Contents Index of Tables

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Index of Tables

Table 1: Main explanatory factors at each level of analysis...30

Table 2: Main explanatory factors of system stability at each level of analysis...54

Table 3: Main explanatory factors of systemic stability and change at each level of analysis ...64

Table 4: Distribution of reforms according to the electoral system element 1975-2005 (Chapter 5)...89

Table 5: Number of reforms (Chapter 5) per country...89

Table 6: Countries analysed in Chapter 6...90

Table 7: Reforms per country...92

Table 8: Distribution of reforms according to the electoral system element (Chapter 5)94 Table 9: Power-seeking motivations and the aspects of reform linked to them (Renwick 2010:30)...125

Table 10: Values and outcomes (Renwick 2010:39)...128

Table 11: Response rates by party...131

Table 12: Descriptive statistics of the variables used as independent factors...135

Table 13: TDs´ positions on electoral reform by party in Ireland...136

Table 14: Degree of satisfaction with how PR-STV works in Ireland...137

Table 15: T-test. Difference in means between those in favour of change and those in favour of the status quo...140

Table 16: Logistic regressions. The impact of instrumental motivations...141

Table 17: Logistic regressions. The impact of values on support for reform...142

Table 18: Logistic regressions. The impact of instrumental motivations and values. . .143

Table 19: Marginal effects...144

Table 20: Barriers against electoral reform according to Rahat and Hazan (2011)...157

Table 21: Brief description of the institutions under analysis...162

Table 22: Dimensions and institutional characteristics of majoritarian and consensus systems in Lijphart (1999)...170

Table 23: Political institutions under analysis and Lijphart’s dimensions...174

Table 24: Distribution of the dependent variable by type of reform...180

Table 25 : Descriptive Statistics of the independent variables:...184

Table 26: Values of the independent variables for each country...185

Table 27: T-tests. Reform and No reform...187

Table 28: Case Processing Summary...189

Table 29: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients...190

Table 30: Variables in the equation...191

Table 31: Covariate Means and Pattern Values...191

Table 32: Total variance explained...194

Table 33: Rotated Component Matrix...195

Table 34: Logistic regression and institutional dimensions...197

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Table 35: Final Cluster Centres...199

Table 36: ANOVA. Independent factors across clusters...200

Table 37: Time periods by country according to their majoritarian or consensus institutional settings (empirically obtained)...202

Table 38: Cross-tabulation occurrence of reforms * clusters...205

Table 39: Countries included in the sample and time span...234

Table 40: Number of cases for each dependent variable (Legislative terms in which reforms were passed)...236

Table 41: Principal component analysis...244

Table 42: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables...253

Table 43: Descriptive statistics for the control variables...254

Table 44: Determinants of reform...257

Table 45: Reforms opening up the structure of competition...258

Table 46: Restrictive reforms...259

Table 47: Cross tabulation procedure. Adjusted Residuals...267

Table 48: Correlation measures and number of observations and cases of reform...267

Table 49: Restrictive reforms and Central and Eastern Europe...268

Table 50: Time matters: when are inclusive reforms introduced?...270

Table 51: Time matters: when are restrictive reforms enacted?...271

Table 52: Measurement information for each of the independent variables and original wording...333

Table 53: Instrumental motivations. Exact logistic regressions...334

Table 54: The impact of value-laden motivations. Exact logistic regressions...335

Table 55: Impact of instrumental motivations and values. Exact logistic regressions..335

Table 56: Models of instrumental motivations and values with the alternative measure of legislators' electoral safety...336

Table 57: List of reforms included in each dependent variable: Europe 1945-2010....339

Table 58: Comparison of indicators and sources with Lijphart (1999) and Vatter (2009)347 Table 59: Executive-parties dimension. Logistic regression models...348

Table 60: Logistic regression. Judicial and constitutional factors...349

Table 61: Levels of confidence in political parties...356

Table 62: Levels of confidence in national governments...357

Table 63: Levels of confidence in national parliaments...358

Table 64: Information on treatment of party splits, mergers, individual candidates, and specific countries and political parties...361

Table 65: List of Political parties per country and election coded as new parties in the new parties volatility index...364

Table 66: Binary panel logistic regression with random effects...378

Table 67: Impact of alternative economic indicators on the likelihood of reform. Unemployment and inflation rates...379

Table 68: Impact of within-system volatility on all reforms...380

Table 69: Impact of within-system volatility on reforms opening the system...380

Table 70: Impact of within-system volatility on restrictive reforms...381

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Index of figures

Figure 1: Norris’s policy cycle model of electoral system reform...104

Figure 2: Policy making process and legislative dynamics...116

Figure 3: Averages of independent variables across group (1)...138

Figure 4: Averages of independent variables across group (2)...139

Figure 5: Adjusted predictions for constituency size...145

Figure 6: Adjusted predictions for satisfaction with democracy...146

Figure 7: Barriers against reform and institutional settings...176

Figure 8: Distribution of reforms (percentages)...181

Figure 9: Distribution of reforms over time...182

Figure 10: Survival function at mean covariates...192

Figure 11: Survival function for judicial review...192

Figure 12: Two dimensional map of the institutional settings...196

Figure 13: Distance of each observation to the cluster centre by cluster...201

Figure 14: Average level of confidence in national parliaments, national governments and political parties...240

Figure 15: Evolution of the indicators of satisfaction with democracy in Europe...242

Figure 16: Evolution of the Pedersen Index in Europe...245

Figure 17: Evolution of the new party volatility index in Europe...248

Figure 18: Evolution of the volatility of small parties in Europe...250

Figure 19: Evolution of within-system volatility across countries...252

Figure 20: Marginal effects of satisfaction (1

^st

graph), Pedersen Index (2

^nd

graph) and new party volatility index (3

^rd

graph)...260

Figure 21: Predicted probability of reform according to model 3 on Satisfaction with democracy...261

Figure 22: Impact of dissatisfaction with democracy on the probability of the actual reforms according to model 3...263

Figure 23: Probability of reform and volatility (Model 4)...382

Figure 24: Probability of reform and new party volatility (Model 5)...383

Contents Index of Tables

Contents

Index of Tables...10

Index of figures...12

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ...14

Research questions ...16

Main motivations for this research...18

1. Focus on the intraparty dimension of electoral system reforms...18

2. The lack of balance between change and stability...19

3. The tension between theory and evidence in the field...20

4. Electoral system changes versus the origins of electoral systems. ...21

5. Major reforms and minor reforms ...24

Theoretical framework and expectations: Three levels of analysis...27

Research design...32

Main findings ...35

Structure of the thesis...36

CHAPTER 2: Theories of electoral system stability and change...40

Introduction ...40

1. How electoral systems turned into endogenous institutions. Evolutions in political science and politics...41

The state of the art before the 1990s...41

The state of the art after the 1990s ...43

2. Explaining the stability of electoral institutions...46

3. Explaining electoral system change...56

Conclusion ...66

CHAPTER 3: Definitions and operationalization of the main concepts...68

Introduction...68

1. Definition of electoral systems ...69

1.1. The intraparty dimension of electoral systems...70

1.2. The interparty dimension...78

2. Definitions of electoral reforms in the literature ...82

3. Definition of dependent variables in this study...85

3.1. Support for reform...85

3.2. Definition of reforms ...87

3.3. Time and processes ...95

CHAPTER 4: Parties as non-unitary actors: the role of individual legislators´ preferences in electoral reform...98

Introduction...98

1. Intraparty heterogeneity of preferences, system stability and electoral reform processes. 102 1.1. Intraparty heterogeneity of preferences and the policy cycle model...103

1.2. The impact of intraparty heterogeneity of preferences on the agenda-setting stage. Division within Israeli Labor ranks...106

1.3. Failure to reach the policy-making stage. Consequences of intraparty division in the failed British attempt to reform the system in the nineties ...106

1.4. From the agenda-setting to the policy-making stage. The consequences of intraparty division in the New Zealand move towards proportionality...108

1.5. The policy-making stage: the consequences of intraparty division in the 2011 Referendum to introduce an AV voting system in the UK...110

1.6. Consequences of intraparty division: Conclusion ...112

1.7. Party heterogeneity of preferences, party loyalty, party discipline...115

2. Ireland: A case of stability and debates...118

2.1. Single Transferable Vote ...118

2.2. Origins of STV in Ireland...119

2.3. Requirements for change and debates...120

2.4. Defection and discipline in Ireland ...122

3. Determinants of individuals´ preferences regarding the electoral system: partisan affiliation, self- interest and values...123

3.1. Partisan affiliation, self-interest or values? What drives legislators´ desires for reform? 123 3.2. Instrumental motivations ...124

3.3. Ideals and values: Satisfaction with democracy...128

4. Data and operationalization of dependent and independent factors...131

5. Results ...136

5.1. Parties and the unitary actor assumption...136

5.2. Disentangling motivations for reform...137

6. Conclusion ...146

CHAPTER 5: Institutional Barriers against Reform...152

Introduction...152

1. Institutional constraints and electoral reforms ...155

2. Models of democracy, institutional barriers and electoral reforms...168

2.1. Lijphart’s Patterns of Democracy...169

2.2. Institutional settings and electoral reform ...172

3. Data and operationalization of the variables...179

3.1. Case selection...179

3.2. Dependent variables: the occurrence of electoral reforms and the duration of electoral systems ...180

3.3. Independent variables...182

4. Results...185

4.1. The impact of institutions on the duration of electoral systems ...186

4.2. Models of democracy, institutional barriers and electoral reforms...193

5. Conclusion...205

CHAPTER 6: Incentives for electoral reform ...212

Introduction...212

1. External shocks and the likelihood of electoral reforms...215

1.1. Economic crises. ...219

1.2. Crises of confidence in institutions...221

1.3. Electoral shock: degree of electoral threat to established parties...225

2. Electoral changes and the rationales for reform ...228

2.1. Reforms aiming at opening up the structure of competition ...229

2.2. Restrictive reforms...230

2.3. The timing of reforms: do parties react or do they anticipate changes?...231