Thesis
Reference
Power maximization, hegemony and the unipolar international structure
BRIGHENTI, Olivier
Abstract
Définir la structure internationale contemporaine comme unipolaire est devenu un fait accepté par l'ensemble de la communauté scientifique. Cependant, qu'entend-on par unipolarité? En d'autres termes, comment la structure unipolaire affecte-t-elle le comportement de la puissance hégémonique? Cette thèse tente d'apporter un cadre d'intelligibilité permettant de mieux comprendre l'unipolarité et ses conséquences sur la politique internationale. Pour ce faire, elle propose une nouvelle approche théorique intitulée "Hard-Line Realism" mettant en exergue certaines "tendances lourdes" de l'unipolarité. En se basant sur deux grandes études monographiques, à savoir, la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ainsi que la guerre en Iraq, cette thèse met en exergue le fait que l'unipolarité a des conséquences importantes sur les stratégies de maximisation de puissance de l'hégémon. Elle teste également la logique causale de théories alternatives (réalisme offensif/défensif et libéralisme structurel).
BRIGHENTI, Olivier. Power maximization, hegemony and the unipolar international structure. Thèse de doctorat : Univ. Genève, 2007, no. SES 644
URN : urn:nbn:ch:unige-24057
DOI : 10.13097/archive-ouverte/unige:2405
Available at:
http://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:2405
Disclaimer: layout of this document may differ from the published version.
Power Maximization, Hegemony and the Unipolar International Structure
Thèse présentée à la Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales de l’Université de Genève
Par Olivier Brighenti
Pour l’obtention du grade de
Docteur ès sciences économiques et sociales Mention : science politique
Membres du jury de thèse : Monsieur Philippe Braillard
Professeur, Genève, directeur de thèse Monsieur Pierre de Senarclens
Professeur, Lausanne, membre du jury Monsieur Frédéric Varone
Professeur, Genève, président du jury
Thèse no 644 Genève, 2007
La Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales, sur préavis du jury, a autorisé l’impression de la présente thèse, sans entendre, par là, émettre aucune opinion sur les propositions qui s’y trouvent énoncées et qui n’engagent que la responsabilité de leur auteur.
Genève, le 1er octobre 2007
Le Doyen
Bernard MORARD
Impression d’après le manuscrit de l’auteur
INTRODUCTION
1. Unipolarity in the Study of World Politics: Exploring the Debate
---11.1. The Significance of the Debate--- 10
1.2. Why the United States?--- 16
1.3. The Research Design--- 17
1.4. The Plan of the Dissertation--- 20
PART I : THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 2. Theorizing Unipolarity: Hard-Line Realism and the Understanding of power maximization strategies In Contemporary International Politics
--- 222.1. Hard-Line Realism: A Realist Theory of Unipolarity--- 22
2.1.1. The Hegemon’s Behavior in a Unipolar World --- 25
2.1.2. Unlimited Hegemony--- 28
2.1.3. The Limits of Power Maximizing Strategies--- 33
2.1.4. Power Maximization and Cooperation --- 34
2.2. Alternative theories for the understanding of power politics in a unipolar world--- 39
2.2.1. Offensive and Defensive Realism --- 39
2.2.2. The Quest for Power --- 40
2.2.3. The Question of Hegemony --- 44
2.2.4. The Question of Security--- 45
2.2.5. The Alternative: A Structural Liberal Approach --- 47
2.3. Hypothesis in Unipolarity--- 48
2.4. Conclusion--- 53
PART II : CASE STUDY EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
3. The European Security and Defense Policy from the End of the Cold
War to 1993
--- 553.1. The European Defense in a Historical Perspective--- 59
3.1.1. The “European Pillar”: A History --- 61
3.2. The End of the Cold War, Unipolarity and Security in Europe: Changing Patterns, Recurring Strategies?--- 65
3.3. The United States and the NATO Transformation: Unipolarity and Power Maximization in the Aftermath of the Cold War--- 70
3.4. From the End of the Cold War to Maastricht--- 77
3.4.1. The Franco-German Initiatives in the Early 1990’s: Implications for Negotiations in the Political Union and Consequences on the Transatlantic Partnership --- 77
3.4.2. The Dumas-Genscher Initiative --- 79
3.4.3. The Second Franco-German Proposal--- 85
3.5. The Maastricht Treaty on Political Union--- 93
3.5.1. The Petersberg Summit--- 97
3.6. New Security Architecture: Recurring patterns, contending visions?--- 98
3.7. The United States’ Power Maximizing Strategy and the European Security Architecture from 1989 to 1993: An Interim Assessment--- 104
4. A European Defense Identity within the Atlantic Alliance: Competition or Temporary Setback?
--- 1104.1. The 1994 Brussels NATO Summit Breakthrough--- 110
4.1.1. The Franco-American “Rapprochement”: Implications for the ESDI and NATO 113 4.2. The Positive Rapprochement Phase: 1993-1996--- 115
4.2.1. The Berlin Summit: High Point of the ESDI --- 120
4.2.2. The CJTF: A U.S. Power Maximizing Tool? --- 123
4.3. The Negative Rapprochement Phase: 1996-1997--- 127
4.3.1. The AFSOUTH Command --- 127 4.3.2. NATO Enlargement: Strengthening America’s Preponderance on the Alliance 134
4.4. The Amsterdam Treaty: The “Architectural Debate Strikes Back”--- 137
4.5. The United States and European Security 1993-1997: Power Maximization an Interim Assessment--- 142
5. The ESDP and Transatlantic Relations: The End of the Atlanticist/Europeanist Clash?
--- 1445.1. The British Policy “Revolution”: Blair’s New Strategy for Europe--- 146
5.2. France: Promoting Yet Another European project?--- 150
5.3. Germany: One More Step Towards Normalization?--- 153
5.4. The United States and the ESDP Project: The “Autonomy” Issue--- 154
5.4.1. St-Malo and the United States: An Ambiguous Support--- 155
5.5. From St-Malo to the Washington Summit: ESDI and ESDP--- 160
5.6. Cologne: Reaffirming the Autonomy Issue--- 162
5.7. The Helsinki Summit and the Headline Goal: Towards “Genuine” EU capabilities--- 166
5.8. The United States and the ESDP Project: Maximizing U.S. Power in European Security Affairs?--- 169
6. European Military Integration 1945-1961: Bipolarity and The United States’ Offshore Balancing Strategy
--- 1786.1. The United States and European Military integration: From the EDF to the EDC--- 181
6.1.1. The European Defense Force: McCloy and the creation of a genuine European Army--- 182
6.1.2. The Pleven Plan for a European Army: Preventing German Rearmament--- 185
6.2. The European Defense Community and the U.S. Offshore Balancing Strategy. --- 186
6.3. The Nuclear Sharing Policy: Eisenhower and the Ultimate Strive Towards Offshore Balancing--- 194
6.4. Conclusion--- 199
7. European Security after the End of the Cold War: A Hard Case for Hard-Line Realism?
--- 201PART III : CASE STUDY 2002 NSS AND THE WAR IN IRAQ
8. The U.S. National Security Strategy, The War in Iraq: Power Maximization Strategies and the Unipolar International Structure
- 209 8.1. The Bush Doctrine: A Unipolar Strategy?--- 2148.1.1. Inside the Bush Doctrine: Structural Incentives and the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States --- 217 8.1.1.1 American Exceptionalism, Hegemony and Democracy Promotion--- 218 8.1.1.2 The Unipolar Distribution of Power and Forcible Democratic Imposition in Iraq
225 8.1.2. Preventive War and the Unipolar International Structure: A Power Maximization
Strategy? --- 232 8.1.2.1 Preemption and Preventive War: The NSS and the Rationale for Invading Iraq
235
8.1.2.2 Preventive War: A Strategy of Unipolarity? --- 239 8.1.3. Deterrence, Containment and the Bipolar International Order: Is a Global Strategy of Preventive War Possible? --- 243 8.1.3.1 Bipolarity: A Clear-Cut Definition --- 244 8.1.3.2 Bipolarity: Structural Constraints and Superpower Rivalry --- 246 8.1.3.3 Bipolarity and Superpower Rivalry: An Assessment of Deterrence and
Containment --- 248 8.1.3.4 Implementing the Hegemonist agendas and the bipolar/unipolar international
distribution of power: Recurring Patterns, Different Outcomes? --- 251 8.2. The Invasion of Iraq and the United Nations Security Council: International
Cooperation and Power Maximization in a Unipolar World--- 266 8.3. The Invasion of Iraq: A Hard Case for Hard-Line Realism?--- 282
PART IV
9. Conclusion
--- 287 -Unipolarity in the Study of World Politics : Exploring the Debate
1. Unipolarity in the Study of World Politics: Exploring the Debate
Defining the contemporary international structure as unipolar has become a standard assertion for nearly all scholars in international relations. The United States possesses such a margin of power over other states, especially but not just in the military realm, that it stands as the sole global actor. As Kenneth Waltz outlined: “The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighed. States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how well they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capabilities, military strength, political stability and competence.”1 Indeed, such power asymmetries have never existed in world history. Does this overwhelming power make the international structure unipolar? I argue that the current international structure is unipolar and highly imbalanced. Paul Kennedy, the leading scholar of the once influential
“declinist school” forcefully revised his judgment. “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power, nothing” he wrote, talking about America’s current overwhelming power. “The Pax Britannica was run on the cheap. […] Charlemagne’s empire was merely western European in its reach. The Roman Empire stretched farther afield, but there was another great empire in Persia, and a larger one in China. There is therefore no comparaison.”2 Drawing from neorealism, the school of thought most concerned with power, I strongly believe that a system is unipolar and imbalanced when a state is overwhelmingly preponderant since its capabilities are such that it can preclude any balancing tendencies.3 On the other hand, capabilities are not so concentrated as to create a global empire. An empire as defined by Michael Doyle would require an effective control whether formal or informal, of a subordinate society by an imperial society.4 Empires exercise power territorially through effective and centralized command.
For several centuries, the world under Rome was ruled by this imperial pattern. There is now one sole superpower but that does not mean that it is an empire. Tautologically speaking a unipolar system is
1 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, p. 131.
2 Kennedy Paul, "The Eagle has Landed," The Financial Times, London, Saturday 2 February 2002, p. 1.
3 The United States is not overwhelmingly powerful in every area, specifically in the economic realm, but as pointed out by John Ikenberry it is the multifaceted character of its power that make it far reaching and unbalanced.
Ikenberry rightly asserts: “We live in a one superpower world and there is no serious competitor in sight. Other states rival the United States in an area or another but it is the multifaceted character of American power that makes it so commanding, far reaching and provocative.” Ikenberry John G, ed. America Unrivalled; The Future of the Balance of Power, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 2002. p. 1.
4 Doyle Michael W, Empires, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1986, p. 30.
one comprised of only one pole that has the capacity to address important international issues alone and no combination of states have enough power to prevent the hegemon from doing so.5 Although China and India are rising powers and the European Union is a great economic power roughly equal to the United States, they do not constitute poles.6 In other words there is no other pole in sight that can by itself counterbalance the hegemon.7 Thus we are years away from any balancing coalition and even more remote from the emergence of a new pole. The whole dissertation will draw along this line and rest on the unipolar unbalanced character of the contemporary international structure. Within the international relations scholarly community most of the debate on unipolarity and American hegemony has focused on the stability of the system. In other words, if a unipolar world configuration is peaceful or more prone to instability and war.8 Realists have also paid attention to the durability of a unipolar configuration, i.e. if unipolarity was only a “moment” in history, a structural anomaly or if this type of
5 A unipolar world refers to a distribution of power comprising a single pole in the international system. It is opposed to a multipolar world i.e. three or more great powers as before the Second World War with Germany, Japan, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. A bipolar world is one with two great powers. The classical example is the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The bipolar world ended in 1991 and led to the current unipolar world. For the best definition of bipolarity see: Wagner Harrisson R, "What Was Bipolarity?," International Organization, vol. 47, no. 1, (Winter 1993), pp. 72-106. Although I do not agree with Huntington’s uni-multipoar classification, he offers a very good set of definitions in: Huntington Samuel P, "The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 2, (March/April 1999), pp. 35-37.
6 According to Neorealism and mainly Kenneth Waltz only states, not alliances can be poles: Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979,pp. 98-99. The most interesting example is the European Union. Although it integrated its economic and monetary system it cannot be a pole unless it aggregates the military capabilities of its member states.
7 Randall Schweller asserts that a state: “to qualify as a pole must have greater than half the military capabilities of the most powerful state in the system.” Schweller Randall L, Deadly Imbalance: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest, (New York: Columbia University Press), 1997, p. 17. In other words, in a unipolar world a potential pole must have 51 percent of the power of the unipole. The estimates for the American military expenditures for 2005 is $ 518 billion. The total 2005 military spending of other major states is $ 81.5 billion for China, $ 45 billion for France, $ 44 billion for Japan. American military expenditures represents roughly 50 percent of the world military expenditures. In order to only match their military power the next 50 states would have to combine their military capabilities. Real balancing (not protesting) involves real economic and political outlay, which none of the 50 first ranked states have been willing to bear. These figures are for 2005: Central Intelligence Agency, The world Fact book, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2067rank.html (09.05.2006).
For John Mearsheimer a state qualifies for great power status in a nuclear age if it has a nuclear deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as well as formidable conventional force. If a state gained nuclear superiority over all its rivals, it would be so powerful that it would be the only great power in the system. Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001,p. 5. On the conventional forces, the numbers speak for themselves and the U.S. conventional superiority is undisputable. On the nuclear aspect scholars argue that the nuclear balance has shifted dramatically since the end of the Cold War and that the United States now stands on the cusp pf nuclear primacy. Nuclear primacy means a situation in which one country with primacy can destroy its adversary’s nuclear retaliation capabilities in a disarming strike. These arguments are advocated by Lieber Keir A & Press Daryl G, "The End of MAD? The Nuclear Dimension of U.S. Primacy," International Security, vol. 30, no. 4, (Spring 2006), pp. 7-44. See also: Lieber Keir A & Press Daryl G, "The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2, (March/April 2006), pp. 42-54.
8 For the best account on the question of stability see Wohlforth William C, "The Stability of a Unipolar World,"
International Security, vol. 24, no. 1, (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41.
configuration could be sustained at length.9 Until the beginning of the new millennium, it was widely believed that the unipolar world configuration would not last and that the balance would be restored.
Kenneth Waltz echoes this view: “Theory enables us to say that a new balance of power will form but not to say how long it will take. National and international conditions determine that. Those who refer to the unipolar moment are right. In our perspective, the new balance of power is emerging slowly, in historical perspectives it will come in a blink of an eye.”10 Fifteen years after the end of the Cold War and Krauthammer’s path-breaking article,11 there is no sign of a balancing tendency and we are still in a unipolar world order comprising one sole superpower i.e. the United States. First of all, the unipolar structure of world politics is not a temporary setback due to vanish only because international politics abhors unbalanced power. It is an uncontested reality and no one can predict when the disrupted balance will be restored.12 Secondly, a unipolar world dominated by a sole hyperpower, in the words of former French Minister Hubert Védrine, does not imply a dramatic change in the study of international politics. Power is always at the center of political life. The end of bipolarity has in no way “hoisted high the colors” of a Wilsonian world approach through peaceful cooperation and interdependence.
Realpolitik remains the rule and states always see their foreign policy options pragmatically with security and power as primary goals. The strive for power is always the central issue in world politics. Although merely everyone has now acknowledged and taken for granted that the current world configuration is unipolar, there has been no in depth analysis of how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world. This is what I call the “unipolar theoretical puzzle”. This assertion from Brooks and Wohlforth nicely illustrates my concerns: “If today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then nothing ever will. The only things left for dispute are how long it will last and what the implications are for American foreign
9 See Mastanduno Michael, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 21, no. 4, (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88. and Layne Christopher, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, vol. 17, no. 4, (Winter 1993), pp. 5-51.
10 Waltz Kenneth N, "Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.
11 Krauthammer Charles, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1, (Winter 1990-1991), pp.23-33.
12 The debate on how long unipolarity and American primacy will last can be quite simply addressed. If unipolarity is defined by the overwhelming military imbalance of the system, then as long as no other state builds up its military capabilities in order to “catch up” with the hegemon and disrupt the contemporary asymmetrical balance, unipolarity and American primacy will endure.
policy.”13 Although the questions of stability and durability are all interesting and above all fundamental ones, I will address another set of fundamental theoretical questions.
How does a hegemon behave in a unipolar world? How does the unipolar world structure affect the hegemon and provide it with incentives to act in a way or another? Which are the strategies that the hegemon will adopt in order to promote its national interest? Will the hegemon constantly strive to maximize its power or will it choose to restrain itself? In other words I ask this question: What effect does the unipolar distribution of power have on the behavior of the hegemon, particularly in its power seeking behavior? Since the end of the Cold War the “unipolar theoretical puzzle” has been one of the most important and unresolved question in the study of international politics. This study tries to answer these questions by testing various theories of international politics against the historical record of American “behavior since” the end of the Cold War.
My chief goal in this dissertation is to provide a power-based theory of unipolarity and by examining the post Cold War “security architecture”, to demonstrate not only that unipolarity provides incentives for power maximization strategies, but also that my theory offers a better explanation than the existing ones. The existing theoretical approaches do not predict how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world.
I am going to propose a theory that can deal with this fundamental question. If the realist research program successfully made predictions about state behavior in a distribution of power comprising two poles, three poles, ten poles etc. what can it say about state behavior in a unipolar distribution of power? Thus, the dependant variable is the political behavior of a hegemon when confronted with strategic decisions to enhance its interests. It asks what kind of political options the hegemon chooses to maintain and improve its position in the system. The independent variable is therefore the distribution of capabilities in the international system in other words, the unipolar world configuration. Finally, I will emphasize the consequences of the political strategies the hegemon chooses to adopt on the prevailing international order.
13 Brooks Stephen G & Wohlforth William C, "American Primacy in Perspective," Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4, (July- August 2002), p. 21.
As every social science research requires, I have to place actions, in the case at hand, the behavior of the hegemon in a unipolar world, in the context of abstract, generalizable theories of international politics. This is to my knowledge, the first attempt to address this specific question in a reasonably parsimonious and generalized form. A relevant research must necessarily be based on solid theoretical assumptions. Hence, foreign policy debates can tend towards flawed predictions unless they are embedded into strong theoretical approaches that provide a coherent framework on how international politics work. Theory remains essential for diagnosing events, explaining their causes prescribing responses and evaluating the impact of policies.14 Consequently, which are the theoretical models I chose to test one against the other as explanatory realms for my case study findings? In short, we are confronted with an international system “dominated” by a sole superpower ensuring its primacy and duration by maximizing its power and narrow national interest. Consequently, international politics remains what it has always been: a competitive arena in which every state strives for its own power or security. As emphasized by David Callahan: “[…] strategy has not been dramatically overhauled in the Cold War’s wake because realism remains dominant in the foreign policy establishment. In the realists’
view, the end of the Cold War changed the structure of world politics but not its essential nature.”15 The literature in international relations is wide and one can find a host of theories and research programs that can be used as explanatory realms. First of all, the realist research program in its structural acceptance perceives pressures from the international system as the main factor to shape a state’s foreign policy. In other words, pressures from the structure help define the strategy. Realist theories of all strands predict that statesmen and political leaders, trying to cope with these pressures, will make strategic choices. In the case at hand, to choose between power or security maximization, cooperation, restraint or status quo policies. The logic at stake here is power and how it is used according to the
14 A good IR theory should be logically consistent and empirically valid. It should not leave scholars wondering about the causal relationships at work. A good theory must also have a high explanatory power, i.e. its ability to account for phenomena that would otherwise seem mystifying. Put differently, a good theory should make odd or surprising events seem comprehensible. For a very good account on the imperatives between theory and empirical implications see: Walt Stephen M, "The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations,"
Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 8, no., (June 2005), pp. 23-48.
15 Callahan David, Between Two Worlds: Realism, Idealism, and American Foreign Policy After the Cold War, (New York: Harper Collins), 1994, p. 2.
distribution of capabilities in the international system. Within the structural realist research program or neorealism two sets of theories dominate the debate on the crucial question of power.16
First of all, defensive realism concurs with the importance of power but asserts that states need only the amount of power necessary to ensure their security. Defensive states are security seekers. As Fareed Zakaria says: “defensive realism assumes that the international system provides incentives only for moderate, reasonable behavior.”17 Offensive realism, on the other hand, parts ways with its defensive
“cousin” in the sense that international anarchy pushes states’ to maximize their power in order to ensure security.18 Since states can never be sure of other state’s intentions, power maximization is the only way to ensure a state’s security with regional hegemony as a final goal. In short, whereas for defensive realism states are security seekers, offensive states are power maximizers. Secondly, I have chosen another structural approach that offers an alternative explanation of world politics: the structural liberal approach. Structural liberalism or theories of constitutional order also see the pressures from the international system as the main factor to shape a state’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, dramatic disagreements occur both in the prescriptions as well as in the underlying logic of the theory. Structural liberalism predicts that when statesmen and political leaders are confronted with power they will decide to restrain it rather than to maximize it.19 In other words, when they are in a position to shape the fundamental character of the international order, statesmen will opt for the multilateral and institutional
“way” in order to create rule-based agreements and institutions. These are the ways to signal restraint
16 Realists throughout history have argued that power is the decisive determinant in the relations among separate political units and of crucial importance in order to understand the dynamics of international politics. For a very good account on realism and the notion of power see: Schmidt Brian C, "Competing Realist Conceptions of Power," Millennium, vol. 33, no. 3, (2005), pp. 523-548. In short, the struggle between tenants of offensive and defensive realism is not a general quarrel within realism as a general research program but a dispute among the followers of Kenneth Waltz. Offensive realists assume that states continuously strive to maximize their relative power with the ultimate goal of hegemony. Since not every state can maximize its relative power at the same time, conflict is frequent in the international system. By contrast, defensive realists assume that states aim at maintaining their relative position of power in the international system, but do not aim for hegemony since this would disrupt the prevailing balance and might in the end lead to war and defeat.
17 Zakaria Fareed, "Realism and Domestic Politics (A Review Essay)," International Security, vol. 17, no. 1, (Summer 1992), p. 180.
18 The fullest statement of offensive realism is Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York:
Norton), 2001, 555 p, Mearsheimer John J, "The False Promise Of International Institutions," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3, (Winter 1994/1995), pp. 5-49, Mearsheimer John J, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International Security, vol. 15, no. 2, (Fall 1990), pp. 5-56.
19 John Ikenberry is the prominent scholar of this theoretical framework. He has synthesized his thought process in the single most important treatment of constitutional orders in: Ikenberry John G, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, And The Building Of Order After Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2001, 293 p.
and commitment to other states, thereby encouraging the acquiescence and cooperation of adversaries, potential competitors or long standing allies. According to advocates of this approach, this constitutional architecture provides the hegemon with a certain degree of legitimacy and ensures the consent of minor states. Structural liberalism rejects the constant strive for power and the logic at stake is restraint and cooperation rather than power maximization, unilateralism, and coercion. From this perspective, multilateralism should increase rather than decrease as power asymmetries rise in a unipolar world configuration.
Each of these theories, although having proven highly compelling in the understanding of international politics, mainly for bipolar and multipolar world structures, do not predict how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world. We are back to my “unipolar theoretical puzzle”. First and most important of all, both strands of realism, as we will see in the following chapter, make a certain number of predictions. These predictions have been derived from a bipolar or multipolar world configuration. Thus there has been no attempt so far to derive predictions for a unipolar world. Defensive states, emphasizing on security and the inalienable logic of the balance of power, seek to maximize their security by preserving the status quo. Caution is the master-word for defensive states and they have no incentives to disrupt the status quo. On the contrary they, will seek by all means to preserve the prevailing balance. Defensive realism falls short in explaining power driven policies in a unipolar world since the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their position in the system. According to Waltz, offensive and expansionist behavior often proves to be counterproductive because it triggers counterbalancing coalitions.20 Defensive realist states tend to be “defensive positionalists” in the terms of Joseph Grieco.21 In other words, defensive states will seek power only to minimize international gaps and not to maximize their own position in the system.
On the other hand, although offensive realism has been designed to account for power driven strategies, it also falls short in explaining the current unipolar world configuration. In effect, according to offensive realism, states strive to maximize their power in order to become the most powerful state in the system. Drawing from this logic, the United States is the dominant power in the Western
20 Waltz Kenneth N, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill), 1979, pp. 125-128.
21 Grieco Joseph M, "Realist International Theory And the Study of World Politics," In. New Thinking in International Relations Theory, edited by Doyle Michael M & Ikenberry John G, (Boulder: Westview Press), 1997, pp. 167-168.
Hemisphere. Since global hegemony is virtually impossible to achieve according to offensive realism, the U.S. is the hegemon in its own hemisphere and acts as an offshore balancer in the rest of the world.
Resting on this status of regional hegemon, the United States does not strive for additional power and does not seek to maximize its power in other regions of the world. It only seeks to preserve its dominant position in its sphere of influence. Drawing from this prediction, we can say that the hegemon becomes a “defensive positionalists” in a unipolar world. Structural liberalism is probably the most puzzling theoretical framework that will be used. In reality, it asserts that the hegemon, when confronted with overwhelming power, tends to restrain its power and build a constitutional order. Since the end of the Cold War, restraint has not been the rule. Contrary to its predictions, as we will discuss in the following chapters, rather than restraining its power, the hegemon adopts maximizing strategies whenever it can.
In this dissertation, I seek to provide an answer to the different theoretical aspects that have been outlined above. The three sets of theories are compelling but do not provide the most convincing theoretical framework for the understanding of the hegemon’s behavior in a unipolar world. Offensive and defensive realism rightly outline some of the fundamental core assumptions that are relevant to the current international configuration.22 Their predictions have been though for multipolar and bipolar world.
The reason why predictions have not been made for a unipolar world configuration remains a puzzle.23
22 A theory cannot be considered flawed as long as its core assumptions remain relevant. Terry Moe summarizes this argument very well when claiming: “Every theory are inherently unrealistic because they abstract from the rich complexity of the real world only a significant and few of its infinite aspects. […] The proper question is not whether theoretical statements exhaustively account for everything but whether they make true or false assertions about only those aspects of the world that are singled out for special attention.” Moe Terry M, "On the Scientific Status of Rational Models," American Journal of Political Science, vol. 23, no. 1, (February 1979), pp. 222-223. The predictions drawn from these assumptions may be inaccurate given a particular distribution of power even if its core assumptions remain relevant. Although realism has been highly challenged by various other theoretical approaches, it is hard to find even among its detractors, somebody that asserts that the core assumptions of anarchy, survival etc are irrelevant. Robert Keohane, distinguished representative of the liberal institutional thought process, grudgingly accepted the importance of realism as a general theory of world politics. He argues:
“Understanding the general principles of state action and the practices of governments is a necessary basis for attempts to refine theory or to extend the analysis to non-state actors. Approaches using new concepts may be able to supplement, enrich, or extend a basic theory of state action, but they cannot substitute for it. The fixation of critics and reformers on the Realist theory of state action reflects the importance of this research tradition. In my view there is a good reason for this. Realism is a necessary component in a coherent analysis of world politics because its focus on power, interests and rationality is crucial to any understanding of the subject. Thus any approach to international relations has to incorporate, or at least come to grips with key elements of Realist thinking.” Keohane Robert O, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," In. Neorealism and its Critics, edited by Keohane Robert O, (New York: Columbia university Press), 1988, p. 159.
23 I cannot explain this theoretical puzzle but one hypothetical argument could be that the balance of power has traditionally been treated as a law of nature, wherein the whole universe is pictured. In the words of Randall
Thus, I will outline the alternative theories. I elaborate the logic of each theory and from each one, I extrapolate specific sets of predictions for the hegemon’s behavior in a unipolar world.24 I thus review the causal logic of every theory and integrate within them the new independent variable, i.e. the unipolar distribution of power. Then, I will discuss my realist theory of unipolarity and test its logic against the historical record.
The theory I lay out in the next chapter, what I have labeled hard-line realism is based on the same assumptions common to most strands of realism.25 As outlined by Stephen Walt: “far from being a narrow intellectual monolith, realism is a large and diverse body of thought whose proponents share a few important ideas but disagree about many others.”26 Hard-line realism is a power-driven theory that emphasizes the fact that the hegemon maximizes its power ad infinitum. Staying on the sideline is not the goal of a hegemon. Once it has achieved regional hegemony, it wants more than what it has. It will seek more power and maximize its strategies in order to achieve global preeminence. The theory also shows that the hegemon does not adopt strategies in a frenzy way, but calculates the costs and benefits of each strategy at stake. The theory shows that when the costs outweigh the benefits, the hegemon adopts strategies of conciliation and does not seek by all means to maximize its power. Hard-line
Schweller as: “gigantic mechanism, a machine or a clockwork, created and kept in motion by the divine watchmaker.” Schweller Randall L, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,"
International Security, vol. 29, no. 2, (Fall 2004), p. 159. Balance of power apostolates such as Kenneth Waltz assert: “In international politics, overwhelming power repels and leads other states to balance against it.” Waltz Kenneth N, "America as a Model To The World," Political Science and Politics, vol. 24, no. 4, (December 1991), p.
669. Likewise, Christopher Layne writes: “Notwithstanding the predictions derived from hegemonic stability theory, balance of threat theory, and the liberal approach to international relations, it is doubtful that America’s hegemony will endure. Neorealist theory predicts that states will balance against the hegemons, even those like the United States that seek to maintain their pre-eminence by employing strategies based more on benevolence than coercion.” Layne Christopher, "The War on Terrorism and the Balance of Power: The Paradoxes of American Hegemony," In. Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, edited by Paul T.V, (Standford:
Standford University Press), 2004, p. 115. Drawing on the same logic Mearsheimer claims: “status quo powers are rarely found in world politics because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.” Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001,p. 21.
In short, it may be this balance of power logic, developed in the context of the European Westphalian system applied to the current international structure, that is at the source of this international relations theoretical puzzle.
24 Extrapolation is necessary since the existing theories do not predict how the hegemon behaves in a unipolar world.
We are back to my “unipolar theoretical puzzle”.
25 Hard line offensive realism will be developed in depth in chapter II. It will provide us with the core assumptions and predictions to understand the hegemon’s behaviour in a unipolar distribution of power. Offensive defensive, and structural liberalism will also be shortly discussed in chapter II. All the theories predictions will be tested and confronted in chapter III, IV and V.
26 Walt Stephen M, "The Progressive Power of Realism," American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 4, (December 1997), p. 61.
realism is a theory of international politics that seeks to outline and explain what effects the unipolar distribution of power has on the behavior of the hegemon, particularly on its power seeking behavior.27 Hard-line realism follows Waltz’s old adage: “States actions are not determined by structure. Rather structures shape and shove, they encourage states to do some things and refrain from doing others”28 Hard-line realism does not wish to supersede the prevailing structural realist theory. Moreover, I base my arguments on the same assumptions. Nevertheless I propose an alternative approach to understand unipolarity and its consequences on international politics. In short, I will emphasize the hierarchical character of world politics as opposed to the equilibrium strand championed by traditional neorealist theories. It is not an attempt to put yet another label in the already existing realist jargon. As outlined by Charles Glaser: “The divergences are important to understand and resolve because the different strands of realism can provide quite different policy prescriptions.”29
1.1. The Significance of the Debate
The chief goal in writing this dissertation is to refute the conventional wisdom that the post Cold War international order is benign and that the United States hegemony is restraint and benevolent.30 My argument is straightforward: the U.S. position in the international order and its role in shaping the international system is driven by power considerations. This is a outcome of the asymmetries in the international distribution of power i.e. unipolarity. Thus, the unipolar distribution of power has dramatic
27 Hard Line realism, like all its structural counterparts is a theory of international politics. Nevertheless it can help us understand foreign policy issues. Kenneth Waltz argues that a theory of international politics can explain international outcomes but cannot account for the foreign policy of individual states. Hard-line realism as a structural theory helps us understand the foreign policy that states choose to adopt given the particular pressures from the system. For a good overview on the debate between a theory of international politics and a theory of foreign policy see: Elman Colin, "Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?," Security Studies, vol. 6, no., (Autumn 1996), pp. 7-51 and Waltz’s response: Waltz Kenneth N, "International Politics is not Foreign Policy," Security Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, (Autumn 1996), pp. 52-55.
28 Waltz Kenneth N, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, vol. 91, no. 4, (December 1997), p.
915.
29 Glaser Charles L, "Structural Realism in a More Complex World," Review of International Studies, vol. 29, no. 3, (July 2003), p. 404.
30 American officials tend to see the United States as a benevolent superpower. This is quite a logic way to see world politics by policy makers. Unfortunately it does not reflect the true nature of international politics. For example former Deputy Secretary of Treasury Lawrence H. Summers asserted: “The chief challenge of the United States today is maintaining its unprecedented role as the world's first outward-looking, nonimperial superpower.”
Summers Lawrence H, "America: The First Nonimperialist Superpower," New Perspectives Quarterly, vol. 15, no.
2, (Spring 1998), Although the international structure is heavily in favour of the United States, politics are always about power and the struggle for power.
effects on the hegemon’s power seeking strategies. In other words, when cooperation does not meet the hegemon’s strategic power calculations, it will use unilateralism and go it alone policies as an alternative strategy to promote its national interest and maximize its position in the system. From this perspective, power maximization strategies should increase rather than decrease as power asymmetries rise in a unipolar world configuration.31
It is a widely spread belief that a significant difference exists between past hegemonies and the current American one. Past hegemonies were highly based on coercion and the assertive use of power. It fostered a high degree of resentment and great power rivalry. As theories of hegemony and great power politics predict, these hegemonies led to war and open conflict as soon as revisionist states had built up their military capabilities and accumulated enough power to balance the hegemon. The American hegemony since World War II totally reversed the “natural course” of hegemonies and gave birth to a new kind of domination based on an allegedly strategic restraint and cooperation order. The United States usually gave considerable weight to its partners and its policies resulted often from a wide consensus within its sphere of influence.32 This “historical anomaly” often labeled benevolent hegemony engendered an un-coerced peace accepted by most states. This is a theoretical puzzle that does not fit well in with the realist logic of power. Indeed, according to most strands of realism, and above all offensive realism, no such animal (benevolent hegemony) exists in international politics.33 In fact, during
31 As I will show in chapter 2, power maximizing strategies can be pursued by acting unilaterally but also by using international institutions and multilateral frameworks in order to enhance one’s position.
32 On this aspect I totally disagree with John Ikenberry’s claim that the institutional order created after World War II was intentionally made by the U.S. to check and restrain its own power. Why would a state that has won the war and enjoys overwhelming power asymmetries build institutions for the purpose of intentionally limiting the exercise of its power? Ikenberry provides three major explanations. First of all, the leading state reinforces its power and lowers its enforcement costs in a constitutional order by giving the weaker states a stake in the system. A constitutional settlement reduces the necessity of the costly expenditure of resources by the leading state on bargaining, monitoring, and enforcement. Secondly, a constitutional order seals the fleeting power advantages and locks in favourable arrangements that persist beyond the zenith of the hegemon’s power. Finally, institutions are sticky and they are likely to persist and continue to shape the international order. See Ikenberry John G, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, And The Building Of Order After Major Wars, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2001, 54-57. On the third aspect see: Jervis Robert. Nau Henry R & Schweller Randall L,
"Correspondence: Institutionalized Disagreement," International Security, vol. 27, no. 1, (Summer 2002), pp. 174- 177.
33 Indeed, according to Christopher Layne a benign hegemony does not exist in international politics and it is a construction that suits policymakers. A hegemony is a threat to the security of others simply because it is so powerful. The United States is not immune to the kind of geopolitical blowbacks experienced by previous hegemonic aspirants. Thus in a self-help world, the United States must perform the strategic equivalent of threading a needle. It cannot abrogate its freedom to act unilaterally to defend its interests but Washington simultaneously needs to find a grand strategy that reduces fears of U.S. preponderant power. Layne Christopher,
"Offshore Balancing Revisited," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, (Spring 2002), pp. 243-244.
the Cold War, what restrained American power was not the so called “benevolent hegemony” but the Soviet threat. What really restraint American power and also made it legitimate in the eyes of its allies was the Soviet threat and the need to cooperate within multilateral agreements and institutions in order to contain it. In other words, a common threat and a shared strategy to contain it made the American post-war international order seem benevolent, and in fact a high degree of concentration and cooperation existed. This cooperation, however, was the means to implement military containment of the Soviet Union through the projection of American power. As outlined by Robert Jervis: “The desire for survival and autonomy leads states to join together temporarily in order to stop a potential hegemon even though they have severe conflicts with each other and even if many would like to be hegemons themselves.”34
A closer examination of the U.S. hegemony since the end of the Cold War reveals some interesting aspects. Indeed my hypothesis claims that since the collapse of bipolarity the nature of the American hegemony is more and more driven by power considerations, although the threat of the Soviet Union has disappeared. Put differently, it “appears” less restraint and more power oriented.35 As power asymmetries resulting from the unipolar world structure grow deeper, and the common threat of the Soviet Union vanished, self interest and power politics have become a central component in American foreign policy. There is a rather simple structural explanation to that. Unipolarity offers the hegemon unprecedented freedom of action. The huge asymmetries in power set out a new pattern of behavior that is dictated by choice rather than necessity. As brilliantly outlined by Brooks and Wohlforth:
“Historically, the major forces pushing powerful states towards restraint and magnanimity have been the limits of their strength and the fear of overextension and balancing. Great powers typically checked their ambitions and differed to others not because they wanted to but because they had to in order to win the
34 Jervis Robert, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," The American Historical Review, vol. 97, no. 3, (June 1992), p. 718.
35 The United States has been power oriented ever since the World War II. Nevertheless structural aspects of the Cold War and the bipolar distribution of power highly limited America’s hegemonic aspirations to the Western Hemisphere. Now that the distribution of power is unipolar, the whole international system is its own “backyard”. On American hegemony since World War II see: Zakaria Fareed, From Wealth To Power, (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999,199 p. and Layne Christopher, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present, (Ithaca: Cornell University press), 2006,pp. 39-51.
cooperation they needed to survive and prosper.”36 Unilateralism is thus the default strategy of great powers and the United States is not immune to that trend. Indeed, the pressures and temptations of great powers create incentives to act more aggressively. According to Robert Jervis: “The forceful and unilateral exercise of U.S. power is not simply the by-product of September 11, the Bush administration, or some shadowy neoconservative cabal, it is the logical outcome of the current unrivaled U.S. position in the international system. Put simply, power is checked most effectively by counterbalancing power and a states that is not subject to severe external pressures tends to feel few restraints at all.”37
This may seem misguided and counterproductive but it is a normal pattern for hegemons, and even more compelling in a unipolar world. I claim that the U.S. is currently shifting towards a more coercive hegemony in accordance with the traditional realist predictions. Indeed, the United States has the means to adopt power maximizing strategies and its political leaders, as well as members of the Congress, show no restraint in doing so, even on issues that are not vital for its national interest or its national security. As clearly outlined by Richard Lebow: “In fifty years we have come full circle in our foreign policy discourse. The Cold War ended more than a decade ago, but the discourse it empowered continues to exercise its hold over American foreign policy. The Clinton and the Bush administration have refracted almost every important foreign decision through the prism of narrow self-interest, and have had no compunction, quite the reverse, about publicly justifying their policies on this basis.”38 Power maximization and hegemony will be in the foreground and serve as a catalyst for the doctoral research. The concept of hegemony is well known in the field of international politics. Its theoretical conceptualization has been argued by scholars from broad range of theoretical approaches such as realists, neo-realists, Marxist, liberals etc. It had a widespread audience in the academic debate during the Cold War. Following the end of the Cold War, hegemonic theory was neglected and underestimated by a large number of scholars and students in international relations. As underlined by William Wohlforth: “Hegemonic theory has received short shrift in the debate on the nature of the post Cold War
36 Brooks Stephen G & Wohlforth William C, "American Primacy in Perspective," Foreign Affairs, vol. 81, no. 4, (July- August 2002), p. 31.
37 Jervis Robert, "The Compulsive Empire," Foreign Policy, vol. 137, no. 1, (July/August 2003), p. 84.
38 Lebow Richard Ned, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interest and Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2003, p. 18.
international system.”39 Paradoxically, the concept of hegemony and particularly American hegemony is widespread in the journalistic language. Gradually, hegemony has lost its academic legitimacy and has turned into a widely used and misused “catch all” concept. It is not simple to understand the reasons underlying the neglect of the concept of hegemony as a heuristic tool. First of all, the notion of unipolarity has a wide audience in the post Cold War academic debate pushing the notion of hegemony to the sidelines. Scholars, reluctant to the use of this concept, wrongly link it to the notion of empire.
Others, embracing the neorealist approach of the anarchic nature of the international structure, reject this notion that emphasizes a hierarchical approach to power politics rather than equilibrium.40 As Michael Cox suggests: “The case against hegemony was certainly a powerful one, and clearly convinced many commentators that they were better off sticking to the theoretically simpler, perhaps politically less controversial notion of unipolarity, rather than risking their reputation defending something that even its supporters agree was ambiguous and potentially misleading.”41 Thus hegemony as well as unipolarity are the key concepts. As previously stated, the neorealist balance of power approach voluntarily or not, omits unipolarity as a possible world configuration. Some leading neorealist scholars such as John Mearsheimer states that the current world order is not unipolar since the United States is not a global hegemon. Kenneth Waltz argues that unipolarity is a momentary “anomaly” of the system and the balance of power will soon be restored.42 Thus, much of the neorealist debate on unipolarity is fostered on its durability rather than on its implications to understand world politics. John Ikenberry is partly right when he asserts: “The durability of American hegemony and Western world order is a puzzle primarily because scholars of international relations have tented to rely on realist theories of balance and hegemony to explain it. […] To understand the continued primacy of the United States and the continued durability and cohesion of the advanced industrial world, we need to go beyond our existing
39 Wohlforth William C, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, vol. 24, no. 1, (Summer 1999), p.
23.
40 In the hierarchical view the international system comprises an overwhelming powerful state that the other states do not and can’t counterbalance. States are able to translate their power resources into political preeminence. The equilibrium tradition, i.e. tenants of the balance of power logic argue that any concentration of power in the hands of one state is bound to fail because states will balance against the rising hegemon.
41 Cox Michael, "September 11th and U.S. Hegemony - Or will the 21st Century Be American Too," International Studies Perspectives, vol., no. 3, (2002), pp. 53-70.
42 Mearsheimer John J, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: Norton), 2001,p. 381, Waltz Kenneth N,
"Structural Realism After the Cold War," International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.
theories of hegemony and balance.”43 Nevertheless, I advocate that hard-line realism and its power maximizing component in a unipolar world provides crucial aspects for the understanding of the debate.
Since hard-line realism is based on a hierarchical rather than an equilibrium approach, it will provide us with elements to understand hegemony and how the distribution of capabilities within the international structure affects the hegemon’s strategies. I will focus solely on the hegemon’s strategy and will thus not address the reactions of weaker states to the hegemon’s overwhelming power.
Both hard-line realism and the concept of hegemony will provide us with important heuristic and conceptual tools. Thus, hegemony as a theoretical concept must be adapted to the complexity of post Cold War geopolitics. Indeed, post Cold War American foreign policy and especially the current Bush administration can be characterized as “hegemonist”44. It rests on five pillars which are familiar to anyone stepped in the realist tradition. First of all, the United States lives in a dangerous world (anarchic world order). Second, self-interested nation-states striving for power maximization are the key actors in world politics (VS liberalism). Third, power and mainly hard power is a sate’s main asset in the anarchic world structure (power maximization). Fourth, multilateral agreements and institutions are neither essential nor necessarily conducive to American interests (unilateralism). 45 Finally there is a sole super- hegemonic-power in the international system (hegemony).
To this day, a conclusive attempt to theoretically highlight and understand the hegemon’s behavior in a unipolar world does not exist. Here lies the originality of my approach. By developing a realist theory of unipolarity, I go beyond the existing analysis, emphasizing on the international structure and its effects on world politics. The resulting asymmetries in the distribution of power confers a hegemonic status to the United States. This status implies that the hegemon can act according to its broad national interest and use a wide range of strategies and first and foremost, power maximization.
43 Ikenberry John G, "Liberal Hegemony and the Future of American Postwar Order," In. International Order and the Future of World Order, edited by Paul T.V & Hall John H, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1999, pp. 123- 124.
44 John Van Oudenaren clearly defined this fact by characterizing the hardliners of the Bush administration unipolar unilateralists: “They see the distribution of power in the international system as essentially unipolar. They also embrace unilateral policies as the means by which the United States must protect its interests and act for the greater good of humanity.” For a conclusive overview of the different intellectual approaches towards unilateralism and polarity see: Oudenaren Van John, "Unipolar Versus Unilateral," Policy Review, vol., no. 124, (April-May 2004), pp. 1-10.
45 See Daalder Ivo H & Lindsay James M, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, (Washington:
Brookings Institution Press), 2003, pp. 41-46.
1.2. Why the United States?
Power maximization is not a political strategy used solely by the United States. Every state, and more specifically the most powerful ones have at some point or another sought to promote their interests through power maximization strategies. Therefore, why focus this study essentially on the United States? Why is the case of the United States more relevant than other great powers?
As we will see in the following chapters, effective power maximization strategies are a matter of both relative power and scale. The current asymmetries in power are such that the United States has no peer competitors. The U.S. is the only state in the system that can rely on its own tools in order to influence as well as seek to shape the world order according to its interests. These tools include multilateral agreements and institutions but also unilateralism when it best serves its interests. The United States is preponderant in all aspects of power, i.e. economically, technologically, politically, and above all militarily.46 Thus, its capacity to globally project its power is unprecedented. Whether the U.S will be able to sustain its preponderant power and remain the sole superpower on the long term is uncertain, but we can predict that for at least the next decade the United States will stand aloof. Which are the alternatives and potential challengers to U.S. preeminence and what are the consequences for my study? A host of scholars tend to see the European Union, China, Russia as well as India as tomorrow’s would-be hegemons.47 Although each of these states has a huge potential in one or the other components of power, none of them is able to match or counterbalance the United States. Russian power has been declining since the end of the Cold War. It has a hard time keeping its preeminence in its sphere of influence. Indeed, the United States maintains two military basis in Central Asia, formerly Russia’s strategic “backyard”.48 Although Russia is slowly recovering, its capacity to project power are relatively weak. China and India are fast-growing powers and their regional influence is strong. They have far-reaching ambitions and are developing their economies on a wide scale. Nevertheless, for the
46 On the military aspects of U.S. preponderance see: Posen Barry R, "Command of the Commons : The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony," International Security, vol. 28, no. 1, (Summer 2003), pp. 5-46.
47 For an interesting view on Europe as a peer competitor see: Kupchan Charles A, The End of the American Era:
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century, ( New York: Knopf), 2002,368 p.
48 Karshi-Khanabad Air Base is located in southern Uzbekistan not far from Tajikistan; Manas Air Base is situated just north of Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The United States began leasing both Soviet-era bases during the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. They are used primarily to station soldiers, refuelling jets, and cargo planes. Each airfield houses roughly 1,000 U.S. troops and civilian contractors. For more information about U.S.
basis in Central Asia see: http://www.cfr.org/publication/8440/asia.html#2
