Control and Voting Power in Shareholding Networks

Characterization results are provided for each of the two prominent additive rules: Evaluative Voting when the evaluation set is finite and Range Voting when the evaluation set is

Abstract—In the context of mobile clustered ad hoc networks, this paper proposes and studies a self-configuring algorithm which is able to jointly set the channel frequency and

Moreover, it allows one to model the arbitrary and unexpected connections and disconnec- tions of nodes in a network as well as the possibility for a node to administrate power

While in the protocol DSR with PAA, the mobility of mobile host was under the control of PAA, and further more with the appropriate setting of the length of restarted period, the

Expected sum-utility against the proportion of ad- vanced nodes for an ad hoc network of 50 nodes with 4 − node interactions; by ”advanced” it is meant that the nodes imple- ment

This work focuses on multi-type games in which there are a number of non- ordered types in the input, while the output consists of a single real value.. When considering the

Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players

As we have seen, there is no democratic case for compulsory voting on the grounds that it is in people’s interests to vote (even if it is), as this argument only