not apply in such a case—although it could be argued that an attempt to transfer technology may have been made. Even if there is no difficulty in accepting this assumption, there will still be a problem in regard to ability to identify and distinguish the movement of technology and assets from non-transfer-related events.
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To reach a clear definition of technology transfer, three other issues must be addressed: (1) the conditions in which it can occur; (2) the ability the supplier/recipient to provide/absorb transferred assets so as to permit their coherent use; and (3) the fundamental objectives behind the decision the supplier/recipient to transfer/acquire the technology. In the first and second instances, it is difficult to estimate the transfer conditions because the flow of technology between a supplier and a recipient may not be easily identifiable. For example, in a joint-venture, the R&D of a given system may depend not only on a supplier’s input but also—and to varying degrees—on that of a potential recipient. In such an example, the concept of sharing technology R&D may also be added to the definition as part and parcel of the technology transfer process.
Additionally, input should not be characterized only in such terms of abstract participation as the provision of knowledge, but also in terms of human, financial, and other investment resources – which adds to the difficulty of identifying technology transfers. In the third instance, the decision to acquire technology—as distinct to undertaking indigenous R&D—is often closely linked to a need to decrease programme costs and development time, while at the same time widening the scope of potential applications.2
Therefore, it seems that, to be pertinent, a working definition of “technology transfer” for the purpose of this paper has to take three factors into consideration – namely:
(a) the existence of asset movement, including knowledge and services,
between two or more protagonists;
(b) the possibility that a recipient may employ the transferred assets either to
produce finished products or to provide services without the assistance of the
original supplier; and
(c) the ability of a recipient to have access to a given technology in a manner
that would save time, financial investment, and other resources.
2/
For some decision-makers, the issue of cost and time seems to be a major motivation to
engage in technology transfer agreements and avoid indigenous R&D developments. For
example, the main argument in the case of outer space applications is that physical, chemical,
and other natural laws, as well as the many different ways of addressing problems deriving
therefrom, are well known. One of the main objectives is the lack of adequate financing and
time (in terms of years or decades) for the development of a space programme: therefore,
technology transfer is seen as an alternative solution.
In conclusion, for the purpose of the present discussion, the term “technology transfer” is
neither meaningless nor vague. On the contrary, it carries a strategic vision and responds to
specific criteria.
B. Outer Space and Dual-Use Technologies
In the light of the above definition, the transfer of outer space technologies would naturally
refer to the movement of outer space assets, applications, and services between suppliers and
recipients. However, outer space is an environment and it is not particularly obvious, a priori,
how the outer space environment fundamentally relates to technology transfer. There is no
precise, universally agreed, legal, technical, or political definition of the boundaries separating
outer space from air space or from deep space, nor is there any agreement in diplomatic
and/or scientific quarters of the term “outer space” itself.
3 One of the major obstacles in definingthe boundary between air space and outer space is the difficulty in obtaining agreement on the quantifiable physical parameters dividing the two environments. Moreover, this boundary is not necessarily stable and may, at some point in time, be affected by atmospheric changes and/or physical phenomena. However, for the purpose of the present discussion, a working definition of outer space could be as follows:4
[o]uter space is all of the space surrounding the Earth where objects
can move in at least one full orbit around the Earth without artificial
3/
For lengthy discussion of different possible definitions of outer space, see, inter alia,
“The Question of the Definition and/or the Delimitation of Outer Space,” Official Records of
the General Assembly, A/AC.105/C 2/7, 7 May 1970; “The Question of the Definition and/or
the Delimitation of Outer Space,” Official Records of the General Assembly, A/AC.105/C 2/7,
21 January 1977; “Matters relating to the Definition and/or Delimitation of Outer Space and
Outer Space Activities, Bearing in Mind Inter Alia, Questions Related to the Geostationary
Orbit,” Official Records of the General Assembly, A/AC 105/C.2/L.139, 4 April 1983;
Bhupendra Jasani (ed.), “Introduction,” I, Problems of Definitions, Where Does Outer Space
Begin?, in Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of Definition for the
Prevention of an Arms Race, UNIDIR, New York: Taylor & Francis, 1991, p. 19; Caesar
Voûte, “Boundaries in Space,” in Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Space: Problems of
Definition for the Prevention of an Arms Race, op. cit.
propulsion systems according to the laws of celestial mechanics,
without being prevented from doing so by the frictional resistance of
the Earth’s atmosphere. It extends from an altitude above the earth of
approximately 100 km upwards.
Under this working definition, any technologies which contribute directly to applications in such an environment could be considered as outer space technologies: e.g., rocket boosters, satellites and their components, and Earth-based control and tracking systems. Equally, other technologies contributing to these and other outer space applications in a less direct manner could be considered as “related” outer space technologies — for instance, the technologies of systems and sub-systems which could be used instead of the traditional means of manufacturing and operating space devices. In consequence, the following questions may then be raised: (1) what are dual-use outer space technologies, and (2) how can they be distinguished from single-use technologies? Are operational interactions and technical similarities the only criteria to differentiate dual- from single-use technologies? Or are there other more conceptual and less technical reasons?
The term dual is used in its generic sense to denote the mathematical number “two”. When used in relation to an operative verb such as use, “dual” means more than one employment, nature, or characteristic of a given object or method, or any other word it qualifies. More specifically, in the context of outer space technologies, dual use can be defined as being a usage which has both civil and military employment, whether proven or potential. In a more general sense, dual use also embraces weapon technologies and their systems and sub-systems, in any of their different basing modes: ground-based—fixed or mobile, ship-mounted, air-mounted, and space-based. However, while there are a great variety of weapon-specific systems that could be associated with outer space, it is the non-weapon technology that could be employed for military purposes which is the most difficult to define. For example, in rocketry, the line differentiating booster technologies from ballistic missiles is rather fine. It is a core issue in international security debates. Indeed, it is often thought that the possession of the former is a passport to obtaining the latter. However, rocketry technology is only one component of the dual-use debate. It is therefore important to understand the dual-use nature of both artificial satellites5 and rocket/satellite Earth-based tracking technologies. Here too, the line between
civil and military technologies is difficult to draw. One may therefore question how these technologies can be identified and also, equally importantly, how they have been employed in terms of dual use. The discussion which follows is an attempt to illuminate these issues.
5/
The term artificial satellites (satellites hereafter) refers to active or non-active man-made
objects in outer space. It therefore includes man-made space debris, but excludes other objects
in outer space such as meteorites.
C. Space Booster or Ballistic Missile Technologies?
Different launch vehicles may provide distinct, diverse applications and three major categories of carrier rockets using outer space technologies can be identified: (a) sounding rockets, (b) space launchers, and (c) ballistic missiles. While the first two rockets are essential to the space boosters (or space launching vehicles) used for the exploration of outer space, the BM is propelled into outer space with the intent to use that environment only as a pathway to its final destination back into the Earth’s atmosphere—with, however, the exception of an attack on satellites such as Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons.
Sounding rockets are usually employed for scientific studies and provide the capability to conduct
endo-atmospheric and, more importantly, exo-atmospheric experiments6—the latter providing limited
access (a few minutes) to microgravity.7 These rockets usually have a range less than 1000 km and
most have a single solid fuelled-propelled body (see examples in Photos I.1.1 and I.1.2). In most cases, their trajectories are designed in such a way that, via its parachute, the payload returns to the vicinity of the launch pad, thus allowing the payload-bay and its scientific equipment to be recuperated and perhaps reused for other missions.
Photo I.1.1: Example of a Solid-Fuel Graphite Fibre Rocket Motor
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Courtesy the US DoD
Photo I.1.2: Example of a Solid-Fuel Motor Test Fire
image005
Courtesy the US DoD
As may be seen from Photo I.1.3, sounding rockets are intended to carry experimental scientific experiment equipment in their payload-bay or to conduct experiments themselves. Different signals from experiments provide Earth stations with data derived from devices in the payload-bay, such as
6/
Endo-atmospheric launchers are vehicles designed to boost a payload up to the limits of
the atmosphere
—
generally considered as altitudes below 100 km. In contrast,
exo-atmospheric launchers are vehicles capable of boosting a payload above the altitude of 100
km.
7/
Microgravity is the quasi-total absence of weight produced when a spacecraft orbits
around the Earth. This phenomenon is created by an equilibrium between the spacecraft’s
gravitational and centrifugal forces.
visual and parametric observation of experiments conducted during the endo-atmospheric and/or exo-atmospheric phases of the flight. This allows scientists in Earth-based stations to have real-time access to the experiments and the possibility of transmitting experiment-related telecommand signals8 to the
vehicle’s experimental scientific equipment.
Photo I.1.3: Example of Sounding Rocket Payload Bay
image006
Courtesy of MBB/ERNO Orbital Systems & Launcher Division
Space launchers are, however, technologically more complex and financially more demanding than sounding rockets. Their technical characteristics and mission functions are also different, because space launchers are exo-atmospheric rockets which can be used to reach low Earth orbits (approximately 150-500 km), high altitudes such as geostationary9 orbit, and even deep space (over
40,000 km). Thus, there are different types of space launchers for different Earth and transfer orbits. Consequently, launchers designed to reach geostationary and high transfer orbits are more complex to construct than those for low orbits because—assuming the rockets carry equal payloads— considerably higher thrust power is required. Space lunchers can have different body structures and propulsion fuels: some have a single body while others have three to four stages as well as strap-on boosters.10 Usually, strap-on boosters are propelled by solid fuel, while the main body of the space launcher uses a combination of solid- and liquid-propelled motors.11 As shown in Photo I.1.4,
8
Telecommand signals are commands transmitted to the satellite from the ground through a
radiofrequency link.
9
A geostationary orbit, also known as a geosynchronous orbit, is an orbit located nearly
36,000 km above the Equator, where a satellite travels at the same speed relative to a point
situated on the Equator. Thus, satellites in this orbit appear stationary above a specific point
on the Equator.
10
Strap-on boosters are small rockets attached to the body of a larger main rocket to increase
thrust in the initial (boost) phase of launch.
11
Both solid and liquid propellants function as the result of a chemical reaction. See a
discussion by Stephen E. Doyle, Civil Space Systems: Implications for International Security,
UNIDIR, Dartmouth: Aldershot, 1994, pp. 43-45. Doyle also refers to experimental sounding
rockets in the 1920s that were propelled with liquid fuel engines. Other propellants presently
under consideration and development include nuclear and electrical reaction elements.
fuel motors are structurally more complex and more cumbersome to operate than solid devices. Only a few States are able to manufacture cryogenic propellant, a special high-performance liquid fuel for liquid boosters.12
Photo I.1.4: Example of Liquid-Fuel Motor (Japanese H-2 LE-7 engine)
image007
Courtesy of NASDA
Mission space launchers—which are sometimes called expandable launchers—
are rockets which place satellites and manned vehicles into Earth orbits or launch
probes into deep space. They have a greater payload capability than sounding
rockets, although their satellites do not always contain scientific study instruments.
The difference in mission purpose also reflects a difference in the form and size of
the rocket’s payload-bay structure (see Photos I.1.5 and I.1.6). In addition, the type
of trajectory of space launchers also differ from those of sounding rockets, with the
additional particularity that space launchers are not usually intended to return to the
Earth: they either burn-up when they re-enter the Earth’s atmosphere or remain in
outer space as space debris. There are, however, vehicles that carry astronauts into
outer space and are designed to have their manned capsulae re-enter the Earth’s
atmosphere and then be parachuted into the sea or onto the ground as well as the
capability to perform regular aircraft-like landings.
Photo I.1.5: Example of Space Launcher Payload-bay-I (Preparation before
closing the fairing)
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Courtesy of Arianespace
Photo I.1.6: Example of Space Launcher Payload-bay-II (Satellite composite mating
on to the launcher)
image009
