Architectonics of thought : a symbolic model of neuropsychological processes

ARCHITECTONICS

or

THOUGHT:

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by

Todd Lael Siler

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Bachelor of Arts

Bowdoin College

1975

Master of Science in Visual Studies

M.I.T.

1981

Submitted to the Department of Architecture

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the

Degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES

IN PSYCHOLOGY

AND ART

at the

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

February

1986

@Todd L. Siler 1985

The author hereby grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce and

to distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.

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Certified

Department of Architecture~ November

18~ 1985

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ii

ARCHITECTONICS OF THOUGHT: A_SXmbolic Model of Neur02psYgt2122ical Processes

by

Todd Lael Siler

Submitted to the Department of Architecture on November 18, 1985 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Interdisciplinary Studies in Psychology and Art

ABSTRACT

The thesis presents a monistic theory of relations between two aspects

My theory is expressed in the

model, entitled "Thought Asse dynamics of intuition, reason

equivalence between [mental]

fusion" and between reasoning refers to artistic and scient

neuropsychological of human neural-mental activity. form of a discussion and a symbolic mblies," which concentrate on the ing and expression. I posit an intuition and (neural] "cerebral

and "cerebral fission". Expression ific representations of knowledge. Both the theory and model describe and depict some of the

processes involved in these two modes of mental activity.

brain

My thesis is introspective to the extent that it is founded

on my personal and professional experiences in the arts and the sciences. Also, it is based upon my own views and methods of representing neuropsychological processes. The investigations presented here are ideas and images towards a theory proper as opposed to being an opus of science. In discussing the nature of mental activity and the brain-mind relation, I consider the

views of others such as James (1890), Kohler (1947), Hebb (1949), Bunge (1980), and Bindra (1980). This discussion serves to

elucidate "Thought Assemblies" which explores the organically structured nature (the architectonics) of human systems.

Thesis Supervisor: Stanford Anderson

Title: Professor of History and Architecture Thesis Supervisor: Stephan Chorover

I dedicate this book to my family.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost I wish to thank Professor Stanford Anderson of the Department of Architecture, co-chairman of my

interdisciplinary studies, for helping me structure my program and for allowing me the latitude to research my subject as I deemed necessary. His guidance, together with the other members

of my ad hoc committee, - Professor Stephan Chorover of the

Department of Psychology at M.I.T., Professor James Ackerman of the Department of Fine Arts at Harvard University, Dr. Eric Schwartz of the Brain Research Laboratory at New York University Medical Center, and Otto Piene, Director of the

Center for Advanced Visual Studies - has made my work at

M.I.T. truly a privilege.

I am most grateful to Stephan Chorover whose sensitivity towards my work and perspicacity has not only provided radiant constructive criticisms, but he has stimulated me to develop new methods of interrelating disciplines and articulating these interrelations. Though he may not share all my points of view, he has nonetheless helped me to define my perspective, encouraging me to explore my questions and their implications. His open-mindedness, sense of humanity, and model as a teacher has secured my faith in the power of productive (creative) thinking in the field education.

I wish to extend my appreciation to Dr. Walle Nauta and

Dr. Gerry Schneider of

at M.I.T. whose persona (and their interactions me. Both scientists are flexibility of mind to experience. The opportu human neuroanatomy and artistic and scientific

inspired me.

the Fleischmann Center for Neurosciences

1 conversations on arts and humanities

with the sciences) were invaluable to exemplars of educators who possess the make the process of learning a great nity to attend Dr. Nauta's lectures on to observe his virtuosity (in combining

insight) in this subject has profoundly I would like to mention her

the Ronald Feldman Fine Arts Gal continual support of my artwork been crucial for both my artisti well, James Ackerman's views on

(and the integration of the arts the development of my methods of Finally, I want to thank Dr posed the seemingly simple quest "Physically, what is a thought?" provided some important insights neuropsychological implications) in the form of a symbolic model.

e Ronald Feldman, Director of lery in New York. His

over the last six years has c and personal growth. As

the union of art and life

and sciences) contributed to

inquiry in a major way. Jerry Lettvin who first

ion to me six years ago

-- and Dr. Eric Schwartz who

into this question (and its helping me frame my answer

iv

The ideas and artwork presented in this dissertation originated from my research in the Masters of Science

in Visual Studies Program at the Center for Advanced Visual Studies at M.I.T. The freedom of exploration I was permitted under direction of Otto Piene has been critical to all my efforts. Moreover, the projects undertaken as a Research

Affiliate at this institute - involving scientists,

mathematicians, philosophers, scholars, engineers, and

artists - has helped my work and thinking move beyond the

traditional boundaries. This has been a long-needed,

long-desired complement to the nurturance and collaborative spirit I have enjoyed in the artworld.

To my friends cited here I, once again, express my

gratitude for allowing me the freedom to challenge myself in pursuit of my studies. This is perhaps the most powerful

agent in the realization of any dream - this applied freedom

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTERS Pages

I. Three Views on the Brain-Mind Relation...1-20

1. Monism

2. Psychophysical Dualism

3. Mirror Reflectionism (a monist-dualist construct)

II. A Theory of Thought...21-73

A. "cerebral fusion": merging of brain processes;

intuition or insight-perception

B. "cerebral fission": splitting of brain processes; analytical reasoning and expression

C. Evaluation of the Theory and its Implications

III. Symbolic Model of Neuropsychological Processes...74-155

A. "Thought Assemblies"

1. visualization of the interactions of intuitive and

analytical thought processes

B. Concepts on the Ways and Means of Thought Explored in

"Thought Assemblies"

1. physiological and psychological definitions

2. philosophical and artistic descriptions

C. Overview: Architectonics of "Thought Assemblies"

REFERENCES...156-158

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Architecture and Art...159-163 Brain Sciences...163-170 Literature and Philosophy...170-179

BORN: Long Island, New York, 1953

EDUCATION:

1983- Graduate study towards Ph.D in Interdisciplinary

1986 Studies in Psychology and Art, Department of

Architecture, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts

1981 Master of Science in Visual Studies, M.I.T.

1975 Bachelor of Arts, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine

APPOINTMENTS:

1981- Research Fellow, Center for Advanced Visual Studies,

1983 M.I.T.

AWARDS AND PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

1985- Fulbright Fellowship to India

1986

1984 Innovative Design Fund Award/ National Endowment for

the Arts

1984 Invention: "Textile Machinery and Process for Producing

Design Patterns on Materials," M.I.T. Patent Case #3922

1983 Council for the Arts, M.I.T.

1979 Seed Grant, Council for the Arts. M.I.T.

1979 Created designs for a new line of linens (called

"High Tech") for the Martex Textile Company, New York

1975- I.B.M. Thomas J. Watson Fellowship to Paris, France

1976

1973 Invention: "Artists' Canvas Stretching Device,"

U.S. Patent No. 4,190,974

1972 The William Zorach Painting Scholarship to the

Skowhegan School of Painting and Sculpture, Skowhegan, Maine

ONE-PERSON EXHIBITIONS: (partial list)

1986 "Sive-sive" ("This as well as that"), Centre Saidye

Bronfman, Montreal, Canada

1985 "Mind" Installation, Galerie Noctuelle, Montreal,

Canada

1983 "Book Forms", Gallery Takagi, Nagoya, Japan

1983 "Thoughts/ Thought Assemblies", Ronald Feldman Fine Arts

Gallery, New York City

1983 "Insights and Explorations", Compton Gallery, M.I.T.

1982 "Cerebreactors", Galerie France Morin, Montreal

1982 "Book Forms", The M.I.T. Museum and Historical

Collections, Cambridge, Massachusetts

1981 "Inquiries Into The Biomirror", Ronald Feldman Fine Arts

viii

GROUP EXHIBITIONS: (partial list)

1985 "Brainworks", Municipal Art Gallery, Los Angeles,

California

1985 "Brainworks", Festival 'Steirischer Herbst', Graz, Austria

1985 "San Paulo Biennale," Brazil, South America

1985 Hokin Gallery, Miami, Florida

1984 "Philosophies on the Art Process", Caidoz in Makkom,

Amsterdam

1984 "The Year One: 1984-2001", The Chrysler Museum, Norfolk,

Virginia

1984 "Politics in Art", Queensboro Community College/ The City

University of New York

1983 "Connections: Science Into Art", Summit Art Center,

Summit, New Jersey

1983 "1984 - A Preview", Ronald Feldman Fine Arts Gallery

in conjunction with The Village Voice, New York City

1983 "The New Culture", Center for Peace Through Culture,

Toronto, Canada

1982 "Alea(s)", Musee D'Art Moderne De La Ville De Paris,

A.R.C.2, Paris, France

1982 "Revolutions Per Minute (The Art Record)" produced by

Ronald Feldman Fine Arts and the Greene Street Recording Studio, New York City; art works and record presented at the following galleries and museums:

The Tate Gallery, London, England

Galerie Ursala Block, Berlin/ Documenta Biennale De Paris, France

The Basement Group, Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Bluecoat Gallery, Liverpool, England

1982 "War Games" and "The Atomic Salon", Ronald Feldman Fine

Arts Gallery in conjunction with The Village Voice,

New York City

1982 "Anti-Apocalypse: Artists Respond to the Nuclear Peril",

The William Paterson College of New Jersey, Wayne,

New Jersey

1982 "Sky Art Conference", Center for Advanced Visual Studies,

Ars Electronica im Rahmen des Internationalen Brucknerfestes Linz, Austria and Munich, Germany

1982 "Drawing New Directions", Summit Art Center, Summit,

New Jersey

1981 "Collaborations One", Connecticut College Museum,

New London, Connecticut

1981 "Schemes: A Decade of Installation Drawings", Elise

Meyer Gallery, New York City; national traveling exhibition

1980 "Imaginary Voyages", Bronx Museum, New York

1979- "Reality of Illusion"; national traveling exhibition

1978 O.K. Harris Gallery, New York City

1975 The Norton Museum of Art, West Palm Beach, Florida

1972 Colby College Museum, Waterville, Maine (The William

Zorach Painting Scholarship) PUBLICATIONS:

1985 "Neurocosmology: Ideas and Images Towards An

Art-Science-Technology Synthesis" in LEONARDO Journal, Vol.18, No.1,

pp.1-10; Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press.

1984 Photographs of my artworks published in P. Freeman,

E. Himmel, E. Pavese, and A. Yarowsky (eds.) NEWART. (pp.172-174). New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc.

1983 The Biomirror. New York: Pilgram Press.

1982 Article entitled "Thought Assemblies" in ALEA, numero 3,

pp.80-85. Paris: Christian Bourgois Editeur.

1982 Gates of Freedom: A PassoverHa2gadat by Chaim Stern

with visual interpretations by Todd Siler. New York: New Star Press.

1982 Think Twice (a monologue on the brain processes of

"cerebral fusion" - intuition and "cerebral

fission"-analytic reason) in Revolutions Per Minute (The Art Record), released by Ronald Feldman Fine Arts Inc.

1981 Cerebreactors. Hartford: Bond Press.

REVIEWS AND ARTICLES: (selected)

1985 Photographs and text on artwork titled "Cerebrarium"

(working model of the human brain) published in a book

by Jurgen Claus Chigp2pKUNST. Berlin West: Verlag

Ullstein GMBH

1985 "Where Art And Medicine Meet", MD Publications (February);

article by Marguerite Feitlowitz (pp.65-78)

1984 "Art And Orwell", Port Folio, Vol.I, No.28 (February);

review of Chrysler Museum Exhibition "The Year One:

1984 - 2001" by Linda McGreevy

1984 "Chrysler exhibit large on symbolism", Yirginian-Pilot_&

Ltdggr-Star (February); review of Chrysler Museum Exhibition by Teresa Annas

1984 "Helping Designers Build Protypes", The New YorkTimes,

Thursday, January 26; by Angela Taylor

1984 "Todd Siler at Ronald Feldman", Express Magazine (Winter);

review by Cyril Christo

1983 "Review: Todd Siler/ Ronald Feldman Fine Arts", Arts

by Ellen Handy

1983 "Todd Siler/ Ronald Feldman", ARTnews Magazine (December)

1983 "1983-1984 Annual Guide To Galleries Museums Artists",

Art in America Magazine (Sourcebook to the U.S. Artworld),

x

1983 "The Atomic Salon", DOMUS Magazine (review of Ronald

Feldman Fine Arts "The Atomic Salon" Exhibition - 1982)

1983 Who's Who In American Art, Edited & Compiled by Jaques

Cattell Press, Temple, Arizona

1983 "Artist Finds 'Cerebral Fusion' During Moment of Intuition"

Tech Talk (M.I.T. Newspaper - September 28); article by

China Altman

1983 "ARTLIT" - Amy Blumental Looks At A Renaissance In

Thought", United Press International (UPI)

1983 "Exhibit by M.I.T. Artist Shows Brain Processes",

The Hartford Courrier (October); Boston (UPI)

1982 "Exposition: Alea", Liberation (Mars 30); editorial

by Herve Gauville and review of ARC, Musee D'Art Moderne "ALEA(S)" Exhibition by Jean-Pierre Thibaudat

1982 "Alea(s): Onze artistes jettent un pont entre l'art et la

science", Latitude (Mai 7); review of "ALEA(S)" by Maiten Bouisset

1982 "Alea(s) au Musee D'Art Moderne: une partie de des entre

l'art et la science", Le Matin (Mars 23), Maiten Bouisset

1982 _{"Esthetique, machine et reve scientifique", Arts}

(Avriel 1); review of "ALEA(S)" by Anne Tronche

1982 ""ALEA(S)" a l'A.R.C.", Le Monde (Fevrier 4), review by

Genevieve Breerette

1982 "ALEAS"/ ARC - Musee D'Art Moderne", Les_Cahiers De La

1982 1982 1981 1981 1981

Peinture No.130 - Premiere Quinzaine (Mars); Claude Lorent

""War Games": Of Arms And Men", ARTnews Magazine; review of Ronald Feldman Fine Arts Exhibition by Jonathan Crary

"Painting - The Arts",

QMNI

article by Michael Schrage on my artwork "Cerebreactors" "The Brain as an Art Medium", DOMUS Magazine (Italy),

December Issue

"Todd Siler/ Galerie France Morin", Vaguard Magazine (December/ January); review by Martha Fleming

"Chronique Des Arts: Six expositions prospectives",

A Presse Journal, Montreal, Samedi 24, Octobre; review of

"Cerebreactors" Exhibition at Galerie France Morin by G.T. Artwork owned by various public and private collections.

-1-In this dissertation I present my theory of intuition

("cerebral fusion") and reasoning ("cerebral fission"). My

theory seeks to describe certain physiological interactions in the human brain as they may correspond to these two mental processes. More importantly, it questions some of the

distinc-tions traditionally made between the arts and sciences

-including those propounded by cerebral dominance studies. It thus provides a new interpretation of the interactions between synthetic and analytic thinking, positing relationships of parity between the pairs of all such dichotomies.

My thesis considers the mergence of brain processes (i.e.

the convergence of cognitive functions) in cerebral fusion. It suggests that intuitions are oriented toward neither art nor science; they inform both. They cannot be physically shown but can only be experienced. Conversely, analyses and expressions of knowledge are by convention either art or science; they are records of what is experienced by their producers. They include the spectrum of symbolization from mathematical logic to visual arts. My symbolic model ("Thought Assemblies") is one record or expression of my insights into the physical correlates and composition of both synthetic and analytic modes of mental activity.

The two parts that follow discuss the details of my theory of thought (Chapter II) and my symbolic model of neuropsycho-logical processes Chapter III). Chapter I is intended to define

(and thereby to justify rationally) the dialectical position from which I plan to speak. Moreover, since my ideas about mental processes and the brain-mind relation have been influ-enced by various classical and current views (see Table 1), a brief account of these views and their influence on my work

is also in order.

As any serious inquiry into neuropsychology soon reveals, knowledge of the brain entails entanglement in the

philosophic-al doctrines of monism and duphilosophic-alism [1]. Philosophies,

accordingly, have always played a critical role in shaping the course and scope of thought on mind-matter (i.e. "mind-brain," "mind-body") issues. Dualistic notions of immaterial

reality were common among the ancient Indians, Chinese,

Australian aborigines, and others [23. In due course, along

with early monistic notions of materialism (e.g. Epicurus, Hippocrates, Lucretius), these dualistic notions found their

way into the vocabularies and world-views of modern physical sciences [3] and philosophies [4]. Further to the point, the notions of monism and dualism continue to provide theoretical

constructs in the brain and behavioral sciences [5]. For

instance, Wilder Penfield's (1975) neurophysiological study of consciousness and the human brain is steeped in dualism as are John Eccles' (1953) descriptions of the neurophysiological basis of mind. By contrast, Dalbir Bindra's (1976)

-3-represents brain An

(or the physical)

Mon i sm

IDEALISM. PANPSYCNISM,

PRENOMENALISM:

Everything is . All is mental.

berkeley, Fichte, lecel,

Mach. James. Whitehead, Teilhard de Chardin

VEUTRAL WONISM,

DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY: and 3 are so many

aspects of a single

entity. Mental and physical manifestations

of unknown nentral

substance.

0

Spinoza, James. Russell,

Carnap. Sctlick, Feigl

ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM, IERAVIORISM: Nothing is . Mo mind at all. J.Z.Vatson, B.F.Skinner. A.Turing, R.Rorty, W.V.Oune REDUCTIVE MATERIALISM (PHYSICALISMI: k is physical. Epicurus, Lucretius, Bobbes, K.S.Lashley, J.J.C.Suart. D.ArmStrong P.Feyerabend EMERGENTIST MATERIALISM: is a set of emergent brain inctions.

Diderot. Darwin, G.Edelman,

T.C.Schneirla, D.Hebb. D.Bindra , V.Mountcastle REFLECTIONISM:

0 and lW are one &ad

the same thing.

and Y/ are so many

aspects or manfestations of a single entioy -mirror reflection T.Siler

I

(or the mental)

Dual ism

AUTOOMISM:

* and are independent.

L.Wittgensteain

- PARALLELISM or SYNCERONY.

PREESTABLISHED NARMONY:

and ₁/ are parallel or

synchronous.

Leibaiz, R.H.Lotze,

H.Jackson, som Gestaltists

EPIPEENOENALISM:

- affects or causes grain secretes aind.

T.E.Buxley, K.Vogt, C.D.Broad, A.J.Ayer, R.Puccetti ANIISM: -1V affects. cans., animates, or controls

Plato. Auqustine, Aquinas.

S.Freud. R.Sperry,

- .To4in

INTERACTIONISM: and interact. sin "basi" of mind

yet controlled by it.

Descartes, W.RcDougall. 'C.Eccles, K.R.Popper. J.argolis

RELECTIONISM:

lj/ mirrors or reflects

t

(literally and figuratively)

opposite and reverse the

properties of

S.Radhadkrishnan, B.Heimann.

J.A. Arguelles, Chuang-Tzu,

T.Siler

Table 1. Twelve views of the brain-mind relation (a modified

(1971) psychological investigation of the relations between

biological and cognitive processes are entrenched in materialistic monism.

My concept and philosophy of "reflectionism" considers

how the world of matter might "mirror" [6] the world of mind. Reflectionism regards the brain and mind, like matter and energy, to be identical, equivalent, and interchangeable [71; that is, they are two essentially complementary aspects of the same thing and process. The implication is: as the states of brain change so change the states of mind simultaneously. The concept of reflectionism introduces the idea that the "mirror" is the 'unknown neutral substance' (i.e.

relation-ship an dual me the dua the con us to s (materi (mental can be d process) (see

ntal and physical man listic descriptions o ceptual illusion that eparate the physical al) from the psychica

) (see Figure 1). The

explained away the mo

sees the human brain as only a

Table 1) which is responsible for the

ifestations. It points out that

f brain and mind processes set up

MIKLOt leads body 1 mind illusion ment one

3 lb. Fig. I Reflectionist dualism

-perceiving the brain and mind as

. 12 nd two separate but interdependent

omplex with 1 0 ne urons and 10 things. It is as if by introducing either a physical or an imaginary mirror we immediately create two

synapses/neuron. At the same time, separate worlds from one reality.

reflectionism recognizes (what Bunge (1979, 1980] is quick to emphasize) 'that the brain, as a system, is not identical

-5-with the set of its components... that it is endowed -5-with a structure (which includes the connections among its neurons) and an environment, not only a composition.. .and that it contains [mental] emergent properties, such as those of being able to perceive, feel, remember, imagine, will, think, and

others, which its cellular components lack' (p.8).

Like emergentist materialism, reflectionism has the

potential of becoming a theory proper, i.e. "a hypothetical-deductive system containing precisely formulated and detailed hypotheses accounting for a wide range of psychoneural facts" (Bunge, 1980, p.22). It may be thought of concomitantly as an edifying philosophy which relies on ordinary language as

opposed to the logico-mathematical language of the physical sciences. Each language and system of thinking has its

importance. In describing neuropsychological activity, reflectionism does not reify materialism, as for example, eliminative and reductive materialism do. Also, it does not

attempt to explain mental phenomena or to define the mental correlates of brain processes. Unlike emergentist materialism which proposes that "mental states form a subset of brain states" (Bunge, 1980, p.24), reflectionism maintains that mental states may be more than a 'subset' of brain states; that is, they may form a set of the state of the whole human organism. This overall state is different from and greater than the exteroceptive and interoceptive stimuli of the

organism (which includes its interactions with the immediate environment). What is more, reflectionism concludes that in so far as a complete [scientific] description of the nature of thought is or could be attainable, such a description must

implicate every level of material reality - from nucleons to

molecules to cellular systems to societies. Every level and aspect of the human organism (and not just the nervous system) must somehow be factored into the mental process of thinking

(imagining, knowing, understanding or learning), feeling (sensing, emoting), and doing (making, creating) [8].

It is to be remembered that for the mind to be the brain, all the abstract, ambiguous and undefinable properties of the mind must already (always) be present in the brain. That is, all the problematical, unquantifiable characteristics of mind

(or rather those we tend to associate with the 'nature of mind') must somehow be related to the workings of the brain.

If we cannot relate such things as aesthetic experiences and sensual feelings to the human brain then either our notions

of brain-processes, B, are too narrow or they grossly

undermine the nature of mental processes, A. I suspect that the more we try to match the nature of A with the nature of B, the larger or more inclusive will be the theoretical and empirical definitions of B (see Figure 2). Simply, our

notions of material and immaterial reality will become

concerning the 'fundamental differences' between animate and inanimate matter have been rendered indistinct by molecular biologists and solid state physicists researching the growth of crystals [9].

1 23456 7

P

B

Fig. 2 Bridging the 19th century dichotomy

between materialism, B. and spiritualism, A. science seeks to relate the events, states, and structures of brain to those of mind

-thus relating two differen geometries of

of our notions of and .

In this direction, the scientific and philosophical inquiries into the distinction between brain/mind processes and material/immaterial reality will be transformed by the realization that these terms are referring to two different

aspects of one and the same reality [10]. Any prima facie

evidence for the materiality (so-called "biological basis") of mind will also be evidence for the mind's ultimately

irreducible immateriality. It is not contradictory to say, then, that the new definitions will permanently suture up the Cartesian division between the material res extensa

('extended thing,' i.e. the body) and the immaterial res

cogitans ('thinking thing,' i.e. the mind) [11. I would imagine that they will also add new meaning to the dialectic

dialectic, the t'ai chi Yin-Yang dialectic, and the

traditional Indian Zero-concept dialectic [12)) that has wrestled our imaginations into a headlock since ancient

times [131. Where the concepts of complementarity, polarity,

and parity _{(together with the object-mirror-image relation)}

separate matter into 'two distinct worlds,' the new definitions will no doubt shift our attention to the union or intersection

of these worlds (see Figure 3) [14).

Fig. S Tracing the process of integration and separation

-from monism to dualism - in philosophies of brain and mind.

Reflectionism is a compound concept. It draws on aspects

of each of the other monist perspectives (with the exception of eliminative materialism), in establishing its viewpoint.

For example, it basically accepts the premise of idealism

-"everything is mind" - adding that the mind is identifiable

with everything and disassociated from nothing in that it [the human mind] is the medium through which the world and its contents is comprehended. To look at and discover, to imagine and interpret anything (or everything) implies that the comprehending and looking is being done by someone and

that his or her mind "touches and is touched by everything"[15].

Also, it mind are

accepts the notion of neutral monism - "brain and

-9-(i.e. "the mirror" - my note). Furthermore, it marginally

agrees with the view of reductive materialism - "mind is

physical" - adding that the mind is physical in so far as one

concurs with the tenet of the [brain-mind] identity theory. The general philosophy of reflectionism is derived from both Western and Eastern philosophies. The latter influence has a significant entailment. For one thing, it does not put a premium on scientific and technical precision. Moreover, it equally values purposeful ambiguity and paradox. In a dilemma, the number and variety of its strategies for approaching

brain (mind) questions are markedly larger and broader than those of most currently ongoing scientific research programs

[16]. Finally, skepticism and relativism abound in Eastern

philosophy. No one, single, definitive explanation or

explanatory model or perspective is presumed to exist, and diversity of models regarding the workings of the mind are not unwelcome. All humans truly have are notions (general

impressions and hunches) and concepts which we nurture and groom to become theories. Moreover, attempting to predict where these theories will lead is similar to forecasting the direction and fate of winds and clouds. These remarks aside, I do believe that eventually neurophysiology may define brain

processes in the following way:

"Organism b feels pleasure of kind

K=4f. Subcortical system s of

organism b, under stimulation by events occurring in c (another

neural system, or sense organ...) fires according to pattern p" (Bunge, 1980, p.13).

The problem with this definition of Bunge's should be obvious. To hypothesize about the subtle variations of the human

neurochemical-electral system and its "cerebral language" (using our present state-of-the-art) is a bit like trying to tether of unkn cannot Minsky, a pup-tent in own variables share the opt 1974; Bindra

a hurricane of inform

is staggeringly great

mism of Sellars, 1965

1980; among others)

is a case of ignotum perignotius ("th the still more unknown"). The number techniques, and experimental strategi (or at least coordinated) to form one study is overwhelmingly large. What i networking of information that would ting the findings of such an enterpri

of subdisciplines) is immensely compl

It should be self-evident that a approach to the thought process is a view of the late psychologist Donald that "thought must be known as theore knows the atom"...that "physiological part systems...but a further fundamen

e of m S be se a unkn dis tha ulti more req (gi

tion. The number

(so great that I Bogen, 1969; 17]. Simply, it own explained by ciplines, research t must be integrated -interdisciplinary , the kind of uired in

communica-ven the labyrinth icated.

strictly physiological cul de sac. I share the Hebb (1980) who says tically as a chemist

methods can deal with tal feature is missing, namely, how these part systems are coordinated in the

ordinary behavior of the intact unaesthetized animal" (p.80).

;

-11-Understanding this whole-part relationship is essential if one is to learn about the nature of thought processes (e.g.

insight-perception, reasoning and expression).

To summarize: reflectionism explores the notion that the brain-mind reality is one (multifarious) process. It examines the implications of this notion with respect to the thought process. It employs the various perspectives (specified in Table 1) in this exploration, using the plane mirror as both a model and metaphor for describing states of brain (and mind). According to the application and context of my mirror concept, one may perceive it as either a mechanical [inorganic] device

or an "amorphous principle" and philosophy [18]. Either way,

I think it demonstrates why we need both types of philosophies (those with and without mirrors) [191, emphasizing the fact

that with the mirror we split reality - thus creating the

mimetic relation of the actual object and its virtual image, the subject. Without the mirror we fuse reality integrating these two realities, i.e. the worlds of the object, observer, and the subject, observed. The former philosophy represents the 'systematic' dualistic tendency (see Figure 1); whereas, the latter represents the 'systemic' monistic tendency (see Figure 3). My contention is that both of these philosophies are necessary for comprehending the nebulous nature of mind and thought through the dialectic perspective.

CHAPTER 1 NOTES

1. The doctrine of monism states that there is only one ultimate

"substance" or "principle" which may be physical (matter) or nonphysical (mind) or something other than these things; also, reality is considered as a whole without autonomous parts. Read S. Radhakrishnan and C.A. Moore (ed.) A Source Book In

IndianPhilo sghX, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1957).

Cf. the doctrine of dualism holds that the world (the

universe, nature, life, etc.) is composed of both matter and nonmatter or mind. For a sensitive account of the mind-body

(matter-mind) relation, read Jack H. Ornstein, The Mind and the Brain (Netherlands: Martinu

Chapter 1: "Descartes - The Min

"The Physical and the Mental";

Theory of Mind"; read also, Sid

A symposium (New York: New York Cf. pluralism maintains that

multitude of "ultimate principl Physical Work of The Greeks (Tr Dagut.) (London: Routledge & Ke "The World of The Atom," pp.105

The literature on this topic

presenting a variety of analyse for example: Blanshard (1955); Corning (1968); Hess (1968); Bo Harman (1973); Ornstein (1974); Zangwill (1976); Uttal (1978); Bunge (1980); Fodor (1983).

s Nijhoff, The Hague, 1972),

d and the Body"; Chapter V:

and Chapter VI: "A Multi-Aspect ney Hook, Dimensions of Mind;

University Press, 1960).

reality consists of a

es." Read S. Sambursky, The

anslated from the Hebrew by M.

gan Paul, 1963); Chapter V:

-131.

is particularly expansive, s and interpretations; note, Feigl (1958); Quinton (1965); rst (1970); Grene (1971);

Balasubrahmanian (1976); Jusczyk (1980); Cohen (1980);

2. Ancient Greek mythology and, for example, Ionian cosmogony, are redolent of dualism, i.e. notions of immateriality and and spiritualism. Consider Plato's mythical Timaeus which

describes how the "soul is prior to body" and how "the world's body is fitted to its soul." Read Milton K. Munitz (ed.)

Theories of the Universe; From Babylonian myth to modern science (New York: Free Press, 1957), pp.21-31; pp.67-88.

3. I call your attention to the dualistic vocabulary in P.A

Buser and A. Rougeul-Buser Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience (North-Holland and New York, 1977) and W. Penfield The Mystery of the Mind (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975); the dualistic perspective in J.C.

Eccles TheNe urohyiological Basis ofMind (Oxford: Clarendon

1953) and in K.R. Popper and J.C. Eccles The Self and Its Brain

(Springer International, 1977); also, note the presence of the dualistic world-view in R.W. Sperry "Mental phenomena as causal determinants in brain function." In G.C. Globus, G.

-13-Maxwell, and I. Savodnik (eds.) Consciousness and the Brain:

A Scientific and PhilosophicalInguiry (New York: Plenum

Press, 1976): cf. the monistic perspective in E.R. Kandel and

J.H. Schwartz (eds.) Principles of Neural Science (New York:

Elsevier/North-Holland, 1981) and E.L Schwartz "Computational anatomy and functional architecture of striate cortex: A

spatial mapping approach to perceptual coding" (Vision Research 20, 1980).

4. Note especially the dualism of L. Dewitt's "Consciousness, mind, self: The implications of split-brain studies" (Brit.

J. for Phil. Sci._27, 1975) and R. Ziedins's

"Identifica-tion of characteristics of mental events with characteristics of brain events" (Am._Phil. Q._8, 1971).

5. Some major 'buildings' (important theories of the mid-19th

-20th century) in the neurosciences and psychology include: Weber and Fechner's (1860) psychophysical theory; James's

(1890) explanations of psychological processes; Freud's

(1895) interpretation of dreams; Watson's (1920) behaviorist

theory; Kohler and Wertheimer's (1947) Gestalt theory; Hebb's (1949) cell-assembly theory; Lashley's (1949) mass action or equipotentiality theory; Cajal's (1954) neuron theory;

Chomsky's (1965) syntactic langauge and computational psychology theory; Paivio's (1971) dual-coding theory of imagery and verbal processing; Sperry's (1969) and Kinsbourne's (1974)

knowledge _{lateral ity or cerebral}

dominance research in commissurotomy; Gibson's (1950), Luria's (1966), and Kosslyn's (1980) componential analysis theory of visual n ni m d-ti -al-s m

car.y.at.d _{nl. caeyaftdes} (kar'Eat'tdt) n.. p. -ds. -t-o.,. .j . a percept ion and spat ial

< Gr. ka,,aides. prte Seseso e ap or PtN

the temple of Diana at Kartzo nMacedonia) _{cognition; Regan's}

£ uporting columrn *hat hao the rorm of a

73~. femakefcurewhich represents Nature. (1972) and Davidson's

(1978) evoked-potentials

(or brain potentials) research, to name a handful. Each of these theories is founded on either monist or dualist views.

6. _{I am not using the term "mirrors" or "reflects" in the same}

way the 17th century systematic philosophers used the term to denote Isabella's "Glassy Essence" or Locke's "mind as

mirror" which reflects reality (Rorty, 1979). Instead, the term connotes identicalness or equivalency as in the

relationship between mass and energy (note the connotation of reflectionist dualism, Table 1). To be clear, my mirror

conception is not based on the notions of Platonists,

Kantians, positivists or other analytical philosophers who maintained that "our chief task is to mirror accurately... the universe around us" (Rorty, 1979, p.357). Nor is it based on the complementary notion of Democritus and Descartes, for example, "that the universe is made up of very simple, clearly and distinctly knowable things, knowledge of whose essences provides the master-vocabulary which permits

commensuration of all discourses" (p.357). As if the purpose of the mirror was to "reflect" these 'simple things,' thus revealing the "foundations of knowledge" while bringing us closer to a "theory of representation."

7. According to psychoneural identity theory "every mental state

(or event or process) is a state (or event or process) of the central nervous system (or part of it)" (Bunge, 1980, p.6). An important variation (and extension) of this definition is emergentist materialism. As Bunge explains:

"The emergence claimed for the mental is double: the mental properties of a central nervous system (CNS) are not possessed by its cellular components but are 'systemic properties' and moreover, non-resultant ones; and they have emerged 'at some point in time' in the course of a long biotic evolutionary process...Consequently, although

physics and chemistry are necessary to explain CNS functions, they are insufficient. Nor does general biology suffice: we need to know the specific

emergent properties and laws of the CNS, not only those it shares with other subsystems of the

animal, such as the cardiovascular and the digestive systems." By contrast, "reductive

materialism ... holds that the brain is nothing but an aggregate of cells, so that knowing the latter

is not only necessary but also sufficient for

knowing the former and thus explaining the mental"

(pp.6,8).

What I would like to emphasize here is that the brain is indeed a "multilevel system." So depending on which level one wants to describe or hypothesize the functions of the CNS, one can employ the reductionist-physicist line of thinking and say something meaningful (albeit, limited) about the

the brain's quantum reality. Or one can follow the emergentist-physiologist line of thinking and say something meaningful

-15-is, no one definitive theory or explanatory model reveals the

whole "Truth" or that tells the whole story. Each theory

-with its systematized assumptions, tests and experimental

results - must be looked at as a piece of an ever changing

puzzle, where the evolution of brain processes marks the evolution of some aspect of human behavior and some advance-ment in our understanding of the behavior of humankind.

8. The expression thinking-feeling-doing is Stephan Chorover's (1982) interpretation of the integrative nature and

multi-level system of the brain (from personal conversation). These three words linked together represent the interrelation and

integration of the Cortical-Limbic-Brain stem systems. The advantage of this scheme is that it does not set 'exclusive' boundaries between one region and another; instead, it recog-nizes the free exchange and flux of information within the

human nervous system - using the semi-permeable membrane as a

model for the neurobiological reality of cerebral processes. Chorover's view is expressly formulated in the following chart.

Organism Person

I

(biological) (individual) (sociological) CORTEX Thoughts Beliefs

(cognition)

LIHBIC _Feelings

Values SYSTEM (affect)

CORE Acting Practices (Brain stem) (doing)

The dotted lines imply that there are extensive conceptual transformations of each of these entities which involves the interpenetration of their respective anatomical boundaries. Chorover's diagram also suggests that the association,

auditory, cerebellar, motor, and visual cortices - despite

their different locations in the human cerebrum - all share

common means (i.e. pathways) for communicating with one another. Whether this communication involves the short or long association fibers in the neocortex of the temporal, occipital, parietal, or frontal lobes, or whether it involves the comtact with the deeper allocortex (or archicortex) of the hippocampus (in the Limbic system), the physiological and anatomical fact remains that they do communicate via their labyrinthine neuronal connections. This means that when the afferent fibers from the entorhinal region (in the lower

portion of the Limbic system) "speak," various higher regions of the neocortex "listen" and respond.

9. Regarding the nondistinction between animate and inanimate

matter, I quote the following passage from an article by Harold J. Morowitz which appeared in TheNew York Times

(June 23, 1980). The Yale psychologist wrote that the U.S. Supreme Court Justices decided that in patent law no

distinction exists between the living and nonliving - that

is, between naturally occurring and non-naturally manufacture or composition of matter.

"Millennia of awe and respect for the special character of life, dating back to biblical times,

or before, are being discarded if that life has any

element of biological or genetic engineering in its

synthesis. The refusal to draw a sharp distinction between animate and inanimate matter is the

ultimate in reducing life to physics, a viewpoint that has been forcefully advocated with the

scientific community since the mid-1800's."

The ultimate dangers of this notion may involve a similar nondistinction between, for example, rational and irrational behavior. I believe this is what Morowitz feared most when he

said that the Court's decision in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty case tgoes beyond the confines of patent law and ultimately,

may find its way back to our view of humanity.'

10. In Bunge's (1980) history of the mind-body problem, we learn

of several contemporary philosophers who sensed this same single reference. For instance, the materialist Herbert Feigl who straddled between the notions of identity and neutral monism, felt that "no matter how much the concepts of psych-ology may differ from those of neurophysipsych-ology, they have the same referents. Moreover, he believed that a mere critical reflection upon the meanings of the terms 'physical' and

t

mental' should eventually solve the mind-body problem

(Feigl, 1960)."

Bunge objects to this view stating that "the various

languages employed to describe mental events - in particular,

Mentalese, Behaviorese, and Neurophysiologese - are not

mutually translatable on the whole. This is because their sentences do not express the same propositions."(p.94) I tend to side with Feigl on this matter.

11. For an in depth account of the implications of the Cartesian

interactionist dualism and/or mechanistic world-view, read Fritjof Capra's TurningPoint (New York: Simon & Schuster,

1982), Chapter 2.

Read also Paul Feyerabend (ed.) Mind, Matter,_andMethod (Minneapolis: University of Minesota Press, 1966).

-17-12. In Facets of Indian Thought (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), Betty Heimann writes: "The Zero-concept is not only a mathe-matical discovery, but was originally conceived as a symbol of Brahman and Nirvanam. Zero is not a single cipher, positive or negative (growth and decay) but the unifying point of

indifference and the matrix of the All and the None. Zero produces all figures, but it is itself not limited to certain value. It is "sunya," the primary or final reservoir of all single shapes and numbers (p.24).. .Zero is the transition-point between opposites, it symbolizes the true balance within divergent tendencies (p.97).. .Zero is the falling-together of all numbers... the sum of all numbers, positive and negative combined." (p.112)

R. Balasubrahmanian writes (in Advaita Vedanta [Madras:

Centre for Advanced Studiy in Philosophy, University of Madras,

19761, pp.116, 117): "The Upanisad says that Brahman is 'one

only without a second.' The advocates of plurality argue that sruti speaks of the ultimate reality as one in the figurative and not in the real sense. On the basis of such an

interpreta-tion they argue that plurality is real.. .According to Advaita, oneness alone is real, and plurality, whenever mentioned, is

used figuratively. The world of plurality is not real as it

is dependent on maya"...and "our perception of plurality is

not real, but illusory."

My hope is that, with the coalescence of this thinking

and Western thought, there will emerge a "new vision"

(Moholy-Nagy, 1938) and a "philosophy in a new key" ,(Langer, 1963)

-one that will speak in terms of "inseparable relations" (Aprthak-saddht) and "relations of identity-in-difference" (Tadatmya). Perhaps this new philosophical view will deftly apply the Indian expression "not this, not that" (neti-neti) or "this as well as that" (Sive-sive).

13. The concept of the dialectic, like

reflection," has inspired, seduced, humankind throughout recorded histo (of the evolution) of this concept, What aspect(s) of "reflection" (the and repel us so? Is it the physical radiation and specular reflection (

the notion of "mirror

provoked and perplexed

ry. In reading the history one is bound to inquire: sis, antithesis?) attract characteristics of light-i.e. "speculative"

philosophy) that touches us or is it the metaphysical and metaphorical potentialities that move us?

In the case of mirror reflection, it seems strange that something as rigid and static as a plane mirror would be compared to something as flexible and dynamic as a human

mind. Apparently man's interest in the mirror lodged itself in his imagination long before his fascination with optics, in particular, his discovery of physiological optics (Helmholtz,

visual illusions in general (e.g. Mueller-Lyer figures, Hering illusion, Jastrow illusion, the "moon illusion,"

mirages, etc.) - have intrigued humankind. I suspect that man's

awareness of the reality of illusions prompted insights into the illusions of reality. Where the former relies primarily on visual perceptions, the latter relies on mental conceptions. At some point in our history we twisted and then connected

the ends of this awareness thus creating a Mobius strip (i.e. a topological melding) of perceptible and conceptual reality.

Hinduism and Buddhism seem to confirm this thought by saying: "Reality is one thing but the learned call it many things."

Once one has accepted this world-view - concerning the

connectedness of, for example, the perceptual and conceptual

process - no aspect of reality or nature or life is seen (and

believed) to be "problematic," "separate," and "unrelated." Neither the universals nor the particulars of matter and mind,

or mass and energy, are seen to be in opposition to "one another." Rather, "they" (I really mean the singular case) seem to fulfill their complementarity through unification.

Somehow, in the course of analyzing this 'unification' and the 'problematical' nature (of our

some Western philosophers such as believe that "a mentalist must be

understanding) of reality, Ryle (1949) were led to a dualist; in particular, that mentalism and materialism are mutually e

1975, p.4). I hope I have convinced my reader

of thinking leads to a dead end. In fact, it 'the mind's knowledge of the mind,' by thinki "exclusivity" and "either-or" (as in the Law Middle). History shows that Descartes, Locke,

members of the Western regime followed this 1

to its logical conclusion (Rorty, 1979).

xcl us that clearl ng in of the Kant, ine of ve" (Fodor, this route y confuses terms of Excluded and other thought

14. The simplest way to show this shift in perspective - from the

Cartesian-Newtonian world-view to holistic world-view - is by

relating, for example, the gist of the neural identity theory to the one-sided surface of a Mobius strip.

5

- x7-- 7,

The mirror plane as a Mobius strip.

We must credit this 'broadening of notions' and 'shift in perspective'largely to the research efforts of high-energy physicists (e.g. Bohr, Chew, Bohm, Kaluza) and cosmologists (e.g. Hawkings, Edelman) who are not just curiously

uncovering the mysteries of matter but who are curious about the human mind which is doing the 'uncovering,' i.e. making the discoveries. Although current textbooks on quantum

19-mechanics and nuclear physics still have not factored the influences of the mental processes into the observations,

measurements and related experimental techniques, some authors maintain that such references are inevitable (Capra, 1982; Wilber 1982).

One of the ramifications of this view involves correcting the 19th century notion (of Wundt's and of Avenarius's) that psychology deals with "immediate experience" while physics

deals only with experience "mediately" (Boring, 1962). The

psychologist Edwin Boring presents an interesting account of this issue in ThePhysical Dimensions of Consciousness (New York: Dover Publication, 1962):

"Avenarius's position is that there are two ways of regarding experience. Psychology...regards experience as dependent upon the experiencing

individual, whereas physics regards it as inde-pendent. Here we seem to have two coordinate points of view and to have avoided the derivation physics

from psychology. However, psychology has now become factually mediate. Experience, instead of being prior to physical entities, like the nervous system, is now held to be dependent upon the experiencing individual; and the experiencing

individual is, for all practical intents, the nervous system.

Thus we come out with a circle. Experience is the cognitive ground of those inferences which yield

the material of physics (Wundt). The brain is a physical entity. But the brain is actually the essential condition of experience" (pp.4,5).

15. I relate this stateme

statement: "The p

hold fast to is t

their appearance

redistribution of

self-same atoms w

now, jammed and t form our brains; understood, would to be caught and touched by everyt See Imag-ee 77, Brain Processes," oint hat are the hich e mpo and be nt to William James's (1890, p.46)

which as evolutionists we are bound to all the new forms of being that make really nothing more than results of the

original and unchanging materials. The

, chaotically dispersed, made the nebula,

rarily caught in peculiar positions, the 'evolution' of the brains, if

simply the account of how the atoms came jammed." In this sense, we touch on and are hing.

"A Lateral View of The Evolution of Human , 13. 16. On the (1953), (1970), subject of scientifi Popper (1957, 1965, among other scienti

c research programs, read Quine

1972), Kuhn (1959, 1970), Lakatos

17. On a similar note: one may recall that scientific definitions

of the laws of thought (to borrow George Boole's (1854] phrase) have proven to be as fragile and tenuous as the analytic techniques and experimental strategies used to define these neuronists neurons; e investigat 1929) and (intent on systems as Hebb, 1949 (i .g. ing "fi de a an

'laws.' Consider the research of: atomists or ntent on tracing ideation back to individual

McCulloch and Pitts, 1943), holists (intent o

the brain as a whole - "mass action" [Lashley

eld physics," [Kohler, 1947]) and systemists scribing the integrative functions of neural means to understanding thought processes; e.g.

d Bindra, 1976). Although many valuable

n

,

insights

and hypotheses have emerged from these studies, one is still left wondering what thought is. It appears as though we need some larger atomistic-holistic-systemistic approach for inte-grating the various schemes and data in a comprehensive way.

18. Heimann as the

without

(1964) refers to the "Brahman" in Indian philosophy amorphous principle, active within the potential the empirical facts and factors' (p.112). Although this reference does not exactly characterize my mirror concept, there are some curious similarities between this philosophical principle, which involves "transition,

transformation, and reflection," and my notion of the process of mirroring which resembles the synthetic actions of Brahman (instead of the actions of the plane mirror). "The Brahman," Heimann writes, "is not bound to such or such definition and

arbitration...It defies all prediction and discrimination. It is constant, and yet dynamically changing in visible

existence.. .It is in-divisible in its unity - even when

manifesting itself in the Universe through particles of its essence" (p.118)...Thus the sum of all [its] manifest forms comprises only a small, or even negligible, part of the

Whole" (p.119)

I regard the "Mirror" as Reality's ideal mechanism for penetrating Reality itself. The history of mathematics

illustrates brilliantly how one principle of mirroring

-namely, the equality sign - can be used forcefully to no ends

(e.g. mathematical induction - Dantzig, 1954).

19. For a discussion on "philosophy without mirrors," read Richard

Rorty, Philosogbyand The Mirror of Nature (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979). The author offers a cogent polemic against the 17th-century systematic

philosophers, pointing out the strengths of those Western "edifying" philosophers (such as [the early] Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Dewey, Sellars) who avoided what the author calls "the self-deception which comes from believing that we know ourselves by knowing a set of objective facts" (p.373).

-21-My theory of cerebral fusion ("intuition") and cerebral

fission ("reasoning") is an amalgam of theories: for example, theory of thought (Bruner, Goodnow, & Autin, 1956); productive thinking (Wertheimer,1959); cell-assemblies (Hebb, 1949, 1980);

imagination and creation (Kohler, 1947; Koestler, 1964);

intelligent behavior (Bindra, 1976); mindfulness (Edelman and Mountcastle, 1978); and stream of thought (James, 1890, 1910). What separates my conjectures from those authors are the

multitude of philosophical perspectives (some-contrasting) I maintain, as well as the way I express and conceptualize my

ideas through art. My visual conceptualizations of human

neuropsychological processes (e.g., "Thought Assemblies") are not cast in diagrammatic 'statement-picture' form (Rom Harre's

[1961] term); that is, they do not follow the conventional

procedures of scientific investigation and illustration. Instead they are abstract and suggestive (interpretive) rather than instructive (illustrative) or explanatory. My

theory has emerged from a phenomenological study of insight-perception and expression and not from experimental studies

(unless one considers the experiences upon which introspection is based).

In many respects, the writing and research presented here are ideas and images towards a theory proper as opposed

to being an opus of science. Moreover, my investigations are based on my introspective analyses [1] and the introspections

-23-of pr-23-ofessional artists, scientists, engineers, mathematicians, writers and scholars with whom I have been fortunate to work

in the last six years. In the course of my own investigations, I have reviewed reports of research in the neurosciences and psychology as a way of tempering my conjectures. For example,

in examining the details of my theory, I have reviewed some research which investigates the states of brain and cerebral functions: e.g., evoked-potentials (Regan, 1972; Bodis-Wollner,

1982), positron emission tomography (Heiss & Phelps, 1980),

nuclear magnetic resonance (Pieniadz, 1983; Tsai, 1983) and lateralization (Gazzaniga, 1972; Sperry, 1968a, 1969, 1976; Trevarthen, 1980). This fact aside, my thesis is philosophical and personal in so far as it considers my own views and

methods of researching and representing neuropsychological processes.

There are many different ways of describing human mental activity. Most observers would agree that there are many

different types or forms of thought (e.g. images and

propositions [Paivio, 1977]; "preperception" [James, 1890];

"perceptual inference" or "conscious conclusion" [Helmholtz,

1962]; problem-solving, insight, and productive thought

[Selz, 1927; Koffka, 1935; Wertheimer, 1945; Kohler, 1947; Osgood, 1953]). As well, there are many varieties of

expression (of feeling) (e.g. poetic, pictorial, and musical

My research concentrates only on two processes of thought [2]:

intuition (which I call "cerebral fusion") and reasoning (which I call "cerebral fission") (see Figure 4) [3].

CEREBRAL FUSION

merging of brain processes

...-.---.

_O0

object

CEREBRAL FISSION

splitting of brain

processes,-F i g . 4

brain

" 7

...

M

And

mind

Here reasoning includes both analytic and affective reasoning in artistic and scientific expressions (representations) of knowledge, experience, etc. Virtually every form or aspect of reasoning is represented in artistic expression including sequential, feature by feature reasoning (as in spatial cogni-tion) and emotional or affective reasoning (i.e. reasoning about and with emotions as in the discrimination of feelings).

The following drawings, notes and diagrams (Figures 5 - 10,

pp.25-31) are my interpretations of the physical basis and