2 GAT E-LA 24-2 OCT B 2017 OBER ED ITIO N 5
WOR KSHO P
22 SOC IAL AND MOR N O RM Soci AL S G al N A TE , E cu orms lly (F ra nc e) and Mor al N orms
With the support of CORTEX, ANR (FELIS grant) and the Van Gogh PHC program
Summary
Welcome Address 5
SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION:
Speakers 6
Programme 8
Abstracts 10
List of participants 16
5 GENERAL INFORMATION
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
Dear Participant,
We are very pleased to welcome you at the GATE research institute. This workshop aims at developing scientific discussions about Social Norms and Moral Norms. One objective is to better understand when people are more, or less, likely to act fairly and honestly and follow the moral course of action and norms instead of serving their strict self-interest, including at the others’ expense. Another objective is to clarify the role of institutions in the evolution of social preferences.
We are extremely grateful to our guest speakers for their contribution to the success of this workshop and we thank you for attending the workshop.
Two research programs, CORTEX* and FELIS*, as well as the Van Gogh PHC programme sponsor this workshop.
CORTEX (Construction, Cognitive Function, Rehabilitation and Repair of the Cortex) is a Laboratory of Excellence that combines multidisciplinary effort to understand human cognition. FELIS (Fraud and Economic Lies : Information and Strategies) is a research program funded by the National Research Agency and devoted to the analysis of dishonesty.
We hope that you will enjoy the meeting and also find some time to visit the lovely city of Lyon! We wish you an excellent meeting and a memorable stay in Lyon.
Marie Claire Villeval.
*CORTEX (Construction, Cognitive Function, Rehabilitation and Repair of the Cortex)
CORTEX is a project that was awarded the label “Laboratoire d’Excellence” by the French Government through international experts via ANR, the National Research Agency. The LabEx projects are part of a State initiative that promotes Excellency in French Research. The LabEx projects contribute to improve international visibility of the French best research teams. Consequent funding allows reinforcement of the scientific potential from these specific teams thanks to recruitment and equipment. 15 teams constitute the LabEx CORTEX, including the GATE research institute.
CORTEX combines multidisciplinary effort to understand the brain and human cognition, based on systems level studies of networks and interactions of multiple scales, from neurons to individuals. How the cortex is dynamically assembled, its architecture, the computations it supports and finally its capacities for perception, action, emotion and communication are part and parcel of a highly integrated process. Hence creating a coherent research program that integrates the communities pursuing cortex development, physiology and anatomy, cognitive science, medicine, social sciences is a primary ambition of CORTEX.
https://www.labex-cortex.com/en
*FELIS: Fraud and Economic Lies: Information and Strategies
FELIS is a research project funded by the National Research Agency (ANR) that involves researchers from GATE, CREM, the Higher School of Education in Moscow, the University of Amsterdam, and University Laval in Quebec.
The FELIS program investigates norm compliance, norm violations and deceptive behavior, notably with the aim of deriving policy implications in terms of deterrence policies. It includes the development of behavioral models and experimental tests in which the motivation of individuals includes concerns for image, emotions, limited cognitive abilities and other-regarding preferences. The aims of FELIS are to characterize the strategies of self-deception used to deceive oneself and others, the deterrence effect of uncertainty and information disclosure on audits, and how social networks convey peer effects leading to norms of honesty or dishonesty.
FELIS combine behavioral economics modeling, field and laboratory experiments, neuroeconomics, and the econometrics of social networks.
The 2nd GATE-LAB Workshop «Social and Moral Norms»
is organized by GATE Lyon Saint-Etienne
93, chemin des Mouilles 69130 Ecully (FRANCE) Tel : +33(0) 472 86 60 60 E-mail : gate@gate.cnrs.fr Internet : https://www.gate.cnrs.fr Twitter: https://twitter.com/GATE_LSE
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SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
October 24-25, 2017 - Ecully (Lyon)
Speakers Speakers
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
Arno Riedl (U. of Maastricht, Center
of Neuroeconomics)
Christian Ruff (University of Zurich)
Ivan Soraperra (CREED, University of
Amsterdam)
Marie Claire Villeval (GATE, CNRS) Jeroen van de Ven
(University of Amsterdam) Enrique Fatas (University of East
Anglia)
Fabio Galeotti (GATE, CNRS) Brice Corgnet
(GATE, EM Lyon) Gary Charness
(University of California at Santa Barbara)
Jean-Claude Dreher (CNC, Lyon)
Astrid Hopfensitz (Toulouse School of
Economics)
Nils Köbis (CREED, University of
Amsterdam)
Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham) John Hamman
(Florida State University)
Theo Offerman (CREED, University of
Amsterdam)
Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE, University Lyon 2) Ro’i Zultan
(Ben Gurion University of the Negev)
• Gary Charness (University of California at Santa Barbara) charness@econ.ucsb.edu
• Brice Corgnet (GATE, EM Lyon Business School) corgnet@gate.cnrs.fr
• Jean Claude Dreher (CNC Lyon) dreher@isc.cnrs.fr
• Enrique Fatas (University of East Anglia, Norwich) e.fatas@uea.ac.uk
• Fabio Galeotti (GATE, CNRS) galeotti@gate.cnrs.fr
• John Hamman (Florida State University) jhamman@fsu.edu
• Astrid Hopfenstitz (Toulouse School of Economics) astrid.hopfensitz@tse-fr.eu
• Nils Köbis (CREED, University of Amsterdam) n.c.kobis@gmail.com
• Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham) Daniele.Nosenzo@nottingham.ac.uk
• Theo Offerman (CREED, University of Amsterdam) T.J.S.Offerman@uva.nl
• Arno Riedl (University of Maastricht, Center of Neuroeconomics) a.riedl@maastrichtuniversity.nl
• Ruff Christian (University of Zürich) christian.ruff@econ.uzh.ch
• Ivan Soraperra (CREED, University of Amsterdam) i.soraperra@uva.nl
• Jeroen Van de Ven (ACLE, University of Amsterdam) J.vandeVen@uva.nls
• Marie Claire Villeval (GATE, CNRS) villeval@gate.cnrs.fr
• Ro’iZultan (Ben Gurion University of the Negev) zultan@bgu.ac.il
• Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE, University Lyon 2) zylbersztejn@gate.cnrs.fr
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SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
October 24-25, 2017 - Ecully (Lyon)
Programme Programme
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS» 2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
Tuesday 24 October 2017
9:45 - 9:50: Welcome address by Marie Claire Villeval
Session 1 Cooperation and social norms Chair: Marie Claire Villeval 9:50 - 10:30 Astrid Hopfensitz (Toulouse School of Economics)
What if women earned more than their spouses? An experimental investigation of work-division in couples
10:30 - 11:10 Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE, University Lyon 2) Cooperation in a risky world
11:10 - 11:40 Break
Session 2 Incentives and communication Chair: Ro’i Zultan 11:40 - 12:20 Brice Corgnet (GATE, EMLyon Business School):
On the merit of equal pay: performance manipulation and incentive setting 12:20 - 1:00 Jeroen van de Ven (ACLE, University of Amsterdam):
The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games
1:00 - 2:00 Lunch
Session 3 Endogenous group formation Chair: Brice Corgnet 2:00 - 2:40 Arno Riedl (University of Maastricht):
Freedom to choose neighborhood guarantees socially desirable outcomes in social
coordination problems
2:40 - 3:20 John Hamman (Florida State University, Talahassee) On the stability of coordination in dynamic groups
3:20 - 3:50 Break
Session 4 Information and ignorance Chair: John Hamman 3:50 - 4:30 Gary Charness (University of California at Santa Barbara):
Choices over biased information structures: reinforcement, confirmation and contradiction seeking behavior in the laboratory
4:30 – 5:10 Ivan Soraperra (CREED, University of Amsterdam) Shooting the messenger - A market for willful ignorance 7:30 Dinner (on invitation) at Aux 3 Maries, Vieux Lyon, 69005 Lyon
Wednesday 25 October 2017
Session 5 Bargaining and competition Chair: Astrid Hopfensitz 9:10 – 9:50 Fabio Galeotti (GATE, CNRS, Lyon)
The attraction and compromise effects in bargaining: experimental evidence 9:50 - 10:30 Theo Offerman (CREED, University of Amsterdam)
Fight or flight
10:30 - 11:00 Break
Session 6 Social norm compliance Chair: Arno Riedl 11:00 – 11:40 Daniele Nosenzo (CEDEX, University of Nottingham)
Peer effects in norm compliance 11:40 – 12:20 Christian Ruff (University of Zurich)
Neural foundations of social norm compliance 12:20 – 1:00 Jean-Claude Dreher (CNC, Lyon)
Moral and social norms compliance: effects of audience and social distance on
the brain
1:00 - 2:00 Lunch
Session 7 Inter-group conflicts Chair: Jeroen van de Ven 2:00 - 2:40 Ro’i Zultan (Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer-Sheva)
Humans reciprocate intentional harm by discriminating against group peers 2:40 - 3:20 Enrique Fatas (University of East Anglia, Norwich)
Violent conflict and political inclusion. The value of political rights among victims and non-victims of conflict in Colombia
3:20 – 3:50 Break
Session 8 Dishonesty and moral norms Chair: Daniele Nosenzo 3:50 - 4:30 Nils Köbis (CREED, University of Amsterdam)
Intuitive (dis)honesty – A meta-analysis 4:30 – 5:10 Marie Claire Villeval (GATE, CNRS, Lyon)
Dishonesty and the moral cleansing effect of control
7:30 Dinner (on invitation) at Brasserie Chavant, Celestins Square 69002 Lyon
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SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
October 24-25, 2017 - Ecully (Lyon)
Abstracts Abstracts
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
Tuesday 24 October 2017
Session 1 Cooperation and social norms
What if women earned more than their spouses? An experimental investigation of work-division in couples (with François Cochard and Hélène Couprie)
Astrid Hopfensitz (Toulouse School of Economics)
Female specialization on household work and male specialization on labor-market work is a widely observed phenomenon across time and countries. This absence of gender neutrality with respect to work-division is known as the ‘‘work-division puzzle’’. Gender differences regarding characteristics (preferences, productivity) and context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recognized as competing explanations for this fact. We experimentally control for context and productivity to investigate preferences for work-division by true co-habiting couples, in a newly developed specialization task. Efficiency in this task comes at the cost of inequality, giving higher earnings to the ‘‘advantaged’’ player.
We compare behavior when men (or women) are in the advantaged position, which corresponds to the traditional (or power) couple case where he (or she) earns more. Women and men contribute equally to the household public good in all conditions. This result allows us to rule out some of the standard explanations of the work-division puzzle.
Cooperation in a risky world (with Vincent Theroude) Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE, University Lyon 2)
We offer a novel investigation of the effect of environmental risk on cooperation in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Our baseline is the standard setting in which the personal return from the public good is deterministic, homogeneous, and publicly known. Our experimental treatments alter this classic design by making the marginal per capita return from the public good probabilistic. In the homogeneous risk treatment (HomR), the random draw is made for the whole group, while in the heterogeneous risk treatment (HetR) this happens independently for each group member. Our hypothesis is that different environmental risks may differently affect the ex post payoff inequalities, so that other-regarding preferences (inequality aversion) may generate higher contributions in HomR than in HetR.
Our main result is that the environmental risk does not affect the patterns of cooperation either in the one-shot or in the finitely repeated version of the game. This suggests that the standard experimental methodology provides a robust and conservative measure of human cooperation.
Session 2 Incentives and communication
On the Merit of Equal Pay: Performance Manipulation and Incentive Setting (with Ludividne Martin and Angela Sutan)
Brice Corgnet (GATE, EMLyon Business School)
Work performance is often difficult to assess thus leaving room for manipulation of commonly- used metrics. Because manipulation attempts are difficult to observe in actual organizations, we created a laboratory workplace in which we can precisely assess both work performance along with manipulation activities. Using two independent studies we show that, whenever pay for performance is used, manipulation of performance metrics is pervasive leading to both a waste
of organizational resources and a weakening of incentives. By contrast, paying organizational members equally effectively deters manipulation attempts leading to higher organizational production than when performance pay is used. Instead of relying on equal pay, managers may deter manipulation attempts by recruiting employees who are less likely to engage in such activities. We identify these employees as being neither spiteful nor cognitively reflective.
The Power and Limits of Sequential Communication in Coordination Games (with Simin He and Theo Offerman)
Jereon van de Ven (ACLE, University of Amsterdam)
We study theoretically and experimentally the extent to which communication can solve coordination problems. We do this in the context of coordination games in which there is some conflict of interest. In contrast to existing studies, we allow players to chat sequentially and free- format. The main behavioral assumption that we make, which we dub the `feigned-ignorance principle’, is that players will ignore any communication unless they reach an agreement in which both players are better off. The model predicts that communication is effective in Battle-of-the-Sexes but futile in Chicken. A remarkable implication is that increasing players’ payoffs can make them worse off, by making communication futile. Our experimental findings provide strong support for these and some other predictions.
Session 3 Endogenous group formation
Freedom to choose neighborhood guarantees socially desirable outcomes in social coordination problems (with Ingrid Rohde and Martin Strobel)
Arno Riedl (University of Maastricht)
Stag-hunt games represent social coordination problems where individuals can coordinate on a Pareto efficient or an inefficient risk dominant equilibrium. The existing experimental evidence overwhelmingly shows that individuals have difficulties to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. Specifically, over time play mostly converges towards the inefficient equilibrium. We show that these sober results can be overcome by giving individuals the possibility to choose their interaction neighborhoods. The behavioral mechanism behind this result relies on the inclusion of individuals having played the efficient action in the past and the exclusion of individuals having played inefficient action.
On the Stability of Coordination in Dynamic Groups
John Hamman (Florida State University, Talahassee
Independent agents must regularly agree on social conventions for public good provision and self-governance, yet populations are rarely static. In dynamic groups there is a potential tension between maintaining social conventions and replacing them. We study the stability of coordination in such groups with changing membership. In a threshold public goods game with heterogeneous returns and costly punishment, group members chat to determine initial contributions to reach the threshold. Group members are then systematically rotated by either switching between groups or using a ‘generations’ mechanism. New group members either see their group’s history of play or not, for a 2 (rotation mechanism) x 2 (information) design. We find that the rotation mechanism has a significant effect on coordination and norm stability when subjects may see the contribution history for their new group.
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SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
October 24-25, 2017 - Ecully (Lyon)
Abstracts Abstracts
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
Session 4 Information and ignorance
Choices over biased information structures: reinforcement, confirmation and contradiction seeking behavior in the laboratory (with Ryan Oprea and Sevgi Yuksel)
Gary Charness (University of California at Santa Barbara)
We study choices among information structures that are characterized by different biases. Bias is introduced via either distortion, through possibility of false reports as in cheap talk games of Crawford and Sobel (1982), or via filtering, through possibility of strategic omission of information as in disclosure games of Milgrom and Roberts (1986). The experimental design exploits how the optimal information structure depends on one’s prior and the form of the bias- filtering or distortion. Typing subjects based on their choices in a series of questions spanning these cases, we find strong evidence for confirmation, contradiction and certainty seeking behavior. This is particularly surprising given that traditional explanations for confirmation or contradiction seeking behavior are shut down in our design. Finally, we do not observe bias in choices over information structures to be correlated with biases in how signals are later interpreted. We discuss implications of our results in the context of political information and the role of media bias.
Shooting the messenger - A market for willful ignorance (with Shaul Shalvi, Marie Claire Villeval, Joël van der Weele)
Ivan Soraperra (CREED, University of Amsterdam)
Many people try to avoid information about the negative consequences of their actions.
Previous studies have shown evidence of both non-strategic information avoidance (when ignorance can reduce the moral cost of making unfair choices (Dana et al. 2007; Grossman 2014) and strategic information avoidance (when the deliberate choice to remain ignorant can shift blame and deflect third party punishment (e.g., Bartling et al. 2014)). But no paper has studied the supply side of willful ignorance (except Coffman and Gotthard Real 2017). In our paper, we study the interactions between uninformed decision makers and informed advisors in a setting where decision makers have a moral non-strategic reason to remain ignorant about the consequences of their action. We study whether (i) the advisor anticipates that decision maker may want to remain ignorant, (ii) the decision maker avoids information by actively choosing the less informative advisor, and (iii) the demand for willful ignorance decreases the number of informed choices and the total welfare.
Wednesday 25 October 2017
Session 5 Bargaining and competition
The Attraction and Compromise Effects in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence (with Maria Montero and Anders Poulsen)
Fabio Galeotti (GATE, CNRS, Lyon)
We experimentally investigate the Attraction Effect and Compromise Effect (AE and CE) in bargaining situations, namely the propensity of bargainers to agree to an intermediate option (CE), or to an option that dominates another option (AE). The data suggest that the AE and CE are more likely to occur if none of the feasible agreements offer equal payoffs, and if the agreement targeted by the CE or AE is the least unequal one. In general, the CE is more robust than the AE.
Fight or Flight (with Boris van Leeuwen and Jeroen van de Ven) Theo Offerman (CREED, University of Amsterdam
When two players compete for a prize, they sometimes try to act as quickly as possible. At other times, they wait and see if the other person chooses to flee first. We study this interaction in the context of a dynamic fight-or-flight game. At each moment, a player can decide to wait, flee or fight. Players are privately informed about their strengths, which in case of a battle determine who wins the prize. In the case that one player flees and manages to escape, the other player earns the prize plus a “deterrence value”. We show that the deterrence value determines if fights occur immediately or only after a waiting period. In cases where the deterrence value is positive but not too large, players can use time to learn something about the type of the opponent, as the weaker players may find it advantageous to flee earlier in the game. Weaker players thereby avoid the risk of ending up in a fight. We derive conditions under which this is the case, and test this experimentally in the lab. Our findings support the idea that endogenous timing can reduce the likelihood of a fight compared to a static version of the game (where players decide simultaneously whether to fight or flee). We also observe many fights early on in the game, even if strong players would benefit from waiting.
Session 6 Social norm compliance
Peer effects in norm compliance (with Simon Gaechter and Lucas Molleman) Daniele Nosenzo (CEDEX, University of Nottingham)
We report the results of a large-scale experiment to quantify the impact of peers on norm compliance. In the experiment subjects are asked to comply with an arbitrary behavioral rule at some cost to themselves. There is no financial sanction if the rule is violated, and thus compliance reflects an intrinsic preference for norm-following. We measure whether preferences for norm- following can be weakened or strengthened by cues about the behaviour of others in the task: depending on the treatment, subjects are displayed the behavior of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 other participants, who either follow or violate the norm. Across 28 treatments, we map out all possible scenarios where the N other participants are either all compliant, all non-compliant, or any mixture of partial compliance in between. We find large and statistically significant effects of others’ behavior on norm-following. However, these peer effects are strongly asymmetric: observing “good” examples of compliance has little impact on norm-following, but
“bad” examples of non-compliance have a powerful negative effect. We show that this effect is mediated by a shift in norms perception: after observing a bad example, subjects update their beliefs about the appropriateness of compliance. We do not observe any norms updating after observation of good examples.
Finally, we document an asymmetry in peer effects between proscriptive and prescriptive norms: when the norm is prescriptive and demands that the individual takes, rather than abstains from, a certain action, the influence of peers is virtually absent.
Neural foundations of social norm compliance Chritian Ruff (University of Zurich)
Social norms like honesty and fairness play a key role in social and economic life. Without such norms, promises are not kept, contracts are not enforced, and taxes remain unpaid. Despite this importance, it is largely unknown which personal and situational factors determine our ability to comply with social norms. Here I present brain stimulation studies identifying brain processes that are biological prerequisites for social norm compliance. These studies show that the human brain contains at least two mechanisms that are necessary for fair and honest behavior. These mechanisms either enhance the sensitivity to social incentives for norm-consistent behavior or they increase the weight of moral motives associated with norm-compliant actions. The properties of these brain mechanisms have interesting implications for the possibilities and limits of interventions designed to enhance norm-compliant behavior.
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SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
October 24-25, 2017 - Ecully (Lyon)
Abstracts Abstracts
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
Moral and social norms compliance: effects of audience and social distance on the brain Jean-Claude Dreher (CNC, Lyon)
Concerning moral norms, I will present recent fMRI and TMS findings allowing us to identify how the brain processes three sources of motivation: concerns for self-image, moral values and extrinsic rewards. Concerning social conformity, I will present the results of a fMRI study on the integration of individual and social information when making judgments in a group. Concerning social norms, I will present a recent fMRI study identifying the neural systems engaged in social norms enforcement by a third party as a function of the social distance with a first party. Together, these studies should shed light on the neural systems engaged in various processes required to enforce or follow social and moral norms.
Session 7 Inter-group conflicts
Humans reciprocate intentional harm by discriminating against group peers (with David Hugh- Jones and Itay Ron)
Ro’i Zultan (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev)
The evolution of human intergroup conflict is a social science puzzle. Motivated by cycles of intergroup revenge in real-world conflicts, we experimentally test the hypothesis that humans practice group-based reciprocity: if someone harms or helps them, they harm or help other members of that person’s group. Subjects played a trust game, then allocated money between other people. Senders whose partners returned more in the trust game gave more to that partner’s group members. The effect was about half as large as the effect of direct reciprocity. Receivers’ allocations to group members were not affected by their partners’ play in the trust game, suggesting that group reciprocity was only triggered when the partner’s intentions were unequivocal. We show conditions under which group reciprocity can evolve, and discuss its place in conflict among early humans.
Violent conflict and political inclusion. The value of political rights among victims and non- victims of conflict in Colombia (with Cristina Bicchieri, Catherine C. Eckel and Lina M. Restrepo- Plaza)
Enrique Fatas (University of East Anglia, Norwich
The experience of conflict generates a wide variety of effects in human behavior. A collective memory of violence may facilitate the perpetuation of conflict through aggressive in-group favoritism and a sense of duty for retaliation. Individual exposure to violent conflict may distort individual preferences by exacerbating risk loving attitudes and impatience. On a more positive side, the experience of conflict may also increase individuals’ egalitarian motivations toward others, and may trigger a sense of moral obligation and solidarity toward other victims. In this paper, we study how conflict shape preferences for the political inclusion of other individuals. In a lab-in-the-field experiment in Colombia, we measure how individual and family exposure to conflict change the value individuals assign to their own political rights and the political rights of others. Participants are asked to choose the rules governing a collective decision, and then use these rules to make a substantial donation to one of two well-known, and politically distant, local charities. We elicit their willingness to pay for three political rights used to design the ballots used to make the donations: freedom of expression (including a short message in the ballot), choice (making their preferred charity eligible for the donation), and vote (buying voting rights). Our within-subjects design controls for the level of exogenous (distance between local charities, high or low) and endogenous polarization (unanimity, majority or minority teams, depending on how individual preferences are aligned with the preferences of others). The between-subjects’ manipulation compares how much individuals are willing to pay for their own political rights (in Treatment 1) or the political rights of other team members (in Treatment 2). Our results strongly suggest that participants show a well-ordered preference between political
rights, polarization, and group composition. While exposure to conflict does not change participants’ value for their own political rights, it does significantly increase their willingness to pay for the political rights of others, boosting political inclusion at the team level. The magnitude of the difference is larger for high levels of polarization (exogenous or endogenous), and the results are robust to different specifications and controls.
Session 8 Dishonesty and moral norms
Intuitive (Dis)honesty – A Meta-Analysis (with Bruno Verschuere, Yoella Bereby-Meyer, David Rand and Shaul Shalvi)
Nils Köbis (CREED, University of Amsterdam)
When facing temptation, is the intuitive tendency to be dishonest? A growing stream of behavioural research has tested whether fast intuitive decision-making favours honesty or dishonesty, yet draws an inconclusive picture. In the talk I present the results of a meta-analysis on magnitude of dishonesty (k = 29, n = 4248) and on the percentage of cheaters (k = 42, k = 6898) suggest that experimental manipulation of intuition increases dishonesty. This effect is present when no concretely identifiable victim of cheating exists, yet disappears when another participant is harmed by dishonesty. While no evidence for p-hacking exists, there was some evidence for small study effects. The talk discusses these findings and a research agenda to synthesize adopting dual process models with behavioural ethics.
Dishonesty and the moral cleansing effect of control (with Fabio Galeotti and Valeria Maggian) Marie Claire Villeval (GATE, CNRS, Lyon)
Does dishonesty in one context predict misbehavior in a different one? Are there spillover effects of monitoring and punishing misbehavior across contexts? The paper reports on a field experiment conducted in public transportation and on the streets of a large city in which we first observe dishonesty in a natural setting and second, we create a new opportunity for unethical behavior in a different setting. We study (i) whether cheating in the original natural setting generates dishinibitory effects on misbehavior in the new setting, (ii) whether sanctioning fraud has a deterrence effect on fare-dodgers when they are exposed to the new opportunity to misbehave, and (iii) whether being controlled has any effect on the behavior of honest passengers in the new context. While punishment may serve as a corrective tool on fare-dodgers, it may also have the opposite effect of favoring the emergence of moral cleansing. Similarly, moral licensing of honest people may arise as a side effect of control, strengthening their positive self-image and making them less concerned about subsequent immoral behavior.
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SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
October 24-25, 2017 - Ecully (Lyon)
List of participants List of participants
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
2ND GATE-LAB WORKSHOP: «SOCIAL NORMS AND MORAL NORMS»
• Julien Bénistant (GATE, University Lyon 2) benistant@gate.cnrs.fr
• Gary Charness (University of California at Santa Barbara) charness@econ.ucsb.edu
• Marina Chugunova (University of Hambourg) Marina.Chugunova@wiso.uni-hamburg.de
• Brice Corgnet (GATE, EM Lyon Business School) corgnet@gate.cnrs.fr
• Jean-Claude Dreher (CNC, Lyon) dreher@isc.cnrs.fr
• Enrique Fatas (University of East Anglia, Norwich) e.fatas@uea.ac.uk
• Fabio Galeotti (GATE, CNRS) galeotti@gate.cnrs.fr
• Thomas Garcia (GATE, University Lyon 2) garcia@gate.cnrs.fr
• Mathilde Godard (GATE, CNRS) godard@gate.cnrs.fr
• Chrisa Gresset (GATE, University Lyon 2 and EM Lyon) gresset@gate.cnrs.fr
• Valentin Guigon (Institut des Sciences Cognitives) valentin.guigon@outlook.com
• John Hamman (Florida State University) jhamman@fsu.edu
• Astrid Hopfensitz (Toulouse School of Economics) astrid.hopfensitz@tse-fr.eu
• Yang Hu (Institut des Sciences Cognitives) yanghu@isc.cnrs.fr
• Rémi Janet (Institut des Sciences Cognitives) remi.janet@isc.cnrs.fr
• Mateus Joffily (GATE, CNRS) joffily@gate.cnrs.fr
• Nils Köbis (CREED, University of Amsterdam) n.c.kobis@gmail.com
• Maxime Le Bihan (GATE, University Lyon 2) lebihan@gate.cnrs.fr
• Jiawei Liu (Institut des Sciences Cognitives) vlamenco@foxmail.com
• Valeria Maggian (GATE, CNRS) maggian@gate.cnrs.fr
• Daniele Nosenzo (University of Nottingham) Daniele.Nosenzo@nottingham.ac.uk
• Theo Offerman (CREED, University of Amsterdam) T.J.S.Offerman@uva.nl
• Arno Riedl (University of Maastricht, Center of Neuroeconomics) a.riedl@maastrichtuniversity.nl
• Claire Rimbaud (GATE, University Lyon 2) rimbaud@gate.cnrs.fr
• Julie Rosaz (GATE, University Lyon 2) rosaz@gate.cnrs.fr
• Christian Ruff (University of Zurich) christian.ruff@econ.uzh.ch
• Charlotte Saucet (GATE, ENS de Lyon) saucet@gate.cnrs.fr
• Ivan Soraperra (CREED, University of Amsterdam) i.soraperra@uva.nl
• Rémi Suchon (GATE, ENS de Lyon) suchon@gate.cnrs.fr
• Quentin Thevenet (GATE, CNRS) thevenet@gate.cnrs.fr
• Jeroen Van de Ven (ACLE, University of Amsterdam) J.vandeVen@uva.nl
• Marie Claire Villeval (GATE, CNRS) villeval@gate.cnrs.fr
• Ro’i Zultan (Ben Gurion University of the Negev) zultan@bgu.ac.il
• Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE, University Lyon 2) zylbersztejn@gate.cnrs.fr
