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Diversity of economic instruments to finance environmental service provision and sustainable land-uses: a transaction cost economics perspective

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Academic year: 2021

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(1)

Diversity of economic instruments to finance

environmental service provision and

sustainable land-uses: A transaction cost

economics perspective

Raes, L.

a,b

& Le Coq, J.F.

b,c

a

Ghent University/Humboldt University

b

Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica – CINPE

c

CIRAD

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Objective: To obtain a classification of schemes

that finance and/or incentivize the provision of ES

without exclusions

Overview:

• Cases

• Direct classifications

• Transaction cost economics

• Link to nature related transaction

• Further steps

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Schemes for the provision of

hydrological services

• ESPH-PROCUENCAS, Costa Rica

• PES Pimampiro, Ecuador

• Regional Water Fund (FORAGUA), Ecuador

– Municipality of Celica

– Municipality of Loja

• RWA Los Negros, Bolivia

• Water Fund for Life and Sustainability, Colombia

• …

(4)

ES provider based classification

• Contracts versus land purchases

• PES and non-PES or PES-like

• Land purchases, investment in ES, not PES (Rojas and

Aylward, 2003)

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ES “Buyer” Based classification

o Municipalities and municipal water companies

– FORAGUA Celica

– Los Negros

o Private companies

– ESPH-PROCUENCAS

o Water user associations

– Los Negros

– Water Fund for Life and Sustainability, Colombia

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Transaction Costs Economics Theory

• The transaction ‘is the basic unit of analysis ’

(Williamson, 1985)

• Institutions as rules

• Governance structures as the organizational

solutions for making rules effective

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• Types of transaction costs

o Information;

o Decision making;

o Enforcement costs

• Influenced by

o Asset specificity

o Uncertainty

o Frequency

• Determine the governance form

– Markets, hybrids and hierarchies

• Characterized by

o Contracts law

o Incentive intensity

o Administrative control

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PES and land purchases in basic TCE

•PES Pimampiro

•Water tariff fixed contractual payment

•Contract between landholders and Pimampiro’s municipal water

company

•Monetary incentives

•Providers monitored for compliance

•FORAGUA, Loja (land purchases)

•Water tariff fixed contractual payment

•External fund management

•No contract

•Incentive not external, except legal obligation to invest water

fund

•Watershed protection by municipal water company

•Pimampiro’s PES closer to markets and Loja’s land purchases closer to

hierarchies (hybrids)

•Frequency: Daily water use/flow, number of water users

•Uncertainty: Trust in compliance by landholders

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• “A transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred

across a technologically separable interface. One stage of

activity terminates and another begins” (Williamson 1985).

• Different Properties

• Mobility

• Separability

• Complexity (knowledge problem)

• Difficulties to standardise

(Hagedorn, 2008)

• Role of governments

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Theoretical Options

• Revised TCE framework

• Public Private Partnership

(e.g. Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2009)

– Role of governance costs

• Integrative and segregative institutions

(Hagedorn, 2005)

– How consequences of decisions made by actors

are dealt with under a set of rules

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Concluding remarks

• TCE more appropriate to be able to compare

instead of exclude different mechanisms

• Focus on all transactions: Human-nature

related, financial and property right

transactions

• Focus on providers and beneficiaries

• Power relations

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References

Hagedorn, K., 2005. The dichotomy of segregative and integrative institutions and its particular importance for sustainable resource use and rural development, in: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis Colloquium, Mini Series, Bloomington.

Hagedorn, K., 2008. Particular requirements for institutional analysis in nature-related sectors. Eur. Rev. Agric. Econ. 35, 357–384. doi:10.1093/erae/jbn019

Rojas, M., Aylward, B., 2003. What are we learning from experiences with markets for

environmental services in Costa Rica? A review and critique of the literature. (Working Paper), Environmental Economics Programme. International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK.

Van Huylenbroeck, G., Vuylsteke, A., Verbeke, W., 2009. Public Good Markets: The Possible Role of Hybrid Governance Structures in Institutions for Sustainability, in: Beckmann, V.,

Padmanabhan, M. (Eds.), Institutions and Sustainability. Springer Netherlands, pp. 175–191. Williamson, O.E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York, USA.

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Thank you

Gracias

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