Adverse selection and moral hazard in health insurance

We begin by summarising the general properties of the Rosenzweig-MacArthur [1963] and Hastings-Powell [1991] models, including the stability of fixed points, the value of the Hopf

Si les bons élèves se montrent capables de bénéficier des deux approches, de les utiliser activement pour créer des liens et développer des stratégies pour structurer

We show that the determinants of the demand for health insurance are not only the correlation between the health and uninsurable risks as shown by Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a)

On one hand, for a given pattern of health care expenses, a larger coinsurance rate o¤ers a better risk protection to risk averse individuals: thus, the larger the degree of

The previous sections have shown how optimal insurance under ex post moral hazard involves partial coverage at the margin, no deductible and, possibly, an upper limit on medical

On one hand, for a given pattern of health care expenses, a larger coinsurance rate o¤ers a better risk protection to risk averse individu- als: thus, the larger the degree of

(Non-decomposition result when ex post moral hazard is the only problem.) When the only constraints are RC, and ICX i , i = 1; 2, then, in the standard utilitarian case, the

An increase in the difference between prudence and twice risk aversion (that we define as the degree of foresight) moreover makes dynamic insurance contracts more stable (when