Environmental Risks and Bank Liability

In this paper we construct a theoretical model of spatial banking competition that considers the differential information among banks and potential borrowers in order

Our main results support the conjecture that the ultimate controlling shareholders with excess control rights avoid issuing equity and instead draw on earnings

Variable definitions: N_FIRMS = number of industrial firms in which bank holds equity investments over the period 2004-2008; FIRM_EQ = mean of bank equity investments as percentage

The first column illustrates the estimation of Credit Risk model where we regress the Non-performing Loans on Fiduciary, Life Insurance, Other Insurance Services, Loan Servicing,

= growth of bank loan for working capital in period t (from January to December); Investment = growth of bank loan for investment capital in period t (from January to December); MSME

Hence, by favoring informal lending in regions where In-group trust is high, bank lending is expected to develop at a lower rate as people will be less relying on banks

To ensure that the control group and the treated group are balanced, and that any changes in loans are not due to other factors (Abadie 2003), we add as control variables to

We find that banks adjust their liquidity ratios upward in response to negative shocks to their risk-weighted regulatory capital ratios, but we find no similar