St. Joh n 's
FREEDOMANDTHE EGOIST; AN ANALYSIS OF FREEDOMIN MAXSTIRNER'S DtREINZIGE UNDSEIN EIGENTUM
by Rob e r t S. Rowe,B.A.
A th esissubmitted to the School of Graduate Stu dies inpartialfulfilmentof the
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JUly, 199 1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE ABSTRACT••• •••••• •••••• ••• ••• • • •••• •••••••••• •••••• ••• ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT •••• •••• •• •• •••••• •••• • • •••••• •••.• •••. iv INTRODUCT I ON
CHAPTER1: THE BACKGROUND
1.1 HegelianFre edom••••••••••. • •••.••••••••• • ••• 1.2 TheLe f t - Wing Reaction••••• • •• • • •••• • • •• • ••• •
CHAPTER 2: FIXED IDEAS
2.1 A Defini tion •.•• ••••••••• •• •••••..•• ••.•••••• 15 2.2 Idealism•••••• •• ••.•••.••••• .•••• •.••••.••••• 17 2.3 Humanism•••.•••..••••••• ••••.•• •••••• •••••••• 20
CHAPTER 3: FREEDOM
3.1 Freedom as Abstract••••••• • •• •••••.• • •••••• •• 25 3.2 Anarchis ticFreedom•••••••••• •. ••••••••• •••• •36
CHAPTER4: OWNNESS
4.1 Freedom of the RadicalIn di v i d u a l i st 46 4.1.1psycho logica l detachment •• •• •• ••• .•• •48 4.1.2ownness, powerand utility••• ••• •••• •51 4.1 . 3 in diffe rence tospirituali ty •• ••• • ••• 53 4.2 Ethical Solipsism •••• ••••••••••••••••••• • ••• •55
CHAPTER 5: OWNNESSANDEXISTENTI ALFREEDOfol
5.1 Stirner'sAmorallsm •• • ••••• • ••••. ••• ••••• •••• 58 5.2 Existentia l Fr e e d o m ••••. • •• ••• ••••••••••• •••• 60 5.3 Co nc lusion.•• • ••••••••••••••.••••• •••••••• ••• 69
BI BLIOGRAPHY •••••• • .••• •••••••••• •.•••••• •••••••••••• •• 73
i i
ABSTRACT
As a philos op herMax Stirner is re memb eredforon l yone boo k,Der Einzige uodSel"Eiq e ntum. first pub li shed in1944. In i t he por tray s the standpointof an ind ividualdedicat ed exc l u si ve l y to hls own self-ceringAgenda. It isa port.rayal distingui shedbya radical affirmati on of in d ivi d u al fre ed om whichIs socomplete,asto chal lenge an y traditionalvi e w of th is most compl ex concep t.
The conce pt of ownnes s in Stir Rer's Der Einz lqe is an extre me l y diffi cultone todefine. Thi s thes i s isan attemp t todoas mu c h throughacompa r ativeana lysis ofStir ner'stext wi thsev e r al tr aditional ph i losophical standp o in t s.
Cha p te roneexamine sthe freedomadvancedbyidealismand hWllan islll.towhic h Stirnerwas soopposed.
Chap t e r two di s cus sesStirner' smeanin9of afixed id e a, without an understan din9of whi c h it would be dif ficul t to proc eed in~rEinziqe.
Cha ptersthre ean d four formthe mainbodyof the thesis and attempt todescribethe distincti onsbetweenfr e e d om and ownness . Aswillbesh own, thesedistinctions haveprofoun d ethical implic at! rms.
Chapter five compares Stirner's ownness with the at h eis tic lineofexistent ial th ou9 h t,spec if i c allyJean -P aul
Sartre. While exi stentialfreedom mostclose ly re se mbl e s the true free existence Stirne r cal ls ownness, we conclude, however,that freedom and ownnes sarein c ompa t i bleca t e g or i e s. ByStirner'saccount, freedom isnothingmorethan an abstract ideal which ought to be abandoned al togethe r . Thus, an ambiguity appe ars in DerEi nzl ge . The questionto be re solved is whether ownnessis something more than or prior tofre e d om or just freedom i tself byano t h e r name.
iv
ACKNOWLEDG EME NT
Iamind eb t e d and exte n dlIlYgr at i tu de to Prof esso r F.L . Jackson for his va l ue d advi c e and assi stance in the pre p a r a t i on of this th e s is.
INTRODUCTI ON
Max Stirner' sDer Einziqe and Sein Eige n tumlwa spart of a transition in the hi storyof philos ophy; a transiti onfrom a religi ou s lybas e dvie w of the worldtoa more sec u lar and cri t i cal st a nce whi chpla c e s eve r ything rel a t i v e to Man as the age nt by whom andfor whomth e world exists. The early to mi ddl e decade s of the 19t h cen t u r y were characteri z ed by a ri s e in ind ividua l sel f-c on s cious awaren e s s whi ch, through re a sonandfreedom; reg ard s thespe cie s Man as the cen treand sa nctionof i1world which ha s meaningonly becau s e of Man's exis te nc e. It is a sho rt but pro f oundlyimporta nt st e p from this deificati onof Mantothese l f-p ro posed intellectualand pers onallibera tionofthe radicalindiv i d ua l de s cribed in Der Ein ziqe. Itisworthy of notethatinVerEinziqe wefind at the ver y beginning of this tran sition the mos t radical exp r es sionof th i s new-found se l f- c ons cious andse l f-r e l ian t stand po i n t.
In all realms inte ll ec tua l , spiri t ua l and materialthere is alatent da n g e r in that whatseemsto be truthful, noble or us eful can be manipulated for de structi v e as well as constructivepurposes . One hardlyne ed sto cite from a litany
lMax Sti rne r , VerEinzige uo d Sein Ei ge n t um. transl ated from theGe r ma n by Steven T.Byington. Sun City, Californi a: Western WorldPres s, 1982. Al lsu bseq uen t reference stothisworkwillbe as DerEinzige . Where Byington use s emphas is I will underline.
of exan'ples that historycan provide. Itis a simple fact th at themo~tpr of ou nd ideaor inventioncan be, at once, our salvationand curse. Freedom is just such a conceptwh i ch ca r r i e s with i tth e potential for ironic consequencesin its misemployment. It is an ideal which has cultivated human dign i t y, inventiveness andconununity, yet, under pinsa great deal of thedi v i s i v e n e s s in our history.
It seems that this is often the resul tof an abstraction or one-s idednessof thoughtand actionwhic htakesfreedo mou t ofth e con t e x t of theto t i:l.l experienceof li f e . It is argued, therefore,that freedomis not justto be thoughtof orwished tor but 15 to be expressed in th e concre te practical expe riences of life. Richard H.Tawney in his essayMa n Can Be Free inthe Socialist Planned Society, expresses thematter asfoll ows:
The reis no such thi ngas freedomin the abstr act , divorce dfrom th e realities of a spec ifictimeandpla c e.Whatever else itma y or may notimply, itinv o l ves a power of choice betwe en alter na tives- a choicewhich isre al , not merely nominal, betwe e n alternativeswhich exist infa c t , not onlyon paper. It means, in shor t, the ab ili tyto do - or refrainfr om doi n g - de fi n i t e thir.gs, at adefinite
~~~~~t~o~~i~~f~~i:~l~frcumstances , or i t Pre ci s e l y for the that Richard Tawne y arti culates, fr e e d om is most often expressed in firm
~In: Fr e e d om: It s Hi s t o r y . Nature and Variet ies. RobertE.
DeweyandJames A. Goul d,edi tors . New York:MacMillan, 19 7 0 , p.
263.
cons Ltuc ronar terms in whichthe concretebenefits of freedo m accrue to the individual only to the extent theyaccrue to society as a whole. Accordingly, freedom as a function of political, social and economic principles insists no t onlyon fceedomfoe the individual but a fceedomfo e all di s ti n gu i s h e d by a spi ri t of justice and reciprocit y. This provokes the question as to what extent freedom of the individual is compromised by the demands of any soci a l collectivity.
In d e ed , cantrue individual fr e e d om tolerateany compromiseat illJ 0,[ must it be unreservedand uncon d i tio nal? In othe r words, to what exte n t is freedo ma fu n ction of the sel f - kn owing individual who, as th e agent who separates hims el f from al l externa l restraintsand demands, makes of the world whatever he will?
Th e rad i c al individual th a t Stirne r descr i be s in Der Einziqetakes theviewtha t fr e e d omas a rel igious,polit ical or social ideal nec e s s ari l y involves some degree of self - ren un c i a t i on . As suc h , Sti rne rIs uniq ue one will not coun tenanceany idealorcollectivesystemof val u e s whic hare not enti relya functi onofhi s own choicesand self-inte res ts. Withre s pe ct to duty an d self-interestthe freedompe cu li arto Der Einzige is whollycompleted by an un c on diti on al act of self-a ppropri ationinwh i ch duty ha s norole. This isnot to say that Stirne r's individual wouldnot contribute to some common purpose. But any coope rative communal spi ri t would
almost ce r t ai nly di sgui se his own conceale d self-caring age nd a.
My con c ern is nei t h er the divine nor the human, no t th e true, goo d, jus t, free, et c.,butsol ely what is!!!.!..!!!.L and it is notagene ralone, but is
~~:i~~e~ea~h~na:y~:~1~r· Nothin gis
Th ecou rs eofthe followingre mar k s atte mpt s todraw out the implic a t i o ns of su ch a st a ndpoint, an d to clar ify i f possi b le anyambi gui tiesDe rEi nzigedisplayswi thre sp ectto freedom withi n St i r ne r'sthoro ughg oing egois m. Spe c if ic a ll y , Stirner's critique of freed omis so comple te that at man y points inOt!rE:indge itseemsheisas ki ng usto aba ndon it al tog e ther in fav o u r of a tr u e free existen ce he ca l ls Is ownn e s s, then, somethi ng bey ond or prior to freedom? Or is it jus t fre e do lllitself in termsof its re al groundoractu a l i ty ?
The metho d of exposit i on wil l be one of co mpar at i ve analysis l'.,ing, in the be gin n ing , idealis m 1n ge n eral and humanismin pa r tic ular as philosophi cal positions towhI ch Stirne )," is radic all y opp o sed . Der Einzige will then be disc u s s e d with re spect to its anarchistic an d ex isten ti al the mes, two movements of thought towhich Stirne r has of ten beenli n ked and whichperhaps moreclo s elyrepr esen t the true fr ee exis t en c e hecall s ownne ss.
JDer Einziqe, p.5.
CHAPTER 1:THE BACKGROUND
1.1 Hegel ianFreedom
Kantprov idedthe philos ophicalbasi s fo r a new kindof conscious ne ss, a consciousnes s which place~ everything rel a ti ve toitse l fand foravie w of the worldas, in a sense, a creati on of this consciousne ss . It is a st a nd p o i n t which makes everythingrelativetothe subject and in thisrespect Kant was a man of his time. The Enlightenmentperiod ha d pr o vo keda proce ssin whichtheself-c o ns c i o us individual was to becomethece nt r e and sa ncti o n of man inth e modern world.
Ma nb~ 9antotak eacr i ti c a lst a nce towa r d theold order, an objec ti ve order heretofore fixed and inviolable. The sc i e nti ficsp i r it of theti me encourageda re-examinationof commonly accepted beliefs and practices whichupunt il then were sus ta i ne d by ml"thical and spiritual interpretations of rea l i ty. Universal princ iplesexpressedin moral or religious termswere inc r e a s i n gl y regardedasunscientifi c dogma which neither refl ectedconcretehuman existence nor allowed for the new-found sen se of freedomcha rn c t e r is t i c of this period in his tor y .
As the Enlightenment precipitated a new se nse of con fi d e nc e and individual liberty which eroded the old culturalorder, justso i t presentedmodern man as the fixed
category by which everything else was to be measured and valued. This period seesthe birthof these lf-con s ci o us and se lf- cen t r e d individual inra d ica l opposition to allthat is non-human. According toHegel thisis prec isely the failing of bo t h th e Enlightenmen t and Kan t's transcendental stand point. The hold i ng apartof thecat e gor i es of subje c t and obj ecti.e.makingsel fthe exclusiveref er e ncepoint from whic h al l progress and truth inhuma n affairs we r e to be deri v e d, was precisel ythe abs t r a c t i on thatHe g el inv e i gh e d agai n s t.
Rather forHegel, th~diale cti c al proces swhichun f o l d s inhis Philosophyof Mindestablishe s freedom as essentiall y a fun c ti on oftho u ght an d by a bein g who se very nature i tis to mediate onesidedne s s and opposition. I t is not atall su rp rising then that according to He gel self-co nsciousness cannotexistin isolation; it is not mere lyself-apprehendin g but is enti re lycontingentupo nawarene ss of the other for its develo pJllent and fullest expre ssion. In other wcrcrs, it requi res an object in orde r to differen t iateand recognize j"ts el f. He g elsaid, "Th e objectis rayide a: I am aware of th e object as mine ; and thus in it I am awar e of me ...4 Howe ver , hequicklycauti ons thatthisison ly truefor se lf- conscio usne s s at anabs t rac t stage of de v elopment wher e the freedomofsel f-consciousnessis it s elfII, pu reabs traction.
4Hege l, Philosophy of Hind. Tra n sl a t ed byWilli amWallace. London: Oxfo r dUnive r s i t yPr e s s , 1976 . p, 165.
:inune rtiate se l f-consc i ousness has not ye t for itsobjectthe1=1, but only the Ii therefore,itisfre e on ly for us, notforits e l f , 15not as yet awareof its fr e edom , andcontains only
~~:/~~n~~~i;na~~u~i:~butnotyetfreed om In the processof the deve lopmentof free d om of sel f - consciu usnessthe "I" recognizes the oppos i tionandexpli c i t co n t r a d iction at te ndi n g the appe a ran ce of ano t h er sel f- con s c i ou s be ing.I; He gel the n quick l y moves tore sol v e the matte r in thefollowingmanner.
Tooverc ome thi s cont radic t ion itis necessary that the twooppo s ed selves should ma k e exp lir:it.andsh o u ldrecognize in th e ir existe nce , in the ir being - f o r- ano the r, whatth ey essentia llyarein th e ms e l v e s or accordi n g toth ei r Notion, na mely , beingswho arenot merely nat ural butfr ee. On lyinsucha mann e r is tr ue fre e do mreal i z e d ; for sinc e thi s co nsists in myid ell t i ty with the ot her ,
~l:: ~~;~ =~~lrsf~:~o~~~~e~h~yo~:e~si~ree.
7In the forego i n g wehave,by Hegp-l'saccou n t , anini tial in sightin t o answers tothe questionsposedatthebe g inning.
Freedomis not solelyafunct.Lon ofsel f-conscious ne ss in its immedi acy and henc e not simp l y a mat te r of choosing in accordance with one's own des i r es. Ra t her, it requires th e othe r and can onl y de velop withi n a spirit of soc ial recipro c i ty .
~Ib id., p.16 5 . 6Ibid.,p,171.
1I b id•,p , 171.
This fre e d om of one in the other un i t e s men in aninward manner, whe reas ne ed s and necessitybring themtogethe ronly exte r na lly. There fo re, menmu s t wi llto find themselves again in one another.
But this cannot;ha pp e n so long as they areimprisoned inthe i r immed i a cy, in their nat ural be ing ; for it is justthis th a t excludes them from one ano ther and prevents th e m from being fre einre g ard to one another.8
Heg e lca l l s this standpointuniversalself-consciousness, the affir mativeawarenessof self in another self...,9
self-consciousness which is freeonly whenexpressed wi thin thecontext of thatwh i c his external and opposed to it.
consequently, forHegel ,thesubjectivewill in isolation is incomple te, an abstract moment in which the ra t i on al universalwill is limitp.dto the form of a mere collectivity of individual will s . But, ina collectivityof ind ividua l willsthere is an implicitcontradictionwhichtakesth e form of duty ve rsusself -i n terest . Th i s contradiction, for which freedom is an inseparable issue, is reconciled when the subjec t ivewil l achievesit s freedomwithinthe context of an objectivewil l I.e.the state. This isho wWil li a mJ.Brazill presents He g el' s view of the state.
The state was theexte rna lizationof the spir i t , the institutionalizat ionof di v i ne for c e inhistor y. The spirit was immanent in history, and th e statewas thephysical repre s enta tionof tha t dmmane nce, Th e sta te , th e n-because i t was apart of th e
BIb i d.,p•171.
"I bid., p. 176.
The st ate was the productof reason forwithout the r.a could not be a state. Furthermore, the indivi d ual secure s his fre edomonly to theexte n t he contributes to the st a t e ; the true worldl y embodiment of morality, reason and fre e d om.l l This , al ong wi\.:h the underlying issue as to whether the whole historical proce ss wa s sa c r e d or secular, pro vokedthe left-wingre a c t i on to the Hegelianmetaphys icof which St i r n e r ' s De r Einzige isthe most radicalexample.
1.2 'I'he 1oef t-Wing Rea cti on
Ge rman philosophy during the fifteen year period following Hege l ' s death in 18 31 was, in large measure, an effort to draw out the political, social and rel igious imp li c ati ons ofhi s thought. It wasthe view ofmany thatthe Hegeliansynthesi sof the real and the rational did not, in any practical sense, properlyaddress the socio-econo micand politicalunrest which was so characteristicof most Europe an st a t e s at that time. Hegelianismwa s regardedby many as an attemp t to preserve a cultu ral orde r based on tradi tional
taWil liamJ. Brazil l, The Young Heqelians. t{ew Haven and London: YaleUniversityPress , 1970 , p. 41.
lIIbi d., p, 43.
Christian va l u e s and polit ical a'.lthority.
10 Moreover, HegelianisJl'l represented a wor l d of pu r e phllosophic th e ory which neither refl ected concrete histor i cal existence nor pronised the fundamental changes in poB tical and societal ar rangeme ntswhich themoo d of the timeseemedto demand.
those people the real inte r e s t lay in the human, not the absolutesp i rit .
Con s e qu ently there was a gradual polarization of philosophic opini o n intheGer mansta tesduri ng the ear l y to midd le decedes of the nineteenth century. On the one ha n d were thos e inclined to reconci leHegel' s absolute idealis m withthe currentre lig i ous , po l iti cal and soc i al structure.
On the other was the morelibera l vie·... demandinga new set of moral, political and soc ia l standards whi ch would prop e r l y reflec t the attitudes and co ndi ti o n s of an increas ingly enlightened andin d us t r i a li ze d society . The ideas of the s e liberals and the i r implications fo r society we r e clearly revo lutionary. Theybecame known,appropriate ly.as thelef t- wi ng Hegelians.
Amongthose who were at the forefrontof thismovement were David Str a us s, Bruno Bauer , LUdwi g Feuerbach and Max Stirner. The publ ica t i on of Das Leb en Je su by David Strauss in1835 intensifi ed4proc es s of cr it i c al ana lys isofcommon l y accepted re l i gi ous pract i ces and bel ie fs wh i ch , her eto f o re , had sup po rtedthe poli tical and social orderof theti me . The point was to expose the gospels as simply a co ll e c ti on of
11 myths; then all inherent authority which was sanctified by these myths collapses. concomitantly, in challenging the historical truth of the gospels, Strauss challenged the philosophy of Hegel who was perceived by many as having confirmed the truth of Christianity in a philosophical context.12
The course of the religious debate during the period between 1835-1845 illustrates different approachas among the principal radical participants.n Whereas Strauss attempted to demythologiz.e the bible he yet retained i t's essential ethical principles. However, Bauer denuded Christianity of anyva l u e whatsoever, literally or spiritually. For Bauer, no transc endentauthority Christian or otherwise,was beyond the ceaseless cri ticism of the human consciousness. For Feuerbach, true to his Hegelian background, the Christian religion was simply a phase in the development of human self- consciousness. In finding himself man had looked beyond himself, projecting his own idealized self in God. It was now time to reclaim himself, give up the idea of a transcendent being and exercise his own capacity to progress toward an earthly heaven.
Essentially. then,the left-wing Hegelians represented an anti-religious point of view. Eventually their sustained criticism of conventional Christian dogma would contribute to
IZI b i d., p,106. u 1b i d., p , 63.
12 the erosion of religion as the basis of society. For the le f t - wi n g Hegelians the erosion of Christian doqma opened the floodgates for an entirelynew range of questions regarding human freedom and cultural reform. In their view, religious mysticismand abstract philo sophicalspecula tionwereself- alienatingpositionswhich veiled the real is s uesof concrete existence. Havingdismissedthe illusioncreatedbyreligion they could focus on the pr a c ti c al problems of social and poB tical reform which a new se n se of individual worth and freedom had created.
ClearlyI these thinkers sha r e d the conunon project of libe r a t i n g thehuman intellectfrom o.ny dogma whicnsustained the illusion of atr a nsce nd e n t deity. They simp l y couldnot reconcile the in tegri ty of the intellect~fiththe mystical eromenee of Christianity . Thi swasparticularlytrue within the context of current sc i e ntific progress, technological innovation, and the transformation of consciousness to an acuteawareness of self-worthand ind ividualfreedom. In each casethey clearlyrej e c t e d thoreality and rulersh ipof anall powerful divine creato r in favour ofth e concretepractical dictates of the' human in t elle c t.
For the left-wingHegellans in general, thegoal was a radical reform of the existing politi ca l and soci a l structure.14 Th e i r common strategy was to underminethrough
14R.W.K. Paterson , The Nih il ist i c Egoist. London, New York, Toronto: OxfordUniv e r s i t y Pres s, 19 7 1 , p.27.
13 cri t ic is m the rel i gi ou s foundati on s whic h un de r pinned th e exis ti ngorder. But,withthepubli ca tion ofDerEinzigei t be c amepaten tl ycle a r tohiscon t e mporar i e s thatStirner wa s nota tr ue pa rt n er intheir cr usade. St i rne rwas,at once , a co-cons pi rato r an dthei r mos t tr encha n t criti c .
Sti rne r, too , rej e ctedthe sacred and these lf-sacri fi ce it demanded. But in doingso he go e s far beyond the mere re j e ction of the Go d ofChristian i ty. He cate gori cal l y denies not only theabstra c t claimsof ap o l o g is ts for theChri stian deity, but al s o the equa l l y ab stra c t valu e s and princi ples whi ch hi s radi cal col l eagues were to res cue fr om their destruction of traditionalChri s ti a ntheory . Sti r n e r notonly wanted to dispense wi t h religi on but all ove r ma s te rin g conce p ts which the ind ivid ua l wa s required to remain submi s sive. Inshort,St i r ne r'sstand po i n t isnotsimpl y the rej ec t ion of al l obli ga ti ons an d du t ies, bu t also the ens lavi ng con c e pts upon which the y may be based i.e. , goodne s s,truth, equ i t yorlo ve.
Put simpl y, Sti rnerobjected to anyandall limitations impos e d upon the individual. However, hi s view of the indi vidual wa s not as on e among many, not as one of an agg r eg ate ofindi v i dua ls; butas "the one " forwhomall laws and re s trictions imposed weretobe regardedwith susp i c i on if not rej ectedoutright. Anythi ngwh ichzequLr-ed theindi vidual to tak easu bmissivest a n ceor required an obligatoryloy alty wa s sus pec t.; be i t theGodof Christianity, the deity of the
14 Sta te or the divinityof Man. All socialco n ve n ti on s wh i ch liaitedthefreeexerciseoftheun i q u eon e ' s appro pria tio nof what is his own we r e to be counted as noth i n gIIlOre thana reflection of the pr i ma c y of the interes ts of th e social collec t ivity. Bu t , for Sti:l:ner, theinterests of th e 50cial coll e c tivi ty sho ul d be the leastof thein d i v i d ua l's concerns unle s s the y , coincidentl y, se rved hi s ownpurposes.
The fr ee d om impli ci t in Der Einz ige is aradi cal free dom which se ems to re j ect all con ve n t i o na l thin ki n g on the concept . It will be shown that Stirnerdism is sesfreedomin bothIts idea l anditshuman i sti c meani n g . Inde e dthecentral ques t i o n to be ra i s e d iswhethe r orno t Stirne r is aski ng us to abandon freedomal t oge t her. The fol lowing-att e mpts to answ e r th i s questio n, ta k i ng- asits starti ng- po i nt an analysis of what he means by a fixed idea.
15
2.1A Definition
A fixed idea is everythought , bel i e f or tr ad i tion to whichwe give special reverence as a guiding pr i n c i pl e inthe conductof our live s. It is a standpoint fro mwh i c h we view theworld,thoseinit , and upon whichour actions are based.
"WhatIsit, then, that is calleda fixed idea? An ideatha t has subjectedthemanto i tself."l! As such, a fixedide a is animpe d i me n t tothera d i c a l in dividual i sm Stirnerportraysin Da r Einzige.
The me an i ng iscl e a r ; anidea that is fixed Is immutab le and has value in itse lf, it is more impor tant than the indiv idual inwh om it is foun d. Fixedideas arepar t of the spirtt world according to Stirner.
Manyour he ad ishau nt e d;you ha ve wheel s in you rhe a dl Youima gine great thi ngs. anddepic t to yoursel f awhol e wor ldof Gods that hasan existence fo r you, a spirit-rea l m to whichyousupposeyourself to
~~u~ali:~'h:~ei:e:~X:~a~d::~~~ons to
I~DerEinzige,p, 43.
lloIbid . ,p, 43.
16 So wl10isit tha t holds to thesefi xed ide a s ? Th e re ligi ou s and the fa ithful hold to their princip les at all costs inc ludingandpa r tic u l a r ly at allcosts to the mse lves. They crea teahi gher ord e r towhichthey must givethemse lvesover;
for sel f-sacri fic e is A dominant th eme of thereligi o us. It Is no t just the re lig i ous in the formal s-en s e with wh o mSti rner ta k e s issue,but tho s ewho wouldgivethems elv es up toany ideal, to tr u t h, love , humani tyor the sta te. Al l thosewhobelieve inid e a s or causes which arecha racterized by sel f lessness are es s e n t i a l l y rel ig i ou s; in short,almost everyo ne. From Stirne r'5 standpoint there is ha r dl y any distinc tiontobe mad e among the intellectua l,political or Socialzealotsofhis time . Allareessentially reli g i ous and al l are gu il tyofdi sp o ss e s sing themselves in a most wasteful Sti rner ma k e s it quite cle a r that to gi veonesel f over toafixedidea is not hingmoreth a n an exercisein self- deniaL Bu t onlyafoolwc uId denyhimself and Sti r n er takes timetoemphas ize thi s po i nt.
Do not think th a t Iam je s ting or speaki n gfig u rativelywhen I re g ard tho s e pers on swho cling toth e Highe r, and (because th e va stma jori t ybe l ongs und erthis he a d) al most th ewhole world
~fm:~~~u::.Y7erit able foo ls, foolsin
mad hou s ei th i s is how Sti rn e r dis d a i nfu lly chara cteri z e s aworld toolongoccupi ed withcaus e si.e ,,with givingonese lf up for on e abstrac t id eaor another. But, jus t
17Ibid., p,43.
17 as religionIsan example of fixedid e a s In general, idealism is nothing more tha n rel i g i o n expressed in a phil osophic context.
2.2 Idealism
Modernphilosophy wasdominatedby ph ilosophica lsystems which establis hedreason as the unc onditional a pr ioriof all knowledgeand action. Rant, forexa mp l e,made reeson , however limited, the supreme basiS of a mo ral imperative to which humanactionin the worldis tobe conformed. Reason re q uire s of man that he ta k e responsibili ty for his moralbehaviou r Lve, that he take respons ibility for his fr e e d om. Any conflictbetween duty and desirewas to bere s olve dbeyon d the realmof merese n s e and alwaysin favour of duty. Freedomis thusdirectlylinked tore ason and man'5 ob ligationto temper and control his pa s s i on ate inclinations.
In Hegel, also, thereis a direct li nk be tw e en free d om andreason. Thewho le pro c e s s of knowi ng somethi ngi.e,,the given ap pe ara nc e and th e subject's act of app re hend i ngIt, belongs toa:sing le rela ti on of reason;arelat i onbetwe e n its own subjective and objective forms. Re a s o n , by it s own in t e r na llog ic,pr oc lai msitsownbe ing -f or- s elf ou t of wh i ch and thro ug h which fre e d o m is po s s i ble. It is th is same in t ern al log i c by which freedomof se lf - con s cious n e s s develop on ly in opposition i.e., through the de ma nd s for recip r ocityof oth e r fre e sel f-consc iousbeings .
19 Infactthe con ce ptof freedolllhasmeaningonl y Inso far as it ha sthi s opp ositio n withou t wbicb, accord in g to He gel . freedom has no content . Itsconte ntisgive n asa 9'0a 1to be achievedbythera t io n al su bject in an ordered so ci et y. But Sti r ne r argue s th at if reason prev ail s th en mind is rais e d above us, It becomes some thi ngmore than us. As such we be c ome cap ti v e s of th e egoismof though t i.e .. we become po s sessedby",ind. Ac c o r dingl y,faithan db'! 1i efinspir itor mind deman d s tha t we give ours elves over to a higher or de r.
ab dic a t e our fle sh and blood earthly des ires. "Bu t thinking and tho ugh t s are not sa c r e d to me, and I defend my ski n ag ainst them as agains t othe r thing s.,,'. Hen c e " ... 1f tho u ghts are fre e I 4111the ir sla ve ."·' In other wo r ds, whe n though t sare con cretelyexpres sedintheformofacau se oran ideal ,theytake on acer tainau th ors hipofthe irowninwhi ch theindi v i dual inwhomtheyare foundbec ome squi te powe rles s. For example whe n one is duty bo und in favou r of some na t ionalistic ideal , one is quit e prepa red to give up al l sel f -inte rests in defe rence toit.
And whatha sre asonan d theEn light e nmentbr o u g httothe political sphe re? AccordingtoStir ner a newmaster, anew fixed idea in ebe form of the nation st a t e. The French re vo l u t i o n populari zed,if not invented, the ex p r es s i o n"go od cit ize n". And whatisagoodci tiz en ? One whogiv e s himself
I-Ibi d.,p, 149. l'I bid.• p. 345.
19 up, who sacrifices himself in the in t.eres ts of fraternal unity , in the intere stsof the state. An indi v idual ' svalue under sta t ehood is measured in terms of his va l ue to the state. While the sta te may repres ent a free and equal assoc i ati on of indi viduals, all rights and pri vil eges rest with andar e grantedat the state'sdi scretion . Therefore the state' s goals are se l f -se rv i ng , egoi sti c ; it insistsupon a rational order, a moral behavior. alimitedfre edom.20
The political liberty of asta t e so guidedby reasonand a moral code must in s i st on th e indi vi d u a l ' s subj u gati o nto the st a te i.e., there must be a certain forfeiture of individualfre edom. Paradoxically , in the name of freedom, the ind ivi dua l is ask e d to give i t up. Consequently , poli t icalfreedomdoes not mean thesubject can choose to be st a t e l ess; it doe snot allow thesub jec t 's independence from the sta t e, its constitution or its laws . On the contrary, say sStirner , thesta te is sacredand its exc l us ive concern is with itself. Therefore only the state is freesi nc e it has the power, hence therigh t accordingto 5tirner, to use all means neces sary to insure its continued existence and sta bi li t y.
Hence f or th onlythe lordship of the state, isadmitted ;personallyno one isany longer the Lord of another.
~~:ns~:t:~flththe children belongto ZOI b i d., p.lOS.
"rs re., p.109.
' 0
This oppre s sion, und er the guise of fre ed om, is wha t the French revol ut i o n and su bseq u en t pol i tical li beral is m has fois t e d upon the so l ita ry individual with whom Stirner id e n tifi<-s. Stirn erwanted particu l a r ly to expos ethe the sis of liberal hum...nism. the stand point of his rad i ca l con tempo raries who thou ght they had cv ercoae ph ilosop hy. religionandthe sta te throughthe idea offreed om. Athesi s whichStirnerregarded as just one morefixed idea .
2.3 Humanism
Fe uer ba c hwa s aleadingfigure in the transf o rma tionof Germanid ealismand themysticalele mentsof Christiani t y into the hwna n is lIl and philosoph y of "pra xis"whichwa s tobec o me thematic in subseque n t 19th century thought. He raile d ag ai ns t idea lislIlas a formofse l f - ali enat ion,anou tof bod y ab s t r a c t i o n wh ich focus e d on thoughtbut had for g ottenthat whi chth inks. Ide alismabst r ac ts thehumanfun ctionofre a s on fromits fl esh and blood host making reaso n aself -su sta ini n g, indepen de nt entity. Just so, Ch r istiani ty abstr a cts ideal ve r s i ons of humanchara cteristicsandprojec t s theminto the infinitebei ng of God. ButforFeu erbach:
The divi nebeingisnothingelse than thehumanbeingor, ra t her, thehuman naturepur ified, freed from the limits of the individualma n,made ob j ective - Le., cont e mplate d and revered as another,a di stinct bein g. All th e
21 attri b utes»t the divine na t ur e are,
~=~~;~~f.e,at'tribu t esofth e huma n
And fu rther:
Cons ciousn e s s ofGod is self- consci ou s ne s s, knowledgeofGod is self-knowl edge. By his God thou
~:~;e~~et~:om:~; ~~=n~rc:~~uftlan his
Humanismis, th.ere f o r e, a resolve ecbeginwith man as the sourceandsanc ti on of al l that Is good andcr ea tive in thewo rld . Man is the::':'?T emeb£::lng and the fu'turenoth i n g elsebuta.functio nofman'spract i c a l relat io ns hi p to na ture andhisfellowman. Man'slife in a.rel i gious cont ext Is&
con t i n u alst rugg letooverc ome thatwhichwasassignedto him from birthi.e .,his or i ginalsin. Rat her,for Feue r bach,man II1USt reclaimth a t wh i chwas his al l along; the fr e e d o m to exp lore and de velop his own divi n e nature and hi s own immortality; not iautlorto!. l i tyinth e sense of a persona l life att e r death but, thr ou ghthe eternal re aso n ofthe species, the immortal spiritual liteof hunanity .
He r e FeuerbachandSt i rnerpa r twa ys inamostabru ptand decisive manner , Cont rary to the eter na l re as on of the spe c ies and the fra t erna l unit yof man,Stirnerpresent s the soli ta r y tlgure of onewhofaceshi smortality wi t h what seems
22Ludwi gFeuerbach,The Essence of Chri st i a nity . translated fr omtheGermanby GeorgeEl l io t. New Yor k: Harper and Row, 195 7, p,14.
2J1bid., P. 12.
22 to be an enthusiastic declaration and accepta nce of his
"creative nothingness ".
Allpredicates of objects aremy statements,myjudgemen ts ,my-creatures. Ifthey wantto tearthe ms e l ves lo o s e from me and be somethingfor themselves, or actuallyoveraweme, thenI have no th i n gmor e pressi ng todoth a n to take
;~e~h~a~~e;~~~.},heirnothing, into
Andalit t le further:
For me there is no truth for nothing is moretha n I I Not even my essence,not eventh e essence ofMa n , is more thanII
~~~~i~~ii~~:n~d~:~"i~th e bucket,"this Stirner vie ws Feue rbac h'scriticismof idealismandhi s shift from Christianity to humanismasa la t e r a l move at best which provide s no es s enti al change in the status of th e individual. The individ ualis still obliged tolove,obey and contri bute to th e social collec tiVi ty. The Essence of Chr istiani t y of f ers ampleevidence for Sti rner'sco n t e n ti o n tha t Fe uerb a c h's humanismis profound ly religio us and thus anathema to the individual. "Man ha s his highest being ,his God, in hi ms elf; not in himselfas an indiv idua l,but in his essential nature, hi s species .,,26 Clearly Feuerbach ha s simply framed th e old relig i o us order in new terms an d expressed the result as a ntow religion, the religion of
240e r Eiodge,p, 337.
;2'Ibid., p. 355 .
"zeeenceof Christianii.:y,.Q.E:.cit. , appe ndix1.
23 huma n i sm. Th e abs olute1s now hu man nature itsel fwith love as a guidin gprinci p le.
Feuerbach, trueto his Hegelian roo t s, give s credi t to Christianity as ha v i n g been a ne c e ssa r y stage in the development ofself -consc iousnessandpersonality. But i t was a transito rystage in which the limi tsand defects ofmanare overc ome by fa i t h. Ra the r , for Fe u erba c h, an objectified divinespirit i. e . , theconsciousnessof God, is nothing more than the consciousness of the species. Huma n i s m, then, remains sacred according to Stirner since:
Howe ver human this sacred th ing nlay lo ok, thoughi t be thehuma nits e l f , that does not take awayits sacredness, but at most changesit froman unea rth l y
~~ea~oe:r~~~~n~~credthing, fro ma divine
Feuerbach,along wi t h his notab lecontemporaries St rauss and Bauer hadsta r tedaproc e s sof calling thenature of man intoques t ion. Ide al i z e d humancharac terist icswere reclaimed by the verycreat urewhoha d given the m up inthefirst pla c e ; the creatu re who, in doi ng so, ha d give n up hi s fr e edo m.
Implicit in all this is th at forFeuerbachfreedominvo lves firstly, a rejectionof anyide ologi c al andrelig iouscontrol overma n and, secondly, a longingt.o be free from theli mi t s and defects of hi s individua lity.28 But for Stirner, itA pecpLe cannot be free otherwise than at the individua l's
270e r Einzige, P. 36.
28Es s e nc e of Ch ri s t i a n i t y. £2.cit . , appen d i x1.
24 expense; for i t is notth e ind i vi dua l that is themain point in this liberty , but the peop le."a
The age of reason and enligh tenmen t wh i l e seemi n g to l ib e r ate manIsconsc iousnessand revea lhispotential freedom, ha d onlysucceeded inprovidinga host of new self-alienating and intra ns i ge nt id e a s whic h, in fact, limited freedom accordingto Stirner. To theuni qu eind ivi dua l theseideas or causes , in wh a t e ver form they too k , were anathema to the spontaneousdi cta t e s of one who refusedto givehim s e l f up to any entrenchedand stat icidea or cause.
To Stirner, not only were idealism and humanism essentiallyreligiousand thus tobere j e cted,but so wasthe idea of freedominwh ose namethey had been advancedalsoto bere j e c t e d as ju st one moreabs traction,another fixed idea.
2\1n er Einzlge, P. 214.
25
CHAPTER 3:~
3.1Freedom 85Abstract
Freedom is a di f f icu l tand elus iveconcept cons t a nt ly bei n g re d e fi n e d in the ligh t of changes inmanIs socialan d pol i t i c a l environme n t and hi s perc e p t i o n of hi ms e lf an d nature. In thepresent ti me freedom,and th e val ue jUdg e ments whic hinvariablyattend this concept, is an unavoida b leis sue wh i ch gives uni ty to a myriad of diverse contemporary problems.~c The direct rootsof the mo d ern inclination to re g a r d all value jUdgements as somehow a pu rel y pe r so n al matter,are traceabletotheris e in individua lself-conscious awareness and theconv iction tha t freedomandprogress were excl usi vely a matter for human act ion.
This convic ti on wastomanifest itse l f in various social and political th e orie sJl whic h were to prese nt a pe cul i arly dif ficu l t pro blftmfor governme nts and society alike. The pro ble mwas, howbest to de f i ne and encourage a sense of ind i vi d u a l liber t yand . at the same time, pre s erveorder and
lOFor examp le , abortion, gen e t ic re s e arch and env i ronmental issuesall, inonewayor ano t he r,involvevalu e judgements andthe extent towh i c hwe are fre e todetermi ne the pr e s en t and futu r e re s pe c t ing ourse lves, othersand natur e.
J1Examples: Humani s m (Fe u e rbach ) , Ana r chism (pr ou dho n l, Socialism (Marx).
26 purpose in society withi n a framework of co mmo n l y accepted moral and social norms. This is the underlying is s ue with which the left-wing Hegelians were engaged, albeit on a theoret ical level , andoutof which thei r ra d i c al vie ws were formed. Theent i r espec t r u m of soc i e ta l relationsh ipstoso me importantdegree then, as now, ce n t r es on thisiss ue .
Thenegati ve approach to theconceptof freedom entail s theabsenceof coercion . It de scribes aconditionwhereby an individual Is no t preve nted by an exte r n al auth o r i t y from choos inghi s own course of acti o n. An in di vi dua l Is fre e to theexte nt that he isnot compe l led to act otherwise thanhe wishes. This isfre edo m define d in a rathe r nar ro w se ns e and is commonly re ferr ed to as "freedomfrom".
Thescop e of the definition of freedom can bebroaden e d inat lea s t twosi g n i fic a n t ways . The firstwou ld in c l ud e the abs ence of nat ural conditions which wou ld obstruc t the individual from actingas he wishe s. In a ve r y realsense th is has beena ceaselessgoal of man, to bringnatureunder control i.e ,., to overcome it. Second, it is argued that freedom is onl y substant i v e if an individual ha s theme a ns ac t ua l l y to achievethat which he desire s of his ownvo l i tio n I.e ., the power to contro l his present and future in a positive an d dynami cway. Associated with this is an element of spont ane i t y; action whichis initiated for no pa r t i c u l a r purposeand which mayor may not be grounded in some code of ethics: we justsimplyactin a givenway becauseitoccurs
27
to us to do so. This sense of fre edom Is referred to
"freedom to",ac t i on grounded only inthe agent's abil ityand resourceswithno particul arrestraints of con sc ience.
Free dom,then ,to the extent that we do or do not havei t ca n be rela t ed to three general is sue s. The absence of coe rc ive humanagents and the irinstitutions, the absence of naturalbarri ers and , the individual'sabilityand re so urces to act spo n ta n e o us l y withre gardonly for the acting agent ' s des iresof the moment.
Thedegreeto whichcoercionisleIt and the re sponse of those subject to i t is a funct ion of th e poll tical and soc ietal matrix withinwhichi tis used. For exampl e ,a state in which the press, literature and public as sembly are dire ctl ycontrolled by the state, will exhi b i t aco nc omi t a nt co n t r ol ove r public op i n i on , educ ation and poli tical opposition. Given that this systemiswellen t renc he d there may not be a significant sense of limitation felt by its cit izens. Its citizenry may become des ensiti z ed by a poli tical and social order which permi ts the ve r y direct manipulationofda ily lifein what is called a closedsoci ety . A moresubt l e kind ofcoe r c ion , but not necessarilyless de bilitating , ca n exist in an open society. This kind of soc ie t y is some t i mes characteri zed byan inordinant emphas i s on the compe t i t i v e sp i r i t of man. Freedom to competeis a dominant thememotivatedby the conviction that freedom and materi alstatusare identical. Usuallythe mechanismsdevoted
28 to influencing publicopinion and decision making are highly sophisticated and powerful. These mechanisms are not dedicated exclusively to commercial issues ; but may also influence to an extraordinaryextent other important decisions of a political and moral nature. The po i n t is that coercion cuts acrossall politicaland culturalsphere sand isno tjust a ma tter of heavy-handed int r u si o n s which limit an individual's freedom.
In so far as freedom requires the absence of coercion, the German revolutionaries of the mid-nineteenth century presented aseri o u s challenge to the oldor d e r whosesec u r i ty restedon their power-s of coercion. Heretofore, religion had been the basis of moral standards an d are f e r e nc e forman's mode of conduct. Man was to obey or risk retribution as severe as eternal damnation. Religion,therefore ,was used as a coercive weapon to control the individual asmuch in this life as in the promised rewards of the next.
These revolutionarieswere determined to be free from the mysticalmessages ofCh r i s t i a n i t y andits coerciveauthority.
They proposed in its place the self-determining man who, as the centre and sanction of all that is,establisheshims elfas the sole arbiter of his future and the values upon which that future is to be based. Feuerbach said:
The absolute to Manis his own nature.
i~:r~~:~~ ~~et~~w~~j~~th~;e~~i~at~re .
J1"aesenee of Christianity, 2,2. ci t " p. S.
2'
The humanh'tic project, therefore, consists primarily in '"
redefin ition of fre edom outside a traditional re li g i o u s co nte xt . HumanislIIdeclaresal l forms of the supernaturalas an abdicationofman'sown div inepotential:thealienation of his creat ive abilitytosolve his own prob lemsInth e hereAn d now of this ea r thly exper ience. Also, hu ma ni st ic ethics gro unds all valu e judgements so l e l y in huma n inter personal re l a tio nsh i ps . Assuch ,man takescont ro lof his futureand the re spon s i b i l i ty fo r the val ue jUdgements behind his decisio ns i.e., he takes resp o n s i b i li t y for his fre e d o m.
Freedom,so described,is pure ly a matterforhuma n actionand not contingent onany tri ba l or divinecodes .
ToSt:tr n e r this project is fine so faras it goesbut it
doe snot go fareno u g h. He chargedtha t Feuerbach,inho l din g thatth e firstand hig h e stlawmu s t beth elove of man to man, retainedaba s i c tenet of Chri stianethics. For Stirnerthis is nomo re than ano t h er fixedidea; me nlIustnow revere each other instead of God. No doubt his radi cal contemporaries were al l atheistsbut atheismdoes not precl udespiritualism . Neit he r is moralityan exclusive fun c ti on of th e i s m. Stlrne r con ten d s that libera l human i sm , in ge n eral, mai n tains spiri t ua li ty and mora lity in ne w form s i. e., the sta te , soci e t y, and huma n i t y. These ideals , accor d i ng to Sti r ner, maintai n thatprote an hiera r c hywh ich hi sto r y shows hasonly served to dominate and control the in d ivi dual and, in so
30 doing ,servethemselv es. St irner'sresponseisca t e gori c a lly cl e ar.
Letraeth en lIkewiseconcernmyself fo r myself, who am equallywith God th eno t h i n g :~l;l~n:~~trs .who am my all,who lirathe
Hence, Stirner con c l ud e s that the libera l -humanists rel e ga t e the sta t us of theind ividua l to thatof serva nttoa highe r order . Unde r theGod of Huma n !tyfre e d omremains an abs t r ac tion . Thefre edo moff ere d iseclipsedby the sha do wof itsowncreato r, aparti a l free domde void ofcon ten t.
Of what use Is freedom toyo u, indeed i fi tbri ng s in noth i ng ? Andi fyou be c ame free fromeveryt hing. youwou l d nolongerha veanyth ini' for freedom is emptyof substan c e.
And further:
To be fre e is soneth ingthat I cannot truly will , becauseI cannot make it.
cannot createit: I can o'1ly wi s h it :~di~::~r: :;::~l!tit, foritre mains
This all po ints toa fundamen tal problem. Any kind of collectivi st poli ti cal syste mha s at its ro ot a built-in contradic tio n I.e ••it sets upit s ownin terna l op pos i ti o n. On theone hand there are the indi v i du a l s who comprise the co ll ect ivi t y and who se freedom as ind i v i d ua l s is often a primarygoal. On the ot he r is theco llec t ivity its el f tak en
"neeEin zig e . p. S.
lf1b i d ••p , 156.
J~Ibid., p. 157.
31 as a who l e wh i c h wa n t s to organ ize its members and th e totality of its resource s towardsa single aim or pur pose. Thisisth efo c us of the conflictwhich arises whe nind i v i du al int e r e s t s i.e .,se lf- int e r e s t s , aresubIated In favour ofthe amalgamproposed,for example, by a socialistsociety.
The sta te, especia lly the for mof it proposed by the soc.teftee s, represents just tha t sense of freedom against which Stirner inve ig hed so vehemen t Iy, It represents, in wh a t e ver formitmay appear,ju stth at stultifyingcommonality so contraryto Stirner'sunique individual. Each citizenmay be free to th e extent that the statewill no t permit the capriciousacti onof oneindividua lagainst ano t he r. But,all sanctions reside withinthe pur vi e w of thestate ; therefore the state contro ls all coercive authority. He nc e, whilea constitu tional l yguara nteedstate ma y givea senseof fr e e dom to the peopleas a socialcollectivity , it doesso only at the expense of the indi vidual says Stirner.
Wha t is the me an i ng ofthe doctrine thatwe allenjoy "equ ality of political ri ght s ? " only th i s -- - that the state hasno rega r d formy person,thattoitI, like every other,amonlya man, wit ho ut ha Vi n g ano t he r si g nificance that commands its deference.36
Equa lity of poli ti cal rights only means tha t everyone ma y par t a ke ofal lthe rightsthe state ha sto give solong asthe attending conditions are met I.e., all state laws are given
l6I bi d., P. 10 2.
32
due respect. This is precisely the partial freedom that Stirnervie we dasan abs tra c t i o n bec a u s ei tbringsin nothing . Freedom 5Ilus t be complet e and unre served, theref ore,itca nnot be granted because th e mome n t the gif t 15 accepted the ind ividual must als o ac c e pt the power and a ....t.ho r l t yof th e grantor. To theque stionof the relations hipbetweenfre e dom and powerwe shall return.
In anyeven t, so c ial libertydoe sno tne ce s sarilyattend political liberty. Th e issues of clas s st r u c t ur e, property andthesy ste mof dist ribu t i on ofsc arce me ans,al l be a r upon the extent to whi ch an individu a l is fre e within a given politicalst r uc t ure. KarlMarx de scribed asociety in whi ch ea c h individual has a responsibility to the social collectivity. Inord inateaccumulatio ns of wealt hcont radic t thisresponsi bil it yin that it provokes anecono mi c and soc i al imbalance; as a co ns eq uence it crea t es ins ta bi l i t y. Therefor e soc i a l ism impos esan obligation on everyoneto acquiretothe extent of their nee d s and on thest r e ng t h of their labourso long as the overa ll effectco n t ributes to the progre ss of societyasa whole.
In Stirner's vie w socialism takes away distinc tive ness asindividuals, it makesushomo gen o us and it makesfre edom a functionofsocial and ecene mxc princi pl e s. Theref ore, thehuman i stic idea of love and the socialist ic principle ofmutualobligationarepreciselythe princi plesof
se l f-s a c r if i c e which Stirner abhors. characterized the socialist'soutlook.
33 This Is how he
We are freehorn men, and wherever we look we seeourselvesmadese rv a nts of egoistsI Arewe then to become egoists too! Heaven forbid! Wewant rathe r to make egoists impos sibleI We want to make them all "ragamuffins";
~~ i l O~a~Sh:~:~.1;t,av e nothing. that And further:
Let usdo away withperson alprO;lerty, let everyonebe a ragamuffin. Let
~~o~~:t~o~~e~;~~8rsonal,letit be l o ng
Sti r ner sees the abrasi veintellectual di s c o u r s e of his timeas a st r uggle betwee nli beral and cons ervative ele me n ts both ofwho mha ve thesame objectiv e Le .,freedomofspi ri t . This freedom of spirit is to be achi evedin either thecity of God or the city of Man but in bothcase s the spirit reigns supr e me. "The spirit remai nstheabsolutelord for both, and their only quarrel is over who shall occupy the hierarchical throne..."J9
And furthe r, with a tone of finality and detachment respectingthisstruggle he say s:
The best of i t is that one can calmly look uponthe stir with the certainty that the wild beastsof historywill
"ns re,, P. 116.
lIlI bid. , P. 117.
lllI b i d.,p , 64.
J4
Inpr evi o ustimesthewa t c h wordwas "s ervice". Serve the feud a l lordand he will protect you, serveGod and He wi l l redeem you,onlyse rveand itwill bere corded;puton deposit to your cr ed i t. The deedsof your se rv ice will be heldin trus t, on ly trust and serve . According tu St irne r this wa s the ethic of spi ritua l fre e dom. The de s erving man, the serv a n t ,will be rewardedwith fre e dom, weareno t born free we ear ni t.
Inse r viceand obed ience to societyandthe state freedom was, at la s t , made concrete. Humanityinsoci e t al fo r m had at la st reclaimed fre e do m for itself , brouqht it backdown to earthand dep osited i tinthesta te forallto partake of in eq ual aeasure,
Allofwhich15nothingbu tII.grotesque abs trar.:t i o n,say s Stirner. As benign SUbjec ts we remain capt ives of the objective spir i t of humanityandthe state,two overmastering idealsgrounde d in theobject iv it y of thought. Howe v er ,the se idealsex iston lyinsofar as theindi v idualallows them to, andthe fre e dom theyof f er isconc octed, cons t ituti o nal,it is cha rtered fre e d om. The st a te remains sa cre d and offers a limi ted freed omwi thi n the fra mewor k of its cons ti t u ti ona l dic t a te s. In otherwo r ds ,thesta t e re s erve san esca pe clau se permit ting fre e d om only tothe extent tha titsown continuance
40Ib id., P. 64 .
35 is not threatened. Stirne r makes th isvery po werf ul commen t wi t hre spe c t to li mi t e d or charte red fre edo m:
In theirsIy ness the y kn owwel l that given (char tered) freedo mis nofre e dom, si n c e only thefre e domone tak e s fc.r himself, therefore the egoist'sfreedom, rideswi t h full sails . Donatedfreedom strikes it s sails as soon as therecomes a stor m.U
Stirne r is not trying to formulate a new sys tem of intrinsicor constitu t iona l social valuesupon whichtobase a newvi s i onof freedom. Itbe c ome s increasinglyclear tha t he was no t only wI ll i n g to challenge trad i t i on al Christian mor a li t y but theval i di t y ofmoral ity itself. He contends that fr e e d o mis not possiblei fconditionedbymor al !tybythe very fact thatmo r al ityg a cond i tion . His is a pr o jec t of ove r c oming moral i ty it s e lf since, by hi s view, freedom is und efi na b l e and unlimited. The r e is no doub t at this po i nt that Stirnerhas lit t l e regar d forhumanisticand socialistic idealsandthefr e e dom inwhos ename the ywere advanced. But thequestion arises as to whetherhe isas k i ngusto abandon freedom altogether, not jus t freedom as a liberal - hu manist fixed Idee but freedomas such . There is some ambi g ui ty in Der Einzige respe cting this is s u e and i t is thi s th at subsequentchapte rswill address. But fir st, since Stirner
"rsra ., P. 167. WithStirn er '5 po i nt e d comment here on e is imme di a t e l y reminded of severa l conte mpor a ry examples. The FLQ crisis in Quebe cin197 0is one such ca s e. The declara tion of th e War MeasuresActand the subs e que n tsuspensionof common l yaccepted libert ies, gi vessomecredibility to St i rne r'sargume nt .
3.
ha s often be e n li n k ed to the anarc hi sttrad i t ion,U it m19ht be useful to loo k ttt th e se nse of fre e d orll pecul i ar to anarchism and see how, if at al l , it Is co mp at ibl e wi t h St irner's ra d ica l ind i v i d ual i s l'l.
3. 2 Anarchi stic Freedom
Thespiritand the mode of alll1bertar i a n politicaland so c i al id e a ls have not always shown a rigid un i f o rm i ty of st r uc t ure and pur po s e, One su c h distinct ive form of lib e r t a r i anism is thatdefined by the anar chist tradition. Anar -:h i s m insi sts on a complete re j ec t i on of all forms of autho ri ty. It is the oneinf lex ibl e prem iseonwhi c hthere is noco mpr omi s e and wh ichq1\oe 5the th e oryun itywithi n1 tsown variat i ons. Thisprellis e , alongwith an appare n t asso c iation wi th some lat te r day vi ol en t extremists , has not served ana r c hy well in it s popularity as a social and po lit i c al theory. The termisgene r ii.l l y us e d inIt pej orat i vesensebut of ten for thewrong re asons .
Asta teis the embodi me nt of governme ntand la w wit hits attending coer c ive author i t y . As coercive, the anarchist beli e ve s it should not exist if true indi vidualfre e d omisto be achieved. The anarc h ists offer in its place the
UExa mples; G.Woodc ock,V. Basch, B.R . Tuck e r. (See R.W.K. Paterson,~ci t . pp, 126-144.)
37
provocative ide a of4 free as soci at i on of ind i v i d ua ls in a societ.y gove rn ed only on the basi s of indivi du a l mu t ual conse n t. Thecas e fora.societyfre e fro,. la w an d government, while st il l re g ard edbymost as naiveandpo t entiallychaotic, has hu g e imp li c a t i o n s for the concept of freedorl and , the r efore, merits some con side r ati o n as a intellectually sign i fi c an t social and political the ory .
The three mai n proponentsof anarc h ism intheni n ete e n th centurywerePi erre Jos e p h Proud hon ,MikhailBakun ! n andPeter Kropotkin. Thei r so c ial the o r yrests on thecommongro undof aso c i e t y fre eof gover n ment. The so cie t y theyenvisioned is marked by a vo lun tary sp i r it of cooperationamong individual s who are ra t i onal and ha ve a dee p sense of moral values.
Anarchi s t s are not an t i -social. rath er. they are anti- autho rita rian. The y seekacommunity in wh i chsocial order is mai ntain ed throughrea soned arguments &lIon g cooperative and enli g h tened fre eindi vi du a ls . Ifno thing else an arc h i sm is an op timi s tic th eo ry of hUlllan natu re . To expect a group of in d i v i du al s to co a l e sce in a soc ie t y free of any rigidly structured lega l system and succes sfullyprtJducea peacefu l and progre ss ivecommunityIs. byany account. optimis t ic .
Among its three majo r pr opon ent s th e r e were some difference s inapp roac h to soc ie tyand thefre edom defining its st ruc t u r e. Proudhon pro posed a reformation of socie ty commit te dto a work ingclass fra ter ni ty. However. violence wa sdislll.iss ed as apr inciple in achie vingthe necessaryso c i al
38 reform. He proposed a cooperative so c ie t y of ind ep endent equals opposedto monopolisticindustrial ag en ts and to the principles of privateproperty. Property, in term sof land for example, shouldbe held by e kind of provi s iona l owner whosesaleMo t iva t i o nin ho ldingthe prope rtywas toproduce the goods he ne ed ed to live. This provis i onal ownership, firstly , permits the sen s e of freedomandinde p e n d e nc e that anarchy demands and, secon d ly, prev ents the pos s ible exp l oi ta tionofla b o u r by thosewh o mightotherwiseac cu mu l at e huge amounts of wealth.
Bakun!ndif f ered fromProudhonIntwo si gn i f i c a n t ways.
First. he was not ave rse tousing viole n c e inth e promoti onof his ideasand, se c o nd, he was more in c l i n e d to beli eve that the meansof prOductionshouldbe publ iclyowned. Thi s might seemto place hi..ne arMarxis m on thepoliti c al spe c t rum bu t Bakuninand Marxwere polar oppositespolitically . Harxi s lIl advocatesproletari an controlin the fo rmati o nof a newstat e ev en though this new state sh o ul d event ua lly disap pear. Bakuninvi e we d this new stat e, no mat t erhow tr a ns i t o ry , as nothing more thana new political power structurewith the same pote nt i a l for corruption , in new hands.U
In contrast to St irner 's anti-social stance, Pete r Kropo t k i nexh ortsmento anacti vepa r ticipat i on in soc i e ty be lie v ing, ashe did, that on l yin societywas comp lete5el£ -
UG.P.Max imoff,Bakunin. London: Collier,MacMillanLindted, 19 5 3,p.22 4 .
39 development po ssible. The eth ical fo r mula he presen ts const ituting the necessar ycond i t ion fo ra harmonious societ y whi ch wouldfoste r freed om and se lf-development isasfolloW5 :
"Withouteq uity there isno jus tice,and withou t just ice there is nomoral i ty." u Cle a rl y then, th e anarc h y wh ich Kropotkin depicts and the sense of fre e d om so central to i t, are condi t i oned by eq~ity, justice and morali t y. Howeve r , he cautiouslytempers hi s viewas fol l o ws.
Amostimpor t a nt cond ition wh i c h a modern ethica l system isboundto satisfy is that it mustnotfetter individu a l ini ti ati v es,be it.fo r
~~eh~~~~n~~~i~~eo~st~:es;:~i:~~.~of
In hi s defe nse of individual initia tive and, conco mita ntly,his insistenceon an ethical code upon wh i ch freedom may be cultivated , Kropotkin re co gn i z e s the fun d a me ntal contradic tionwhicharises out of th e concept of conununal individua l ity. His solutionto thiscon t rad ict ionis ba s e d onabe lief inth e thera peuti c andme d i ati ng effectsof mut ualaid , jus tice andmorality.
It isnot soimport an t that the detailsofan anarc h istic soc ial and political sys tem be revi ewed here as it is to unde rstand the basic principles which und e rl i e the socia l arra n ge ment wh i ch it pro po se s ;th i s wit h avie wto contras ting
"PeterKropotkin,Eth i c s.Tr a nsl ated byLou i sS.Fri edlan d an d JosephR. Piroshni ko f f. New York,Lond on : Benjami n Blom, 196 8, p, xv.
·~Ibid.,P. 27.
40 the sense of freedom arisingout of theirideas with those of Stirner. There are three general observations that can be made with re s pe cttoth e soc ialtheoryof anarchi sm: 1) i tis anti-authoritarian , 2) it is social, promoting individual liberty withina communalsettingan d ,3) i trequire saco nuno n senseof valuesi.e.,an ethical code.
stirner' s Dcr Einzige has beencha r a c te r i ze d asa caseof the individualagainst soc ie ty . andso far as thi sgoes there is no doub t th at Stir ner ca n just l y be pl ace d amo ng the pragen! tors of anar chistic theory. He. to o. look s uponal l forms ofau t ho ri ty , especiallythecoerc i v e authorityof the st a te , as theabs o l ute negationof creative individuality.
Poli tical liberty, whatare we to unders tandby that?Perha p s the in d i v i d u a l '5 independenc e of the st ate and i t' s laws ? No; onth e contrary,
:~:t;n:~~i~~a~~es~~!~~~;o~a~~"~rbe
Bakuninis equally remonstrative in declaring : The st a t e as I have said before is in ef f e c t a vas t cemeterywherein all the manifestation of individualsand local lif e are sacrificed ,whereth e interests of the parts constituting the who le dieand are buried. It is the al tar on which the real libertyand the well-being of peoplesare immolatedto politi c al grandeur; an d themore complete this
~:o~~:~:~ni S,themoreperfectis
460 e r Einzinge., P. 106 .
"G.P. Madmoff,.Q.E..cit.,p.134.
41 Fromthisth ere is hardlya que st ion th a t , asreg ards thei r ve h e me ntop position tolaw and go ve rnme ntal aut ho ri ty . Bakun!nandSt i rnerar e kindredspiri ts. What iscommon to bot h is th eir absol u t e dedication to sel f - in te res t as the pr i nc iple pre-requi siteforalife of in di vidu alfreedom. It re mai n s a que stion, tho ugh, whether there is ro o m for both Stirner and Bakun!n inthis so c iet y . Fo r indee d, ana r chism co nce d es the val ue of be ing socia l and, conse q ue n t l y , Proudhon, Bakun!n and I<ropotkin al l tried to work ou t the socia l implic ations ofa sy s tem groundedin radicalindi v idual fr e edom. How e v er, St i rne r 'swo rl d is unpri nc i p l e d an d a- socia l; he di s s ol v e s societywhen he rejects entirely its moral , social and political de mand s upon him. "Le t us not asp i r e to cl)mrnu n i t y, but toone- sidedne s s", 48he Bays.
Theprogenitors of anarch isti c theorieswerewel lawar e of th e di f fic u l ty as to how bes t to mediate the inevitable discordbe tw e enradi c allyfreeindivi d u a ls whoarese c ondarily conuni tt edtoaconununalarranqement . Without government an d acod i f iedsys temoflaws , th eques tio narises as tohoworder an d equity are to be maintained in a so c i ety where the dictate sof the indiv i d u a l are su p reme. Itisherethattheir optim ismre scue s theirpolitical theory. Anarchistssuch as Pr oudhon believed thatthe power of human re a sonwould preva il in matter sof dispute. Reasonedargulllents would bepre sented to an aqentwh o conuni t tedor was co n t e mp l a t i n g an act thouqht
48De r Einziqe, p , 311.
"
tobewron gbythecOlMlun i ty . Complianceby th e agentrema ins his cho ice but anarch i s t swereconvinced th at. foubj ect to th e agen t'sowndelibera tions , reasoned ar gumentswo u l d preva i l.
Anana log yto this approach that .ightbe citedis the con te mpo r a ry us e of "mo ra l sUlision ". II technique us e d by inst itutions an dgov e rn men ts to sol icitvoluntary co mpli anc e toII requ e stwh ich wouldbenefit societ y as II who le . There maynot be direc t retributionfor non- c omp li anc ebu t th ere is IIpower f u l moti v etodo soin thefaceof publicscr u ti nyand ob li que censorship.
Theear lyanarchists heldto aninstinctiverespec t fornali,lralla wgroundedinthebelief thatmen aee ba s i c al ly good. Theythere forebelievedtha t .lllan";!senseofjusticeand eq uity wouldprevail gi v en the ri ght soc i al circums t an c e s. Thisis an ar gume ntco g entl y pr es e nted by R.W.F:. Patersonin TheNi hilis t i c Eg oist. "Anar c hism the re forerequ ires, nota lower , bu t a infinite ly higher standa r d of ethical cond uc t fromeac h individu al."" Pate rs o n feelsth at the demand s for moralse l f-vi gilan ce arisingoutof a socie ty of ind ivid ual self-det e rm ini ng agents woul d begre aterthan that exp ecte d froma soc ietywit hIIri g i det h ic alcod esusta inedbyco ercive forces. "Anarc hi smth us seeks to replaceanar t i fi c ia l and exte r na l poll tical un!ty bya spo n ta neous an d 11vi n g moral
"pat e rson , ~cit ., p. 134.
43 unity." ~O If this is tr ue th e n al l the less would Stirner approve.
We arein c li n e d, ifno t obliged, to agree wit h Paterson that Stirner wasnot an anarchist except in th e most narrow sens e of the term. In the first place, to be engaged in a campaign for freedom based on a new theory of social justice through conununal ind ividua lityis, for Stirner, a goal to whi chhere ma i n s completely in d if fere n t. Inth e secon dplace, theanarchistprogrampl a c e s everyon eunderthe ausp ice sof an ideal for which the y are tostrive; a standpoint from whic h they are to make themselvesoverintothe idealLe., equal, just, benevolent . Anarchism is a freedom to develop , to become so me t h i n g which Stirne r looks upon as simplyanother example of social id e a li smand that cursed st a b i lit y which dilu tes th e vi tality of th e unique individ ual. Howe v e r tolerant nn a.narch i stsociety maybe and no matter to what le n g t h s itwent to insure individ ua l lib ert y , i t woul dseemto failthereq u i r e ments ofour nineteenthcentury Thrasymachus.
This le a d s us back to our earlie r question, is Stir ner askingus to abandon freedomal to g e t h er; if so, infavour of what? The matter remains un c l e ar at this po i n t forhe allows th e term freedomto stand wh e n he says:
I ha ve no objectiontofr e e dom, but Iwishmore thanfr e e d omfor you: you shouldnot merelybe rid of what
~Qlbid.,P.134.
44 youdo not want; you sho ul d not only
be a"f r eeman ", you shouldbe an
"owner " too.~1 And further:
Mustwe the n, bec au s efree dombetrays i tself asa Christian ideal, gi v e it up?
No, nothing is to be lost. freedo mno morethanthe re st;but i tis to become ourownl~and Inthe form of fre ed omit ca nn o t .
Whi l e stirner allows the term freedomtostan d he will not coun te nan c e the idea of fre edom and herein lies the amb i g u i t y of hisposit i on . He saysthat in ownn e s snothingis to be lo st , freedomno more thanthe re s t . Doe s thi s mean that ownne ss contai ns th e idea of freed om; or is ownness co t e r mi no us withfreedom, si mpl y freedomby anot herna me ?
Ownness inc l udes initselfeve rything own,and brings to honor aga i n what Ch ris tian language disho nou r ed . But cwnneashas not anyali en st a nd a r d either, as i t is notin anysen se an ide a like freed om,morality , humanity , :~dt~~e_l~~~~r ~hisonly a descr i p ti o n
It is just be cause freedom isan idea andnot hin g more , that he present s own n essas someth i ng more than or, insome sens e, pri or to freedom. "OWnness ... ismywhol e be ing an d existenc e, it is I myself...~6 It is to an analysi s of the
~tDerEinzige,p, 156.
~2Ibid.,P. 157.
~3 I bid., P. 171.
~4I bi d., p, 157.
45 owne r and ownne s s as the individual's whole being and exi stence thatwe now turn our attent i on.
