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Antoine Ducastel & Ward Anseeuw The financialisation of South African grain cooperatives. What room for the agrarian capital?

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The financialisation of South African grain cooperatives. What room for the agrarian capital?

Antoine Ducastel & Ward Anseeuw

Paper for the 5th Annual Conference of the International Initiative for the Promotion of

Political Economy (IIPPE), 16-18 September 2014, Università degli Studi di Napoli “L’Orientale”,

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• South African white commercial farmers as

agrarian capital (Bernstein, 2013).

• Direct involvment of the financial industry in

the South African agricultural sector -i.e. farms,

agribusiness firms, banks.

• Reconfiguration of the accumulation process

and the social relations underlying it in the

South African agricultural sector.

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The grain cooperatives: a key institution for the SA agrarian capital

• The grain cooperatives during the Apartheid:

 Intermediaries between government and white commercial farmers (i.e. loans, commodities Board)

 Public subsidies to build agricultural infrastructure (i.e. silos)

 Geographical monopoly

 Cooperatives’ structures ensured farmers’ control • The conversion process in the 1990’s:

 From coops to public companies  From members to shareholders

• Safeguard of their dominant position in the production chain (Bernstein, 2013; Greenberg, 2009)

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1 problematic:

• How does the finance capital shake the balance of power within the South African former grain cooperatives, and beyond, in the agricultural sector?

2 closely related issues:

• The concrete implementation of the financialisation devices and mechanisms in these firms

• The various paths of financialisation and the uneven resistance capacities from one firm to another

2 case studies analysed in a historical perspective:

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1. The financialisation of Afgri

• Former Oos Transvaal Kooperasie

• First and only former agricultural coop listed on the JSE (1996)

• Financialisation of the company in two different steps:

– Financial rationalization (2000-2014) – Private equity takeover (2014-…)

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A. The financial rationalization of Agri (2000-2014)

• Transformation of the firm’s strategy, management and governance:

• Substitution of executive and non-executive directors on Afgri board

• Sale of the debtors’ book

• Reduction of company’s staff

• Sale of « non-core business » (e.g. milling division) • Geographical expansion –mainly in SA-

• Implementation of the « Economic value added » framework and metrics

• Evolution of the firm’s control and ownership:

• Marginalization of farmers as shareholders and Board directors • Ownership of institutional shareholders (i.e. pension funds,

insurance companies, etc.)

• Emergence and empowerment of a professional management team

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B. The private equity takeover (2014)

• The pool of investors (Mauritius):

– Fairfax Financial Holding (Canada) and others North-American investors (60%) - Agrigroupe

– The South African Government Employee Pension Fund (15%) – The Bafepi Agri Trust: Black Economic Empowerment Trust (20%) – The Afgri management team (5%)

• The battle for Afgri’s asset:

– Resistance from black emerging farmers (African Farmers Association of South Africa, AFASA)

– Divisions in the SA government

• Afgri as an investment company? ‘Off-shorisation’ and African expansion

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C. The two waves of Afgri’s financialisation

• Promotion of private equity as a privilegied takeover mechanism

• From a financial restructuration according to the shareholders principles to the conquest of ‘frontier markets’

• Changes in the investors’ profiles:

• Involvment of foreign investors (new appetite for the agricultural sector and Africa)

• A Black Economic Empowerment Trust • The SA government

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2. Zeder and the « financialisation in reverse »

 Zeder’s strategy

“The complete transformation of co-operatives to

profitable public companies with good management, sweating the rich assets and shares that are freely tradable, reflecting a share price that is closer to fair value” (Zeder, 2008)

– Non-controlling strategic stakes – Unbundling of the former coops

– Financial rationalization: governance (i.e. Board comitee) and share trading

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 Resistance from agrarian capital

• Agrarian capital instruments against finance capital: – Share trading restrictions (i.e. OTC platforms)

– Farmers controlling blocks

• Tension between two types of shareholders:

shareholder-customer and shareholder-investor • « Financialisation in reverse » (Burch & Larwence,

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Conclusion

• Professional managers play a key role in the financialisation of these agribusiness firms on behalf iether of the financial capital or the agrarian capital

• Marginalization of the (smaller) white commercial farmers in the control and ownership of the former coops; role of these farmers for the expansion into Africa • Invisibilisation of black farmers; promotion of a black

urban elite -redistribution from above-

• Development and empowerment policies through financial mechanisms: private equity promoted as a political instrument

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Thank you

Antoine Ducastel antoine.ducastel@cirad.fr

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