The (In) Coherence of U.S. Foreign Policy in Colombia - RERO DOC

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(1)THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA?”. Thèse de doctorat Sous la direction du Professeur Jacques Forster. Présentée à l'Institut Universitaire d'Etudes de Développement de l'Université de Genève par. Vanessa Barclay Neumann (-Peat). Genève 2004.

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(3) TABLE OF CONTENTS. T ABLE. OF. C ONTENTS. Table of Contents .............................................................................................I Illustrations .................................................................................................... V List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ........................................................ VII Acknowledgments .........................................................................................IX Introduction Checkmate: A Policy Doomed to Failure ............................. 1 A. Main Criticism of Drug Control Policy .................................................................3 B. Main Questions ........................................................................................................5 C. Why Do Colombia and the Drug Issue Matter? ....................................................6 D. Methodological Considerations .............................................................................7 (1) Case Study: The Policy Cycle of the U.S. Aid Package to Plan Colombia, 1998-2000 .......... 7 (2) Hypotheses................................................................................................................................. 8. E. Outline of the Dissertation .....................................................................................9. Chapter 1 Colombia: Drugs, Violence and Democracy............................. 11 A. Background on Colombia ......................................................................................12 (1) Historical Context ................................................................................................................... 12 (2) Political and Sociological Context in the 1990s..................................................................... 13 (3) Broad Social and Economic Trends ........................................................................................ 17. B. Colombian Illicit Drug Industry...........................................................................19 (1) Evolution of Illicit Drug Trafficking in Colombia ................................................................. 19 (2) Political Economy of Drug Trafficking (Mainly Cocaine) .................................................... 25 (3) Estimates on Coca and Opium Poppy Cultivation and the Production of Cocaine and Heroin............................................................................................................................................ 30. C. Set of Interrelated Crises and "Ademocratic Governance" ................................36 (1) Crises in Governance .............................................................................................................. 36 (2) Armed Conflict, Main Actors and Link with Drug Trafficking ........................................... 41 (3) The Peace Process .................................................................................................................... 50. Appendices...................................................................................................................54. -I-.

(4) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA. Chapter 2 U.S. Drug Control Policy : The Weight of Narcotics on U.S. Colombian Relations .................................................................................... 61 A. U.S.-Colombian Relations: An Overview............................................................62 (1) The Early History - Highlights............................................................................................... 62 (2) Post-World War II (WWII) Era.............................................................................................. 64 (3) The Alliance for Progress ........................................................................................................ 65 (4) The Early Days of the "Narcotization" of U.S.-Colombian Relations.................................. 67. B. Weight of the Narcotics Issue on U.S.-Colombian Relations ............................69 (1) From 1982 to 1994: Apogee of the War on Drugs and Counternarcotics “Partnership”.... 69 (2) From 1994 to 1998: Reluctant Partners in the Drug War? Crises of Decertification ......... 74. C. Dimensions of the Drug Problem in the U.S. .......................................................78 (1) Broad Trends in Drug Use ..................................................................................................... 79 (2) Correlation Between Drug Use and the Purity Levels of Cocaine and Heroin and Market Prices? ........................................................................................................................................... 82 (3) Drug-Related Incarceration .................................................................................................... 83 (4) The “Treatment Gap” ............................................................................................................. 83. D. Origins of U.S. Drug Control Policy ....................................................................84 (1) The First Generation of U.S. Drug Control Policy................................................................ 84 (2) The Consolidation of the Drug War Under the Bush Administration ................................. 87 (3) The Perpetuation of the Drug War Under the Clinton Administration............................... 90. E. From 1998 to 2001: Hope for a New Partnership, Plan Colombia to the Rescue ......................................................................................................................................98 (1) U.S. Commercial and Financial Interests in Colombia ......................................................... 99 (2) New Era of Cooperation ........................................................................................................ 100 (3) Presenting Plan Colombia .................................................................................................... 100 (4) Overall Strategy and Components ....................................................................................... 103 (5) Budgetary Breakdown ........................................................................................................... 108. F. Plan Colombia: Main Critiques .......................................................................... 111 (1) Criticism of Plan Colombia’s Strategy ................................................................................. 111 (2) Problems Relating to the Lack of Resources and Financial Sustainability ......................... 113 (3) Repercussions ........................................................................................................................ 115 (4) U.S. Interventionism or “Neo-Imperialism”? ..................................................................... 117. Appendices................................................................................................................. 119. - II -.

(5) TABLE OF CONTENTS. Chapter 3 Theoretical Approach to Drug Policymaking........................ 123 A. Overview of Policymaking Models.................................................................... 125 (1) Rational Actor Model............................................................................................................ 125 (2) Alternative Decisionmaking Models .................................................................................... 126. B. Notion of Policy Coherence................................................................................. 133 (1) Defining Policy Coherence: Internal and External Coherence............................................ 134 (2) Why is Policy Coherence Important and For Whom? ......................................................... 136. C. Constraints in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking Models................................... 138 (1) Democracy as a Constraint?................................................................................................. 138 (2) Structure of the U.S. Government........................................................................................ 139 (3) The Policy Process as a Source of Policy Incoherence?........................................................ 140. D. The Policy Cycle Model....................................................................................... 141 (1) The Policy Cycle .................................................................................................................... 141 (2) Sharp's Comments on Kingdon's Model ............................................................................. 150 (3) Relevance of Kingdon's and Sharp's Frameworks............................................................... 151. E. Causes of Policy Incoherence .............................................................................. 152 (1) Domestic Breakdown Factors of the Policy Cycle ................................................................ 153 (2) External Factors and Actors ................................................................................................. 163. F. Main Hypotheses, Methodology and Synthetic Grid........................................ 165 (1) Main Hypotheses................................................................................................................... 165 (2) Methodological Approach: Some Considerations................................................................. 166 (3) Indicators Used in the Process Tracing................................................................................ 168 (4) Synthetic Grid for Analyzing the Drug Policy Process ...................................................... 168. Appendices................................................................................................................. 173. Chapter 4 Case Study : The Policy Process of Plan Colombia .............. 175 A. Plan Colombia’s Policy Process - Phase 1: August 1998-January 2000.......... 177 (1) The Colombian Government: Pastrana Administration...................................................... 177 (2) The U.S. Government: Executive Branch ............................................................................ 178 (3) The U.S. Government: Legislative Branch........................................................................... 181 (4) Analytical Remarks ............................................................................................................... 191. B. Phase 2: Agenda Setting in the U.S. Congress, From January 2000 to July 2000 .................................................................................................................................... 198 (1) The Legislative Branch: Republican Members and Senators............................................... 199 (2) The Legislative Branch: Democratic Members and Senators .............................................. 200 (3) Analytical Remarks ............................................................................................................... 204. Appendices................................................................................................................. 207. - III -.

(6) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA. Chapter 5 Plan Colombia: Multiple Causes of Policy Incoherence ..... 217 A. The Policy Cycle and Plan Colombia................................................................. 218 (1) Breach No. 1 Problem Definition / Problem Stream............................................................ 221 (2) Breach No. 2 Specification of Alternatives........................................................................... 231 (3) Breach No. 3 Evaluative Feedback Information Loop .......................................................... 238 (4) Comments on the Synthetic Grid ......................................................................................... 239. B. Drug Policy’s Lack of Effectiveness ................................................................... 243 (1) Evidence of Drug Policy’s Ineffectiveness and Inefficacy.................................................... 243 2) Problems in the Overall Approach......................................................................................... 259 3) Some Recommendations Regarding the Use of Indicators.................................................... 260. C. Domestic Politics ................................................................................................. 262 (1) Presidential Elections............................................................................................................ 263 (2) Congressional Politics of Drug Policy.................................................................................. 266 (3) Public Opinion on Drugs ..................................................................................................... 267 (4) Weight of Lobbying Groups .................................................................................................. 269 (5) Counternarcotics Bureaucratic Politics................................................................................ 273. D. Impact of External Factors / Actors ................................................................... 275 E. Concluding Remarks on the Policy Cycle .......................................................... 291 Appendices................................................................................................................. 295. Conclusion Reflections on Drug Policy Continuity and Alternatives . 307 A. Continuity in Drug Policy? ................................................................................. 307 B. Recommendations: Alternative Approaches ..................................................... 312 (1) Global Trends in Drug Trafficking and Illicit Drug Use.................................................... 312 (2) Some Recommendations........................................................................................................ 314 (3) The European Approach to The Drug Problem ................................................................... 318. References..................................................................................................... 323 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 323 Chapter 1.................................................................................................................... 325 Chapter 2.................................................................................................................... 329 Chapter 3.................................................................................................................... 335 Chapters 4 and 5........................................................................................................ 339 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 345. - IV -.

(7) ILLUSTRATIONS. I LLUSTRATIONS. Tables Table 1.1. Costs, Average Net Annual Income per Hectare (ha) and Harvesting Periods (Thousands of Colombian pesos): Department of Cauca, 1998 26. Table 1.2. Average Price of Coca, Cocaine Base, Opium Poppy and Heroin in U.S. dollars. Table 1.3. Average Price and Purity of Cocaine and Heroin in the United States in U.S. dollars 28. Table 1.4. Coca Cultivation (hectares), Seizures (metric tons) and Destruction of Laboratories in Colombia from 1990 to 2001 55. Table 1.5. Global Illicit Coca Cultivation and Cocaine Production, 1989-2001 and Cultivation of Opium Poppy in Latin America, 1989-2001 56. Table 1.6. Profile on the Main Structural and Economic Indicators for Colombia. 57. Table 1.7. Main Social and Human Development Indicators for Colombia. 58. Table 1.8. Colombia: Exports by Region of Destination and Imports by Region of Origin, from 1995 to 2000 59. Table 2.1. Trends in Selected Drug Use Indicators from 1979 to 1997, in Millions of Users. Table 2.2. Domestic Consumption of Cocaine, Heroin, Marijuana in Metric Tons, 1978-2000. 28. 80 81. Table 2.3. Average Price of Cocaine at Retail Level and Purity Level. 82. Table 2.4. Average Price of Heroin at Retail Level and Purity Level. 82. Table 2.5. Overall Breakdown of U.S. Aid to Plan Colombia. 110. Table 2.6. U.S. Assistance to Colombia 1999-2001. 110. Table 2.7. U.S. Assistance to Colombia, from FY 1981 to FY 1989 (US $ millions). 120. Table 2.8. U.S. Assistance to Colombia, from FY 1989 to FY 2001 (Obligations and Authorizations, US $ millions 121. Table 3.1. Main Indicators for the Synthetic Grid. 171. Table 3.2. Presenting the Synthetic Grid on Plan Colombia's Policy Process. 174. Table 4.1. Chronology of U.S. Legislation on Plan Colombia. 176. Table 5.1. Analytical Grid of the Drug Policy Process. 295. Figures Fig 1.1. Map of Colombia. 54. Fig. 2.1. Evolution of Federal Drug Control Funding, 1981-2001. 119. Fig. 3.1. The Policy Cycle. 173. -V-.

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(9) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS. L IST. OF. A BBREVIATIONS. AND. A CRONYMS. ACI. Andean Counterdrug Initiative. APTA. Andean Preferential Trade Agreement. APTEA. Andean Trade Preference Expansion Act. ARI. Andean Regional Initiative. AUC. Autodefensas Unidades de Colombia. FBI. Federal Bureau of Investigations. CIA. Central Intelligence Agency. CNP. Colombian National Police. COG. Colombian government. DEA. Drug Enforcement Agency. DHHS. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. DOD. U.S. Department of Defense. DOJ. U.S. Department of Justice. EMCDDA. European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction. ELN. Ejército de Liberación Nacional. EU. European Union. FARC. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia. FY. Fiscal Year. GAO. General Accounting Office. - VII -.

(10) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA. HA. Hectares. HCL. Hydrochloride cocaine. NGO. Non-governmental organization. NSC. National Security Council. OAS. Organization of American States. ONDCP. Office of the National Drug Control Policy. STATE. U.S. Department of State. UK. United Kingdom. UNDCP. United Nations Drug Control Program. UNODCCP. United Nations Office of Drug Control and Crime Prevention. UNDP. United Nations Development Program. USAID. United States Agency for International Development. USG. United States government. WIDA. Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act. - VIII -.

(11) ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. A CKNOWLEDGMENTS. This research was undertaken under the auspices of the Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED). The committee was composed of Professor Jacques Forster – IUED, University of Geneva -, Professor Bruce Bagley – Faculty of International Studies, University of Miami -, Professor Claude Auroi – IUED, University of Geneva -, Professor Paolo Urio – Faculty of Economy and Social Science, University of Geneva -, Jean-Pierre Gontard – IUED, University of Geneva. This research would not have been possible without the support of the Swiss National Science Foundation and the scholarship they granted me, which allowed me to go on several visits to Colombia and the United States. I owe much gratitude to the Director of the IUED, Professor Jean-Luc Maurer, for his support and confidence which enabled me to conduct my doctoral research. I am very grateful to my advisor, Professor Jacques Forster, for all of his support and commitment, during the past six years. Working with him was a very enriching experience, in terms of both academic and personal growth. I was privileged to work with Professor Bruce Bagley, during the last year of my research and I would like to thank him for his generosity, encouragement and insightful advice. I would like to thank Dr. Jennifer Milliken, whose astute guidance, during the first half of my research, helped me structure the dissertation and build an interesting theoretical framework. I would like to express my gratitude to my husband, Cédric, for his moral and logistic support, that gave me the courage and motivation to write my dissertation. Last, but not least, I would like to thank all of the persons (officials, professional and academic experts) I interviewed - in Colombia and the United States - for their candor and availability; they provided me with first-hand, invaluable information.. - IX -.

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(13) INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE. I NTRODUCTION C HECKMATE: A POLICY D OOMED TO F A I L U R E. “U.S. drug policy is flawed primarily in its extremism. A long-standing tradition of immoderate, unbalanced policy is the problem; and policy innovation is needed not in the sense of an explosion of new energy directed at the problem but in the sense of a major standing down from vociferous approaches to the problem”. Elaine Sharp1. During the past thirty years, the U.S. administration has waged a low-intensity war against illicit drug traffickers and crop growers in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, primarily against marijuana (during the 1970s) and cocaine production and trafficking. U.S. foreign policy towards Colombia has been driven by a plethora of political interests and motivations, increasingly tied to counternarcotics and national security, as exemplified by the U.S. aid package to Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative. From 1981 to 2002, the U.S. spent $237 billion on the Federal Drug Control Budget, including $87 billion since 1998, of which $14.9 billion for foreign interdiction and source country programs2. Which results has the U.S. achieved, having invested over $65 billion, since 1981, in the international drug war? Drug policy analysts unanimously agree that the United States’ showcase is nothing less than dismal, with blatant failures and counterproductive results. The drug war should have decreased the quantity of narcotics available on the street as well as raise their prices which - according to its inherent logic of supply reduction3 - should have reduced demand in the United States. By the same token, U.S. counternarcotics policy in South America has been aimed at drastically cutting down the production of cocaine and. 1. E. B. Sharp, The Dilemma of Drug Policy in the United States, 1994, p. 165. ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2003 Budget Summary, p. 9-10, February 2002.The annual Federal Drug Control Budget has consistently been on the rise, particularly over the last six years. Since 1998, funding for international drug control and interdiction programs has ranged from 14 percent to 21 percent of total Federal spending. Since this research examines U.S. foreign and anti-drug policies in Colombia, the focus is placed on international drug control, that is on the international facet of the war on drugs. It should also be noted that the Federal Drug Control Budget provides funding for both international and domestic drug control programs. 3 Supply reduction efforts seek to eliminate the production of illicit crops (coca, opium poppy and marijuana) and the manufacturing of the final product (cocaine, heroin, marijuana) in source and transit countries, in order to reduce drug availability in the United States, raise retail prices and reduce purity levels. These should in turn act as “disincentives” for drug users thereby reducing the domestic demand for illicit drugs. 2. -1-.

(14) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA the surface area of coca cultivation - the raw material for cocaine4. However, U.S. international drug control has neither succeeded in reducing the availability of cocaine nor in raising street prices, except in short-term periods, directly following interdiction events. Furthermore, the surface area of coca cultivation has doubled in Colombia since 1996. U.S. drug control efforts have always been grounded in the principle of supply reduction, according to which illicit drug consumption and availability in the United States should decrease, following a decline in the production of illicit crops (cutting supply at the source), in the supply of precursor chemicals, and/or a decline in the amount transiting through U.S. borders (through interdiction at the level of transit and source countries). International drug control was originally aimed at curtailing the flow of narcotics in the transit zone (in the Caribbean), particularly since President Bush instigated the war on drugs in 1989. As argued by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), interdiction has the potential to significantly alter the cocaine price structure as long as the funding levels for interdiction (as part of the international drug control components of U.S. drug policy) remain sufficiently high. However, funding was short-lived due to the Gulf War in 1990, leading to immediate cuts in interdiction operations in South America. Nevertheless U.S.-supply reduction5 efforts in the Andean region, aimed primarily at reducing the production and transportation of cocaine and, to a lesser degree, of heroin (since 1996), have failed to significantly: •. Decrease the surface areas of coca and poppy cultivation in Colombia (though coca cultivation has drastically decreased in Peru and Bolivia);. •. Decrease purity levels (according to the logic of supply reduction, traffickers should increasingly dilute the final product to raise margin profits);. •. Raise retail prices in the medium- and long-term (acting as an additional constraint for drug use).. The ultimate result should have been a decrease in the demand for, and consumption of, illicit narcotics in the United States. Nevertheless, the demand for cocaine has remained relatively stable throughout the 1990s.. 4. In addition to coca leaves, twenty-two precursor chemicals are used to produce hydrochloride cocaine (powder cocaine, HCL). 5 It should be mentioned that the supply/demand reduction ratio has remained stable since the early 1980s, averaging 60-65 percent to 40-35 percent. As defined by Robert Charles, supply reduction “consists essentially of drug interdiction efforts, coordinated by the Defense Department, U.S. Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Customs, State Department, U.S. Border Patrol, and other supporting law enforcement agencies”. R. Charles, “Back to the Future: The Collapse of National Drug Control Policy and a Blueprint for Revitalizing the Nation's Counternarcotics Effort”, 1996, p. 9.. -2-.

(15) INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE. A. Main Criticism of Drug Control Policy Many analysts and critics of U.S. anti-drug policy have talked of a quagmire6, making the allusion that U.S. officials are “knee deep in the mud” and cannot get themselves out of it. Why is it so difficult to curtail illicit drug trafficking, in particular the Colombian cocaine industry, and stem both production and demand? Among academics, independent researchers and experts, there is a widespread consensus with regards to the failure of U.S. international drug control, which they explain in terms of a panoply of factors ranging from: •. The policy’s inherent flawed logic and its imbalance between supply reduction and demand reduction7: “(…) Supply reduction on a meaningful scale is a lost cause”8;. •. The predominance of military assistance in contrast to economic assistance and alternative development – militarization of the war on drugs 9;. •. The fragmentation and poor coordination of policy implementation10;. •. Conflicting interests between, on the one hand, the Presidency and Executive branch and the drug control bureaucracy and on the other, between the Presidency and Congress (also tied to domestic politics);. •. Problems tied to insufficient funds and misallocation of counternarcotics assistance;. •. Unilateral and coercive approach of the United States in international drug control, mainly exemplified by the certification process11;. •. The lack of political will on behalf of Andean governments12;. 6. C. Youngers, “The Andean Quagmire: Rethinking U.S. drug control efforts in the Andes”, 1996, and D. Baum, Smoke and Mirrors, the War on Drugs and the Politics of Failure, 1997. 7 Supply reduction has produced what critics call the “balloon effect” or “hydra effects”, such as M. Falco, Rethinking U.S. International Drug Control: New Directions for U.S. Policy, 1997, E. Bertram [et al], Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial, 1996, K. Sharpe and E. Bertram, “Memo for the New Drug Czar”, 1996, C. Youngers, “The Andean Quagmire”, 1996 and P. Clawson-R. Lee III, The Andean Cocaine Industry, 1996. 8 S. Wisostsky, Beyond the War on Drugs: Overcoming a Failed Public Policy, 1998, p. 105. 9 See publications of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), “Going to the Source: Results and Prospects for the War on Drugs in the Andes”, 1991; C. Youngers, 1996, op. cit; C. Youngers, “The National Drug Control Strategy: A New Policy for the Andes?”, 1994; C. Youngers, “The War in the Andes: The Military Role in U.S. International Drug Policy”, 1990. 10 See E. Bertram [et al], Drug War Politics, The Price of Denial and B. Bagley, “Hablando Duro. La Política Internacional Antinárcoticos de los Estados Unidos en Los Años Noventa”, in J. Tokatlian, Ed., Colombia y Los Estados Unidos: Problemas y Perspectivas, 1998, B. M. Bagley, “U.S. Foreign policy and the War on Drugs: Analysis of a Policy Failure”, Summer/Fall 1988. 11 As explained by M. Falco and the Independent Task Force, op. cit., the certification process is a source of great inconsistency, in both its unequal treatment vis-à-vis producer and transit countries and in its repercussions on relations between the U.S. and these countries. 12 According to S. Wisostky and WOLA (C. Youngers, op. cit and K. Sharpe, op. cit), Andean governments have lacked the political will to “collaborate” with the U.S. due to strong internal opposition, problems tied to corruption and economic instability as well as the overall weakening of the State.. -3-.

(16) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA •. Fragmentation between international and domestic drug control programs13;. •. International drug control programs have had adverse, unintended effects in source countries, destabilizing their democratic development, by contributing to human rights abuses, ecological damage, and corruption.. “Reducing drug trafficking is just one of many important interests we share with our Latin American neighbors and should not be pursued in a way that undermines other important policy goals, such as promoting human rights and democracy throughout the hemisphere. These goals, including drug control objectives, can best be advanced by promoting economic development and strengthening civilian judicial and law enforcement institutions in Latin America”14.. There are nonetheless conservative critics of drug policy, such as Robert B. Charles, (former Staff Director and Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice, of the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight), who have criticized U.S. drug control policy for being too heavily focused on the domestic front - on demand reduction (aimed at providing drug abuse treatment for regular users rather than at preventing a rise in casual use, particularly among the youth), and for neglecting international and interdiction programs (particularly in the transit zone). Robert Charles argues that since the beginning of Clinton's first administration -since 1992the shift away from the transit zone in international programs, the sharp decline in Federal funding for interdiction and the focus on treatment programs for regular users (or “hardcore addicts”, in this case, the emphasis was placed on cocaine), have triggered an upsurge in domestic rates of youth drug use and violent crime15. Indeed, this argument is upheld today by high-ranking, Republican House members - who support international drug control programs (particularly in source countries, such as Colombia). The most important factors brought up by critics are the flawed logic of supply reduction, underlying all counternarcotics law enforcement operations, and the resulting militarization of country source programs, because they have caused the greatest harm in country programs. As denounced by numerous critics of U.S. international drug control (such as C. Youngers, K. Sharpe, S. Wisostky, E. Bertram, and J. Tokatlian), U.S. assistance has exacerbated tensions between, on the one hand, Andean governments - particularly between Colombian authorities – and the other, drug traffickers, guerrilla groups or illicit crop growers, thereby fueling drug-related violence and terrorism. Likewise, the U.S. has not behaved as a genuine friend or partner in helping them solve internal problems. On the contrary, the U.S. government has promoted the downfall of the State, particularly in Colombia, where democracy is jeopardized by internal strife among the State, influential 13. M. Falco, op. cit., p. 9. L. Freeman, WOLA, “A Guide for Citizen Action”, Executive Summary, 1999. 15 R. Charles, op. cit., p. 1. 14. -4-.

(17) INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE drug trafficking organizations, the paramilitary, and guerrilla groups (mainly by the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces - FARC. 16. ). It could be argued that the illicit drug. industry and U.S. military funds, equipment and training, have constituted additional resources to the illegal armed groups, involved in the armed conflict in Colombia. In sum, the shortcomings of U.S. drug policy, including international drug control policy in Colombia, can be attributed to a variety of explanations ranging from the dynamics of domestic and bureaucratic politics and Presidential and Congressional elections, to the incremental and fragmented nature of policymaking in the Executive branch and Congress and to the cognitive preferences of policymakers and elected officials regarding the drug issue (adherence to the dominant paradigm on counternarcotics, grounded in law enforcement and punitive action). Therefore, this research is conducted within the broader framework of domestic politics and analyzes U.S. policy in Plan Colombia according to the policy cycle model. Moreover, the decisionmaking processes of U.S. foreign and drug control policies towards Colombia have been influenced by a set of external factors and actors, ranging from the evolution of the situation in Colombia (regarding the illicit drug industry and security concerns), to the positions and interventions of the Colombian government, Colombian nongovernmental organizations and illegal armed groups, European countries and the European Union, and international financial institutions (World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank), regarding the drug issue and Colombia.. B. Main Questions •. Why has U.S. drug control policy (in general and particularly in Colombia) lacked efficacy and effectiveness, as demonstrated by the emergence of counterproductive results? Why have consecutive U.S. administrations - since President Nixon declared the war on drugs in 1971- continued to “push the bandwagon” of the drug war in light of such defeat, without ever calling into question the policy’s underlying logic, approach, and means of implementation?. •. To what extent can the policy cycle of drug control policy explain on the one hand, the lack of policy consistency or coherence and on the other, the continuity of drug policy over time?. 16. In Colombia, there is a strong correlation between the regions where new coca plants have been planted and the territory that has come under the control of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). According to the 1999 GAO report (op. cit., p. 8), two-thirds of FARC units and one-third of ELN units are implicated in drug trafficking, either by protecting small coca farmers or cocaineprocessing laboratories, or by providing support to drug-traffickers for cocaine storage and transport. However, the nature of the relationship between these guerrilla groups and paramilitary and drug-trafficking organizations remains unclear.. -5-.

(18) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA •. Which domestic and external factors contribute to a better understanding of drug policy’s inconsistencies and to what extent is drug policy a by-product of these factors?. •. What impact does domestic politics have on drug policy and its decisionmaking process?. •. How does bureaucratic politics affect the drug policy cycle and/or its inefficacy and ineffectiveness?. C. Why Do Colombia and the Drug Issue Matter? Understanding the dynamics of U.S. anti-drug policy, both on the domestic and international fronts, as well as the causes of its failures and inconsistencies, is a crucial issue for more reasons than one. First of all, since 1999, Colombia is the third most important recipient of U.S. foreign aid, following Israel and Egypt. On July 13, 2000, the Clinton administration passed a comprehensive aid package of $1.3 billion to Colombia over the following two years, of which $860 million was allocated to Colombia17. Thus, the coherence of U.S. international drug control in Colombia, over the past twenty years, is a particularly topical issue. Secondly, U.S. anti-drug policy is an interesting example of an intermestic policy (with domestic and international components), particularly since the drug frenzy around cocaine and crack use in the mid-1980s. Moreover, the U.S. war on drugs has been a “hot topic” in Presidential campaigns, namely those of Presidents George Bush and Clinton. It is therefore worthwhile to further explore the interaction between foreign and domestic affairs, by looking at the decisionmaking processes and diverse interests and stakes. Thirdly, U.S. foreign policy in Colombia, dominated by counternarcotics policy, has become an increasingly important issue since the end of the Cold War, in terms of U.S. strategic and security interests. Finally, illicit drug trafficking (mainly in cocaine, heroin and synthetic drugs) has become one of the main global problems to which the international community (comprised of states and non-state actors) is confronted. As the self-proclaimed leader of this community, it is the responsibility of the United States to help find a sustainable solution to illicit drug production and trafficking.. 17. This aid package represents the U.S. contribution to the: Plan Colombia for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State (the official version of Plan Colombia, submitted by President Pastrana in October 1999).. -6-.

(19) INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE. D. Methodological Considerations The formulation process of Plan Colombia is analyzed from the perspectives of the Colombian and U.S. administrations and focuses on the policy process in the United States. The latter is of particular interest for the purposes of this research because it highlights the strengths and weaknesses of the counternarcotics process. Moreover, the formulation process in Colombia was relatively short - with a limited number of participants - whereas in the United States, it was a fairly long process, involving actors in the Executive and Legislative branches as well as non-governmental sectors (namely interest groups), for a period exceeding two years. President Pastrana’s first version of Plan Colombia was proposed in 1998 whereas President Clinton’s version dates back to January 2000. Finally, President G.W. Bush proposed the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) in April 2001. The policy process of the U.S. aid package to Colombia is analyzed from August 1998 (inauguration of Colombian President Pastrana) until July 2000 (final adoption of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (for Plan Colombia).. (1) Case Study: The Policy Cycle of the U.S. Aid Package to Plan Colombia, 19982000 It is argued that the process tracing of U.S. antidrug policy illustrates that the counternarcotics policy cycle is dysfunctional, thereby explaining problems in coherence, effectiveness and efficiency. Moreover, drug control as an issue policy is an interesting and relevant case study for undertaking process tracing because the debate on the drug problem and policy agenda are made up of a broad array of items and has been receptive to changes in the political process and swings in public opinion since the mid-1980s. In addition, since drug policy is inherently intermestic, it is the by-product of a range of political dynamics and interests, stemming from domestic and bureaucratic politics. The case study is therefore placed within the broader theoretical context of domestic politics. The model used, for analyzing the counternarcotics policy process, is based on John Kingdon’s model of public policy making18, in a broader context of political pluralism. Kingdon defines public policy making as a set of processes, “including at least: (1) the setting of the agenda19, (2) the specification of alternatives from which a choice is to be made, (3) an. 18. J. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, 2nd ed., 1995. J. Kingdon, op. cit, 3. Kingdon defines the agenda as: “the list of subjects or problems to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time”. 19. -7-.

(20) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA authoritative choice among those specified alternatives, and (4) the implementation of the decision. Success in one process does not necessarily imply success in others”.20 The main method used consists in a qualitative analysis21 of the evolution of anti-drug policy and the debate on drug control in the United States since the 1980s. The policy cycle of counternarcotics policy is examined through the lens of a case study: the genesis of the U.S. aid package to Plan Colombia - the formulation process in the United States of Plan Colombia, 1998-2000. Most sources are drawn from interviews conducted in Washington, D.C., and Bogotá, Colombia, with policy actors in the Executive branch, Congress and non-governmental actors and academia (in the United States and Colombia) and from the examination of primary and secondary documents, policy papers, reports, Congressional testimonies and hearings, press articles, academic and advocacy papers.. (2) Hypotheses Hypothesis no. 1 U.S. foreign policy towards Colombia has been characterized by deep-rooted problems of policy incoherence, due to breaches in the policy cycle, at three junctures: at the phases of problem definition, the specification of alternatives and the evaluative feedback loop. Hypothesis no. 2 U.S. drug control policy, both generally, and in Colombia, has lacked effectiveness and efficacy, as demonstrated by poor performance and counterproductive results, due largely to the predominance of a repressive, punitive counternarcotics paradigm, within successive U.S. administrations since the early 1980s. Counternarcotics policy has thus been incapable of adapting itself to the nature and dynamics of the drug problem particularly in the case of Andean cocaine trafficking, in a way which would have enabled the U.S. government to reach positive results from the counternarcotics, economic and military assistance deployed in the Andean region.. 20. J. Kingdon, op. cit., p. 2-3. Most indicators are qualitative except those used for measuring the interests of actors/organizations in terms of the financial and human resources, tied to the aid package for Plan Colombia; or in terms of expanded authorities in their role to be played in the implementation of Plan Colombia. Qualitative indicators are used, as a means to identify key policy actors, dominant arguments used in coalition-building strategies and for following up on shifts in the debate and agenda setting of counternarcotics policy and Plan Colombia. 21. -8-.

(21) INTRODUCTION CHECKMATE: A POLICY DOOMED TO FAILURE Hypothesis no. 3 Counternarcotics policy is the byproduct of a range of interdependent factors stemming from domestic politics, namely: Presidential elections, Congressional elections, interest groups, public opinion, and bureaucratic politics. They constitute not only the principal elements which shape U.S. drug control policy but also the primary source of the lack of policy coherence. Hypothesis no. 4 External factors and actors also affected the counternarcotics policy process, though to a lesser degree than domestic politics. However, the unwillingness of the U.S. government to adapt counternarcotics policy to the evolving circumstances in Colombia (regarding Colombian and Andean illicit drug trafficking and the growing insecurity) and to allow international actors to play an active role in the policy process of Plan Colombia, further contributed to widening the breaches in the policy process. Notwithstanding, Colombia and European countries, coupled with nongovernmental actors and inter-governmental organizations, exerted some influence on Plan Colombia’s policy process.. E. Outline of the Dissertation This dissertation is comprised of five chapters in addition to the introduction and conclusion. In the first two chapters, general background information is provided on Colombia (Chapter 1), the main dynamics of U.S-Colombian relations and the evolution of U.S. drug control policy (Chapter 2). The theoretical framework is laid out in Chapter 3, focusing on policy coherence and decisionmaking models, with an emphasis on the policy cycle model. Chapters 4 and 5 are dedicated to the case study, the policy process of Plan Colombia. In Chapter 4, a narrative on the decisionmaking process, of the U.S. aid package to support Plan Colombia, is provided. The narrative on Plan Colombia is analyzed in Chapter 5, within the framework of the policy cycle model, and the hypotheses are tested against evidence drawn from the narrative and a synthetic grid of Plan Colombia’s policy process. Finally, Chapter 6 places the findings on Plan Colombia in a broader context, seeking to determine whether the United States’ support of Plan Colombia represents either a policy shift or continuity in counternarcotics policy and foreign policy towards Colombia. -9-.

(22) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA Moreover, alternative approaches to the drug problem are examined in the second part of Conclusion, with a view to bringing forth recommendations for raising the policy coherence of U.S. counternarcotics policy and for adopting a new paradigm for dealing with the drug issue.. - 10 -.

(23) CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY. C HAPTER 1 C OLOMBIA : DRUGS , VIOLENCE D EMOCRACY. AND. The background information on Colombia, provided in this chapter, is intentionally succinct, leaving out numerous details, particularly with regards to historical, political and institutional developments. Only the events and facts, relative to the historical, sociological and economic development, which are relevant for understanding the context in which Plan Colombia emerged, are mentioned. It is deemed that the emphasis should be placed on understanding the crises in Colombia which pushed the Colombian administration to search for a solution, namely by adopting Plan Colombia. These crises have primarily four dimensions: political (democratic governance), economic (widespread poverty and sharp economic recession), security (armed conflict), and drug trafficking. The impact of drug trafficking on the political, economic and security dimensions of Colombia, focusing on the armed conflict, is the central theme of this chapter. This chapter is divided into three broad sections. Part I provides general background information on the history of Colombia, on the political and sociological context as well as on the overall economic situation. In Part II the origins and structure of the illicit drug industry in Colombia are laid out, focusing on the Colombian cocaine industry and the political economy of drug trafficking. The principal indicators on coca cultivation and the production of cocaine, as well as the varying methodologies used, are also presented. The last section of this chapter is dedicated to exploring these crises, by focusing on two of these factors, which are the focal point of Plan Colombia: the armed conflict (and related peace process), and the links between the illegal armed groups and drug trafficking.. - 11 -.

(24) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA. A. Background on Colombia (1) Historical Context Colombia has traditionally been one of the oldest and most stable democracies in Latin America. Since its independence from Spain, July 20, 1810, there have been only 5 coups d'état in Colombia which is relatively little compared to other Latin American countries. Since 1910, Colombia has maintained a pluralist and multiparty democracy excluding the period from 1953 to 1957 (military dictatorship under general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla). Colombia underwent the most violent period in its history in the aftermath of World War II, following the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán (Liberal party leader), on April 9, 1948, which triggered intense civil strife, riots and political struggles between the two leading political parties. The confrontations between supporters of the Liberal and Conservative Parties turned into a bloody rural civil war22. This period of turmoil, which lasted five years, from 1948 to 1953, led to the death of over 200,000 people -which is why it is known as La Violencia. None can underestimate the legacy of La Violencia which set the stage for consolidating the culture of violence, inherent to Colombian society. The following quotation expresses this sentiment: “The history of Colombia,…, is the history of violence employed by some classes for the hegemonic conquest of power, and the occupation of the State, to the detriment of the rest of the strata”.23. The civil war ended with a five-year dictatorship, under General Rojas Pinilla (1953 to 1957). The establishment of a bipartite regime, the National Front, put an official end to this somber period in Colombian history, though it did not constitute a panacea. It was far from representing a sustainable and viable solution to Colombia's political and socio-economic ills. The National Front consisted in a repressive bipartite regime (Liberal and Conservative parties), in place from 1958 to 1974, which limited both personal liberties and the participation of popular parties and sectors in the management of public affairs. In 1958, both parties decided to create the Front by sharing control of the administration, alternating the Presidency, and by equally dividing up Congressional seats and ministerial positions.. 22. “Drugs, War and Democracy”, A Survey of Colombia in: The Economist, April 21, 2001, p. 5. F.Palacios, “Violencia, Derechos Humanos y Democracia en Colombia”, 2001/2002, p. 253, translated from Spanish. 23. - 12 -.

(25) CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY The National Front was an elite pact whose legacy led to the perpetuation of two constitutional pacts (pact of autonomy and the pact of impunity for the Public Forces24). Tuft justifies what she calls the “Colombian paradox” by pointing her finger to these pacts which, in her view, are responsible for fostering the high levels of impunity and violence over the past fifteen years in Colombia25. Moreover Tuft argues that impunity has had severe repercussions on the consolidation of democratic governance for mainly two reasons. First of all, it allowed “former authoritarian actors to retain sufficient political autonomy to condition the actions of democratically elected civilian regimes”. Secondly, it placed “the institutions and individuals responsible for past human rights violations above the rule of law, in effect providing a guarantee against accountability”26. During their sixteen-year reign (consisting in seven administrations), the Liberal and Conservative parties regularly used State of emergency powers as their principal means of political repression27. In fact it is precisely this repression which fueled the emergence of guerrilla movements in the mid-1960s and the beginning of the armed conflict - still unresolved forty years later. Moreover, the National Front fostered the widespread practice of impunity which has, in turn, promoted administrative and judicial corruption and clientelism and has been one of the factors fueling terrorism (acts of violence committed by illicit drug cartels and armed groups) and disrespect for the rule of law.. (2) Political and Sociological Context in the 1990s Political and Institutional Development Democracy in Colombia was reinforced by the 1991 Constitution which sought to uphold a set of economic, social, cultural, environmental and human rights, accompanied by large-scale decentralization measures. The Colombian territory is divided into thirty-two departments. There are about sixty political parties with formal recognition but most do not have legislative representation. There are four main political parties: the Conservative Party, Liberal Party, Patriotic Union (formed by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC and Communist Party during the first peace process with the FARC) and Movement24. E. I. Tuft, Democracy and Violence: The Colombian Paradox, p. 5. The pact of autonomy granted the Public Forces (Armed Forces, National Police and intelligence agencies) “de facto freedom in establishing the ideological framework of policy related to public order and implementation of that policy. The primary formal mechanism for the pact is the extensive use of State of emergency powers to expand the authority and jurisdiction of the Public Forces”. According to the pact of impunity (under article 221 of the 1886 Constitution and article 226 and of the 1991 constitution), any crime or human rights violation “… committed by a member of the Public Forces is considered an 'act of service' and prosecuted under the military penal code. It is estimated that the military system has a conviction rate of between one and three percent in cases of alleged human rights violations, meaning that impunity is effectively absolute”. 25 E. I. Tuft, op. cit., p. 6. 26 E. I. Tuft, op. cit., p. 102. 27 J. B. Febres-Cordero, La Democracia en Colombia: Un Proyecto en Construcción, p. 9.. - 13 -.

(26) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA 19 (M-19, former guerrilla movement which gained political recognition with the 1991 constitution). More importantly, it should be noted that the Colombian population has traditionally been very active politically. Colombia’s form of government can formally be characterized as a democratic regime with the following characteristics: a tripartite separation of powers, a regular electoral process, the guarantee of personal liberties and of freedom of the press. Nevertheless, numerous political scientists, such as Febres-Cordero, have pointed out that there are many distortions and malfunctions in the Colombian regime, which could be qualified as paradoxes. Among the most salient ones, are the constant rise in the percentage of the population living below the poverty line, the levels of violence, and the growing gap between the rich and the poor28 (see Section 3 on the socio-economic indicators). In the words of Febres-Cordero, Colombian society suffers from a “social endemic disease” due to the growing breaches between social classes, particularly in terms of access to housing, health services, education and employment opportunities29. The election of a Constituents’ Assembly30 and the ensuing 1991 Constitution (adopted July 5, 1991), marked a turning point in Colombia’s process of democratization. Although it has improved the representation of interests as part of democratic governance –mainly by promoting large-scale decentralization and enhancing the participation of citizens, much remains to be done to strengthen governance in general and with regards to the management of specific public sectors at national, regional and municipal levels31. Nonetheless analysts of democracy in Colombia typically refer to the political system as being a “restrictive” or “excluding” democracy. Tuft talks of the “Colombian paradox” because democracy is accompanied by high levels of violence and human rights violations32. More generally, a “restrictive” democratic State may be defined as a representative democracy combined with “authoritarian repressive” measures33. Colombia's sometimes difficult transition to democracy and long-term problems in governance have been reflected by periods of widespread violence, particularly since the period of civil strife, La Violencia.. 28. J. B. Febres-Cordero, op. cit., p. xix. J.. B. Febres-Cordero, op. cit, p. xx. 30 “Asamblea constituyente”: representatives were elected for the first time in order to revise fundamental norms in view of drafting the 1991 Constitution. 31 J. B. Febres-Cordero, op. cit., p. 427. 32 E. I. Tuft, Democracy and Violence : The Colombian Paradox, p. 2. 33 G. Palacio, Globalizaciones, Estado y Narcotráfico, p. 161. 29. - 14 -.

(27) CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY Moreover, considering the following definition, it can be argued that Colombia is far from having consolidated its process of democratization. “ ‘Democratization’ is the process whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other non-democratic principles, or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations, or extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subjected to citizen participation”34.. At the dawn of the 21st Century, the political regime in place continues to be profoundly affected by the National Front whose legacy of violence and repression persists in influencing democratic governance in Colombia.. High Levels of Violence and Human Rights' Abuses Colombia is one the most violent countries in the world, averaging 30,000 homicides a year of which some ten percent stem directly from the armed conflict. According to the U.S. State Department, Colombia’s per capita murder rate is 77.5 murders per 100,000 habitants, which is eight times that of the United States35. As discussed earlier, Colombia has known a series of waves of violence throughout the 20th Century, the most important one being the period of civil strife known as La Violencia. Such violence results from a combination of factors, namely drug trafficking, corruption, widespread delinquency (especially in the four largest cities: Santafé de Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla) and the armed conflict. In December 2000, the Colombian Ministry of National Defense reported that, since 1996, the paramilitaries may increasingly be held accountable for the massacres committed (in which at least three people are killed, at the same time and place), whereas the guerrilla groups’ share of responsibility for civilian massacres has been progressively decreasing. For instance, in 1995 and 1996, the guerrilla groups were responsible for 100 percent of the massacres whereas in the year 2000, 78 percent of massacres were perpetuated by the paramilitaries and 22 percent, by the insurgencies36. In its 2003 World Report37, Human Rights Watch (an international human rights nongovernmental organization) indicates that civilian casualties have risen dramatically in 2002, particularly since the end of formal negotiations between the government and the FARC in February. Civilians in rural areas have increasingly been caught in the crossfire between 34. O’Donnell and Schmitter, cited by Tuft, op. cit., p. 9. U.S. State Department, “Colombia- Information Sheet”, February 29, 2000. 36 Ministry of National Defense, Los Grupos Ilegales de Autodefensa en Colombia, December 2000, p. 20. 37 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003, Chapter on Colombia, 2003. 35. - 15 -.

(28) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA paramilitaries38 and insurgencies (see Section C). Human Rights Watch also documents the sharp rise in civilian casualties as well as cases of complicity between the Security Forces and paramilitaries, with regards to massacres of civilians and the impunity of officers, belonging to the Colombian military, by referring to the following incident. In April 2002, large groups of paramilitaries allegedly moved into the department of Chocó, in Boyajá, passing by military bases (17th Brigade of the Armed Forces and the Navy's River Battalion no. 50). However, these bases did not alert their superiors of the paramilitary's growing presence which would have permitted them to detain them39. Members of the Catholic Church, however, warned the military and national police of the imminent danger. This incident led to the death of 119 civilians, during confrontations between the paramilitaries and FARC (also present in the area of Boyajá), when the FARC threw a gas cylinder bomb which hit a church where numerous displaced persons had taken refuge (it remains to be seen whether or not the church was hit accidentally). This incident is a clear example of the growing number of civilian casualties as well as the complicity between the paramilitaries and certain sectors of the Security Forces. Moreover, the number of arbitrary executions and forced displacement, committed by the FARC and paramilitaries, has risen considerably during the year 2002. Both of these illegal armed groups have increasingly committed extrajudicial executions of individuals, suspected of being sympathizers of the opposite camp, or of having breached their respective behavior codes. Both groups have imposed a code with strict laws, with regards to the tolerated hair length, clothing and travel indications. Finally, local representatives, especially mayors, have increasingly been the target of guerrilla groups, particularly in times of municipal and regional elections. Furthermore, these high levels of violence are rooted in a deeply imbedded culture of violence (as opposed to a culture of civility or modus vivendi) whereby civilians resort to illegal and/or violent means to resolve problems and differences at all levels of society. According to Rafael Pardo, during the last twenty years, “200 bombs exploded in Colombian cities,…, 4 Presidential candidates, 200 judges and researchers, 1,200 police officials, 151 journalists, and over 300,000 ordinary citizens have been assassinated”40. These numbers clearly demonstrate that violence has played an important role in diminishing the State's. 38. The paramilitary movements regroups self-defense units in Colombia, which originated as decentralized, private armed groups, in the early 1980s. The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) is the largest, paramilitary umbrella organization, founded in 1997 by Carlos Castaño, when he regrouped his own organization (Autodefensa Campesinas de Córdoba and Urába, with other regional, paramilitary groups. 39 Only July 9, 2002, the Inspector General's Office (Procuradaría) began an investigation against the commanders of the Security Forces in that area. 40 R. Pardo, “Colombia’s Two-Front War”.. - 16 -.

(29) CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY legitimacy and the credibility of its institutions which has undoubtedly affected democratic governance.. (3) Broad Social and Economic Trends 41 Colombia has a population of approximately 42 million, with a labor force of over 18.3 million (in 1999). Colombian society is characterized by sharp disparities between the upper and lower classes, with regards to the distribution of wealth, access to basic services, education and healthcare. According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), from 1987 to 1998, the top 20 percent (of population in terms of wealth) controlled 60 percent of national income or consumption42 (refer to Appendix 5, on the Main Social and Human Development Indicators for Colombia). In the year 2000, 62 percent of the population in Colombia (of which 85 percent in rural areas, according to the poverty indicator measuring access to public services, primary schooling, economic dependence, housing and overcrowding) belonged to the lower classes whereas 5 percent controlled the country's wealth and political power43. In the 2002 Human Development Report44, the UNDP affirms that 36 percent of the Colombian population lives with $2 or less per day whereas 19.7 percent lives below the poverty line of $1 per day. The neoliberal policies, adopted in the early 1990s under the Gaviria administration, combined with the recession, have contributed to disintegrating the social fabric and to drastically raising the rates of poverty and unemployment in Colombia. Neoliberal policies such as those imposed by the IMF have been carried out to the detriment of guaranteeing the set of collective social, economic and cultural rights set forth in the 1991 Constitution45. It is important to mention that the armed conflict has further aggravated the highly concentrated land tenure in Colombia and served as an additional obstacle to rural development. During the past fifteen years, the lack of land redistribution has been aggravated by the armed conflict. The increased, illegitimate concentration of land (in the hands of the illegal armed groups) has contributed to large-scale movements of rural exodus towards coca-growing areas in peripheral regions, and to fueling the problem of internal displacement. Moreover, the high degree of land concentration can be directly linked to the. 41. The data in this section is drawn from four sources: The Economist's EIU Country Commerce, “Colombia, Update”, January 2002, The Economist's EIU Colombia Country Report, January 2001; UNDP's Human Development Report 2002, 2002; and CIA's World Factbook 2002, Section on Colombia, 2002. 42 UNDP, World Report on Human Development 2000, p. 179. 43 L. Sarmiento Anzola, “Conflict, Intervención y Economía Política de Guerra”, in Plan Colombia, Ensayos Críticos, p. 66-7. 44 UNDP, Human Development Report 2002, 2002, Section on Human Development Indicators, “Colombia”. 45 F. Palacios, op. cit., p. 271-273.. - 17 -.

(30) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA widening income disparities between the wealthiest and poorest populations and to socioeconomic inequities and poverty in general. Since the mid-1990s, Colombia has been undergoing the worst economic recession since the beginning of the Cold War. In 1999, the unemployment rate reached 20 percent, up from 8 percent in the early 1990s. Economic growth has been progressively declining over the 1990s, economists estimate that GDP has been shrinking between 3 to 5 percent annually. The economic crisis has also been characterized by a decrease in domestic and foreign investment, and by the “brain drain” or emigration of professionals, primarily to the United States. Although Colombia's food industry has traditionally been highly competitive, it has experienced a shift from exporting to importing six million tons of food products46 due to a large-scale rural exodus. The most important exports are oil, coal, coffee and ferro-nickel. Both oil and coffee exports declined sharply in 2001 (the former by 29.13 percent, and the latter, by 31.24 percent), whereas coal exports increased by 58 percent and ferro-nickel exports rose slightly, by 7.69 percent47. It is estimated that during the next five years, Colombia will gradually stop exporting hydrocarbons (500,000 barrels a day) entirely and will be forced to begin importing (see Appendix 4, Profile on the Main Structural and Eonomic indicators for Colombia). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Colombia rose steadily from 1991 to 1994, reaching nearly 12 percent of GDP. From 1994 until 1999, FDI dropped drastically, reaching 4 percent of GDP in 1999. Such a drop in foreign investment can largely be explained by the intensification of the armed conflict in Colombia, dissuading investors. Nevertheless, FDI has been increasing since the year 2000, representing approximately 5 to 6 percent of GDP48. In sum, the economic perspectives are mitigated49. Colombia’s economic health will depend on how long the armed conflict will last (on increases in military spending which averages 2.5 percent to 3 percent of GDP, with a share of 2.3 percent of GDP in 2000) and on the repercussions it will have on, for instance, GDP and exports (export revenues rose in 2000 due to high oil prices but are expected to drop, according to the EIU). The Economist fears that the armed conflict and related decline in consumer confidence, high unemployment and decreasing oil prices, are jeopardizing economic growth. In addition, the Colombian economy has been seriously affected by the world coffee crisis and falling coffee 46. Ibidem. EIU, Country Commerce Colombia, Update 2002, op. cit. 48 “Drugs, War and Democracy”, A Survey of Colombia in: The Economist, April 21, 2001, p. 15. 49 The EIU’s economic policy outlook (Colombia Country Report, p. 8) claims that the macro-economic priority is reducing the fiscal deficit whereas the fiscal policy should be focused on passing legislation on pensions and regional transfers. The EIU predicts that, in 2002, all export markets will grow more slowly and that GDP growth will depend on the recovery of domestic demand. 47. - 18 -.

(31) CHAPTER 1 COLOMBIA: DRUGS, VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRACY prices50. The degree to which Colombia will be able to meet favorable commercial conditions with the U.S. through the expansion of the Andean Preferential Trade Agreement will also have an impact.. B. Colombian Illicit Drug Industry (1) Evolution of Illicit Drug Trafficking in Colombia51 The Tradition of Coca Cultivation and Consumption, in Indigenous Communities, of the High Plains in Peru and Bolivia American Indians of the Andes have consumed and used coca leaves for over 4500 years for their medicinal, spiritual and symbolic qualities. Today, Indians living in the high plains of Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, such as the Aruacos, Aymara and Quechua, have been growing coca for thousands of years. The word “coca” comes from the aymara term, “kkoka “, which means a shrub. Coca is a very sturdy plant which can grow almost anywhere in tropical climates, up to 1800 meters. It calls for very little maintenance and can grow under very severe conditions. It has a lifespan of about twenty years and is harvested three to six times a year, depending on the variety and density of coca. There are over two hundred different varieties of coca which make up the Erythroxilacae family. Primarily three types of coca are cultivated for exporting purposes: in Colombia (mainly the “Caucana”), in Peru (“Tingo Maria”) and Bolivia, (“La Dulce”). The principal Colombian variety is known to yield three harvests annually whereas the predominant coca plants in the latter two Andean countries may be harvested six times a year52. However, only three kinds of coca shrubs have leaves which contain the cocaine alkaloid. It should be noted that the alkaloid was isolated and purified, in Western countries, during the mid-1800s and became a commonly used remedy in the late 1800s53 (as a stimulant and anesthetic), until it was prohibited in the early 1900s. The consumption and symbolic use of coca is inherent to everyday life in Indian communities. Farmers, coal and mineral miners are those who, on a daily basis, chew coca leaves the most, up to six times a day. It helps them fight against the cold, hunger, fatigue and high altitude. Offering coca leaves and sharing them with a group of people is the cohesive element of social relations, as can be alcohol in Western societies. According to a 50. EIU, Country Commerce, Colombia Update 2002, January 2002. This section is largely drawn from V. Peat's, The Andean Cocaine Industry, A Maze With No Way Out?, March 1998. 52 UNDCP, Annual Coca Cultivation Survey 2001, Colombia, March 2002, p. 1. 53 CIA, Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC), Latin American Narcotics Cultivation and Production, Estimates 2001, 2002. 51. - 19 -.

(32) THE (IN)COHERENCE OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN COLOMBIA “DISENTANGLING THE MAZE OF DRUG CONTROL: IS PLAN COLOMBIA THE PANACEA survey carried out in the high plains in Bolivia, 92 percent of men and 89 percent of women made use of coca; on this basis, it can be assumed that there are three to five million people who consume coca in Peru and Bolivia54. Coca is at the center of every spiritual and religious ceremony: coca leaves may be offered as a gift or consumed symbolically, as is the case during all of the important events of one’s life, such as the birth of a child, a wedding or funeral. In sum, offering and chewing coca leaves is the essence of the Amerindian identity which serves as a unifying element, bringing people together and maintaining the cohesion of Indian communities. The cultivation of coca is therefore part of the Andean tradition which they defend as their fundamental right. In Peru and Bolivia, coca cultivation, that which is intended solely for local (Indian) consumption, is legal and institutionalized. However, in Colombia, coca consumption has always been illegal. Coca farmers, especially in Peru (the world’s largest producer of coca up until 1996), formed national unions to commercialize products (legal), made out of coca leaves, such as tea, toothpaste, and so on. It is important to be aware of the tradition of coca cultivation and consumption in order to understand what is at stake for these Indians when international efforts (funded mainly the U.S. government) are carried out to eradicate coca. Coca cultivation for local, traditional purposes, must be differentiated from that which is solely intended for exporting cocaine production and trafficking.. Evolution of Andean Illicit Drug Trafficking The illicit drug industry began in Colombia in the mid-1970's with the cultivation of marijuana (or cannabis). Coca leaves were grown in Peru and Bolivia, but at this stage, they were primarily used for local consumption. Unlike coca leaves, which have been grown by Amerindians for over 4000 years, cannabis was introduced by the Spanish colonizers; up until the 1960's, only small amounts of cannabis were grown in Colombia. During this period, Mexico was the greatest grower of cannabis most of which was exported to the United States. U.S. repression of drug cultivation began at this time: the U.S. sent airplanes, loaded with insecticides, to eradicate all of the cannabis crops in Mexico. The operation was indeed successful; however, the U.S. did not focus on long-term eradication. A decade or so later, cannabis cultivation in Mexico gained renewed momentum. Nonetheless, during the 1970's when Mexico was temporarily out of the cannabis “business”, Colombian traffickers took advantage of this opportunity to increase Colombia’s own cannabis production. Needless to say, cannabis production is far less profitable than that of “hard drugs”, namely cocaine and heroin.. 54. Cited by A. Delpirou and A. Labrousse in Coca Coke, p. 92.. - 20 -.