Université Libre de Bruxelles
Académie Universitaire Wallonie‐Bruxelles
FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES SOCIALES ET POLITIQUES /
SOLVAY BRUSSELS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
The Industrial Organization of Financial Services in Developing and Developed
Countries
Thèse de Doctorat présentée en vue de l’obtention du titre de Docteur en Sciences Economiques et de Gestion
Par Paolo Casini
Directeur:
Co‐directeur:
Membres du jury :
Professeur Georg Kirchsteiger – ULB Professeur Estelle Cantillon – ULB
Professeur Jean‐Marie Baland – FUNDP Namur Professeur Mathias Dewatripont – ULB
Professeur Victor Ginsburgh – ULB Professeur Janet Mitchell – NBB
The Industrial Organization of Financial Services in Developing and Developed Countries
Paolo Casini February 16, 2010
Contents
Introduction 9
1 Competition and Altruism in Microcredit Markets 13
1.1 Introduction . . . 14
1.2 The Model . . . 18
1.3 The Entrant Strategy . . . 21
1.4 The Incumbent Strategy . . . 26
1.4.1 The Profit maximizing Incumbent (PM Model) . . . 26
1.4.2 The Altruistic Incumbent (AI Model) . . . 31
1.5 Conclusions . . . 37
1.6 Appendix . . . 38
2 Ex-ante Incentives for Multiple Borrowing 51 2.1 Introduction . . . 52
2.2 The model . . . 55
2.2.1 Incentives for Multiple Borrowing . . . 57
2.3 The Equilibria . . . 60
2.3.1 No Multiple Borrowing . . . 60
2.3.2 Multiple Borrowing Allowed . . . 65
2.4 Conclusions . . . 68
2.5 Appendix . . . 69
3 Cooperative vs. Third-Party Provision of Financial Services 77 3.1 Introduction . . . 78
3.2 The Model . . . 81
3.3 Investment Decisions . . . 84
3.3.1 Cooperative Provision . . . 84
3.3.2 Private Service Provision . . . 86
3.4 Pooling and Quasi-Pooling Equilibria . . . 87 3
3.5 Separating Equilibria . . . 91 3.6 The Investment Level . . . 94 3.7 Conclusion . . . 96
List of Figures
1.1 Entrant strategies as a function of the Incumbent strategies . . 25
1.2 Incumbent Profit: Example 1. . . 28
1.3 Incumbent Profit: Example 2. . . 29
1.4 Entrant Profit: Comparison AI model and PM model . . . 37
2.1 MFI iStrategies as a function of Cj . . . 63
5