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The
Industrial
Organization
of
Financial
Services
in
Developing
and
Developed
Countries

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Academic year: 2021

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Industrial
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Financial
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Developing
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(1)

Université
Libre
de
Bruxelles

Académie
Universitaire
Wallonie‐Bruxelles

FACULTÉ
DES
SCIENCES
SOCIALES
ET
POLITIQUES
/


SOLVAY
BRUSSELS
SCHOOL
OF
ECONOMICS
AND
MANAGEMENT



 


The
Industrial
Organization
of
Financial
 Services
in
Developing
and
Developed


Countries


Thèse
de
Doctorat
présentée
en
vue
de
l’obtention
du
titre
de
Docteur
 en
Sciences
Economiques
et
de
Gestion


Par
Paolo
Casini



 
 


Directeur:



Co‐directeur:



Membres
du
jury
:
 


Professeur
Georg
Kirchsteiger
–
ULB
 Professeur
Estelle
Cantillon
–
ULB


Professeur
Jean‐Marie
Baland
–
FUNDP
Namur
 Professeur
Mathias
Dewatripont
–
ULB


Professeur
Victor
Ginsburgh
–
ULB
 Professeur
Janet
Mitchell
–
NBB


(2)

The Industrial Organization of Financial Services in Developing and Developed Countries

Paolo Casini February 16, 2010

(3)

Contents

Introduction 9

1 Competition and Altruism in Microcredit Markets 13

1.1 Introduction . . . 14

1.2 The Model . . . 18

1.3 The Entrant Strategy . . . 21

1.4 The Incumbent Strategy . . . 26

1.4.1 The Profit maximizing Incumbent (PM Model) . . . 26

1.4.2 The Altruistic Incumbent (AI Model) . . . 31

1.5 Conclusions . . . 37

1.6 Appendix . . . 38

2 Ex-ante Incentives for Multiple Borrowing 51 2.1 Introduction . . . 52

2.2 The model . . . 55

2.2.1 Incentives for Multiple Borrowing . . . 57

2.3 The Equilibria . . . 60

2.3.1 No Multiple Borrowing . . . 60

2.3.2 Multiple Borrowing Allowed . . . 65

2.4 Conclusions . . . 68

2.5 Appendix . . . 69

3 Cooperative vs. Third-Party Provision of Financial Services 77 3.1 Introduction . . . 78

3.2 The Model . . . 81

3.3 Investment Decisions . . . 84

3.3.1 Cooperative Provision . . . 84

3.3.2 Private Service Provision . . . 86

3.4 Pooling and Quasi-Pooling Equilibria . . . 87 3

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3.5 Separating Equilibria . . . 91 3.6 The Investment Level . . . 94 3.7 Conclusion . . . 96

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List of Figures

1.1 Entrant strategies as a function of the Incumbent strategies . . 25

1.2 Incumbent Profit: Example 1. . . 28

1.3 Incumbent Profit: Example 2. . . 29

1.4 Entrant Profit: Comparison AI model and PM model . . . 37

2.1 MFI iStrategies as a function of Cj . . . 63

5

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