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Imperfect Social Learning on Matching Markets Implications for Stability

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Academic year: 2021

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Figure

Figure 1: α 1 = 1, α 2 , β 1 , β 2 ∈ [0, 3] 3 - Colored dots for (1) - The red square labels the origin I recognise none standard solid
Figure 2: α 1 = 1, α 2 , β 1 , β 2 ∈ [0, 3] 3 - Colored dots for (1 ? ) - The red square labels the origin Unsurprisingly, one observes two triangular prisms

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